From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Mon Sep 27 03:27:17 1993 Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 03:16:29 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (Dan Lusthaus) Subject: Re: what's wrong with tao? >(any way i'm sure Da >will disagree) even i disagree; >Yes, the taoists, esp. the early one's have a thing about (against) knowledge >BUT not all knowledge, not in all contexts. How do I get dragged into these things? The assertion that Lao Tzu (let's forget the rest for now) is "against" knowledge is absurd and utterly ignores the text - not just a few chapters. Ttc uses two distinct characters, both of which get translated indiscriminately as "knowledge" (or cognates). In some later Chinese texts they are used more or less synonymously, but ttc apparently distinguishes clearly between them (the only exception is ch. 3). One character, chih (or zhi), is written with an arrow on the left and a mouth on the right. It means 'knowing', being aware of, etc. and is invariably used in a positive sense ("know when to stop", "know the constant", "know the yang" etc. etc.); the other character, also pronounced chih, is written the same except under the arrow and mouth is a sun, and this is the one that is treated negatively. Playing with the 'visual etymology', one can deduce that the first implies knowledge when what comes from your mouth (i.e., what you know, language; the "mouth" is a special organ in Chinese thought, connected to language, self [one of the words for "I" in Chinese is written with "five" over "mouth", i.e., eyes, nose, ears + mouth], taste; the only unitary sense-organ 'opening' - contra 2 eyes, 2 ears, 2 nostrils, 2 lower orfices - and the only sense organ where what goes out is as important as, yet totally different from what goes in, etc.) is direct, immediate. The other is when what comes out of your mouth is done in the full light of day, for edification, to display erudition, to make a show of oneself (something ttc frowns on). Thus it might best be translated in ttc as "erudition." Now one or the other (or both) of these characters occur in over half of the Chapters of ttc, with the first one always playing a positive role. Conclusion: Ttc is not anti-knowledge (though a lot of the people who write about taoism seem to wish it was!). It is against presumptuous "knowledge" and the sort advocated by Confucians, etc. (the second chih is one of the five Confucian constants discussed in an earlier posting - that's the one in ch. 20 ttc says to abandon). Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Tue Sep 28 00:03:05 1993 To: taoism-l@coombs.anu.edu.au From: jdsellmann@uog.pacific.edu Subject: what's wrong with taoism? Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 20:50:01 PDT Dan thanks for clarifying the point that at least the Lao tzu is not totally anti-knowledge, that it is anti-cleverness or anti conventional knowledge. i agree with your interpretation of the the characters, the two forms of chih (zhi), but the problem is that occasionally the 'sun radical' is left off and then the character which usually means the "proper kind of knowing" means the (confucian moral) clevverness. how about ch. 10 5.10.3 "... Are you able to dispense with cleverness?" if the text is to be treated as consistent (which maybe it aint) that chih (without the sun radica ) ought to mean cleverness and not knowledge??? or what about ch. 3 (2.3.4) "always make the masses be without knowledge or cleverness" i guess we could consistently interpret this chih as knowledge and argue that the masses shouldn't have the sage knowledge? but it might be the easy way to make this chih the other chih (ie knowing to clever). interlude: Dan no one is draging you in, it seems you are one of the few who will like the tao ALWAYS RESPOND. James, you indirectly raise an interesting question: who is THE authority on any tradition, espeically Taoism or Buddhism. if some one is unschooled in Taoism or Buddhism but takes on one (or both) labels and expresses her/ his understanding or form of practice, is that person necessarily wrong, vs. some one who is schooled in say philosophy and textual studies but does not take on the label, is that person necessarily correct????? back on track: the issue is what is wrong with Taoism? on the knowledge issue a big part of the problem is what is that positive form of knowledge; how does one get it; can one person give/transmit it to another; does one get it from natu nature; does it come in ordinary consciousness or in an altered consciousness is it something that only a sage or king can have or can the common folk get it too??? what's wrong with taoist knowledge is that it is vague and ambigious. one can almost make anything out of it as the chinese traditions did. jim From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Tue Sep 28 12:56:36 1993 Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 12:39:00 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (DanLusthaus) Subject: Re: what's wrong with taoism? > how about ch. 10 5.10.3 >"... Are you able to dispense with cleverness?" if the text is to be >treated as consistent (which maybe it aint) that chih (without the sun radica >) ought to mean cleverness and not knowledge??? >or what about ch. 3 (2.3.4) "always make the masses be without knowledge or >cleverness" I noted in the original message that ch. 3 was an exception. That's the only instance of chih/knowing used in a negative sense. Ch. 10 is a different sort of problem, since its rhetorical mode is not as clear as one would like. Is it advising against things, asking if such things are possible, or teasing the readers by asking whether the are capable of doing certain things. Once you settle which tone you're reading the chapter with, then you can decide which chih may have been intended. Incidentally, the mawangdui mss. are not helpful in sorting the problem out, suggesting either those mss. have deviant orthography (as the reversed Te/Tao chapter order and the discrepancies between mss. A & B reinforce) or that the encoding of semantic difference between chih/knowledge and chih/erudition was redacted later. Or some combination. Dan Lusthaus Bates College dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Sep 30 01:48:42 1993 To: Jim Peavler 266-0958 Cc: taoism-l Subject: Re: Knowledge <9309271607.AA02233@mustang.plk.af.mil> Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 01:23:49 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU >I agree that it must be a fine thing to "react" to the ttc, to >respond "spiritually" or emotionally or whatever. Uh-huh. You damn this sort of thing -- uh, "whatever" it is -- with faint praise! >But, in my humble opinion, it is only good to do so after a good, >hard look at the text. In my opinion, it is only good to do so after a good, hard look at one's spiritual life. An enlightened person will immediately recognize signs of enlightenment in any text written by any enlightened person no matter what their tradition. (This statement of course assumes that there is but one enlightenment.) A totally bedarkened person will get nothing out of any such text no matter how much eyestrain they get. Put aphoristically: A farmer will get more out of a crummy translation of Cato's _de Rustica_ than will an insurance salesman who reads Latin perfectly. One has to have some small sort of a clue to build on, and I'll go out on a limb and say that the first step to enlightenment can be found everywhere, from Castaneda's _Journey to Ixtlan_ to Thoreau's _Walden_: the student must be disciplined and come to self-knowledge. The student must maintain no illusions about himself and must understand clearly his motivations for action; he must call everything into question. Once the student has done this, the great texts of world history are no longer historical curiosities but books of practical knowledge with practical application. If I read the Tao Te Ching because it's famous, I will get but little out of it. If I read the Tao Te Ching because I want answers, I'll get a lot out of it, especially if I know what to do with any answers I get. (If I don't know what to do with them; i.e., if I don't have enough control over my life (my emotions, my schedule, etc.) to put them into practise, then I've got to go back to the self-knowledge and discipline phase. The same goes if I end up projecting my wants and needs into the text: I didn't start with a sufficiently honest grasp of my motivations.) Tom Price | heaven and earth regard the 10,000 | tp0x@cs.cmu.edu ****************** | things as straw dogs, baby -- TTC | ****************** From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Sep 30 11:53:49 1993 Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 11:08:57 -0400 (EDT) From: Stephen_Y._Chan@transarc.com To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au Subject: Re: What's wrong with Taoism? Excerpts from personal.tao: 30-Sep-93 Re: What's wrong with Taoism? Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.C (2625) > Once could pejoratively call taoism quietistic, anarchistic. Once could > also praise it in these terms, depending on one's tastes. I forget the Is that Taoism's real nature, or is it the stereotype of the humble mountain sage which we're idealizing? I heard a story about Yang Lujan (sp?) the other day. He was leaving Chen village after learning what he could of the Chen family Taijiquan. He came to a stream, which had only a single log as the crossing. He starts, after he gets on the log, some dinky little Taoist comes and gets on the log from the other side. Now the log is too narrow for more than one person to get across, they meet somewhere between the end of the log and Yang Lujan says "I got on this log first, you'd best go back." The little Taoist says something along the lines of "I don't have time to argue with you, go back or I'll push you off." Yang Lujan, having bested many of the folks in Chen village, warns the little guy about how good his wushu is, blah, blah, blah The little guy knocks Yang off the log and into the stream, gives some remark about his wushu not being very good. And continues on his way. Not exactly quietist, eh? From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Sep 30 14:45:46 1993 Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 13:04:45 -0500 (GMT-0500) From: "George C. Hatch" Subject: Knowledge in Lao-tzu To: Taoism-L@coombs.anu.edu.au Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII I am prompted by Dan's notes of the 27th and 28th to observe that "knowing" (chih) is not the only way of approaching the tao in the Ttc, and perhaps not even the primary way. Dan distinguishes properly between the graphs chih (knowing) and chih (wisdom, cleverness), pronouncing the first positive and the second negative in implication. I find chih (knowing) a simple, functional word for knowing, without moral valence at all in its verb usages. That is most all of the text. In two instances (3,10) its use as a noun (wu-chih: having no knowledge) requires a pejorative sense which cannot be got around. Better to acknowledge that chih (knowing) is a neutral term which takes its meaning according to the context. The term chih (wisdom) was first an alternative way of writing chih (knowing); we check Morohashi's encyclopedia (Daikanwa jiten) to learn that the first meaning was to know, the second wisdom (Mencius: a mind of right and wrong), and the third cleverness, as in military strategy. Dan's "visual etymology" is simply fanciful. That is not how the Chinese language developed, and it is fruitless to approach Chinese characters that way. This chih is anyway the pejorative sense of knowledge we search for. D.C. Lau translates "cleverness" (33,65), and "the wise" (19); I think the reference is more specifically to knowledge as moral discrimination, as defined by Mencius. The two noun uses of chih (knowing) should probably be read as the interchangeable character chih (wisdom), leaving aside the question of moral valence on the term. As the tao that can be named is not the real tao, so are the ideas in the Ttc much bigger than the limited words which carry them. What the Ttc really wants to "know" is the void; since that is indeterminate, indiscriminate, empty and without form, "knowing" is impossible. What is peculiar about the Ttc, in comparison to Ch'an, for example, is that it develops no vocabulary to describe mystic intuition. The Ch'an people use the term wu (satori) which came to define their enterprise. The Ttc, perhaps eschewing conceptualization, overworks a mundane word without any real implications at all. So we ought to explore other ways of knowing the tao apart from "knowing." I find a few meaningful phrases in the text. There is "practicing" the tao (hsing, 2), more effective than "knowing"; "holding fast to the void" (shou-chung, 5); "having the experience of" (shih, 15); "embracing the one" (pao-yi, 22); "modeling on" (fa, 25); "submitting" to the tao (tzu-chun, 32); to "become dependent" upon the tao (shih-chih, 34), etc. All are postures of knowing which reveal more about our relation to the tao than "knowing" can show. The tao reveals itself not to the intellect but to the aesthetic sense. Thus we know the tao primarily through the central images of the book--water, ravine, woman,babe--metaphors which tell us what the tao is like, if not what the tao is. George Hatch Washington University From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Sep 30 14:51:07 1993 To: Stephen_Y._Chan@transarc.com Cc: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au, Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Re: What's wrong with Taoism? Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:20:59 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU >> Once could pejoratively call taoism quietistic, anarchistic. Once could >> also praise it in these terms, depending on one's tastes. I forget the > Maybe this is just the sagely stereotype ... > I heard a story about Yang Lujan (sp?) the other day. He was leaving > Yang Lujan, having bested many of the folks in Chen village, warns the >little guy about how good his wushu is, blah, blah, blah > The little guy knocks Yang off the log and into the stream, gives some > Not exactly quietist, eh? Sure it is. One could live with only one cloak, eat unpolished rice, have nothing to do with the government, believe that actions speak louder than words, cultivate sageliness and live it rather than pandering it to high society ... and still be an asshole. Or, perhaps the guy was teaching Yang a lesson in humility. This would be a very stereotypically sagely thing to do: the quiet nobody appears out of nowhere and performs the impossible feat, to the spiritual benefit of the narrator. Tom Price -- Internet: tp0x@cs.cmu.edu | Accept Nothing. | ... DOGZ! ... | Reject Everything. | From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Sep 30 19:00:43 1993 To: Peter Alexander Merel Cc: "TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au" , Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Re: Knowledge again <199309302156.AA11837@extra.ucc.su.OZ.AU> Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:23:18 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Pete: >it seems impossible to demonstrate >that anyone's zen is the same as anyone else's. Even with colours >we can't say that your 'red' is my 'red' - we can observe correspondances >and distinctions by comparing contexts, but if zen is ineffable then we >are unable to do even that. Quite the opposite is true. William Turnbow Stace, in _Philosophy and Mysticism_, put forth the following serious argument: Things are only different if we can say what is different about them. If we can't say what is different about one thing from another, we say that they are the same. Nothing can be said about ineffable experience. Therefore, all ineffable experience is identical. In fact, he goes further; not only does he say that there is one enlightenment, he relates his conclusion to the mystical doctrine that time is an illusion and we really live in an eternal present. That is, there isn't just one kind of mystical experience; there is *only* *one* mystical experience! I submit that the argument, far from being a trivial word-game, is compelling, and if it is to be assaulted one must claim that no experience is absolutely ineffable. Against this assault one will find ranged the universal claims of mystics that during their experience, their "mind" and "self" vanish -- so who's to say? :-) Tom Price -- Internet: tp0x@cs.cmu.edu | Accept Nothing. | ... DOGZ! ... | Reject Everything. | From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Tue Oct 5 20:22:01 1993 Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 09:41:37 +1000 To: taoism-l@coombs.anu.edu.au From: tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Subject: Re: Knowledge in Lao-tzu Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 10:51:50 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (DanLusthaus) Subject: Re: Knowledge in Lao-tzu (I posted this last week, but it never came back via the list. If this was already sent out - and I was the only exclusion - please excuse the additional intrusion. DL) George Hatch responds to my posting about the two chihs with a mixture of good sense and some more questionable observations. >Dan distinguishes properly between the graphs chih (knowing) and chih >(wisdom, cleverness), pronouncing the first positive and the second >negative in implication. > I find chih (knowing) a simple, functional word >for knowing, without moral valence at all in its verb usages. That is most >all of the text. The word "knowing" in most languages does not carry any moral implications, unless the "object" of knowledge is specifically regarded as something "moral". So this should be a rather obvious conclusion, except, George will show, it is the basis of his reading. > In two instances (3,10) its use as a noun (wu-chih: having >no knowledge) requires a pejorative sense which cannot be got around. Assuming that 10 cannot be got around (I said from the first that 3 is an exception) - and I would still suggest that the tone of ch. 10, which is clearly framed as rhetorical questions; but of what sort? Implying negative or positive responses? A challenge, i.e., "can you do X"? such that X is something you _should_ do (which *would* imply an ethical dimension; one _should_ [=ought to] do X)? Or a mockery of certain "goals" that others pursue? Etc. - that still leaves roughly 40+ other chapters where the distinction between the two chihs holds firm and remains clear. Differentiating the uses of chih/knowing as noun and verb is intriguing, but as Jim wrote awhile back, the clear grammatical distinction between noun and verb had not yet been articulated in China (though I contended that, especially in ch. 1 of ttc, that distinction was indeed being exploited - more on this below). Anyway, in a chapter like 72 one can go crazy trying to decide which chih/knowing is a noun and which a verb (it can be read both ways, to proliferate possible plausible readings). So I'm not convinced that a noun/verb distinction - such that the noun = moral sense, which is negative, while the verb = (morally) neutral sense - fully explains what is happening. Ch. 16, knowing the constant is enlightenment (ming), not knowing the constant leads to disaster. You can (but don't have to, exclusively) take that chih/knowing in a moral sense. Such examples could be greatly multiplied. > The term chih (wisdom) was first an >alternative way of writing chih (knowing); we check Morohashi's >encyclopedia (Daikanwa jiten) to learn that the first meaning was to know, >the second wisdom (Mencius: a mind of right and wrong), and the third >cleverness, as in military strategy. Dan's "visual etymology" is simply >fanciful. Yes, it's fanciful, that's why it was in scare quotes. Morohashi's dictionary is not the final authority on such things (though a handy *first* place to look). And the Mencian sense is (I would argue, against some of my colleagues) something that arises *after* ttc, since ttc preceded Mencius by a century or more. The precise details on the orthography of every Chinese character prior to the standardization of characters qua seal script - which occurs after both Lao Tzu and Mencius - remains unclear to us, and much is simply speculation. The distinction between 2 chihs may have been very early, and implied by the original author (dare I name him "Lao Tzu"). But I also implied that the differentiation between the two chihs may have been redacted rather late; but even if that's the case, since it is not a standard differentiation, but one that seems, if not exclusive to ttc then at least most pronounced in the ttc, the editor/redactor had a deliberate game plan in mind, thus making it part of "our" received text. Whoever introduced the distinction, and in whatever manner, the distinction is "now" fully integrated into the text and operative there, though frequently overlooked even by Chinese readers since the chih/chih distinction is rather hazy throughout most Chinese literature, leaving readers nonsensitive to the distinction in ttc. The mawangdui mss. are not definitive sources for settling variant orthographs, since they vary between themselves, indicating that by the time the two Lao Tzu texts were buried in the ground, there were at least two main variant texts circulating amongst those who considered the Te ching to come before the Tao ching. MWT can settle other matters (e.g., punctuations), but finding an Ur-character is not one MWT's potentials. > I think the reference [in chs. 3,10] is more >specifically to knowledge as moral discrimination, as defined by Mencius. >The two noun uses of chih (knowing) should probably be read as the >interchangeable character chih (wisdom), leaving aside the question of >moral valence on the term. Your entitled to your opinion. I think ttc had larger fish to fry than Mencius. > >As the tao that can be named is not the real tao, Yikes! How many times will I have to repost my earlier comments on this line? After George tries to chastise me for fanciful manipulations of ancient Chinese usage, he gives the thoroughly ungrammatical "interpretation" of ttc line one, that I've written here and elsewhere about. Peter Boodeberg has also written on the impossibility of reading the first line that way. George, cite one other passage ANYWHERE in ancient CHinese literature where you would read the phrase "X k'e Y" (or X k'e X") as "the X which can be Y-ed". If you saw any other example of the the structure: X k'e Y, fei ch'ang Y wouldn't you read it something like: "if X can be Y-ed, then it's not always Y."? Since the structure of the first two lines of ttc is not "X k'e Y..." but "X k'e X fei ch'ang X" it initially looked a bit jarring and strange to its readers. ("if tao can tao, then it's not always tao" - looks strange [the k'e usually but not always treats the character after it as a passive verb [able-to-be X-ed]; sometimes the succeding verb is active though (able-to X)]). So when Hanfei tzu argued that the second tao in the sentence should be understood as "speak", everyone thought he was so clever they've been following him ever since. If only they knew how to treat verbs as verbs rather than semantically substitute a derivative verbal seme this might all have been avoided. Anyway, unless you are a mystical theologian that believes in the unnameable Divine Name, the second sentence makes no sense by the "standard" misreading. It does however make sense if one recognizes that ttc is pointing to the fact that the character tao in itself is neither decidably a noun or a verb until it is placed into phrases, into context. Then it can only be one OR the other, not both at the same time. This parting of the "potentially either" into two opposing incommensurates is a structure of language, naming, which is why the second line repeats the structure with "name," showing that the notion of name cannot be something both assignable and invariant, i.e., that the verb (process) and the noun (fixed thing) are forever inseparable yet mutually exclusive - not in reality, but conceptually, linguistically. Thus, "these pairs emerge together, yet differently named." Enough, I've already said enough on this list about the non-ineffability of Lao Tzu's tao. Except to note, the reason this misreading is possibly the most popular line is precisely because that's what most people would like ttc _to say_. It's attractive to the inarticulate or those who get conceptually tangled in their own thoughts; but it's not what ttc says. Lao Tzu was a master of language (maybe he was the first Chinese grammarian!?), and had nothing to fear from it. Language's limitations are not, in other words, that some realm "outside" language exists that can only be reached by discarding language. Rather, they consist in invisibly compelling us to draw choices, grasp at options (like choosing an ineffable tao over a sayable tao), and to take our exclusivistic choices seriously. The trap of language is thinking that you can "choose" nonlanguage in the first place, and the crime against Lao Tzu is misreading him such that he is no longer cautioning you about hastily making such "one-sided" choices but rather is made your co-conspirator and even your authority is your choice. > What the Ttc >really wants to "know" is the void; Nonsense. One "empties" one's thoughts in order to observe things as they are. Read ch. 16 very carefully. > since that is indeterminate, >indiscriminate, empty and without form, "knowing" is impossible. Nonsense. Read ch. 21 carefully. > What is >peculiar about the Ttc, in comparison to Ch'an, for example, is that it >develops no vocabulary to describe mystic intuition. The Ch'an people >use the term wu (satori) which came to define their enterprise. Wu-wei? Ming (enlightenment)? "Blunt the sharpness, untangle the knot, harmonize with the radiance, be together with the dust" (ch. 4 and elsewhere)? You don't see this as adequate ttc vocabulary? >The Ttc, >perhaps eschewing conceptualization, overworks a mundane word without any >real implications at all. Aha! Maybe ttc is not in pursuit of the same extra-linguistic lala land you want it to be your encouragement to seek. Your "mundane" IS Lao Tzu's Tao. >[...] All are postures of knowing which >reveal more about our relation to the tao than "knowing" can show. There are many ways of talking about tao and relations with it. Knowledge is not the only. But how many of the terms you mentioned occur in more than half the chapters? Quantity does speak for something. Cf. ch. 17, first line (The best, those below KNOW they have it...."), the numerous times Lao Tzu himself turns epistemological and asks rhetorically: "how do I know? By this." ETC. ETC. > The tao >reveals itself not to the intellect but to the aesthetic sense. Since when, especially in East Asian culture, are those considered oppositions? Boy, are you exclusivistic! Once you make a choice you don't let go, but take it all the way. > Thus we >know the tao primarily through the central images of the book--water, ravine, >woman,babe--metaphors which tell us what the tao is like, if not what the >tao is. Isn't it what it's like? * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * [The above contribution by dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (DanLusthaus) was initially bounced back by the majordomo@coombs.anu.edu.au as his message has slightly exceeded the system's 10,000 chars limit. However, after some programming intervention on my part, the original message reaches you intact - T.M. Ciolek , Taoism-L current listowner ] -================================================== Dr T. Matthew CIOLEK tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Coombs Computing Unit, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia =================================================== From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Tue Oct 5 22:14:28 1993 To: taoism-l@coombs.anu.edu.au, Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Re: Knowledge in Lao-tzu Date: Tue, 05 Oct 93 22:04:01 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU >>As the tao that can be named is not the real tao, > >Yikes! How many times will I have to repost my earlier comments on this >line? After George tries to chastise me for fanciful manipulations of >ancient Chinese usage, he gives the thoroughly ungrammatical >"interpretation" of ttc line one, that I've written here and elsewhere >about. Peter Boodeberg has also written on the impossibility of reading the >first line that way. George, cite one other passage ANYWHERE in ancient >CHinese literature where you would read the phrase "X k'e Y" (or X k'e X") >as "the X which can be Y-ed". If you saw any other example of the the >structure: X k'e Y, fei ch'ang Y wouldn't you read it something like: "if >X can be Y-ed, then it's not always Y."? >Since the structure of the first >two lines of ttc is not "X k'e Y..." but "X k'e X fei ch'ang X" it >initially looked a bit jarring and strange to its readers. ("if tao can >tao, then it's not always tao" - looks strange [the k'e usually but not >always treats the character after it as a passive verb [able-to-be X-ed]; >sometimes the succeding verb is active though (able-to X)]). I don't fully understand these comments -- one interpretation is impossibly ungrammatical, yet the acceptable one is jarring and strange? How can this be? Please elaborate! > Anyway, unless you are a mystical theologian that believes in the >unnameable Divine Name, the second sentence makes no sense by the >"standard" misreading. Considering that the ineffability of the ground of being is one of the sine qua nons of mysticism, that's quite an "unless" you've got there! It's almost as if you're saying, "unless you're like most people who have read broadly on subjects which are commonly considered to be related ..." Dan, how do you define mysticism? Is there "one enlightenment?" Is taoism mystical? Knowing what you think about these questions will make it easier to understand what you're driving at. >It does however make sense if one recognizes that >ttc is pointing to the fact that the character tao in itself is neither >decidably a noun or a verb until it is placed into phrases, into context. >Then it can only be one OR the other, not both at the same time. This >parting of the "potentially either" into two opposing incommensurates is a >structure of language, naming, which is why the second line repeats the >structure with "name," showing that the notion of name cannot be something >both assignable and invariant, i.e., that the verb (process) and the noun >(fixed thing) are forever inseparable yet mutually exclusive - not in >reality, but conceptually, linguistically. Thus, "these pairs emerge >together, yet differently named." I don't very well comprehend the significance of the observation you claim to TTC to be making. Many other passages of the CT and the TTC seem to me to be very consistent with the common reading of ineffability; CT's request for a man who has forgotten words; the chapters of the TTC on getting rid of piety and justice, etc. How am I to read these if the opening poem of the TTC is profoundly enjoining me to choose my grammatical structure carefully? Tom Price -- Internet: tp0x@cs.cmu.edu | Accept Nothing. | ... DOGZ! ... | Reject Everything. | From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Wed Oct 6 04:27:37 1993 Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 04:16:12 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (Dan Lusthaus) Subject: Re: Knowledge in Lao-tzu >I don't fully understand these comments -- one interpretation is impossibly >ungrammatical, yet the acceptable one is jarring and strange? How can this be? >Please elaborate! I earlier posted a simpler explanation of all this, and also mentioned my article, "Retracing the Human-Nature vs. World-Nature Dichotomy in Lao Tzu" (Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17, June 1990, 187-214), in which the first line of ttc is discussed at great length. I can't repeat the whole article here. The first two lines of ttc LITERALLY read: TAO K'E TAO FEI CH'ANG TAO [If] tao can[-be] tao[-ed] [then it's] not always tao. MING K'E MING FEI CH'ANG MING [If] name/naming can[-be] name[d]/naming, [then it's] not always name/naming. The square brackets grammatical fillers implicit in the Chinese that translators usually provide. The "If" could be replaced with "when." These two sentences, like many in Classical Chinese, use the extremely common form: If/when X then Y. The words "if/when" and "then" are implicit in the structure of the sentence, they are not marked in Chinese by explicit words. Translators unfailingly supply them for virtually every other such occurrence in Chinese literature (including elsewhere in ttc), but for some reason fail to do so for these lines. Sentence 1 has 3 occurrences of the word tao. The first is grammatically undecidable (could be read as a noun [=name of a thing] or as a verb [=process, activity, etc.]). The second, since it follows k'e ("can[-be]"), should be a verb. The third appears to be a nominal phrase, hence the third tao appears to be a noun. The second sentence repeats the identical structure as the first, with only one change: it substitutes the word "ming" (name, naming) for tao. So much for the grammar. As for the sense: If tao (status undecided) is a verb, a process, something ongoing, then it cannot be a fixed (=constant) thing. But "tao" can only remain "undecided" in status if it is not used in a sentence. Once placed into a linguistic context, it MUST be one or the other. The second and third tao-s are not undecided but determined by their context, by the syntax of the phrases in which they appear. Thus, the syntax/grammar forces a reader to choose one over the other. Because most readers come already prejudiced in favor of some notion of ineffability, they choose the third tao and reject the second. That's to completely miss ttc's point, which is not to encourage three over two, but to make us aware that "these two (i.e., tao #2 and tao #3) arise together (i.e, from tao #1) but are differently named." In other words, if tao is ongoing, dynamic, etc., it is by definition unfixed, inconstant, nonstatic. If tao is a "constant tao," i.e., fixed, invariant, unchangeable, etc., then it "can't tao" (or "be tao-ed"). The problem with language, then, is that language is forcing us to make a decision between two aspects, as it were, of the same tao; which involves failing to recognize the condition which separated them in the first place, viz. "naming." Hence the second sentence follows from the first, not arbitrarily, or merely polemically, but as an explanation of the "riddle" of the first. Not only is the problem one of naming, but language use, (name/naming), exhibits the same structural dilemma. If "name" can be named (i.e., it's read as a verb), then it's not a fixed name. In other words, if names can be assigned to things (X can be named), then the name of X is not an unalterable, invariant, unchanging name, since such a "name" could be reassigned, and X would have been "named" something else prior to receiving its name. Name (verb) and Name (noun) are not synonyms. The four letter word "name" could be either. Once it occurs in a sentence or phrase, the options are closed; it must be one or the other. ("That's a silly name") ("I'll name this dog later"). The first sentence looks strange in Chinese. The usual "translation" conceals that strangeness by hiding the fact that the verb is tao. One can't justify mistranslating something because the mistranslation is simpler or easier or less problematic. Angus Graham rightly leveled precisely this charge against Watson's translation of Chuang Tzu, namely Watson's version is a too readable simplification, that loses the complexity and richness of the original, and thereby distorts it. Now take a look at the whole of chapter one. Since Chinese prefers to establish meaning syntactically rather than grammatically, one of its most prominent devices is "parallel structure," meaning repeating the syntactic structure of one sentence in the following sentence(s). While some of the sentences by themselves might be ambiguous, one of the sentences will be clear enough to provide the clues for how to read the other parallel sentences. If we apply this basic principle to chapter one, the following results emerge: _______________A___________ | _____________B_______________ 1. can be taoed constant tao 2. can be named constant name 3. nameless (inception of having name (mother of heaven & earth) (10,000 things) 4. desireless (to see miao) having desire (to see chiao) these pairs emerge together, yet differently named. This "together" is called hsuan. Hsuan it, and again (it's) hsuan. Gateway to all miao. The ineffablists consider 1B and 2B the "good guys", and 1A and 1B the "bad guys." They then shift allegiance for 3 and 4, suddenly declaring the A-s the good guys and the B-s the baddies. That violates parallel structure. All the good should be either in A or in B, it shouldn't switch. The key term is miao. It means here a subtle, very fine, minute distinction, a mysterious distinction between A and B that does not separate them. Chiao means the separation between A and B. So the issue is what sort of line one draws between A and B. The infinite regress of hsuan (dark, profound, mysterious) - which is explicitly made synonymous with the linking of A and B, or rather tao #1 (indeterminate) and ming/name #1 - means that when you divide two things, and then look to what constitutes their separation (the line between A and B), it too can be subdivided, each new "dividing line" itself subject to further re-dividing. This infinite regress of hsuan is the gateway to all miaos, i.e, to being able to see A and B as inseparable instead of as an invitation to pick sides. Hence the Ho-shang-kung describes this chapter as a discussion of how tao reveals itself through its own self-concealment. I.e., the very way in which tao #1 subjects itself to the syntactic determinations of tao #2 and tao #3 "reveals" how language "conceals" tao. IN short, the point of chapter one is not to pick A or B (i.e., chiao - carving the world up according to how we want it to be), but to see oppositions as miao (subtle distinctions between oppositions such that they are inseparable). Now this doesn't exhaust what's going on in Chapter one (the progression from tao to language, to Heaven-and-earth and 10,000 things, to the different modes of kuan [observing] in terms of desire or nondesire, etc., require further explanation), but this should be adequate to indicate what is and what is not in chapter one, and why the first line, read in context, can not be (mis)read in the usual way. Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Wed Oct 6 04:55:43 1993 Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 04:46:12 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (Dan Lusthaus) Subject: ground-up being >> Anyway, unless you are a mystical theologian that believes in the >>unnameable Divine Name, the second sentence makes no sense by the >>"standard" misreading. > >Considering that the ineffability of the ground of being is one of the >sine qua nons of mysticism, that's quite an "unless" you've got there! >It's almost as if you're saying, "unless you're like most people who have >read broadly on subjects which are commonly considered to be related ..." >Dan, how do you define mysticism? Is there "one enlightenment?" Is taoism >mystical? Knowing what you think about these questions will make it easier >to understand what you're driving at. That's quite a sine qua non you have there. If you are reading ttc as another example of the Perennial Philosophy, you have lot's of company, but since Perennial Philsophers read EVERYBODY who said anything interesting about religion as members of THEIR club, that sort of claim needs to be taken with a grain of salt (maybe a whole teaspoon of salt). Tao #1 is not a ground existing (or nonexisting) somewhere other than in the tricky linguistic dynamics of tao-s 2 and 3; it is their miao (see previous posting). Ch. 40 (yu [something] arises from wu [nothing]) needs to be balanced by chapter 2 (yu and wu mutually arise from each other). Ttc is interested in how the world works, not in what happens (or doesn't happen) somewhere else. Since ttc's "mysticism" is concerned with the patterns at play in the things of this world, and not in some Radically Other Realm in which different rules and different patterns are at play, the question of defining "mysticism" such that it does not distort ttc to reify its own perspective should be put back to you. Now my point was simply the second line of ttc, in the usual "translation" reads: "The Name which can be Named, is not the eternal Name." "Eternal Name" mysticism is Western, derived directly from the third of the 10 commandments, Don't Take the Name of God in Vain. The mysticism of names, nameology, which plays a prominent role in Egyptian, Mesopotamian, post-biblical Jewish, and early Christian "mysticisms", particularly in angelologies and in dealing with gatekeepers of the chambers of the afterworld or the Supernal Palaces, has no counterpart in ttc's China. There is no notion of an unpronounceable Eternal Name (a tetragrammaton), a name of a Supreme Being too holy to utter. Not that some translators haven't tried to "find" the tetragrammaton in ttc - especially in ch. 14. It's just not there. Without that notion, the standard translation becomes an incomprehensible imposition on early Chinese thinking. If any of the silent lurking scholars out there are indeed aware of an "eternal name beyond utterance" tradition in ancient China, please inform the rest of us. > Many other passages of the CT and the TTC seem to me >to be very consistent with the common reading of ineffability; CT's request >for a man who has forgotten words; But why? To HAVE A *WORD* with him. Someone no longer distracted by the tricks of language is worthy of speaking with. > the chapters of the TTC on getting rid of >piety and justice, etc. Why does that have anything to do with effability or ineffability? Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Wed Oct 6 15:50:45 1993 To: Dan Lusthaus Cc: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au, Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Re: ground-up being <9310060846.AA02275@abacus.bates.edu> Date: Wed, 06 Oct 93 15:39:30 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU I've got to apologize to Dan: I think I spooked him into overexplanation -- to our benefit, but perhaps not to his. It turns out that I agree with him more than he realizes. >The infinite regress of hsuan >(dark, profound, mysterious) - which is explicitly made synonymous with the >linking of A and B, or rather tao #1 (indeterminate) and ming/name #1 - >means that when you divide two things, and then look to what constitutes >their separation (the line between A and B), it too can be subdivided, each >new "dividing line" itself subject to further re-dividing. This infinite >regress of hsuan is the gateway to all miaos, i.e, to being able to see A >and B as inseparable instead of as an invitation to pick sides. > IN short, the point of chapter one is not to pick A or B (i.e., >chiao - carving the world up according to how we want it to be), but to see >oppositions as miao (subtle distinctions between oppositions such that they >are inseparable). Hey presto, that's what I needed to know! Your proposed interpretation emphasises the relative nature of all linguistic meaning -- words defined by other words. That's very nice. >If you are reading ttc as >another example of the Perennial Philosophy, you have lot's of company, but >since Perennial Philsophers read EVERYBODY who said anything interesting >about religion as members of THEIR club, that sort of claim needs to be >taken with a grain of salt (maybe a whole teaspoon of salt). Tao #1 is not >a ground existing (or nonexisting) somewhere other than in the tricky >linguistic dynamics of tao-s 2 and 3; it is their miao (see previous >posting). Hmm, how does this Tao of linguistic dynamics relate to alchemy and the somatic disciplines such as Tai Chi Chuan? >the second line of ttc, in the usual "translation" reads: > > "The Name which can be Named, is not the eternal Name." > >"Eternal Name" mysticism is Western, derived directly from the third of the >10 commandments, Don't Take the Name of God in Vain. The mysticism of >names, nameology, which plays a prominent role in Egyptian, Mesopotamian, >post-biblical Jewish, and early Christian "mysticisms", particularly in >angelologies and in dealing with gatekeepers of the chambers of the >afterworld or the Supernal Palaces, has no counterpart in ttc's China. Eternal Name mysticism is irrelevant to the Perennial Philosophy. The ineffability of the Ground of Being has less to do with any esoteric entity than it does with a sort of anti-deontological program, in which words are considered to not correspond in any essential way to aspects of the universe, but rather to be simply artifacts of human thought. I've posted fairly thoroughly about this; unfortunately I can't refer you to an article in any journal. :) The idea of ineffability, far from being Western, is most succinctly captured in the Buddhist "neti, neti". It's everywhere. Huang Po comes to mind as an example of someone who goes on about how the Universal Mind is not to be described by any particular attributes, etc., etc. ... >There is no notion of an unpronounceable Eternal Name (a tetragrammaton), a >name of a Supreme Being too holy to utter. Not that some translators >haven't tried to "find" the tetragrammaton in ttc - especially in ch. 14. >It's just not there. Without that notion, the standard translation becomes >an incomprehensible imposition on early Chinese thinking. > If any of the silent lurking scholars out there are indeed aware of >an "eternal name beyond utterance" tradition in ancient China, please >inform the rest of us. Straw man -- or is it straw dog? -- argument. >> Many other passages of the CT and the TTC seem to me >>to be very consistent with the common reading of ineffability; CT's request >>for a man who has forgotten words; > >But why? To HAVE A *WORD* with him. Someone no longer distracted by the >tricks of language is worthy of speaking with. This is consistent with both interpretations. Someone who has peered into the void or some analogue of it is also worthy, and may well be the same person. >> the chapters of the TTC on getting rid of >>piety and justice, etc. > >Why does that have anything to do with effability or ineffability? Ineffability is anti-deontological, and the greatest good is not therefore to be found in any nameable virtues. Arguments that virtue is best practised when the names of virtues are abandoned are consistent with this sort of thinking. Tom Price -- Internet: tp0x@cs.cmu.edu | Accept Nothing. | ... DOGZ! ... | Reject Everything. | From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Wed Oct 6 17:15:29 1993 Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 17:07:25 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (Dan Lusthaus) Subject: Perennial babble >Eternal Name mysticism is irrelevant to the Perennial Philosophy. That's not an historical observation. Nor a philosophic one. They never occur without each other. >The ineffability of the Ground of Being has less to do with >any esoteric entity than it does with a sort of anti-deontological >program, in which words are considered to not correspond in any essential >way to aspects of the universe, but rather to be simply artifacts of human >thought. That's nominalism, which can but needn't be a handmaiden to Perennialitis. Without words corresponding to things, on the basis of what does one know there are things, and how does one point to them. But then, you are interested in a thingless void, which is so incommensurate to anything sayable or knowable that it literally corresponds to nothing. Are you confusing language for the void? They are both "void" in your book? And here, Thomas, alas, we see typical perennialitis babble, The Grand Lumping of everything under the sun (with misattributions) to a single ideological vision: >The idea of ineffability, far from being Western, is most succinctly >captured in the Buddhist "neti, neti". Neti, neti - from the Upanisads, is Hindu, not Buddhist; it concerns not language, but identifying or not identifying with what is the "I". It is balanced by another statement in the Upanisads, tat tvam asi, "This am I." > It's everywhere. Watch out for those hallucinations! > Huang Po comes >to mind as an example of someone who goes on about how the Universal Mind >is not to be described by any particular attributes, etc., etc. ... Huang-po would have no idea of what you mean by Universal Mind. The mind he and most East Asian Buddhists speak about is the human mind, which is one of three gates to enlightenment (i.e., self-understanding), the other two being Buddhas and Sentient Beings. T'ien-t'ai Buddhists decided the mind (i.e., examining oneself) was an easier route than the other two "gates." Ch'an followed suit. Be careful not to treat the problem of linguistic reducibility (i.e., reducing everything to a word or concept) as (1) the sole and decisive function of language; or (2) an excuse for circumscribing something (e.g., the "void" - which is a purely linguistic creation!) such that it is bracketed from all epistemological and logical analysis, placed (via language) "outside" language, and then using the excuse of non-reducibility to reduce everything to it. Let me state that more clearly. What some Perennialists do is make the following argument: 1. Language is inadequate or wrong because it pretends to reduce everything to itself, but actually does not correspond to anything "real." 2. The "real" is therefore somewhere other than language. 3. This "real" is {fill in the attributes}, but I don't really mean that, since I'm using language, and thus am not referring to the "real." 4. The void, or whatever, which is what is ultimately real, ALSO does not correspond to anything in the "normal" experiential, linguistic world. 5. Ergo, the normal world, not just language, is not real. OR 6. The "real" non-corresponding void/whatever is what everything is reducible to. Thus language, which was dismissed for the sin of noncorrespondence while pretending to reduce everything to itself, (and which created the notion of its supertwin/opponent, the "real"), is replaced by the Void, which is also noncorresponding and reduces everything to itself. Is that an improvement? Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Wed Oct 6 17:15:30 1993 Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 17:07:20 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (Dan Lusthaus) Subject: Re: ground-up being > Your proposed interpretation >emphasises the relative nature of all linguistic meaning -- words defined >by other words. That's very nice. Ch. 1 focuses on the interstice between words, i.e., the various ways we separate them and live by those separations, while not falling to the opposite extreme of claiming that all words are One. >Hmm, how does this Tao of linguistic dynamics relate to alchemy and >the somatic disciplines such as Tai Chi Chuan? The linguistic "carving up" sets our experiential horizons (the meeting point of Heaven and Earth that encirlces us), which is populated with the 10,000 "named" things, which we then relate to by desire or dispassionately, thus treating distinctions as either occasions for taking sides or for noting distinctions and the conditions through which they arise. All the disciplines arise within those horizons. Taiji is based on the inseparability of yin and yang - yet they are not reduced to each other (yin is not yang, though each "reverts" [fan] to the other). A taiji player uses that. Alchemy is the transmutation of unlike elements, based on their convertability, i.e., the recognition that the distinctions between things are not static. >Straw man -- or is it straw dog? -- argument. Not really. Either the term "eternal name" has a meaningful referent in Chinese discourse or it doesn't. It has a meaningful referent in Western mysticism - as I alluded to - but none in China. Hence one has to consider what else the phrase "fei ch'ang tao" means in Chinese, i.e., a meaning that is *possible* in ancient Chinese. >This is consistent with both interpretations. Someone who has peered into >the void or some analogue of it is also worthy, and may well be the same >person. Do you think they are going to talk about a nonlinguistic void? How useless! >Ineffability is anti-deontological, and the greatest good is not therefore >to be found in any nameable virtues. Arguments that virtue is best practised >when the names of virtues are abandoned are consistent with this sort of >thinking. Anti means "counter to." de also means "counter to" or against. Hence this is a double negative meaning pro-ontological. ProOntology should not be antilanguage, since it is positivistic. Unless you are only affirming (in language, I might remind you) what is not language. Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Oct 7 03:29:26 1993 To: Dan Lusthaus Cc: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au, Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Dan on the Tao, Tom on the Ground of Being <9310062107.AA21477@abacus.bates.edu> Date: Thu, 07 Oct 93 03:16:38 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU New and improved, with distinctive Subject line format, and now, more blatant acrimony! Single carets are Dan, double carets are me. >Ch. 1 focuses on the interstice between words, i.e., the various ways we >separate them and live by those separations, while not falling to the >opposite extreme of claiming that all words are One. >The linguistic "carving up" sets our experiential horizons (the meeting >point of Heaven and Earth that encirlces us), which is populated with the >10,000 "named" things, which we then relate to by desire or >dispassionately, thus treating distinctions as either occasions for taking >sides or for noting distinctions and the conditions through which they >arise. All the disciplines arise within those horizons. But what then is the Tao, according to your preferred interpretation of Ch. 1? You still haven't come out and made so tidy a statement as the customary "the Tao is the ineffable ground of being, which Lao Tzu claims has no name but calls the Tao for convenience' sake." Even if that be wrong it's still clear. You say that the Tao has something to do with the "interstices between words" -- surely you don't expect to get away with such a vague description, especially after your broadly insulting hints about how the customary interpretation has gained general appeal mainly as a result of the weakmindedness and ignorance of its fans. Put up or shut up: what *is* the Tao? Is it the way of non-ostensive definition of terms and all that entails? Is it a linguistic phenomenon only, or is its domain human cognition? What is the ontological status of the ten thousand things? Are we talking about the world of experience, or the world which is (partially) experienced? I'm very eager to hear any alternatives to the customary interpretation. I'd also like to hear one with as little smug sniping and petulant displays of erudition as possible. >>Hmm, how does this Tao of linguistic dynamics relate to alchemy and >>the somatic disciplines such as Tai Chi Chuan? >Taiji is based on >the inseparability of yin and yang - yet they are not reduced to each other >(yin is not yang, though each "reverts" [fan] to the other). A taiji player >uses that. Alchemy is the transmutation of unlike elements, based on their >convertability, i.e., the recognition that the distinctions between things >are not static. I could say the same of them; how does this analysis distinguish your interpretation of tao from the ordinary? >What some Perennialists do is make the following argument: > [deleted] I know some Chinese scholars who shoplift. Big deal. >>The ineffability of the Ground of Being ... >>in which words are considered to not correspond in any essential >>way to aspects of the universe, but rather to be simply artifacts of human >>thought. >That's nominalism, which can but needn't be a handmaiden to Perennialitis. >Without words corresponding to things, on the basis of what does one know >there are things, and how does one point to them? Yes it is nominalism, but I've been hesitant to toss the term around because I doubt that much is gained by patching in a direct link to the problem of universals and all that whole set of discursive problems and goals. However, since you've brought it up, I'll be happy to use it. The explication of my linkage between nominalism and mysticism will be found below. Words correspond to things on the basis of social convention. >But then, you are >interested in a thingless void, which is so incommensurate to anything >sayable or knowable that it literally corresponds to nothing. Or everything. If language can refer to nothing we end up as monists, since there's still the fact of the universe to deal with and we can't "really" carve it up into distinct concepts. But of course at the same time we can and do; language is a useful tool. I suspect that somewhere beneath all our mutual arrogance, this is where we would find our closest agreement. One must use language, but one must maintain the proper perspective; know names, and also know "naming." The world of language isn't "real" and the world of unfiltered experience isn't "real"; it's pointless to talk about what's "real." One simply must understand both to understand either. >>This is consistent with both interpretations. Someone who has peered into >>the void or some analogue of it is also worthy, and may well be the same >>person. > >Do you think they are going to talk about a nonlinguistic void? How useless! This sort of mockery does you little credit. I'll take it as a request for elaboration -- Nominalism when invoked in a mystical context entails, in my view, that the personal identity is socially constructed, like all other concepts. Therefore nominalism leads directly to a transcendental psychology. One who has accepted the "unreal" (socially constructed) nature of his personal identity and of all concepts has peered into this void. The psychological benefits of self-transcendence are widely known and I presume that they are recognized by both of us, despite our dispute over the relationship between self-transcendence and realization of the Tao, so I won't elaborate further. >>Ineffability is anti-deontological, and the greatest good is not therefore >>to be found in any nameable virtues. Arguments that virtue is best practised >>when the names of virtues are abandoned are consistent with this sort of >>thinking. > >Anti means "counter to." de also means "counter to" or against. Hence this > (plausible but false on-the-fly etymology deleted) Actually, "the term deontology derives from the Greek words deon (duty) and logos (science). Etymologically it means the science of duty. In current usage, however, its meaning is more specific: a deontological theory of ethics is one which holds that at least some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences." (cribbed from _the Encyclopedia of Philosophy_.) Most of the deontologists I talk to take it for granted that these duties are distinct enough to be named. In fact most of them regard them as thoughts of a God who thinks like we do, only better. I've found it most economical in disputing with them to simply lean on the idea that the nature of things is unknowable, and my entire argument follows. >>Eternal Name mysticism is irrelevant to the Perennial Philosophy. >That's not an historical observation. Nor a philosophic one. They never >occur without each other. I desire to improve myself. Please give me references to support this startling generalization on your part. Perhaps I dozed off when reading that atheist Aldous Huxley's anthology of world mysticism, _the Perennial Philosophy_? >And here, Thomas, alas, we see typical perennialitis babble, The Grand >Lumping of everything under the sun (with misattributions) to a single >ideological vision: > >>The idea of ineffability, far from being Western, is most succinctly >>captured in the Buddhist "neti, neti". > >Neti, neti - from the Upanisads, is Hindu, not Buddhist; it concerns not >language, but identifying or not identifying with what is the "I". It is >balanced by another statement in the Upanisads, tat tvam asi, "This am I." Thanks for catching the error -- for ten seconds as I typed my brain told me that the Upanishads were Buddhist. Regardless of this, my citation is consistent with my linkage of nominalism and transcendental psychology. (I don't proofread, but you didn't bother to look up the meaning of "deontology." Sorry, no piss-ant points for either of us today.) I hope you don't carry any tension in your shoulders while responding to these posts, by the way. :-) Bad Tai Chi form. I just caught myself. As an added bonus, it's amazing how much more caustically I can write if I breathe from my belly. >> Huang Po comes >>to mind as an example of someone who goes on about how the Universal Mind >>is not to be described by any particular attributes, etc., etc. ... >Huang-po would have no idea of what you mean by Universal Mind. The mind he >and most East Asian Buddhists speak about is the human mind, [attempt at >intimidation by historical exposition deleted]. Hm -- if you're interested, send me email and I'll consult my Blofeld translation and attempt to produce some passages which support my position. Which, incidentally, is only that the Universal Mind is ineffable, and an example of ineffability without "Eternal Name mysticism", so I doubt I'll have any trouble. >Dan Lusthaus >dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu >Bates College Tom Price | abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | tp0x@cs.cmu.edu ****************** | (aum) | ****************** From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Oct 7 06:30:48 1993 Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 06:21:06 -0400 To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au From: dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu (Dan Lusthaus) Subject: Re: Dan on the Tao, Tom on the Ground of Being Thomas, given your stance on ineffability, what is the meaning of the following question you posed? >But what then is the Tao, according to your preferred interpretation of >Ch. 1? You still haven't come out and made so tidy a statement as >the customary "the Tao is the ineffable ground of being, which Lao Tzu >claims has no name but calls the Tao for convenience' sake." Even if that >be wrong it's still clear. You say that the Tao has something to do with >the "interstices between words" -- surely you don't expect to get away with >such a vague description, especially after your broadly insulting hints >about how the customary interpretation has gained general appeal mainly >as a result of the weakmindedness and ignorance of its fans. Put up or shut >up: what *is* the Tao? Is it the way of non-ostensive definition of terms >and all that entails? Is it a linguistic phenomenon only, or is its domain >human cognition? What is the ontological status of the ten thousand things? >Are we talking about the world of experience, or the world which is (partially) >experienced? Would you expect a univocal definition of tao? If you are asking what does "tao" mean in the first line of ttc, the counter question is which one? tao #1, tao #2, or tao #3? Neither by my translation nor by the standard one, which has too many adherents to be in danger of dying soon, do all three tao-s indicate the same referent (although the standard translation suppresses tao #2, and pretends to solve the problem by equating tao #1 and #3). Ttc is not defining tao in the first chapter, it is demonstrating it. Tao moves by reversion (cf. ch 40). Tao #1, when functioning, displays itself as either tao #2 or #3, which are incommensurate. Most people only pick one over the other, thus tao, while revealing itself in its functions, conceals itself by people's one-sided "desire" to see it one way or the other. The theological corollary to ttc 1 would be the question: Is God a noun or a verb? Choose either, and the notion of "God" loses something. Choose neither, and there's no God to talk about. Tao is the play of oppositions. Tao is not the ineffable ground of being. Tao is the "way" things do what they do. It's the way water flows, the way mountains loom, the way valleys lie protected, the way people argue, etc. There is a way, a skill (ch: shan) to doing things. If not done well, then things get screwed up. There is a way to tie shoes (perhaps a couple of ways). There can also be attempts to tie shoes that are not the way. If one chooses the latter course (abandoning tao), one will be tripping over one's feet. >>Taiji ... Alchemy >I could say the same of them; how does this analysis distinguish your >interpretation of tao from the ordinary? Was it supposed to? >Words correspond to things on the basis of social convention. That's not the same claim you made earlier, but this clarification is welcomed. >. If language can refer to nothing we end up as monists, since >there's still the fact of the universe to deal with and we can't "really" >carve it up into distinct concepts. Why assume there is only one thing outside language? I don't see that monism necessarily follows. > The >world of language isn't "real" and the world of unfiltered experience isn't >"real"; it's pointless to talk about what's "real." One simply must understand >both to understand either. If neither is real, what, if anything, is? Both? > Nominalism when invoked in a mystical context >entails, in my view, that the personal identity is socially constructed, like >all other concepts. Therefore nominalism leads directly to a transcendental >psychology. One who has accepted the "unreal" (socially constructed) nature >of his personal identity and of all concepts has peered into this void. Why does nominalism lead to anything transcendental? And why isn't that supposed transcendental just another species of nominal indication? >Actually, "the term deontology derives from the Greek words deon (duty) >and logos (science). Etymologically it means the science of duty. I thank you and Jim for setting me straight on that. > a deontological >theory of ethics is one which holds that at least some acts are morally >obligatory regardless of their consequences." If that's the case, then you are right, Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu oppose the deontology of Confucianism. >>>Eternal Name mysticism [and] Perennial Philosophy... never >>occur without each other. > >I desire to improve myself. Please give me references to support this >startling generalization on your part. Perhaps I dozed off when reading >that atheist Aldous Huxley's anthology of world mysticism, _the Perennial >Philosophy_? Whether you want to call Huxley's beatific vision [hardly the sort of term atheists toss around] "atheistic", or even if, in specific opposition to certain forms of theism, Huxley would call himself an atheist, or whether the sorts of "nonreligious" mystical experiences Bucke documents in his collection of accounts are labelled "atheist" or not, the issue lies precisely in the fact that ineffability is not posited about nothing at all (in the literal sense), but of something (which is then relabeled no-thing, or whatever). The Perennial philosophy claims that everyone's no-thing is the same thing. Hence, despite the many names various religions, mystics, etc., have given it, its "eternal name" is unutterable, unreducible to any single name. Maybe for Huxley the eternal name is nicknamed "Beatific Vision." For Al-Hallaj it's nicknamed Allah. For someone else, it's got another nickname. But to claim that everyone is nicknaming the same 'Name' IS perennial philosophy. There are various sorts of eternal name mysticisms, as I indicated. Some would argue that all the nicknames are permutations of the unchanging, unutterable name. Some, that the true name is hidden, unknown, etc. The eternal name is unutterable, either because it is too Holy so that it shouldn't be pronounced even if known, or intrinsically unsayable. When Holy names start to become sayable, then names proliferate, and the most special one is then reserved as the unsayable one. All utterable names are nicknames, or nominal conventionalisms, pointing to what is Transcendentally nonconventional (which, if it were really being discussed by everyone all the time would be quite conventional, don't you think?). Both quiddity and "ground" are names. Names are emblems. > I'll consult my Blofeld >translation and attempt to produce some passages which support my position. I don't have tremendous confidence in Blofeld as a translator (though I like what he did with the I-ching), and wouldn't be surprised if his translation had that sort of language. Then we'd get started on the same sort of conversation, viz., citing an inaccurate English text, complaints about the translation and what the original says, counterclaims about crabby eruditionitis, and we'd move on to another text. If we can't solve it with Lao Tzu, let's let it go. Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Oct 7 13:16:53 1993 Date: Thu, 7 Oct 1993 13:03:31 -0400 (EDT) From: Stephen_Y._Chan@transarc.com To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au Subject: Re: Dan on the Tao, Tom on the Ground of Being Excerpts from personal.tao: 7-Oct-93 Re: Dan on the Tao, Tom on .. Dan Lusthaus@abacus.bate (7121) > Tao is not the ineffable ground of being. Tao is the "way" things > do what they do. It's the way water flows, the way mountains loom, the way > valleys lie protected, the way people argue, etc. There is a way, a skill > (ch: shan) to doing things. I was going to volunteer this description, but Dan has beaten me to it. As I understand Taoism, _the_ Tao is the way that things work. How something comes about, how it interacts with other things, and how it disappears. It is about relationships between opposites, as well as similars. Since Taoism is more than a simple intellectual exercise, it also applies these concepts to the way that we think and experience things. You have to know yourself before you can know others. By understanding how and why things do what they do, one is able to find the path of least resistance, predict the course of events, and take action in order to influence them (should you desire to do so). One can examine things, and look for generalities, but at any given time, at any given place, there are only particulars. The general rule which we thought was universal, may turn out to be conditional. This is part of the wonder and mystery of nature which is often reflected in Taoism. Can you capture it in language? Sure, you can try. But when you make statements which are prescriptive and useful, you are forced to be particular and have become trapped in one set of circumstances and have lost the universal (no Tao). But if you make universal statements, then you have lost the particulars and the statement no longer has prescriptive application - you end up with some cliche, or otherwise banal observation (you've also lost the Tao). I think this "Ground of Being" and the "unity of mystical experience" stuff seems to be based on an implicit belief in some Platonic ideal of perfect truth which exists somewhere. Just because we are incapable of describing the differences between mystical states, doesn't tell us anything more than "we don't know if they are different". Neither are we able to describe the _similarities_ between the mystical states, so we are also forced to admit "we don't know if they are the same". The relationship between mystical states of different traditions is undefined, to claim that this means that they are the same strikes me as revealing your own sentiments in favor of an abstract, ideal truths. Back to our regularly scheduled acrimony... --------------------------------------------------------------------- Stephen Chan chan@transarc.com |Transarc Corporation (412)338-6996 |707 Grant St "The best move is very close to the worse move."|Pittsburgh, PA 15219 From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Oct 7 14:38:18 1993 To: Dan Lusthaus Cc: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au, Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Re: Dan on the Tao, Tom on the Ground of Being <9310071021.AA07564@abacus.bates.edu> Date: Thu, 07 Oct 93 14:28:28 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Yang yang yang yang yang. Dan, this was the most satisfying and helpful response I've ever gotten from you. Now that I know what it takes ... I am unabashedly delighted at the information I have recieved. >The theological corollary to ttc 1 would be the question: Is God a >noun or a verb? Choose either, and the notion of "God" loses something. >Choose neither, and there's no God to talk about. Tao is the play of >oppositions. Tao is not the ineffable ground of being. Tao is the "way" things >do what they do. It's the way water flows, the way mountains loom, the way >valleys lie protected, the way people argue, etc. There is a way, a skill >(ch: shan) to doing things. If not done well, then things get screwed up. I will attempt to read "tao" in this way at every opportunity, in order to see how it fits with my understanding. I am grateful to you for this alternative. Miscellany: >>If language can refer to nothing we end up as monists, since >>there's still the fact of the universe to deal with and we can't "really" >>carve it up into distinct concepts. >Why assume there is only one thing outside language? I don't see that >monism necessarily follows. How to divide experience into parts without language? >Why does nominalism lead to anything transcendental? And why isn't that >supposed transcendental just another species of nominal indication? If all concepts are arbitrary the self-concept is as well. There is no particularly epistemologically privileged way to distinguish oneself from the universe, although there are still many functional ones. This doesn't lead to a transcendental object but a transcendental type of psychology -- a process. >> I'll consult my Blofeld >>translation and attempt to produce some passages which support my position. >I don't have tremendous confidence in Blofeld as a translator (though I >like what he did with the I-ching), and wouldn't be surprised if his >translation had that sort of language. Then we'd get started on the same >sort of conversation, viz., citing an inaccurate English text, complaints >about the translation and what the original says, counterclaims about >crabby eruditionitis, and we'd move on to another text. If we can't solve >it with Lao Tzu, let's let it go. Yes, you're right; I wouldn't do that again. I didn't particularly enjoy it but am glad to have reached the conclusion: If we can't agree on an English text we simply can't talk about it. There's no reason for me to trust you to provide one and no reason for you to use one that you can improve upon yourself. >Dan Lusthaus >dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu >Bates College Tom Price -- Internet: tp0x@cs.cmu.edu | Accept Nothing. | ... DOGZ! ... | Reject Everything. | From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Thu Oct 7 23:06:12 1993 To: DanLusthaus Cc: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au, Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Re: Gas for the flames <9310072105.AA27881@abacus.bates.edu> Date: Thu, 07 Oct 93 22:55:56 -0400 From: Thomas_Price@KANGA.FAC.CS.CMU.EDU >The reason I am doing such a horrible thing? To provoke the >learned lurkers into dousing the flames or raising the quality of the fuel. Oh, nonsense. You just want the last word, especially when you can get it by quoting other people and not taking responsibility. >One wrote: >{startquote} >Things are heating up, and I'm counting on you to continue fighting the >good fight ... We need to hit them over the head with a very large, >absolutely real, though totally void hammer. Maybe then they'll have >some sense knocked into them. Tell them to learn Chinese if they want >to argue about what the text says. Bullying has never been a very good way to teach anyone anything. It's extremely funny to hear these words coming from (presumably) a Classical Chinese scholar. >The problem is that they're arguing over the >english translations as though the texts were written in that language, >They find translators who agree with their inanities and use their >translations as proof text. Sheesh! >{end quote} If the translations at large suck then that is to the discredit of your field and I suggest that you fight *internally* to provide better translations to the layman. But what are laymen supposed to do? If we can't trust popular translations we certainly have no reason to trust a specialist's translation either. Rather than become upset about not commanding instant respect because of his credentials, it would better serve the expert to simply avoid discussions in which no common ground can be found. >And another: >{startquote} >This attitude of denouncing the experts as >arrogant is precisely the kind of democratic, egalitarian garbage that >allows everybody to denounce those who know what they're talking about >without going to the trouble of finding out what's really going on for >themselves. ... Too bad that the experts are arrogant, then, since it leads to so much trouble. It also discourages people from finding out what's really going on, not so? >Can we talk about something else now? >Dan Lusthaus Certainly. My low opinion of the self-discipline and general maturity of academics has been confirmed, and I have, after considerable difficulty, managed to get an expert to furnish me with a clear explanation of Tao which I had not had before and am very glad to have. I'll quit while I'm ahead. Everybody wins! I'm also of the opinion, given the troubles that discussions have had in finding common ground, that this list would function best as a specialist list. Dr. Ciolek, please unsubscribe me from the list. Thanks very much. Tom Price -- Internet: tp0x@cs.cmu.edu | Accept Nothing. | ... DOGZ! ... | Reject Everything. | From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Fri Oct 22 20:19:40 1993 From: Peter Alexander Merel Subject: Re: how things work To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au (TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au) Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 10:11:50 EST A little while back, Jim Sellmann wrote: >Many of us seem to agree (at least in part) with Dan's analysis of tao >as meaning the "way things work/function/opperate" (what was the exact word) >I was wondering where is leads us? >If tao is the way things opperate, then how can one speak of disharmony or >things not going with tao? when does something not opperate with tao? how >can there be a non-tao action? There are no 'non-tao' actions, but there are 'non-tao' expectations. Think of it like sailing a boat; you can't simply tack in the direction you want to go, or rig the same way in all weathers, or ignore a dropping barometer, or put up a spinnaker just because it is pretty, or ignore your crew if they offend you ... by not contending, by accepting, by dealing with difficulty before it is difficult, by simplifying and restraining action, by attending to details and maintaining compassion for all, you hold fast to Tao. To sail a boat well you must hold fast to events as they happen and not as they do not. Or sink. If you sink, then the fish will nibble your flesh and the sun will bleach your bones and the sea will rot your boat away, all quite in accordance with Tao - it was your expectation that was amiss, that's all. And if you wonder what Taoism has to offer a sailor, well, nothing more than he already is. The sailor worships Tao simply by sailing. -- Internet: pete@extro.su.oz.au | Accept Everything. | UUCP: {uunet,mcvax}!munnari!extro!pete | Reject Nothing. | From taoism-l-owner@coombs.anu.edu.au Mon Oct 25 18:42:27 1993 From: Peter Alexander Merel Subject: Re: no non-tao To: TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au (TAOISM-L@coombs.anu.edu.au) Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 8:28:51 EST Jim Sellmann writes: >If there are "no non-tao" actions, then could violent acts still be in harmon >with tao? If the sailor of my previous mail sails in harmony with the sea, his crew and his boat, then he may continue sailing. If, on the other hand, he sails into a reef, or sparks a mutiny, or shreds his sails in a stiff breeze, then his voyage will end. Harmony, then, is an aspect of the relationship between observation and action, world and self, not an aspect of action of self alone. To call an act violent without relating it to its context is a value judgement. Conversely, to call any act harmonious in relation to the Tao is a value judgement too; you know where beauty lies. -- Internet: pete@extro.su.oz.au | Accept Everything. | UUCP: {uunet,mcvax}!munnari!extro!pete | Reject Nothing. |