Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1993 16:00:30 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 14 Nov 1993 to 15 Nov 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 7 messages totalling 303 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Critical thinking and religious studies (2) 2. On aalaya-vij~naana (2) 3. Banishing mysticism (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 14 Nov 1993 17:52:15 EST From: John Richards Subject: Re: Critical thinking and religious studies While Richard Hayes has a very valid point that without very great care words like "mysticism", "meditation" and "religion" can be so vague and even contradictory as to confuse rather than illuminate, I think he goes too far in suggesting their total banning. There are often just no other words that convey just the same idea, and sloppy or ill-informed use of a word by the majority is no reason to abandon its use - unless we are to retreat into total silence on the claim "Those who know don't speak". There would be no words left to use. We would have to abandon almost every word in the English language, since all are debased and ill-used by the majority. We would certainly have to abandon "love","justice", "truth" and "good". Surely the answer is greater care, and the careful analysis of what we mean by the words we use, as well as a continual growth ourselves into a fuller understanding of their fuller implications. Who ever _ended_ with the same understanding of "God" or even "Buddha nature" that they started out on their search with? Richard Hayes also specifically claims there is no valid Buddhist use of the word "meditation", on the basis that there are several Pali/Sanskrit words, none of which means exactly this. While it is true that the original words often have a clarity and a precision that leaves the English word "meditation" looking uncomfortably vague, it does really remain a workable general term for at least that essential preliminary exercise of _doing_ meditation, as opposed to talking about it - the silencing of the endless chatter of the mind. There may be different objects of focus in this essential exercise, but that bringing of the mind to silence is central to them all. Samatha is essentially that process of calming and stilling the mind. Jhaana is the technical term for the _states_ of levels of silence and stillness this leads to. Vipassanaa is the clarity and insight that the state of inner stillness produces. Bhaavanaa is a general term, almost as general and as vague in Pali as "meditation" or "practice" is in English. To blind people with science that these more precise foreign terms render the general word "meditation" meaningless, moves the discussion of what the sphere of "meditation" is all about not one whit farther forward - IMHO. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1993 05:17:41 EST From: Marc Wachowitz Subject: Re: On aalaya-vij~naana John McRae wrote: > But is the external world denied any and all types of existence? Maybe what is denied is that the world is really divided into internal and external, and that there are any separate objects? I.e. both what is usually considered "inside" (the subject[s]) and "outside" (the objects) are aspects of ... (emptiness/reality/one-mind/buddha-nature or whatever one may like to call it), which has no divisions (but variety). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ * wonder everyday * nothing in particular * all is special * Marc Wachowitz ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1993 05:19:31 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Banishing mysticism Richard Hayes would like to banish the word mysticism f, fearing its vulgar- ization. Plato at least realized that to banish words, you must banish poets first, who are always accused of mixing things up. I suppose we should also banish people, the source of the terrible (and enriching) vulgarity and then we would have wonderfully pure vocabularies-- though perhaps fewer students to teach. The philosopher tyrant with his pure vocabulary ( I mean Plato, not Richard) is an impossibility. I don't wish to defend the curriculum at the University of Kent--for one thing it seems incomplete sans bungee jumping-- but I would like to suggest that there are interesting points of comparison between kabbalah and Theravadan awareness meditation. Moreover, we are just now entering an era of communication and interaction (Richard would call it vulgarization) in which it may be possible for the same person to actually experience several different mystical disciplines. SO I think it would be premature to conclude that mystical systems are any more or less different than, say, languages. Scholars of course will want to elucidate differences, but practitioners, from the depths of their experiences, may well intuit very important similarities.Who knows, the people themselves, that vulgar mass, may throw up some interesting adndimporttant developments that scholars will want to address. It seems to have happened before. Yours in life affirming vulgarity and poetic imprecision, Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1993 05:23:30 EST From: B Bocking Subject: Re: Critical thinking and religious studies Richard Hayes writes: It appears to me that two of these words, `spirituality' and `mysticism', have been allowed to drift towards meaninglessness, especially as those words are used in popular speech.... and later: I spend a considerable amount of my time with students trying to train them not to use words like `mysticism' with reference to exercises that Theravadins customarily do. For those students who master my taboo on that M-word, I give advanced training by teaching them also to avoid using the word `meditation' in their writings on Theravada. Buddhists themselves do not have any single word that includes all the kinds of exercise they do to improve their character. Jhaana, samatha, vipassanaa, bhaavanaa, anusati etc. are very different kinds of exercise, and the distinctions are too easily lost when they are all lumped together under the single term `meditation'. ......................... My response to this is that Jhaana, samatha, vipassanaa, bhaavanaa, anusati etc. are not English words. Therefore, they have no exact equivalents in English, and this is why they are good examples of technical vocabulary that has to be learned in order to understand Theravada. There are many such technical terms in Religious Studies; some of them are of foreign origin and have relatively precise meaning while others are familiar words but used in a special technical way in Religious Studies (e.g. 'myth' which has no pejorative meaning in an RS context); others are simply (for a native speaker of English) 'foreign language' terms which have imprecise meanings in the original language ('Shinto', for example) and have to be used carefully even when untranslated. On this subject Elizabeth Isichei in 'Some Ambiguities in the Academic Study of Religion' _Religion_ (1993) 23, pp379-390 (highly recommended) says 'Perhaps in a lifetime of study, one can enter into one alien world - a journey that inevitably means mastering its language. Even then, our analysis depicts what we think of a people's world view, and not what they think themselves.' (p.387) This seems extreme, but is the stuff of which Religious Studies is made. Note the distinction between 'entering' and 'analysis'. I wouldn't presume to answer for Kent's mysticism course, which sounds extremely interesting, but I should imagine that the kind of points made by Hayes are covered at a very early stage in the course. I can almost hear a lecturer saying 'Welcome everybody, now to begin with, what do we _mean_ by mysticism...?'. I appreciate that words get used in a 'vulgar' (or 'vernacular') context in ways they should not be used in technical discourse. However, what could be more appropriate when advertising a course to students who have _not yet studied_ the subject, than to adapt the language to the audience? I'm sure there's an idea like this in Buddhism somewhere... The salient point, surely, is that the term 'mysticism' is being used here (as so often, and knowingly, elsewhere) to suggest a broad area of enquiry, ill-defined but sufficiently distinct from, for instance, the early history of the Christian church in Norway, or the role of Confucianism in Indonesia (or indeed bungie-jumping or quantum physics) to help avoid misunderstanding when students register for the course. One of the things I hope all students in Religious Studies courses _learn_ very quickly is that understanding a phenomenon in Religious Studies is not simply a matter of looking up a word in an English dictionary, whether the word be 'mysticism', 'meditation', 'religion' or anything else. Regards Brian Bocking Study of Religions Bath College of Higher Education, UK b.bocking@midge.bath.ac.uk ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1993 15:29:49 EST From: Michael Basile Subject: Re: On aalaya-vij~naana ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Although I know very little of the Yogacara scriptures, I have had the fortune to practice some with Great Keen-Eyed Zen Masters. The Zen lineage, as you know, sprouted directly from later Indian Buddhism while the Yogacara and its principle scripture, the _Lankavatara Sutra_ were flourishing. In Zen we often talk of two minds: small mind and big Mind (or an individual's karma in relation to a collective karma). In Case 32 of the _Book of Serenity_ (a thunderous collection of koans compilled with verse by the Great (Cao-Dong) Chan Master Tiantong with commentary by Wansong) Tiantong versifies, "All-embracing, with no outside." Just as you said, "[the Yogacara denies the objective world due to the fact that] our only contact with external reality is through our sensory apparatus." I don't know anything about how a Buddha would experience this, but here I am, an outside object confidently responding assuring that I am not "inside" of you. So of course, in our conventional reality there is an outside, external, objective realm - but we as humans and Bodhisattvas, can never experience it. On the other hand, if we wholeheartedly accept and embrace the dualistic nature of our consciousness (or small mind) in practice, we then take our mind to is boundaries and experience/witness that we are not who we think we are but are instead Mind. Vast Mind like the universe nothing outside. So embracing, it accepts our duality and is thus liberated from it. By allowing ourselves to entirely accept our subjectivity, we are not bound by biased attachments and are enabled to "understand" the Mind of Yogacara. Case 32 of the _Book of Serenity_ offers instructions on how to enter this Mind. (Which, by the way, is already the mind we use, are supported by, and feast in.) Here it is (_Book of Serenity_, trans. Venerable J.C. Cleary, Lindisfarne Press, NY: 1990) Yangshan asked a monk, "Where are you from?" The monk said, "From Yu province." Yangshan said, " Do you think of that place?" The monk said, "I always think of it." Yangshan said, "The thinker is the mind and the thought-of is the environment. Therein are mountains, rivers, and the land mass, buildings, towers, halls and chambers, people, animals and so forth; reverse your thought to think of the thinking mind - are there so many things there?" The monk said, "When I get here, I don't see any existence at all." Yangshan said, "This is right for the stage of faith, but not yet right for the stage of person." The monk said, "Don't you have any other particular way of guidance?" Yangshen said, "To say that I have anything particular or not would not be accurate. Based on your insight, you only get one mystery - you can take the seat and wear the robe. After this, see on your own." Yu province is our small mind. Our individual karma which stores language, memories, etc. It is where all of us come from, our conditional background. After this realization by the monk, Master Yangshan went on to describe to the monk this subject/object reality that we must accept if we want to talk and live. The Master then proceeds with the medecine for our sickness (attachment and belief in the seperation between mind and environment) by instructing the monk to think of the mind that thinks. This is an important meditation throughout the vast Buddha-Dharma and is affiliated with a sense of nausea as the mind enters the ungraspable nature of reality thinking of the mind that thinks of the mind that thinks of the mind that is thinking and on and on. The point is that one doesn't come to an intellectual understanding, but that one feels to the marrow the ungraspable nature of the separation between mind and environment, subject and object, inside and outside. However long this meditation takes, and for some of our great anscestors 30-50 years perhaps made them decent fellows, one finally comes to the realization that differences mingle with unity, mind is Mind and no-thing exists (as seperate, independent). An empty world, this too is just the stage of faith and not yet fit for the stage of person. One must again enter the conventional world and rescue all sentient beings. The Mind of Yogacara is this universal mind which understands Absolute and Conventional, and rambles along the Middle Path between existence and non-existence. If this helps in any one's way, may the merit be given through the Great Ancestral Lineage to all sentient beings. David Basile ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1993 15:31:52 EST From: "C. LOTT - Film Library" Subject: Re: Banishing mysticism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I don't know about banishment, but surely there can be no problem with simply being careful and attempting to be more precise. Particularly in a college curriculum where each student comes to the class with their own definitions and cultural baggage-- which is that much heavier with words such as religion and mysticism. BIG, archetypal words like these should be used only after a series of precise definitions have been made or pointed to... chris fncll@aurora.alaska.edu ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 14 Nov 1993 to 15 Nov 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Tue Nov 16 16:06:54 1993 Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 16:00:19 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 15 Nov 1993 to 16 Nov 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 7 messages totalling 312 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Religious thinking and critical studying (3) 2. No meditation please, we're Buddhist 3. Banishing mysticism (2) 4. On aalaya-vij~naana ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1993 16:44:46 EST From: nrs2460.bhc1@pcmail.dcccd.edu Subject: Religious thinking and critical studying ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Oh, goodie, I get to respond to Prof. Hayes on a list where people may disagree, but where the insults are at least generally funny. I was afraid to write to RELIGION. Richard - didn't anyone ever tell you that "mysticism" IS "bungee jumping", and that all other definitions are derivative from that ultimate ur meaning? But seriously - and what does alaya-vijnana have to do with depression?; and do other people often mistake the word "postmodern" for "postmortem" when reading rapidly? - I think that the word "mysticism" should be restricted in use to a period in Catholic history not beginning before the 9th century - and that this use should be restricted to at least the Christian tradition, if not more properly the Catholic tradition. (Even extending the distinction between mysticism and non-mystical Christianity gets a bit muddy when applied to Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestantism). In this way, the term has some precision and some real usefulness in describing a set of practices and an attitude which differs from distinct other forms of Catholic attitudes. It is my impression that when this term is used more globally, the method of study is colored by a Christian presumption that other religions are really somewhat the same, especially Christianity ;-) - that is, that Christianity remains the standard, even if an unconscious one. Of course, this method doesn't do much for recognizing the unique diferences between various forms of Buddhism. So, in short, I agree with Prof. Hayes in calling for precision. If one is going to use a term, it is a good idea to take a look at its origin and why it became useful to have a word for that sort of thing in the first place. And whether it is now useful to apply the word to broader categories of things. Take for example the term "ad hominem"....You guys aren't talking about me, are you? That's a relief... Your friend, Nancy Smith nrs2460.BHC1@pcmail.dcccd.edu ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 07:46:35 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: No meditation please, we're Buddhist John Richards writes: > While Richard Hayes has a very valid point that without very great > care words like "mysticism", "meditation" and "religion" can be so > vague and even contradictory as to confuse rather than illuminate, I > think he goes too far in suggesting their total banning. I quite agree that if I had suggested a total banning then I would have been going too far. I should like to point out, however, that I did not go anywhere nearly that far. What I did say that was that I train my students not to apply the term `mysticism' specifically to Theravaada. It was really only the word "religion" that I suggested had no real place in scientific discussions, but I certainly would not want to ban the word from the English language altogether. I find, for example, that it is a very useful word in banking circles, where financiers are most accommodating in honouring my paycheques, which are issued by the Faculty of Religious Studies. John Richards also points out, quite rightly, that the term "bhaavanaa" is nearly as general and vague as the English terms "meditation" and "practice". That is true, but the semantic range of "bhaavanaa" is quite different from that of "meditation" -- the two terms are vague in different ways -- and I feel it is my duty as a teacher to inform my students of what Theravaada terms really mean, rather than encouraging them to continue applying English words, often inaccurately, to the subject under discussion. I see the task as approximately like that of a physics professor who has to train students to talk about the physical world in the well-established terminology of physics, and to understand how this way of speaking differs from the way that disk jockeys and taxi drivers might talk about the physical world. Finally John Richards sugests that "meditation" remains a workable term "for at least that essential preliminary exercise of _doing_ meditation, as opposed to talking about it". I am not sure I follow this point. I'm not sure that using the word "meditation" is any more likely than any other word to make people understand that Theravaada exercises are to be done rather than merely to be talked about. And surely it is true of every aspect of Theravaada that it is to be done rather than just talked about. I trust that all of us who teach Buddhism make it fairly clear that siila, vinaya and even abhidhamma are things to make part of one's life rather than things to talk about in the faculty club over a glass of sherry. I do not find that the term "meditation" helps me get this dynamic aspect of Buddhism across very well. On the contrary, I have found that many people (perhaps only on this side of the Atlantic) seem to think that meditation is something that one does for twenty or thirty minutes a day on a round cushion while incense is burning, and when one has done this magical practice of making the mind very still for a few minutes, one is then at liberty to spend the rest of the day using pirated software with impunity, photocopying copyright materials, drinking alcohol and living in excessively comfortable circumstances. The term "meditation", in other words, does nothing to capture the changes in lifestyle and the striving to make radical improvements in one's character that are enjoined on every page of Theravaada literature. It has been my experience that "meditation" is a word that tends to invite a sort of smug complacency in many of the people who do it (whatever "it" is). Whatever it is that such people are doing when they practice what they call "meditation", it does not seem to me to have quite the salubrious effects that a robust practice of Theravaada exercises might have. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 08:46:10 EST From: Marc Wachowitz Subject: Re: Banishing mysticism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Chris Lott wrote: > religion and mysticism. BIG, archetypal words like these should be used > only after a series of precise definitions have been made or pointed to... One might as well say that they should after all those definitions are "forgotten" again ... [Probably both wishes are equally unlikely to happen.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ * wonder everyday * nothing in particular * all is special * Marc Wachowitz ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 08:46:33 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: On aalaya-vij~naana ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- John, It's interesting that your inquiry promted two dhaatu-vaada-type responses (or maybe only intersting to me, since I've been working on my CB paper for the AAR). No, the point of the Yogacara critique of "external objects" is not the promotion of rampant non-differentiation (no inside or outside, no distinction between things), nor Big Mind/little mind dichotomies (nor was the Lankavatara, which even its biggest 20th century fan, DT Suzuki admitted was a jumbled, confuse text, ever on the Yogacara's top 10 book list; it incorporates a lot of Yogacarin ideas, but hopelessly muddles them with Tathaagatagarbha ideas). Skip the Brown book. It's useless; a Fordham U type pontification with no access to the original CWSL. Most of what one finds in English on CWSL are based on the Vall'ee Poussin/Tat translations (Tat's is an English rendering of VP's *very* loose rendering, without the careful notes), which promote a very idealistic understanding of Yogacara (one of VP's baseline assumptions) by people with no access whatsoever to the original CHinese. Frankly, I could barely recognize CWSL in Brown's treatment. There is a section in my diss. on 'external objects' (I won't contribute to your office clutter by sending it). After a careful review and analysis of a major section of CWSL addressing that issue, I came to the conclusion that the focus of the Yogacara point is not "object" (they are differentiated, catalogued, etc., whether in or out of the mind, etc.) but the word "external." Nothing that we know, cognize, etc., is known outside the cognitive act. We falsely impose the notion of 'external' on those objects within our cognitive fields, but they are never elsewhere than implicated in cognition. Thus, the analysis of the structure of cognition becomes imperative. The status of those cognitive-objects apart from their implication in cognition is not of concern to them; that would be unknowable anyway, and thus only matters of uninformed speculation. Both the Vi.m'satika and CWSL clearly affirm that one can directly know other minds (Dharmakiirti later argued that such knowledge was inferential, not direct, but he was breaking with tradition). So this is not solipsism. But unenlightened cognition is 'closured,' projecting its own predilections onto its cognitive field. Abhuuta-parikalpa means projecting what is not present in a locus into that locus such that one thinks it is there (e.g., the snake mistake for a rope). Enlightened cognition, in which the aalaya-vij~naana has become the Great Mirror Cognizance (mahaadar'sa-j~naana), reflects accurately everything before it, without anticipation or attachment, etc. That they should choose a mirror for their key metaphor would indicate that that they are not trying to put everything into the head. Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 08:46:56 EST From: Prof M Pye Subject: Re: Banishing mysticism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Yes, I quite agree with "Chris" in Alaska. People who take comparative religion studies of religion (note the phrasing) seriously just have to keep on working away at the terminology as well as the subject matter. It's taken decades, even centuries, even to get to the rather feeble level of systematic reflection achieved so far. Simply throwing all the tricky words out won't help. Ilkka Pyysiainen of the Dept. of Religion in Helsinki has done an interesting Phd on "mysticism", Buddhism and PCE's recently, which at least works out a way of considering these things conspectually. Usually comparative study of anything helps us to focus on it in a better way, or at least in a different way which might be interesting. The mere study of isol- ated isms all by themselves would leave the comparative questions which in- evitably arise to the ravers, scoffers and preachers. Michael Pye ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 08:47:19 EST From: pgm@ukc.ac.uk Subject: Re: Religious thinking and critical studying ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I suggest that the _last_ thing we want to do is to try to find precise definitions for terms such as 'meditation', 'mysticism' or 'religion'. These are nothing less and nothing more than area-defining and, in some contexts, appetite-whetting terms. Most attempts to give them a more precise meaning end up either us as etymological essays (which doesn't necessarily illuminate current usage) or as _theories_ about these subjects, if not ideological stances. Consider such innocent sounding statements as: 'Judaism is not a religion; it's a way of life' or 'Buddhism is not a religion; it's a way of being'. But which non-Jews would want to deny that _their_ 'religions' too were 'ways of life', and so on? The three terms mentioned above have all but cast off their more precise etymological origins -- though admittedly traces still remain: meditation still carries a whiff of thinking systematicaly around a theme [for the purpose of advancing philosophical understanding or of developing piety]; 'mysticism' still resonates slightly with the grandiosities and vaguenesses of Germanic thought; and 'religion' still sounds a bit too obLIGatory and ritualistic for some more sensitive souls. One can always refine them in particular contexts. For example, I always make a distinction between 'meditation' as a discursive/imaginative activity and 'contemplation' as a non-discursive, intuitive activity. Originally a Christian distinction, but one now applicable across the board, like many another thankfully broad term. In a follow-up posting I'll risk fanning the flames by providing further details of the course on Theravada Buddhist Meditation in Comparative Perspective. Pete Moore, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 13:04:06 EST From: "C. LOTT - Film Library" Subject: Re: Religious thinking and critical studying ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > I suggest that the _last_ thing we want to do is to try to find precise > definitions for terms such as 'meditation', 'mysticism' or 'religion'. > These are nothing less and nothing more than area-defining and, in some > contexts, appetite-whetting terms. Most attempts to give them a more precise > meaning end up either us as etymological essays (which doesn't necessarily > illuminate current usage) or as _theories_ about these subjects, if not > ideological stances. > > Consider such innocent sounding statements as: 'Judaism is not a religion; > it's a way of life' or 'Buddhism is not a religion; it's a way of being'. > But which non-Jews would want to deny that _their_ 'religions' too were > 'ways of life', and so on? > > The three terms mentioned above have all but cast off their more precise > etymological origins -- though admittedly traces still remain: meditation > still carries a whiff of thinking systematicaly around a theme [for the > purpose of advancing philosophical understanding or of developing piety]; > 'mysticism' still resonates slightly with the grandiosities and vaguenesses > of Germanic thought; and 'religion' still sounds a bit too obLIGatory and > ritualistic for some more sensitive souls. > > One can always refine them in particular contexts. For example, I always > make a distinction between 'meditation' as a discursive/imaginative > activity and 'contemplation' as a non-discursive, intuitive activity. > Originally a Christian distinction, but one now applicable across the > board, like many another thankfully broad term. I meant, of course, CONTEXTUALLY precise, which is why I indicated that often instead of defining it for a particular course or group, it is often more expedient to simply point to other texts which illustrate the concept the way you intend it and then work from there. I am no great religious scholar, but I am a pretty good critic... and this kind of semantic/definitional difficulty is something that springs up again and again whenever you examine a text or words closely. Unfortunately it led to the proliferation of deconstructionists and their ilk who are only now thankfully withering away-- but that is a different story :) ***** chris lott fncll@aurora.alaska.edu "Eh?" ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 15 Nov 1993 to 16 Nov 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Nov 17 16:05:17 1993 Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 16:00:15 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 16 Nov 1993 to 17 Nov 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 8 messages totalling 368 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Banishing mysticism (4) 2. Dates of the Paali canon 3. No "meditation" ? 4. ANU-Dhammapada-Verses wais dbase is up & running 5. No meditation please, we're Buddhist ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 08:18:18 EST From: pgm@ukc.ac.uk Subject: Re: Banishing mysticism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Here's some oil to pour on troubled flames: MA IN THE STUDY OF MYSTICISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE M201: Theravada Buddhist meditation in comparative perspective This module guides students through a case study in comparative mysticism, based on two historically quite unconnected traditions which both offer detailed and systematic phenomenologies and psychologies of meditative and mystical states of consciousness. Students first examine the meditation traditions of Theravada Buddhism (the Buddhism of S E Asia), as extensively documented in the Pali canonical and commentarial texts, exploring in particular the relation between doctrine, technique and experience. To approach this material in terms of 'meditation', 'contemplation' 'altered states of consciousness', 'mysticism' and so on is to invite comparisons with the western doctrines, techniques and experiences to which these terms were originally applied. Students continue, therefore, by seeing what comes of juxtaposing the Buddhist material with comparable material from post-mediaeval Roman Catholic mysticism, which resembles the Theravada tradition in its detailed exploration and tabulation of meditational techniques and states of consciousness, though in relation to a strikingly dissimilar set of religious doctrines. Basic bibliography C Butler, Western mysticism: the teaching of Augustine, Gregory and Bernard on contemplation and the contemplative life E Conze (ed.), Buddhist meditation G D'Souza, Teresian mysticism and yoga R Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian perfection and contemplation according to St Thomas Aquinas and St John of the Cross D Goleman, Varieties of the meditative experience P J Griffiths, On being mindless: Buddhist meditation and the mind-body problem H Gunaratana, A critical analysis of the jhanas in Theravada Buddhist meditation K N Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist theory of knowledge R E A Johansson, The psychology of nirvana W Johnston, The still point: reflections on Zen and Christian mysticism W L King, Theravada meditation: the Buddhist transformation of yoga W L King, Buddhism and Christianity Nanamoli (ed), Buddhaghosa's Path of Purification [Visuddhimagga] Nyanaponika, The heart of Buddhist meditation E A Peers (ed.), St John of the Cross: The complete works, 3 vols E A Peers (ed.), St Teresa of Avila: The complete works, 3 vols E A Peers, Studies in the Spanish mystics, 3 vols A Poulain, The graces of interior prayer: a treatise on mystical theology A P Pradhan, The Buddha's system of meditation, 4 vols M Vajiranana, Buddhist meditation in theory and practice T Vetter, The ideas and meditative practices of early Buddhism PLUS selections from Buddhist and Christian texts and selected articles from periodicals Peter Moore, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 08:18:38 EST From: SAMUELS JEFFREY Subject: Dates of the Paali canon ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I was wondering if anyone on Buddha-L was aware of any book or article that outlines a chronolgy of the Paali canon. While I have found a few sources that gives a few dates for some of the books and suutas of the canon (e.g. Geiger's _Paali Literature and Language), I was unable to turn up a complete and coherent chronological list. Any suggestions? Thanks, Jeff Samuels (samuels@ucsu.colorado.edu) ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 08:18:54 EST From: John Richards Subject: Re: No "meditation" ? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I think Richard Hayes has met my points extremely well - and very well to the point. It is not often that one feels this! > I quite agree that if I had suggested a total banning then I would > have been going too far. I should like to point out, however, that I > did not go anywhere nearly that far. Completely valid. I did overstate his standpoint. > John Richards also points out, quite rightly, that the term > "bhaavanaa" is nearly as general and vague as the English terms > "meditation" and "practice". That is true, but the semantic range of > "bhaavanaa" is quite different from that of "meditation" -- the two > terms are vague in different ways. Again, completely correct, and nicely put. Bhaavanaa does cover a different range to "meditation", while the emphasis more towards "development" and "training", which does have a different set of associations to "meditation". This was a point well worth making. > I trust that all of us > who teach Buddhism make it fairly clear that siila, vinaya and even > abhidhamma are things to make part of one's life rather than things > to talk about in the faculty club over a glass of sherry. Valid point but with the emphasis on the _intellectual_ and _moral_ aspects of teaching Buddhism. The passage below here in conjunction with this does just give a slight hint of an antipathy not just to the WORD "meditation" but to any practice of anything that could be associated with the word either. Note not only the parody of "incense-burning" meditation, but the dismissive "(whatever 'it' is)". This is a pity as it spoils his own very reasoned argument, and (dare one say it?) reveals a prejudice. - ? > I do not find that the term "meditation" helps me get this dynamic > aspect of Buddhism across very well. On the contrary, I have found > that many people (perhaps only on this side of the Atlantic) seem to > think that meditation is something that one does for twenty or > thirty minutes a day on a round cushion while incense is burning, > and when one has done this magical practice of making the mind very > still for a few minutes, one is then at liberty to spend the rest of > the day using pirated software with impunity, photocopying copyright > materials, drinking alcohol and living in excessively comfortable > circumstances. I do not wish to discount his point here altogether. An exclusive interest on what one likes to think of as the "deeper", the "mystical", the "esoteric" levels of religion HAS led some people to think they can not only sit lightly to traditional morality, but even, which is a complete contradiction of all they claim to stand for, to act blatantly selfishly. One has only to think of many of the beat zenophiles. However the fault here, surely, is not in the practice of meditation (whatever "it" is!!!) but in the unbalanced approach of an immature and probably troubled personality. Meditation will usually help to correct that, but it cannot do it all at once, and from the very beginning. > It has been my experience that "meditation" is a word > that tends to invite a sort of smug complacency in many of the > people who do it (whatever "it" is). Whatever it is that such people > are doing when they practice what they call "meditation", it does > not seem to me to have quite the salubrious effects that a robust > practice of Theravaada exercises might have. This evoked a picture of "muscular Theravada" to me - or at least an image of Theravada which seems almost exclusively concerned with moral issues. I trust the evocation was subjective! I wish Richard had kept to the points he makes at the beginning of his message. These were very good indeed, and I accept his correction wholeheartedly. However, I would take my final stand on - N'atthi jhaanam apa~n~nassa. Pa~n~naa n'atthi ajhaayato. There is no meditation without wisdom, and there is no wisdom without meditation. When a man has both meditation and wisdom, he is indeed close to nirvana. (Dhammapada 372) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 08:19:33 EST From: tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Subject: ANU-Dhammapada-Verses wais dbase is up & running ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear Colleagues, A new WAIS database has been created at the Australian National University: ANU-Dhammapada-Verses It contains the 423 Dhammapada verses translated from the Pali original by John Richards . The "ANU-Dhammapada-Verses" data base is accessible via standard WAIS client software as well as via the Coombsquest gopher on coombs.anu.edu.au, port 70. A direct gopher link is: Name=Search the "ANU-Dhammapada-Verses" database Type=7 Port=70 Path=waissrc:/Coombs-db/ANU-Dhammapada-Verses.src Host=cheops.anu.edu.au with best regards, -================================================== Dr T. Matthew CIOLEK tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Coombs Computing Unit, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia =================================================== ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 08:21:37 EST From: Anna Yamada Subject: Re: No meditation please, we're Buddhist ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Yeah, Dig it. Christianity is faith transforming one's life such that a worldly life is acknowledged as incompatible with that faith, yet Jimmy Swaggarts abound, and Right Living arises out of understanding of the dharmma areived via meditation, yet people charge megabucks for meditation lessons all over the world. Somehow or other, choosing the right words to describe an experience is not living the experience. "Enlightenment" is not enlightenment. God or deity, or ultimate reality or whatever transcend or are beyone the limits of human language, logic, theoretical contstructs of time, law, reason. Does this mwan we all must remain idiots, solecists, existentialist recluses? I don't know. Maybe it's not for humanity to know the content of another's heart. That's why I took a cat home and she now watches me play with the computer completely indiferrently. (lucky dog) > > John Richards writes: > > > While Richard Hayes has a very valid point that without very great > > care words like "mysticism", "meditation" and "religion" can be so > > vague and even contradictory as to confuse rather than illuminate, I > > think he goes too far in suggesting their total banning. > > I quite agree that if I had suggested a total banning then I would > have been going too far. I should like to point out, however, that I > did not go anywhere nearly that far. What I did say that was that I > train my students not to apply the term `mysticism' specifically to > Theravaada. It was really only the word "religion" that I suggested > had no real place in scientific discussions, but I certainly would > not want to ban the word from the English language altogether. I > find, for example, that it is a very useful word in banking circles, > where financiers are most accommodating in honouring my paycheques, > which are issued by the Faculty of Religious Studies. > > John Richards also points out, quite rightly, that the term > "bhaavanaa" is nearly as general and vague as the English terms > "meditation" and "practice". That is true, but the semantic range of > "bhaavanaa" is quite different from that of "meditation" -- the two > terms are vague in different ways -- and I feel it is my duty as a > teacher to inform my students of what Theravaada terms really mean, > rather than encouraging them to continue applying English words, > often inaccurately, to the subject under discussion. I see the task > as approximately like that of a physics professor who has to train > students to talk about the physical world in the well-established > terminology of physics, and to understand how this way of speaking > differs from the way that disk jockeys and taxi drivers might talk > about the physical world. > > Finally John Richards sugests that "meditation" remains a workable > term "for at least that essential preliminary exercise of _doing_ > meditation, as opposed to talking about it". I am not sure I follow > this point. I'm not sure that using the word "meditation" is any > more likely than any other word to make people understand that > Theravaada exercises are to be done rather than merely to be talked > about. And surely it is true of every aspect of Theravaada that it > is to be done rather than just talked about. I trust that all of us > who teach Buddhism make it fairly clear that siila, vinaya and even > abhidhamma are things to make part of one's life rather than things > to talk about in the faculty club over a glass of sherry. > > I do not find that the term "meditation" helps me get this dynamic > aspect of Buddhism across very well. On the contrary, I have found > that many people (perhaps only on this side of the Atlantic) seem to > think that meditation is something that one does for twenty or > thirty minutes a day on a round cushion while incense is burning, > and when one has done this magical practice of making the mind very > still for a few minutes, one is then at liberty to spend the rest of > the day using pirated software with impunity, photocopying copyright > materials, drinking alcohol and living in excessively comfortable > circumstances. > > The term "meditation", in other words, does nothing to capture the > changes in lifestyle and the striving to make radical improvements > in one's character that are enjoined on every page of Theravaada > literature. It has been my experience that "meditation" is a word > that tends to invite a sort of smug complacency in many of the > people who do it (whatever "it" is). Whatever it is that such people > are doing when they practice what they call "meditation", it does > not seem to me to have quite the salubrious effects that a robust > practice of Theravaada exercises might have. > > Richard P. Hayes > Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec > ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 08:22:00 EST From: Anna Yamada Subject: Re: Banishing mysticism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Sit the kiddies down and make em meditate. then maybe they'll realize how elusive and cultual-constricted definitions can be. Take a good book to read. It'll be the easiest course you'll have taught. Give everyone an A for effort. How would one fail such a course--Not doing the homework? Not being in class? Not listening to the lecture? Not taking notes? Not paying the tuition? Damned if you do, Damned if you don't. Pretty cool this Neti stuff, huh? > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > I don't know about banishment, but > surely there can be no problem with simply > being careful and attempting to be more > precise. Particularly in a college curriculum > where each student comes to the class with their > own definitions and cultural baggage-- which is > that much heavier with words such as > religion and mysticism. BIG, archetypal words > like these should be used only after a series of precise > definitions have been made or pointed to... > > chris > fncll@aurora.alaska.edu > ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 12:47:44 EST From: Prof M Pye Subject: Re: Banishing mysticism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The MA at Kent looks very interesting. Johansson's book is called, surely, The Psychology of Buddhist Nirvana. On the comparative aspect I do reommend Ilkka Pyysiainen's recently published thesis. Write to him at University of Helsinki, Dept. of Relig. Meritulllinkatu 1, Finland. It can be acquired for your Univ. Library. Michael Pye ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1993 13:51:09 EST From: pgm@ukc.ac.uk Subject: Re: Banishing mysticism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Nope. Johansson's book is called The psychology of nirvana. Peter Moore ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 16 Nov 1993 to 17 Nov 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Mon Nov 22 16:08:42 1993 Date: Mon, 22 Nov 1993 16:03:35 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 19 Nov 1993 to 22 Nov 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 3 messages totalling 79 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Meditation again! (2) 2. Language and Emotivity ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 22 Nov 1993 08:33:25 EST From: John Richards Subject: Meditation again! ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In somewhat lighter vein than usual contributions to scholarship, may I offer the following little poem to other Pali/Sanskrit scholars of Buddhist theory? The Strife is O'er The teacher in many a vihara, An expert in battles with Mara, Said, My plan of attack Is to lie on my back And indulge in vitakka-vicara. When questioned on theory, the siddha Said phala is equal to nidda, So the battle is done And Samapatti won When I've thina in balance with middha. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Nov 1993 08:36:01 EST From: JHUBBARD@smith.BITNET Subject: Re: Language and Emotivity ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Professor Morrell, Your comments reproduce _exactly_ the context of the critical Buddhism movement: topica (topical philosophy, from Aristotles _topica_, closely related to the _Rhetorica_) and critica are in basic conflict. One appeals to the pathetic, emotive side of human nature and the other to the rational , and we are carried away by the former. Topica also speaks to the specific context of the human condition, however. Surprise: I am a closet topicalist! If Buddhism is criticism alone, criticism alone is just plain boring! Detailed (and critical) comments to follow after the AAR! Jamie Hubbard, Smith College ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Nov 1993 11:26:03 EST From: Miroslav Rozehnal Subject: Re: Meditation again! ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Very beautiful poetry, indeed! However, I think the problem is different. We can (or we should) distinguish the two levels: the level of theory and the level of practice. If we do mix these two, we wil get into great confusion, I think! On the level of theory, it is O.K. to speak about various "philosophical" and/or linguistical problems from the intellectual's point of view. On the level of practice, of course, we have to "give it up" (to use Ven. Ajahn Chah's words). What I mean to say is, that if we use our intellectual thinking, it does not neccesserily mean we are lost in vitakka and vicara. I think to study the theoretical aspects of buddhism can help us. The only problem is - to be aware of it. The Buddha has never said (or: I have never heard or read it): "The vitakka and vicara is wrong!" The problem lies in unawareness, not in vitakka and vicara, I think. Different opinion? ---------------------------------------------------------------- Miroslav Rozehnal Institut of Indology Charles University Prague, Czech Republic rozehnal@praha1.ff.cuni.cz ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 19 Nov 1993 to 22 Nov 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Tue Nov 30 16:06:10 1993 Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 16:02:18 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 29 Nov 1993 to 30 Nov 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 3 messages totalling 163 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. NEH Summer Institute 2. Can this be first jhaana? 3. question about the five defilements ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 08:28:15 EST From: Donald Lopez Subject: NEH Summer Institute ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The Buddhist Studies Program of the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor announces an NEH summer institute for college and university faculty on, "Reading the Manchu Summer Palace at Chengde: Art, Ritual, and Rulership in 18th Century China and Inner Asia." The institute will offer teachers an in-depth, interdisciplinary study of China's relationship with Inner Asian peoples through a multi- perspectival examination of a crucial but neglected area in the study of China: the role of Tibetan Buddhism in the history, politics, art, architecture, and religion of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1912). The specific focus of the institute will be the Qing summer palace northeast of Beijing at Chengde, where the Manchu emperors constructed a Chinese empire in miniature. The five week institute, to be held on the campus of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, is designed for 25 college and university faculty who teach courses in the humanities and social sciences. The institute will take place from June 27-July 29, 1994, and is supported by a major grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Living and travel expenses and a stipend of $1250 will be provided for each participant. Deadline for receipt of applications is MARCH 1, 1994. For more information and application materials contact: Donald Lopez, NEH Institute, Department of Asian Languages and Cultures, 3070 Frieze Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI 48109-1285. Telephone (313) 764-8286. E-mail: donald.lopez@um.cc.umich.edu ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 09:33:28 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Can this be first jhaana? PRELUDE My mother once lied to me. When I was a young lad I asked her what it felt like to be in love, and she said I would know when it happened to me. In the intervening years I have experienced all manner of fleeting states of greed, hatred and delusion, but none of them came clearly labelled with a tag saying "Warning! This is love." There were, to be sure, occasions when I said "I love you", but that was only a kind of shorthand expression for "My bloodstream has just been invaded by a massive infusion of male hormones, and as a result of this explosive biological cocktail I am temporarily enthralled by anything that moves faster than a tree, and since you are the nearest moving object, I am going to bop around you helplessly for a few minutes doing feather displays." Eventually, as hormone production fell off, I discovered that many of the moving objects in my vicinity also seemed to have thoughts, feelings and mentalities of their own. And so, as I learned more about other people's mental lives, my tendencies to solipsism were gradually replaced by a tendency to misanthropy. But nowhere in this sea of chaos was any mental state clearly tagged with a little abhidharma label saying "This is a mental dharma known as being in love." LUDUS Now that I think of it, not many of one's thoughts are quite as easy to identify as Roger Tory Buddhaghosa's Field Guide to the Five Aggregates would lead us to believe. There is one species of mental event in particular that has consistently eluded my attempts to identify it with certainty. And so I must turn to my colleagues for help. I must ask: Just what is jhaana (dhyaana), anyway? Let's begin with Buddhaghosa's distinction of two kinds of jhaana, which he calls `approach (upacaara)' and `arrival (appanaa)'. Upacaara-jhaana consists in eliminating the five principal obstacles (niivara.na) to serenity: 1) desire for pleasures of the senses, 2) ill will, 3) sloth and torpor, 4) restlessness and worry, and 5) distraction. Appanaa-jhaana, on the other hand, consists in entering into the first of the four jhaanas. Buddhaghosa's description of the jhaanas then follows the formula that occurs in scores of suttas. In the Saama~n~naphala Sutta, for example, the description is along these lines: Being satisfied and content, the recluse is able to sit at the foot of a tree and put aside all craving after things of the world, all desire to bring harm to other beings, all heaviness of the spirit, all weakness and laziness, all worry and anxiety, all irritability and vexation, all wavering and perplexity. He becomes like a man who has gotten free of a large debt, or who has had a remission of a serious disease, or who has become free form a long term in prison, or who has become free from the condition of slavery, or who has escaped a grave danger. When the recluse has put aside craving and so forth, he enters into the first jhaana, and his body becomes overcome with joy. The first jhaana itself is said to be characterized by, among other things, the presence of mental focus (ekaggataa), thinking (vicaara and vitakka) and contentment (sukha). Now what does all this mean in terms of the experiences of everyday life with which we are all familiar? It is fairly obvious that one cannot be in a state of upacaara-jhaana while attending a faculty meeting, since faculty meetings invariably produce either ill will, or sloth and torpor or restlessness and worry. And of course lecturing, marking papers and many other professorial and studential duties produce sloth and torpor in profusion, so there is no question of being in upacaara-jhaana while doing those things. But what about the states of mind that accompany scholarly activities such as reading a book, translating a text and so forth? It seems to me that the state of mind that arises from concentrating on, for example, a saying attributed to Socrates, or a rule in Paa.nini's Sanskrit grammar answers almost exactly the description of the first jhaana. Indeed, it seems to be that the mental state I am in right now as I think about the possible meanings of the term `jhaana' is almost exactly like the descriptions of the first jhaana given in Buddhist texts. Similarly, it would seem that first jhaana must be the state one is typically in while playing a musical instrument or singing, solving a quadratic equation, thinking about how to write a subroutine in a computer program or trying to determine whether or not a raptor seen in the distant sky is a kestrel. My question to my colleagues is this: do these intellectual activities I have named (playing music, doing math, identifying birds) seem to you to be examples of what Buddhaghosa, and the sources he was following, thought of as the first jhaana? If not, then what is it that differentiates jhaana from these other activities? And what is your textual evidence? POSTLUDE By the way, I accept reasonably accurate quotations of words spoken by meditation instructors and some other living human beings as textual evidence. I don't, however, accept communications from departed spirits and Ouija boards as textual evidence. One has to draw the line somewhere. Ludicrously yours, Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 13:01:50 EST From: Beata Grant Subject: question about the five defilements ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I wonder if someone can help me locate a locus classicus, if indeed there is one, for the term wu lou (the five defilements or "leakages" Skt. asrava) used in reference to women. I come across it often in Chinese popular religious texts (such as baojuan) as well as in many Ming-Qing Pure Land commentaries. I know there are various references to the seven or ten evils of women in both Chinese and Indian texts, but have yet to find the term wu lou used in these particular sources. Many thanks! Beata Grant Washington University in St. Louis bgrant@artsci.wustl.edu ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 29 Nov 1993 to 30 Nov 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Dec 1 16:05:14 1993 Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1993 16:01:02 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 30 Nov 1993 to 1 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 10 messages totalling 350 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. question about the five defilements 3. Can this be first jhaana? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1993 08:53:03 EST From: Prof M Pye Subject: Re: question about the five defilements ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > I wonder if someone can help me locate a locus classicus, if indeed > there is one, for the term wu lou (the five defilements or "leakages" > Skt. asrava) used in reference to women. I come across it often in > Chinese popular religious texts (such as baojuan) as well as in many > Ming-Qing Pure Land commentaries. I know there are various references > to the seven or ten evils of women in both Chinese and Indian texts, > but have yet to find the term wu lou used in these particular sources. > Many thanks! > > Beata Grant > Washington University in St. Louis > bgrant@artsci.wustl.edu > Try writing a letter (on paper) to Frau Simone Heidegger, c/o Rel-Wiss, Liebigstrasse 37, D-35037 Marburg, Germany. She has just completed a fairly substantial dissertation (for Magister, or do they say Magistra now?) on "Die Frau im japanischen buddhismus der Kamakura-Zeit" which includes a review of the Indian and Chinese background. I no longer have it to hand, so cannot do the search for you. Even if it isn't in, it might be interesting to correspond on related questions (English OK). Michael Pye ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1993 14:03:09 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Can this be first jhaana? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- This is in response to Richard's post concerning jhaana. It is important not to confuse BuddhaghosaUs account with what we find in the Suttas. So there are two quite distinct questions here: what is first jhaana for the Suttas and what is first jhaana for the commentators a millennium later. There could be a third: what is first jhaana for the Abhidhamma, but in fact the position of the commentators is largely that of the Abhidhamma. For the Suttas there is no distinction between `approach (upacaara)' and `arrival (appanaa)'. I understand this to mean that what the Suttas call first jhaana is a state which might vary between what the later tradition calls approach and what it calls arrival. Whether all Sutta sources are always referring to the same thing when they mention jhaana is of course another question. Still, assuming for the moment that they are, then it must be some fairly (but not extremely) special state. Note the long sequence preceding it in the standard outline repeated numerous times in the first volume of the _Diighanikaaya_. This implies that we are talking of something achieved through considerable faith and endeavour. For Buddhaghosa, the whole Abhidhamma analysis is being presumed i.e. everything that the Abhidhamma says about the nature of skilful (kusala) states is taken for granted and also what the Abhidhamma has to say about the jhaana factors. So arrival (and the later stages of approach ?) must involve rapture or physical stimulation through piiti. This seems to rule out most of your examples. It doesn't necessarily rule them out for approach concentration, however. You would have to examine whether they are associated with any kind of attachment (even the most subtle) and what is the object of the mind - for Buddhaghosa the object of the mind seems to be necessarily both abstract (i.e. not sensory) and very simple in jhaana states. (It must be a pat.ibhaaganimitta.) This perhaps needs an example. If while identifying a kestrel, you experience a brief period of love towards that kestrel, then that could involve moments of approach concentration. Perhaps if you are Gerard Manley Hopkins, it could involve moments of arrival. Similarly for anyone highly experienced in jhaana. The states in which you see the kestrel, remember things and compare it with other birds are neither approach nor arrival. For Buddhaghosa, they could, if skilful, possibly be momentary (khan.ika) concentration. Some thoughts anyway. Lance Cousins -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 30 Nov 1993 to 1 Dec 1993 ************************************************** Date: Thu, 2 Dec 1993 16:01:16 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 1 Dec 1993 to 2 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 9 messages totalling 448 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 4. jhaana (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 2 Dec 1993 09:07:18 EST From: John Richards Subject: jhaana ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- With regard to Richard Hayes interesting question on the nature of jhaana Lance Cousins quite rightly says > It is important not to confuse BuddhaghosaUs account with what we > find in the Suttas. So there are two quite distinct questions here: > what is first jhaana for the Suttas and what is first jhaana for > the commentators a millennium later. There could be a third: what is > first jhaana for the Abhidhamma, but in fact the position of the > commentators is largely that of the Abhidhamma. However, I am not sure that this gets us very much further forward, except to a well-founded distrust of the scholasticism of the later commentaries, and of Buddhaghosa (may he rest in peace) in particular. The commentarial descriptions of jhaana show all the symptoms of death by exaltation. They have turned the jhaana states into something so elevated as to be quite unattainable by ordinary mortals. Even in _first_ jhaana one is meant to be unable to hear sounds around one, for example. I am afraid that Buddhaghosa and his merry men were clearly scholars who kept jhaana at a healthy distance. There may well be a good reason for this (apart from the natural inclination of scholars, who much prefer analysis and classification to uncomfortable sessions of sitting cross-legged for protracted periods). The fourth "Paaraajika" offence, which entails compulsory disrobing for an offending bhikkhu, is "Claiming higher states falsely". An example give of this is claiming jhaana states falsely. This seems to have had a disastrous effect in Theravada countries of frightening people right off jhaana meditation - just in case. Apart from that the commentaries so stress the superior importance of vipassanaa, that most effort in meditation has been channeled in that direction. Yet the Suttas consistently show the Buddha stressing the importance of jhaana meditation to bring the mind to a sufficient level of clarity to make vipassanaa possible - eg. "So evam samaahite citte parisuddhe pariyodaate ananga.ne vigat'uupakkilese kammaniye .thite aanenjappatte aasavaanam khaya-~naaya cittam abhininnaameti. So "idam dukkham" ti pajaanaati" .. etc. (a very common passage) In fact the jhaanas would seem to be states that most reasonably experienced meditators go through, whether Buddhist or not, and whether they call the states "jhaana" or not. They are essentially just convenient descriptions of the growing stillness and "upekkha" of meditation. The first jhaana is characterised by the fact that there is still thinking going on, but the withdrawal from sensory stimulus, and the growing centering on the "theme" or "object" of the meditation gives rise to a great upwelling of joy (piiti), which would seem to be the essential distinguishing feature of first jhaana. It would seem to be a sort of spontaneous outburst of psychic energy into piiti or love, by the cessation of the dissipating of the nervous (psychic) energy in "worry and flurry" and the other hindrances. As the deeper jhaana states succeed to the first, the piiti gradually subsides into a deep sense of "satisfaction" (sukha), while at the same time the thinking, even on the topic of the meditation tends to subside too, until in the fourth level of jhaana, there is just deep, silent upekkha (equanimity) - and a satisfaction that goes beyond the more superficial "taking pleasure" there was before. In this state the mind is deeply at peace, deeply satisfied, and very clear - like the pure lake or unstained mirror the Suttas often talk about. There is nothing particularly esoteric about these states. One finds them described by Hindu and Christian writers too, in a different terminology - but they do take some application, usually several months of regular periods of practice (bhaavanaa). The _word_ jhaana is not an easy one to translate into English. It is, of course, the noun from the verb "jhayati", to practise meditation or absorption. It is a mistake, IMO, to reify the word and talk about "THE JHAANAS", as if they were actual separate things. They are just convenient labels for progressively deepening stillness and focus of the mind, four particularly important stages, lesding to great clarity of mind for looking at such things as "impermanence" or "non self" on the one hand, or alternatively leading on, via the "aruupa" states to the experience of "nirodha" - the cessation of external consciousness, ie. the beatific vision of non-dual conscioysness. Is it right for scholars to discuss these things though? [:-)] In the Name of Buddha, the Compassionate, the Merciful. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 2 Dec 1993 13:46:43 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: jhaana ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- John Richards writes: > However, I am not sure that this gets us very much further forward, > except to a well-founded distrust of the scholasticism of the later > commentaries, and of Buddhaghosa (may he rest in peace) in particular. > The commentarial descriptions of jhaana show all the symptoms of death > by exaltation. They have turned the jhaana states into something so > elevated as to be quite unattainable by ordinary mortals. Even in _first_ > jhaana one is meant to be unable to hear sounds around one, for example. > I am afraid that Buddhaghosa and his merry men were clearly scholars who > kept jhaana at a healthy distance. > I think this misunderstands what Buddhaghosa is saying. He does not mean that the meditator practising first jhaana cannot hear sounds. He means that he does not hear sounds during moments of approach and arrival. > There may well be a good reason for this (apart from the natural > inclination of scholars, who much prefer analysis and classification > to uncomfortable sessions of sitting cross-legged for protracted > periods). The fourth "Paaraajika" offence, which entails compulsory > disrobing for an offending bhikkhu, is "Claiming higher states > falsely". An example give of this is claiming jhaana states falsely. Another example given is the higher stages of insight. > This seems to have had a disastrous effect in Theravada countries of > frightening people right off jhaana meditation - just in case. The main emphasis in Thailand in the past was on jhaana meditation. The tendency to emphasize insight is relatively recent revivalism, probably coming from Burma. >Apart from that the commentaries so stress the superior importance of > vipassanaa, that most effort in meditation has been channeled in that > direction. I don't think they do. See my article on "Calm and insight" in the Saddhaatissa volume (if I am allowed to advertise). > In fact the jhaanas would seem to be states that most reasonably > experienced meditators go through, whether Buddhist or not, and whether > they call the states "jhaana" or not. Are you not in danger of going to the opposite extreme? The description you give of a meditative process is clear and recognisable, but is it the four jhaanas or a process prior to this. Note that it is not only the Theravaadin tradition that elevates jhaana. Compare the Tibetan tradition based on Yogaacaara. There the nine stages of concentration are gone through once to reach the stage of approach and then again a second time with an element of wisdom. Only after still more stages is either path or jhaana reached. This is remarkably similar to some present-day Thai traditions (e.g. Acharn Thate). > There is nothing particularly esoteric about > these states. One finds them described by Hindu and Christian writers > too, in a different terminology - but they do take some application, > usually several months of regular periods of practice (bhaavanaa). > I don't think the Christian mystics would agree that these things are so easily achieved. L.S. Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 1 Dec 1993 to 2 Dec 1993 ************************************************* From: rabbit@teleport.com (Scott "Rabbit" Pugh) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Nyogen Senzaki & Inayat Khan (Part 1) Date: 2 Dec 1993 11:49:08 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) The following is reprinted from the December, 1993 (XVIII, 12) issue of _Still Point_, the newsletter of Dharma Rain Zen Center, in Portland, OR (copywright Northwest Zen Sangha). Reprinted with permission. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Part 1 of 2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Recently [the editor] happened on an old book, printed with no date, copyright, or other publishing information, with a preface by Nanshin Okamoto of the Rinzai Zen Mission, lower Paia, Maui, Hawaii. In it he describes Nyogen Senzaki's work, then says, rather enigmat- ically, that he is "happy to be able to print herewith some of [Nyogen's] lectures and writings to distribute among those who care the voice of silence or the perfect rest in life (sic)." In the book itself, there is a section on "Sufism and Zen," which is a translation of an article Nyogen wrote for a Japanese language newspaper in San Francisco in 1923, about his meeting with the Sufi teacher Inayat Khan during the latter's visit in that city, which would have been very close to the time the article was written. The whole book is full of typos, strange spelling, and stranger punctuation, but is truly delightful. What follows is that article, with the most obvious misspellings and other errors edited out, and some of the language updated, but with much of the original character left in tact. The article documents the ongoing history of contact between spritual traditions on American soil. We hope you find it as delightful as we did. -ed Nyogen's Introduction ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ When Inayat Khan, the Sufi Teacher, came to America some ten years ago, I met him in San Francisco, and wrote an account of our associations for a Japanese daily paper of that city. Inayat Khan succeeded in introducing Sufism into the Western World. Although he passed away several years ago, his books on Sufism as well as on other subjects have been well received in both America and Europe. The sufi movement, therefore, still survives in the currents of thought to such an extent that it is now an important element in the world's religion of the heart. The other day I found a clipping of the article which I wrote, and which was published in "The Japanese American" on the 11th of May, 1923. Having been told by one of the disciples of Inayat Khan that certain Sufi friends in Europe are compiling a biography of their deceased leader, and that contributions of material therefore are desired, I am, for this reason, going to send the translation of this article to those Sufi friends through Mrs. Beth Rowland, an admirer and student of Inayat Khan. The following is the translation. Islamic Zen: Sufism in America ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Zen is not confined to Buddhism. In Christianity there is an element of Zen. It also appears in Taoism and in Confucianism, however colored by those respective schools of thought. Islam is supposed to be monotheistic, but its off-spring which calls itself "Sufism" encourages introspection among its students, so as to realize and to perceive Allah, or God, within one's inner self. If the thoughts of Saint Bernard and of Meister Eckardt can be called "Zen," then the ideas of Jalal-ud-din Rumi of Persia, as well as those of Kabir, the Indian poet, may also be called "Islamic Zen." I have been told that there is only one Sufi Teacher in America, a woman residing in San Francisco; although there are several teachers in Europe of both sexes, mainly in England. The Sufi teachings, I understand, also have some influence in India, as well as in America and Europe. The teacher in San Francisco is Mrs. Martin, a Hebrew Scholar, whom her students call, "Murshida," the Persian feminine form for the word "Murshid," which means "teacher." Inayat Khan is known to his followers as "Pir-O-Murshid," whom they consider to be the greatest teacher of this age. Since the latter part of March, he has been at the Sufi Temple, 153 Kearny Street, of this city, engaged in lectures and the personal guidance of his students. The Murshid was born in Baroda (the writer is not sure of the spelling of this word), India, into a Brahman family, having the well-known musician, Mula Buks, often termed the Beethoven of India, and also "Saint Jin-Mashr" (?) whom some Hindus even now worship, in its lineage. Inayat Khan is now 41 years old. He is a man of commanding personality, being quite tall and stout, and wearing long hair and beard. His bright eyes lend an air of dignity to his dark colored face. He is the author of more than ten books, which range through such subjects as art, philosophy, and poetry. He is also a poet and a musician, in addition to his other accomplishments; and is now lecturing on Sufism under the auspices of Paul Elder, the book dealer, while the intellectual groups of San Francisco crowd around him. -- Teleport.com don't think so (or do they???) Scott "Rabbit" Pugh - - - - - - - - - - - - - - rabbit@teleport.com "Bu tugui?" "Bu kuhaghan!" From: rabbit@teleport.com (Scott "Rabbit" Pugh) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Nyogen Senzaki & Inayat Khan (Part 2) Date: 2 Dec 1993 11:50:14 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) The following is reprinted from the December, 1993 (XVIII, 12) issue of _Still Point_, the newsletter of Dharma Rain Zen Center, in Portland, OR (copywright Northwest Zen Sangha). Reprinted with permission. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Part 2 of 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mrs. Martin invited me to her home to meet her teacher, and as I had benefitted very much by the use of her library over a period of several years, I did not hesitate in accepting her kind invitation. On my way there, I met Doctor Hayes, my old friend, the psychologist. "Where are you going?" he asked. "I am going to meet Inayat Khan," I replied. "Oh, that Sufi teacher?" asked the doctor. "I attended his lecture this morning at the Sufi Temple. It was such a tiresome ceremony the lighting of candles, much bowing, and all that. The lecture bristled with too much about God and Love. There was nothing new in it; and I had to pay one dollar for admission. I believe I will go with you to meet him." "If you do not feel like going," I replied, " you need not come with me. I am not asking you to do so." "Well, said he, "they may not charge anything for an interview. I will come along with you." Thus it was that the two of us went to the home of Mrs. Martin, the only "Murshida" in America. When we arrived we were ushered into the meditation room. It was dimly lighted by a lamp covered with green silken cloth, while fragrant Persian incense filled the atmosphere. After Mrs. Martin introduced us, and after shaking hands in the American custom with the Murshid, we were seated at a square table, Mrs. Martin facing Doctor Hayes, and the Teacher facing me. My friend, the Psychologist, began talking to the Teacher by asking how he liked America and its people, meanwhile selecting a cigar from his pocket, which, however, he hesitated to light at such a meeting. Inayat Khan smiled at me and asked, "Mr. Senzaki, will you tell me what the significance of Zen is?" I remained silent for a little while, and then smiled at him. He smiled back at me. Our dialogue was over. The psychologist, not having recognized what had happened, said: "You see, Mr. Khan, Zen is Japanized from Sanskrit. Its original meaning is Dhyana, which means meditation and..." At that point, Inayat Khan waved his right hand gracefully, and stopped the psychologist's conversation. Mrs. Martin then interposed: "I will get a book which describes Zen very well. It is an English translation from Japanese of _The Twelve Sects of Buddhism_. I will get it for you." Before she could rise from her seat, Inayat Khan again waved - this time his left hand - gracefully, stopping the Murshida, and then glanced at me. His eyes were now full of water - not the tears of the world, but water from The Great Ocean - calm and transparent. I recited an old Zen poem - not with my mouth - not in thought, but with a blink like a flash. It reads: "No living soul comes near that water - a vast sheet of water as blue as indigo! The Abyss has a depth of ten thousand feet. When all is quiet and calm, at midnight, only the moonlight penetrates into the waves and reaches the bottom easily and freely." "Murshid," said I, "I see a Zen in you." "Mr. Senzaki, I see a Sufism in you," he replied. Both of us then smiled, each at the other. Mrs. Martin interposed: "Mr. Senzaki, you should practice your English. Why don't you talk more about Zen?" At this both the Murshid and I laughed loudly, in which the Murshida and the psychologist both joined us, without knowing why. The happy interview was over. I should have gone home at this time, but the psychologist seemed to wish to talk further with the Murshid and interposed his "who's" and "because's" while the Murshida, our Hebrew Scholar, must show us her collection of books and documents. So we remained there the whole evening while we discussed "life," "death," "humanity," and "The Universe." I noticed that the Murshid used the Nyayaya system of logic in making affirmation, and this made me feel very much at home with him, as we Buddhists use the same system. The Murshid told us his ideal of a Universal Brotherhood, which he believes will be established, and which he thinks will transcend all racial considerations as well as harmonize all religions to the extent that they will work together in harmony for the upliftment of humanity, and for the advancement of the Spiritual World. -- Teleport.com don't think so (or do they???) Scott "Rabbit" Pugh - - - - - - - - - - - - - - rabbit@teleport.com "Bu tugui?" "Bu kuhaghan!" From: rabbit@teleport.com (Scott "Rabbit" Pugh) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Nyogen Senzaki & Inayat Khan (Part 3) Date: 2 Dec 1993 11:50:51 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) The following is reprinted from the December, 1993 (XVIII, 12) issue of _Still Point_, the newsletter of Dharma Rain Zen Center, in Portland, OR (copywright Northwest Zen Sangha). Reprinted with permission. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Part 3 of 3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I am sure that Sufism can commune harmoniously with both Bahaism and the Vedanta cult; but the question remains as to how it can associate harmoniously with Christianity and Buddhism, both of which have their own historical backgrounds. The Unitarians, the Christian Scientists, and the New Thought group may, however, understand Sufism easily; but all strictly sectarian people will remain strangers to Sufism for many years to come. And as to the Buddhists, those in Japan alone cannot work together harmoniously, even among the same sects, and how it can ever see the dawn of unification, I do not know. It is true enough that Japan has the true teachings of the Buddha, hidden away, however, in the scriptures; but the old church systems there will prevent the opening up of those treasures, even for the benefit of the remainder of the world. Germany, though, has a new form of Buddhism which is related to that of Ceylon and Burma. There I can see a few hopeful lights. Inayat Khan now has adherents in London, in Paris, and in Geneva. May his brotherhood become stronger year after year - let us sincerely hope for it. One day, Inayat Khan expressed the wish to attend a Japanese concert. I could not find any that were billed for that week, so I went to Madam Nakamura, who teacher the Japanese harp at her home, and asked her to invite Khan to hear her play. She consented gladly. Soon after this arrangement, I went to the Sufi Temple to tell Inayat Khan about this arrangement. It was about two o'clock in an afternoon, and the Murshid asked me to meditate with him in a secluded room where his pupils received personal guidance. We sat down to meditate together, but before even one stick of incense had been consumed, both of use must have entered into Samadhi, for Mrs. Martin suddenly called us, stating that it was already dark, and that it was time for us to go home for our respective dinners. We then looked at each other with surprise, but nodded a knowing assent to each other. The incense had been completely consumed so long that no fragrance then remained in the room. Both Sufism and Zen had become, after all, only yesterday's dream. It was the eveing of May 4, 1923, that we, Inayat Khan, accompanied by Mrs. Martin and I, went to Madam Nakamura's studio. The simplicity of Inayat Khan's manners and conduct as we went to Mrs. Nakamura's studio reminded me of the time when a certain Japanese High Priest came to America, accompanied by a flock of attending priests with a great show of pomp and ceremonial - he could not even move a hand without the assitance of his two Chief Attendants (the Chief and his Vice-Chief). This High Priest was the Abbot of a certain Japanese sect; but with all this pomp and glory, his influence in America never reached an inch beyond his own sect. Although this Abbot gave a number of sermons, his voice fell only upon the ears of Japanese immigrants, and his appearances and presence here went entirely unnoticed by Americans. On the other hand, Inayat Khan's influence was widely spread among intellectual groups, both in Europe and America. He could have put on a "big show" of himself alone, if he had wished to do so; but he was not that kind of Teacher. Wearing a Turkish hat and a long black mantle, and carrying a cane, the Murshid modestly rode in the street cars, instead of in a flock of honking automobiles. The concert at Madam Nakamura's was a success. The first number on her program was the "Chidori" (plovers", played on a harp by herself, accompanied by another harp and a flute, played by one of her pupils and a Japanese youth, respectively. The next and last number was "The Three Intimates" (the Pine, the Bamboo, and the Plum tree), which Mrs. Nakamura led on the harp, again accompanied by another harp and a flute. Although the flute was played by the same youth as before, the second harp was played by another one of Mrs. Nakamura's pupils. That evening all the players wore American dress, as it was an informal reception; but all the players sat on the floor, according to the Japanese custom for such performances. After definite expressions, through keen attention and breathless silence, of his appreciation of the performance, Inayat Khan warmly praised Madam Nakamura, saying that she was music itself, not only with the harp but also even in drinking tea or in walking around the room. Madam Nakamura should appreciate this commendation very much, as the Murshid is also a poet and a musician who is not given to flattery. Having been served with tea and cakes, and having been presented with pictures of other performances given by Madam Nakamura, Inayat Khan left the studio, saying that he would tell European musicians about the deep impression this music had made upon him. On the corner of the street where I was about to bid the Murshid goodbye, I remarked; "All sounds return to one, and where goes that one?" Inayat Khan stopped walking and, shaking hands with me, responded, "Good night, Mr. Senzaki." Now, Bodhisattvas, I have translated my old clipping. What do you think of Inayat Khan? If you wish to meet him today, just open the door and face the lovely shrubbery in front of this Meditation Hall. -- Teleport.com don't think so (or do they???) Scott "Rabbit" Pugh - - - - - - - - - - - - - - rabbit@teleport.com "Bu tugui?" "Bu kuhaghan!" Date: Sat, 4 Dec 1993 16:07:53 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 3 Dec 1993 to 4 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 11 messages totalling 371 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. 8th world 2. Abhidhamma ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 4 Dec 1993 10:22:59 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: 8th world On Fri, 3 Dec 1993, leigh Goldstein wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > On Fri, 3 Dec 1993, Richard P Hayes wrote: > > > Conference. The term refers to the abhidharma tradition whereby > > When did abhidharma begin historically? What is its relation to Madhyamika? > Can you recommend a good text on abhidarma? ---------------------------------------------------------------- Good question. But let me expand the question somewhat. I think we have a difficult issue here of which everyone is aware, but which is rarely articulated. Last summer someone made reference to her preference for the "pure" Theravada tradition. Some commotion, and then silence. In what way can/does the Southern tradition come to terms with the Mahayana--apart from having sporadic Councils in Bangkok? Does the Southern use the notion of upaya at all, and, if so, how? If not, how does the Theravada view other rationalizations of religious experience--including the Mahayana, but also the JCIs? ("JCI"? Look, I didn't create this acronymous world.) My own response to the question would be N. Dutt's Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to the Hinayana (1930). And then T.R.V. Murti's Central Philosophy of Buddhism (ca. 1956). Yes, I know that this is heresy in many circles and I think I know why. But it would be nice if someone brought up the issue from time to time so that we could all know the hidden agenda behind the sniping.> I, for one, would appreciate any replies to be in simple English rather than in Sanskrit. If this is not possible, then perhaps we might ask if Buddhism is a linguistically-based enterprise relevant only to the cognoscenti. Bob M ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 4 Dec 1993 14:38:34 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Abhidhamma > On Fri, 3 Dec 1993, leigh Goldstein wrote: > > When did abhidharma begin historically? What is its relation to Madhyamika? Can you recommend a good text on abhidarma? Taking them in order, we do not know when abhidhamma began. Some elements of it may (or may not) be very early i.e. in the life-time of the Buddha or soon after. The canonical literature of the Vibhajjavaadins and Sarvaastivaadins is probably third and second century B.C. You would have to date it earlier if you date the developed Mahaayaana earlier. Arguably, Madhyamaka is simply high-level Abhidharma. Certainly, a good knowledge of Abhidharma is needed to follow parts of Naagaarjuna's works. Obviously, it subsequently develops as an independent school in its own right. I don't think there is a good introductory treatment of abhidharma at the moment. There is some good material in Rupert Gethin's _The Buddhist Path to Awakening_ (Brill, 1992). Robert E Morrell writes: > In what way can/does the Southern tradition come to terms with the > Mahayana--apart from having sporadic Councils in Bangkok? Does the > Southern use the notion of upaya at all, and, if so, how? It is used quite a lot in the later commentarial texts and among the more traditionally minded. Not so much by those influenced by 'protestant Buddhist tendencies'. For a source in English, see Bhikkhu Bodhi,_The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views_ (BPS, Kandy, 1978) e.g. p. 259 ff. This translates some passages from Dhammapaala on the subject (part of his treatment of the paaramis and the path of a Bodhisatta). > My own response to the question would be N. Dutt's Mahayana Buddhism and > its Relation to the Hinayana (1930). And then T.R.V. Murti's Central > Philosophy of Buddhism (ca. 1956). Yes, I know that this is heresy in > many circles and I think I know why. I would have thought that these are very dated approaches, especially the former. Murti's book is often very stimulating for students, but to my mind he depicts a sharp break between Mahaayaana and earlier schools that is most unhistorical. We now know that many typically Mahaayaanist ideas only develop at relatively late date. Conversely, some ideas often considered Mahaayaanist are quite early and part of the heritage of all living schools of Buddhism e.g. the path to Buddhahood through developing the perfections. Also, there is a problem with terminology. Hiinayaana is quite unacceptable as a name for Southern Buddhism, nor should Theravaada and Mahaayaana be contrasted. They are not comparable terms. (A better recent account is surely Paul Williams, _ Mahaayaana Buddhism - the Doctrinal Foundations_ Routledge, 1989). > I, for one, would appreciate any replies to be in simple English rather > than in Sanskrit. If this is not possible, then perhaps we might ask > if Buddhism is a linguistically-based enterprise relevant only to the > cognoscenti. Surely Buddhist scholarship and Buddhist practice are entirely different matters here. If you want to do Buddhist scholarship, you have to be prepared to acquire the tools of the trade - particularly when there is so much poor scholarship in the field. Otherwise you are like a physicist who wants to do his physics in plain English and forget all that maths jargon. Perhaps this is going too far, but it does seem to me that we are still from knowing how to translate technical terms into English and certainly far from establishing an agreed terminology. Probably we will have to agree to differ on the question. Of course, if you want to do Buddhist practice, you should probably avoid scholarship like the plague! Not that I practice what I am preaching. Lance Cousins -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 3 Dec 1993 to 4 Dec 1993 ************************************************* From: jaffe@panix.com (Bruce R Jaffe) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: ACTUALISM, Part 1: Light-Fire-Energy Date: 4 Dec 1993 15:05:45 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) ACTUALISM: INNER WORK WITH LIGHT-FIRE-ENERGY Meditation and Beyond KEYWORDS: Actualism, meditation, yoga, spiritual, enlightenment. (C)1993 Bruce R. Jaffe, PhD. All rights reserved. Feel free to copy this document and pass it on, but any commercial use requires express permission of the author. BACKGROUND Actualism is a step-by-step process of enhancing and accelerating spiritual evolution for progressive enlightenment. Using ancient techniques in a modern formulation, Actualism works with "light-fire" energy tools and techniques to bring about the releasing of one's potential for healing self and others, for creative inspiration and expression, and for problem-solving in many areas of life. Founded in the early 1960's by Dr. Russell Paul Schofield, Actualism--then known as "Agni Yoga" or "union by fire"--is now taught at centers in New York and California (including Costa Mesa, Escondido, Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco). I am endeavoring to introduce this teaching to a worldwide audience by means of the Internet and commercial online services such as America Online and Compuserve. To teach meditation by correspondence, or long distance over networks such as these is a formidable task, but I think it is possible. At least the introductory technique can be practiced and even mastered from reading it and then sitting down and doing it. With a teacher present in person, it is much easier to learn because not only does the teacher verbally lead the student through the technique, but the energy and awareness of the teacher amplify the experience of the student. That is how I learned these teachings, and that is how the work has been taught down through the ages in many different forms. To begin with, there are some basic laws of energy that are helpful to know: 1. Awareness directs thought, and thought directs energy. 2. Life-energy follows thought. 3. Where there is pain, from mild discomfort to acute distress, the flow of life-energy is obstructed. 4. Where thought is focussed, the power of life-energy is concentrated. We can sum up these four laws in four simple words for practical application: THINK, LET, OBSERVE, and EXPERIENCE. So when you are working with inner life energy tools, think of the energy once, then let it flow, observe it moving about, and with your awareness let yourself enter into the experience. As you become skilled at this directed "letting" you move into what we call "effortless effort". How difficult is it to think a thought? Yet that is all it takes to begin tapping into your inner- light-fire energy. The key is knowing where to direct your awareness, and how to bring the energy from within out. The "how" is easy, once you stop trying to make it difficult. BENEFITS The powerful, yet safe, introductory technique which follows has been taught to literally thousands of people over more than 30 years. Many find it to be calming and centering. Scientific studies have found meditation in general to have health benefits such as reduced stress and lowering blood pressure. But beyond those physical benefits, if you practice this often, it can lead to an overall increased clarity of mind, emotional well-being, and sensory delight in life. PREPARATION Especially when you start out working with life-energies, it is best to be in a situation where you will not be interrupted. If possible, find a quiet, comfortable place to sit. Let someone else or your phone answering machine answer the phone. Sit in a comfortable chair, with your feet flat on the floor, your legs and arms uncrossed. (This can also be done lying down, but you might fall asleep). Rest your hands on your upper legs, with your palms down. Close your eyes, so your mind won't be distracted by what is going on around you. MEDITATION TECHNIQUE Direct your focus of awareness to a place six inches (about 20cm) directly above the center of the top of your head. Here is located a placed in consciousness which is always calm and radiant, no matter what is going on elsewhere in your mind or body, or around you. It is called the "upper room". Think of a point of pure, crystal-white light here. Don't "try" to visualize it. If you see it, fine, but if you don't, it doesn't matter. As you think of the point of white light, it grows brighter, expanding into a little star, three inches (about 10cm) in diameter. Think and let the star burn away the veils that have kept it hidden all these years. Direct the star to open, releasing a downpour of cleansing and purifying life energy. This energy is crystal clear, like fresh spring water. Let the energy flow through your hair, scalp, into the bones of your head and face, into your brain, eyes, ears, nose, mouth, down the neck, through your shoulders, arms, and hands. Experience it flowing through your chest and back, abdomen, hips, pelvic area, upper legs, knees, lower legs, ankles and feet. Think and let the soles of your feet open, releasing the energy into the earth beneath your feet. Now it is flowing through your whole body. Think of the bottoms of your feet closing, so the energy begins to backfill up through the areas you have cleared out. Experience it in your legs, hips, torso, shoulders, arms, hands, neck, and head. Let it overflow out the top of your head, surrounding your body with an aura of crystal clear white light. Bring your hands together, almost but not quite touching, palms facing each other out in front of your body. Experience the energy flowing through your hands. You could use this energy to heal others, by laying your lighted hands on the person's head, heart, or wherever they have discomfort. Whatever you touch with your hands lighted this way will be filled with inner light-fire-energy. If you experience discomfort anywhere in your body as you are working with the inner light, think of the "consuming fire" aspect of the energy. Hold the focus of it in the area of discomfort to burn through the obstructions to the flow of your pure life energy. Afterwards, take a few minutes to assimilate the radiant essence of the light into any area that you have cleared out with the consuming fire aspect. WHEN TO USE THIS TECHNIQUE In addition to your focussed practice of the energy in a meditation as described above, you can work with the downpour any time and anywhere, day or night, with your eyes open or closed, as appropriate to the situation. You can use it as an inner shower while you take your outer shower in the morning. Every time you think of the star and the white light downpouring, it continues for about 30 minutes. So you can literally fill your day with inner light. It's also a great way to go to sleep at night. QUESTIONS If you have any questions, comments, or wish further information about Actualism, please feel free to contact me at any of the addresses below. Meanwhile, I hope you enjoy working with this technique! ------------------------------------------------------------------------- E-mail: | Postal Mail: Internet: jaffe@panix.com | Dr. Bruce R. Jaffe CompuServe: 73112,2647 | New York Actualism Center America Online: Actualism | 27 West 72nd Street | New York, NY 10023, USA Telephone: 212-873-5826 (leave message) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- End of file. From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Mon Dec 6 16:30:07 1993 Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 16:00:11 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 5 Dec 1993 to 6 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 20 messages totalling 895 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Abhidhamma (6) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 5 Dec 1993 18:22:44 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: Abhidhamma Lance --- +++ Many thanks for your helpful replies on upaya and a number of other issues, with biographical references. However, replies all too often give rise to still further questions. Here are a few. You say: >I would have thought that these are very dated approaches, especially >the former. Murti's book is often very stimulating for students, but to >my mind he depicts a sharp break between Mahaayaana and earlier schools >that is most unhistorical. We now know that many typically Mahaayaanist >ideas only develop at relatively late date. Conversely, some ideas often >considered Mahaayaanist are quite early and part of the heritage of all >living schools of Buddhism e.g. the path to Buddhahood through developing >the perfections. +++ So where does this leave us with respect to Nagarjuna? Is he merely an unoriginal thinker recycling old ideas, but a convenient point of reference mistakenly canonized by much later Mahayanists in China and Japan? >Also, there is a problem with terminology. Hiinayaana >is quite unacceptable as a name for Southern Buddhism, nor should >Theravaada and Mahaayaana be contrasted. They are not comparable terms. >(A better recent account is surely Paul Williams, _ Mahaayaana Buddhism - >the Doctrinal Foundations_ Routledge, 1989). +++ Thanks for the Paul Williams reference. I personally avoid using the term Hinayana whenever possible (although I suspect that it will be a long time before the Japanese abandon shojo for, say, nanjo.) I also try to avoid contrasting THERAVADA with Mahayana -- but I suspect that I am not quite getting your point. Are you saying that there is no valid distinction between Southern and Northern Buddhism? At the very least, there are historical and geographical differences. What are the best terms to use? Northern/Southern? We have to use something. >If you want to do Buddhist scholarship, you have to be >prepared to acquire the tools of the trade - particularly when there is >so much poor scholarship in the field. Otherwise you are like a physicist >who wants to do his physics in plain English and forget all that maths >jargon. Perhaps this is going too far, but it does seem to me that we >are still from knowing how to translate technical terms into English >and certainly far from establishing an agreed terminology. Probably we >will have to agree to differ on the question. +++ The motive behind the upaya question and the plea for simplicity is that I sense, perhaps mistakenly, that there is an unfortunate sense of separation between those who work on either side of the North/South divide -- if you will allow me the distinction for the moment -- and that the underlying assumptions are often buried under layers of scholastic jargon. I see two guiding models. One might be called the "Golden Age" view which seeks the pure, genuine teaching in the words of the founder. Perhaps you will recall the exchange last summer, which (packrat that I am) I have been able to dredge up: >>>Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1993 08:23:40 EDT >>>From: Adrian Machiraju >>>Reply to: Buddhist Academic Discussion Forum >>>To: Multiple recipients of list BUDDHA-L >>>Subject: Re: Buddhists vs wizards -Reply ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- >>>>So - what's a scholar to do? esp. one whose favorite sort of >>>>Buddhism is pure, clear Theravada... >>>>Nancy Smith >>>Come to England would be one possible answer. Of course, all >>>those beautifully produced American books about Tibetan >>>Buddhism arrive in our shops, but the popular perception of >>>Buddhism remains almost entirely Theravada. This dates back >>>to the pioneering work of the Rhys Davids and the Pali Text >>>Society, helped by the fact that two of the three jewels, >>>Ceylon and Burma, were British possessions. The founding >>>members of the Buddhist Society, London, nearly all followed >>>Theravada, as did its first populariser in Britain, the late >>>Christmas Humphries. The result is that even now, what is >>>known about Buddhism, and taught in "world religion" classes >>>in schools, is nearly always pure Theravada. >>>Adrian Machiraju, >>>Orchard Library, UHYL005@VAX.RHBNC.AC.UK >>>Royal Holloway College, >>>University of London, Tel. +44-784-443329 >>>Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, U.K. FAX +44-784-437520 The second model might be called the "Evolutionary" view, according to which the ideas put forward by a founder are necessarily extended and refined by later generations. (If you want to know about atoms do you check Democritus or Niels Bohr?) For many of us on the Northern side of the divide, the "tools of the trade" are the Sino-Japanese sutras, commentaries, and popular manifestations of these ideas. Some on the Southern side appear to doubt that this should even be called "Buddhism." Sorry to have been so long-winded, but one thing led to another. Bob M ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University Compuserve: 71640,1036 St. Louis, MO 63130-2030 (314) 862-5418 (voice) ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 5 Dec 1993 21:16:05 EST From: leigh Goldstein Subject: Re: Abhidhamma On Sun, 5 Dec 1993, Robert E Morrell wrote: > I see two guiding models. One might be called the "Golden Age" > view which seeks the pure, genuine teaching in the words of the > ... > The second model might be called the "Evolutionary" view, > according to which the ideas put forward by a founder are > necessarily extended and refined by later generations. (If you Voila! Here is a third view. (There should be 1 more view than the number of Buddhists in the room |->). I) The original Buddha's teaching is not captured in the most 'traditional' teachings; [Possible reasons: they are not old or authentic enough, the teaching wasn't well enough understood by its documenters, they have been corrupted, or even the original teaching wasn't presented with enough technical accuracy to survive being traditionalized.] II) while later developements actually represent the original teachings more accurately. [For example, much later authors who write from realizations as profound as Shakyamuni's are able to understand what he must have 'really' meant, and present this in their own form with methods of realization appropriate to the times and their own background.] Of course, I realize this 'corrective' model is both widespread and not amenable to historical verification. Personally, it allows me study Tibetan Buddhism and feel I am studying just plain Buddhism, without believing in mythical or at least undocumented secret oral traditions. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 06:33:01 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: Abhidhamma Where I come from, Leigh Goldstein's third model is called "revisionism." Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 06:33:57 EST From: "Dr. I. Astley" Subject: Re: Early Chan institutions? Dear Mr. Tweney, In reply to your request for information on early Chan institutions (and, I hope, not too late for your next deadline), I would suggest that your dash to your library forthwith and empty it of anything with J. McRae or B. Faure on the spine. There is also a good collection of articles on early Chan in the Kuroda Institute series, published in Hawaii. Regards, Ian Astley e-mail: astley@mailer.Uni-Marburg.DE Philipps-Universitaet, FB 11 Tel.: [+49] 6421 28-3662, FG Religionswissenschaft -3661, Liebigstr. 37 or -7035 D--35037 Marburg Fax: [+49] 6421 28-3944 Germany ---PLEASE NOTE the new postal code!--- ---AND the new e-mail node address!--- ******************************************************************** ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 09:58:53 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Abhidhamma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- leigh Goldstein writes: > Voila! Here is a third view. (There should be 1 more view than the number > of Buddhists in the room |->). > > I) The original Buddha's teaching is not captured in the most 'traditional' > teachings; > [Possible reasons: they are not old or authentic enough, the > teaching wasn't well enough understood by its documenters, they have been > corrupted, or even the original teaching wasn't presented with enough > technical accuracy to survive being traditionalized.] > Are you not devaluing the spiritual content of the Suttas, at least by implication? Should you consider why the whole Southern tradition of Buddhism sees them as deeply profound? > II) while later developements actually represent the original teachings more > accurately. > [For example, much later authors who write from realizations as profound as > Shakyamuni's are able to understand what he must have 'really' meant, and > present this in their own form with methods of realization appropriate to > the times and their own background.] I sometimes put forward a view rather like this in relation to Abhidhamma. Probably I would not say 'more accurately', but perhaps 'appropriately to their time'. > Of course, I realize this 'corrective' model is both widespread and not > amenable to historical verification. Personally, it allows me study > Tibetan Buddhism and feel I am studying just plain Buddhism, without > believing in mythical or at least undocumented secret oral traditions. Fair enough. I take you to be saying that there are elements in Buddhism which arise from meditational experience as applied in a given historical context. But why not give the same credit to Abhidhamma, to the commentarial tradition and to the multitudinous more recent meditational developments of Southern Buddhism? Perhaps it was not your intention to deny this? Anyway, let me quote the Pali Canon(from memory): "Whatever is well-said was said by the Lord." Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 13:38:21 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Abhidhamma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Robert E Morrell writes: > +++ So where does this leave us with respect to Nagarjuna? Is he > merely an unoriginal thinker recycling old ideas, but a > convenient point of reference mistakenly canonized by much later > Mahayanists in China and Japan? > I didn't intend to go so far. Taking Naagaarjuna as the author of the _Kaarikaa_, his work is at the least a brilliant reformulation of earlier Buddhist ideas and a work of some literary merit. I would not doubt that it contains original elements and new slants on earlier concepts. The problem is that far too little study is being done on what preceded him. This makes it difficult to assess his originality. My suspicion is that he is original in the sense that Dogen or Tsonkhapa are original i.e. with a deep foundation in tradition as well. If Naagaarjuna is the author of a larger corpus of works of a more specifically Mahaayaanist kind, then he is no doubt later in date and a different issue arises. Does he derive his ideas from the Mahaayaana suutras or vice versa? Or both. Both Warder and Kalupahana have argued for considerable continuity with the earlier tradition. I think they are essentially right about this, even if they sometimes overstate the case. (I don't completely go along with Richard's criticism of Kalupahana. Yes, Kalupahana is very much a disciple of K.N.Jayatilleke - Cambridge philosophy perhaps, rather than Logical Positivism. I too find that something which doesn't quite wash. The strength of Kalupahana's book is however the way he draws on Sutta material to argue for continuity.) > +++ Thanks for the Paul Williams reference. I personally avoid > using the term Hinayana whenever possible (although I suspect > that it will be a long time before the Japanese abandon shojo > for, say, nanjo.) I don't object to the use of Hiinayaana in discussion of particular thinkers or as a doctrinal term of the Mahaayaana where it has meant a great many different things. My own definition is that Hiinayaana is any school of Buddhism which thinks it is superior to all others. >I also try to avoid contrasting THERAVADA with > Mahayana -- but I suspect that I am not quite getting your > point. Are you saying that there is no valid distinction > between Southern and Northern Buddhism? At the very least, > there are historical and geographical differences. What are the best > terms to use? Northern/Southern? We have to use something. > Obviously there are differences. I prefer to divide into three: Northern Buddhism i.e. the Tibetan and Mongolian forms; Eastern Buddhism i.e. China, Korea, Vietnam and Japan; Southern Buddhism i.e. Ceylon and South- East Asia. I notice that Peter Harvey has followed me in this in his recent book. The advantage of this is that it avoids value judgments completely and cannot be subverted into a covert or unconscious Mahaayaana/Hiinayaana distinction. Of course Ancient Buddhism then becomes something else again. > +++ The motive behind the upaya question and the plea for > simplicity is that I sense, perhaps mistakenly, that there is an > unfortunate sense of separation between those who work on either > side of the North/South divide -- if you will allow me the > distinction for the moment -- and that the underlying > assumptions are often buried under layers of scholastic jargon. I wouldn't disagree. > I see two guiding models. One might be called the "Golden Age" > view which seeks the pure, genuine teaching in the words of the > founder. Perhaps you will recall the exchange last summer, > which (packrat that I am) I have been able to dredge up: I wasn't reading this list then, but I can't resist commenting! > >>>>So - what's a scholar to do? esp. one whose favorite sort of > >>>>Buddhism is pure, clear Theravada... > > >>>>Nancy Smith > > >>>Come to England would be one possible answer. Of course, all > >>>those beautifully produced American books about Tibetan > >>>Buddhism arrive in our shops, but the popular perception of > >>>Buddhism remains almost entirely Theravada. This dates back > >>>to the pioneering work of the Rhys Davids and the Pali Text > >>>Society, helped by the fact that two of the three jewels, > >>>Ceylon and Burma, were British possessions. The founding > >>>members of the Buddhist Society, London, nearly all followed > >>>Theravada, as did its first populariser in Britain, the late > >>>Christmas Humphries. Christmas Humpheys and most of the founding members of the Buddhist Lodge (as originally called) were Theosophists strongly inclined towards the Mahaayaana in general and Zen in particular. >The result is that even now, what is > >>>known about Buddhism, and taught in "world religion" classes > >>>in schools, is nearly always pure Theravada. > I don't think this is any longer the case. It has gone to the opposite extreme in many contexts. > > The second model might be called the "Evolutionary" view, > according to which the ideas put forward by a founder are > necessarily extended and refined by later generations. (If you > want to know about atoms do you check Democritus or Niels Bohr?) > For many of us on the Northern side of the divide, the "tools > of the trade" are the Sino-Japanese sutras, commentaries, and > popular manifestations of these ideas. Some on the Southern > side appear to doubt that this should even be called "Buddhism." > Are we talking about scholars or disciples here? If the former, then it is just silly. The history of any period is surely of interest to scholarship i.e. both the earliest known developments and the subsequent periods. I wouldn't personally write much about Sino-Japanese suutras because I don't know the relevant languages. My interests are different, but that doesn't mean I think there is anything wrong with doing so. If we talk about followers, then I think you should bear in mind that the emphasis on the 'pure and original' is as much directed at traditional forms of Southern Buddhist practice as at anything else. Hope this clarifies my position, Lance. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 15:02:54 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: Abhidhamma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Lance, Thanks for your careful and detailed replies. They will give me something to think over for a while. Bob M ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 5 Dec 1993 to 6 Dec 1993 ************************************************* Date: Tue, 7 Dec 1993 16:01:17 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 6 Dec 1993 to 7 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 13 messages totalling 471 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Abhidharma (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 7 Dec 1993 09:59:00 EST From: JHUBBARD@smith.BITNET Subject: Re: Abhidharma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- >>I also try to avoid contrasting THERAVADA with >> Mahayana -- but I suspect that I am not quite getting your >> point. Are you saying that there is no valid distinction >> between Southern and Northern Buddhism? At the very least, >> there are historical and geographical differences. What are the best >> terms to use? Northern/Southern? We have to use something. >> >Obviously there are differences. I prefer to divide into three: Northern >Buddhism i.e. the Tibetan and Mongolian forms; Eastern Buddhism i.e. >China, Korea, Vietnam and Japan; Southern Buddhism i.e. Ceylon and South- >East Asia. I notice that Peter Harvey has followed me in this in his >recent book. The advantage of this is that it avoids value judgments >completely and cannot be subverted into a covert or unconscious >Mahaayaana/Hiinayaana distinction. Of course Ancient Buddhism then >becomes something else again. What, then, becomes of the Sarvaastivaada? I think especially of Jan Nattier's "text line" through Central Asia, esp. Kashgar "which divides Buddhist textual remains into two very different areas", the Western side dominated by, if I remember correctly, Sarvaastivaada through the 8th and even 10-11th centuries! Are they Northern, then? Jamie Hubbard, Smith College ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 7 Dec 1993 10:57:18 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Abhidharma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- JHUBBARD%smith.bitnet@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU writes: > What, then, becomes of the Sarvaastivaada? I think especially of Jan > Nattier's "text line" through Central Asia, esp. Kashgar "which > divides Buddhist textual remains into two very different areas", the > Western side dominated by, if I remember correctly, Sarvaastivaada > through the 8th and even 10-11th centuries! Are they Northern, then? > I could certainly make a case that they are. The Tibetan monastic tradition is Muulasarvaastivaadin. If you recall, Atiisha was prohibited from introducing his own Mahaasanghika(?) lineage and no other lineage has ever been permitted or so we are told. Moreover, the model of Hiinayaana used in Tibetan sources divides it into Vaibhaashika and Sautraantika. This is a division which must be of Sarvaastivaadin origin. I am open to correction from Tibetologists on this, however. In fact I did not intend to apply the three divisions to Ancient India at all. This is simply Ancient Buddhism for me. I grant you that there are some areas in earlier times which do not fit the threefold division: Central Asia is certainly one; Indonesia might be another. Nepal perhaps does fit reasonably with Northern Buddhism (although perhaps not Sarvaastivaadin!). The threefold division is intended to describe the major divisions of Buddhism as they now are and as they have been for the last half-millennium or so. Obviously, in the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. everything is different. Mahaayaana is found in Ceylon and South-East Asia. Various non-Mahaayaana traditions are found in China and Central Asia, etc. etc. Best Wishes, Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 6 Dec 1993 to 7 Dec 1993 ************************************************* From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Dec 8 16:07:08 1993 Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 16:00:53 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 7 Dec 1993 to 8 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 5 messages totalling 348 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. A note to Self smugglers 2. is there an atman in the house? (2) 3. Buddhist Research Information Centre 4. Encyclopedia of Buddhism ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 08:01:53 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: A note to Self smugglers About the doctrine of non-self, John Richards writes: > However much Theravada may be a doctrine of "nirattavada" - that > there IS no self, the Buddha never said as much. Several people, perhaps most famously Carolyn A.F. Rhys Davids, have made much of this argument from silence. It is true that "Any doctrine that one does not explicitly reject, one implicitly accepts" was an exegetical dictum accepted by later Indian scholastics, but I have never been particularly drawn to it as a sound principle of interpretation. So I am not sure what conclusion one could draw from the Buddha's failure to provide us with an explicit rejection of a permanent self. Indeed, I am not sure what conclusion one could draw even if the Buddha was referring to a permanent self of some kind when he said that there is something unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, non-complex (as some have interpreted the passage "Atthi ajaata.m abhuuta.m akata.n asa'nkhata.m.") Even if the Buddha had said "There is a permanent Self, oh monks," he could have been mistaken. > Even without going into the subject of the famous Atthi ajaata.m > abhuuta.m akata.n asa'nkhata.m passage, all this is very different from > a simplistic nairaatmavaada. I am not convinced that the doctrine that there is no permanent self is simplistic. While it is true that there were few Theravadin philosophers who produced real arguments (as opposed to appeals to the Buddha's authority), there were other Buddhists who offered rather good arguments. I would cite Vasubandhu and Dharmakiirti as two thinkers who set down a good framework, and then dozens of later scholastics refined their basic arguments as they had to answer replies from Brahmanical and Jain (and even from many Buddhist) philosophers. There was much more going on here than a stubborn staking of claims; it was a real debate that produced some very fine argumentation on both sides of the issue. > In the face of Hinayana nairatmavada it is perhaps not surprising that > the Mahayana was, it is true, forced to bring the self back in through > various back doors and windows. With respect, I must disagree. I think it is rather surprising that anyone felt a need to smuggle a self into Buddhism, and I certainly wouldn't say that anyone was forced to do so. Let me clarify by referring to a passage from an earlier post by Robert Morrell: > In spite of all the emphasis on anatman throughout the history of > Buddhism, is it not also true that very early on the difficulties of > OVER-emphasizing this position were quickly realized and it had to > be subsumed under another variation on the Middle Way? For example, > if there is no "self," then how can there be karmic retribution, > transmigration (however conceived), or moral responsibility? The > actor is no longer there. As far as I am aware, there was never a Buddhist philosopher who denied that there is something real to which the pronoun "aatman" (myself, yourself, himself etc) refers in each statement in which it occurs. The problem is that "aatman", like all other pronouns, is indexical; that is, it takes its meaning from the context in which it is spoken. What Buddhists were at pains to show is that the term "myself" refers to something different when one says "I hit myself with a hammer" and "I am trying to make myself a better person." In the former case, "myself" refers to some part of the physical body, while in the latter case one is usually referring to one's character. (Similar arguments were also made about proper names. The name "Hayes" is referring to different kinds of properties in these two sentences: "Hayes is fat" and "Hayes is stupid".) Once it is accepted that pronouns and proper names have a plurality of different kinds of properties to which they can correctly be applied, it is not at all unreasonable to argue that pronouns and proper names can be used to refer to a series of discrete moments that are linked to one another through a causal relationship. Thus Dignaaga could argue that even a proper name such as Devadatta is really a generic term, since it refers to a great number of different possible mental states and physical states that take place over a long span of time. In Buddhist parlance, the name refers to a causal continnum (even more accurately, to an entire set of causal continua, some of which are physical and some of which are psychological in nature). Quite a few modern philosophers, incidentally, hold a very similar view; it is still considered a defensible position. The important point in all this is that the Buddhists never rejected the notion of the kind of self that Professor Morrell referred to: one that is the agent of actions, the owner of karmic potentials, the experiencer of karmic ripening and so on. Rather, what they did was to show that this self is complex and multifaceted. Being complex, it was liable to change and to eventual total decomposition, as are all composite things. To say that we have no self in a Buddhist context really means just this: there is nothing permanent about us; there is nothing in us that always was, now is and ever more shall be. Vasubandhu, Dharmakiirti and numerous of their followers also considered the possibility that there might be a permanent self, something that remained stable and unchanging while all its properties came into being and disappeared. (Some Brahmanical philosophers actually held such a view, as did some Buddhists.) Most Buddhists tended to reject this notion of a self (which some modern writers like to distinguish from the temporal self by spelling it with an upper case initial: Self). The arguments against it were various, but the principal point that they kept coming back to is that it is impossible to find a relationship between the world of experience (which is always changing) and this supposedly changeless Self. A changeless Self cannot act, since acting requires change. It cannot learn, since learning is a change of state. It cannot be aware of the change going on around it, since this would imply a plurality of inner characteristics within a substance that is supposed to be simple in nature. In other words, this Self would have no connection to anything about which we are concerned in everyday life. It is an entirely counterintuitive notion, and it is riddled with paradoxes. And, since nothing of theoretical or pragmatic value is gained by positing that there is a Self, it is an idea that one might as well give up. There is no point in countenancing paradox unless one is compelled to do so. There is more in the Buddhist position, I think, than mere sophistry, sectarian polemics and stubborn doctrinalism. The whole problem of identity and change is perhaps the most thorny problem in metaphysics, and one should not sell short the philosophers who grappled with it, no matter which side they took. Yours in unrepentent long-windedness, Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 08:55:45 EST From: leigh Goldstein Subject: Re: is there an atman in the house? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- on Tuesday Dec. 7, L.S. Cousins wrote: >"The one who is reborn is neither the same nor different." This is the kind of situation where one, seeking to avoid logical contradiction, which seems to be a motivation for the Ge-luk-bas of Tibet, might say, the one who is reborn is not different, or how could it be reasonable for her to suffer another's karma? And she is not the same, or how could her size and shape (or whatever skhanda one wishes to address) be different? They might say, the one reborn is a different isolate of the same entity. Except as I understand it, a different isolate is a different conceptual way of arriving at the same entity; it might therefore appear to have different qualities since different aspects of it are emphasized (Guy Newland's 'The Two Truths', Snow Lion Publications). Could one define a continuum of mental processes linking incarnations as one entity flowing through time, just as a river is one entity flowing through space? If one dams a river, or throws silt into it, it is affected downstream; yet clearly the river can be very different in two locations, and there need be no single entity that permeates the entire river such as a Naga or a linguistic designator. Would this distinction qualify as different isolate, since the same river is considered from the point of view of, say, its source and its delta; or is this difference too great since the source really is very different from the delta? Considering this kind of question could be a (spiritually) pointless excersize in defining terminology, however delving into it, it appears there could be some value in examining these ideas carefully, even if one were to conclude that efforts to remove logical paradox are doomed. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu University of Colorado fax 303-449-8870 POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 09:01:00 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: is there an atman in the house? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dan, I am having some difficulty replying to your last message without some rearrangement of the statements in the interest of clarity and (hopefully) without distortion. I said, in part:... In spite of all the emphasis on anatman throughout the history of Buddhism, is it not also true that very early on the difficulties of OVER-emphasizing this position were quickly realized and it had to be subsumed under another variation on the Middle Way? For example, if there is no "self," then how can there be karmic retribution, transmigration (however conceived), or moral responsibility? The actor is no longer >there. (And later) >B: While a "self" cannot strictly be admitted into the theory, neither can it >be entirely dispensed with. >D: Sure can. >B: And is not the extreme overemphasis on anatman the fallacy of "annihilationism" (kuken)? >D: Misunderstanding anatman might be (i.e., to think it is the affirmation of an absence), but understanding it correctly is not. * (Your response to my main statement:) The problems you state were not discussed "early on," but were part of the medieval debate stock arguments contra Buddhism. Logically you get three basic choices: 1. No constant, invariant self - in which case holding a person responsible for something they did previously becomes problematic, since they are not the same person. 2. A constant, invariant self. The Buddhist response to this was that if a self (atman) is really invariant, constant, etc., then it is unchanging; if unchanging, it is not being affected by anything; if it's not being affected by anything then it is impervious to moral considerations or actions, since whether the person does good or bad, the self remains unchanged. 3. The Jain position, which is that the self is both invariant and variant. This is precisely the sort of ambiguation that Nagarjuna loved to pull apart, and that Buddha, in the Brahmajala sutta, called "eel-wriggling." Incidentally, the Buddhist response to the objections against option 1 was the aalaya-vij~naana or citta-santaana. * (My current comments:) D: `The problems you state were not discussed "early on," but were part of the medieval debate stock arguments contra Buddhism.' Perhaps our point of difference here is "problems." By "early on" I mean sometime earlier than your "medieval." (Just this morning someone showed me a copy of Walshe's Diigha Nikaaya translation, of which I was not aware (although it was published almost 7 years ago! ...and although it, i.e., the D.N., was the source of the "Eel Wriggler" remarks noted by you above, and by A. Sponberg and L. Cousins in an earlier exchange.) For the benefit of others similarly disadvantaged, let me cite the full publishing info: +++Walshe, Maurice, tr. Thus Have I Heard: The Long Discourses of the Buddha, Diigha Nikaaya. London: Wisdom Publications, 1987, Paper. 648 pp. L17.95 ($34.95) -- at that time.) I am assuming that most would accept the Diigha Nikaaya as on the whole representing the "early on" message of the Buddhist tradition. Walshe comments in the intro, pp. 24-25: "The main points of the Buddha's teaching need only be briefly summarised here. In his first sermon ...the Buddha taught that there were two extremes to be avoided: over-indulgence in sensuality on the one hand, abd self-torture on the other. He had had personal expreience in both. Buddhism is thus the middle way between these extremes, and also between some other pairs of opposites, such as eternalism and annihilationism (see Sutta l, verse 1.30ff. and verse 3.9ff.)" The verses in question are cited as statements by the Buddha himself, not as "medieval debate stock arguments contra Buddhism." * In any case, I am not arguing for putting any more atman back into Buddhism than necessary. I am comfortable enough with a middle way between two extremes -- which, by the way, is not the same as the Jain position noted above (#3), is it? I would also like to note that my friend Murti, the Hindu, was adamantly opposed to distinguishing a (Rhys Davids) "Original Buddhism" -- complete with atman -- from a later Buddhism of "monkish elaborations." (Curious? No?) >D: `Incidentally, the Buddhist response to the objections against option 1 was the aalaya-vij~naana or citta-santaana.' >B: And is not the aalaya-vij~naana the grand daddy of the now infamous hongaku? Bob M ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 10:46:25 EST From: Jagath Samarabandu Subject: Buddhist Research Information Centre ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Following message from Sri Lanka Net forwarded to BUDDHA-L for information. ----------------- Date: Thu, 02 Dec 1993 13:56:00 SLT To: Sri Lanka Net From: "Prof. V. K. Samaranayake" Subject: Buddhist Research Information Centre The Buddhist & Pali University at Baudhaloka Mawatha, Colombo 7 is to establish a Buddhist Research Information Centre with UNESCO assistance. To begin with they have arranged two workshops one local and one international during Dec 93 and Jan 94 resp. The Buddhist & Pali University invites those interested to share with them relevant information and Buddhist research material in your possession and to send views, comments, ideas,questions on this project. Correspondance and replies should be directed to Vice Cahncellor, Buddhist & Pali University, Baudhaloka Mawatha, Colombo 7, Sri Lanka. E-Mail merssages sent to vks@ict.ac.lk will be sent to them. This message is sent to SLNET by vks by way of assisting the the BRIC project. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 14:45:01 EST From: Rob Gimello Subject: Encyclopedia of Buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Does anyone on this list know whether or not work continues on the _Encyclopedia of Buddhism_ that was begun in the early 60's under the editorship of G. P. Malalasekera and was being published by the Sri Lankan government with support from UNESCO? I once had a subscription to this reference work by which I received each fascicle as it appeared up until the mid-eighties. However, the US distributor with whom I had arranged my subscription went out of business some years ago. I have written to what I thought were likely addresses in Sri Lanka to inquire about the status of the project, but have never received a reply. In all, I received 14 fascicles, the last being Vol. IV, fascicle 2, published in 1984 (which included entries fom "Cittavi'suddhipprakaran.a" to "Democracy"). I would be grateful to learn if later fascicles have been published and, if so, where one might order them. Thanks. Robert M. Gimello University of Arizona gimello@ccit.arizona.edu ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 7 Dec 1993 to 8 Dec 1993 ************************************************* From: farris@dmark.llnl.gov.noname (Lorenzo Farris) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Soul/Impermanence Date: 8 Dec 1993 22:18:58 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) In article 624@gap.cco.caltech.edu, salc@ml.com (Sal Cataudella) writes: > -Hi!!! > _ Existence of a soul. If there is no soul or essence, then when one > dies, isn't that 'permanent'? And doesn't this contradict the basic > impermanence tenet? Doesn't some sort of soul that is always somehow evolving, > or changing, thru reincarnation and other means fit better with the > theory of impermenence,which to me seems to mean that nothing stays the same? > In other words, it seems that being dead forever contradicts somehow > the concept of impermanence... I presume that you have read sufficiently to understand that to discuss the existence of a soul is not so cut and dried as to be able to say that there is or isn't a soul. The term soul perhaps isn't relevant. Perhaps the correct term might be self. In my experience, what I call my self corresponds to a collection of memories, inclinations, disinclinations, talents, ineptitudes, desires, which correspond for the moment to a particular physical body. This collection of stuff bears the illusion of continuity as well. However, upon close examination, i.e., in meditation, it turns out that the continuity is illusory, and I can't find any 'self' in there. This 'self' is capable of radical change from moment to moment, yet there is something in there that thinks it is essentially the same self. Go figure. ;-) One of the tenets of Buddhism is that the fact that this bag of stuff is aware means that this bag of stuff suffers. However it's all clinging together, if it stopped clinging together, suffering would stop. You could think of the self as an intelligent, aware, wave on the ocean of being. (Uff, I think I'm going to gag....) The shape, speed, size, etc., of the wave is determined by the conditions it encounters from moment to moment, yet it is always different water making up the wave. In essence, you could think of one of the 'goals' of buddhism is to have this wave dissipate and vanish, and this energy would return to the ocean, coming back in different ways, but not the same as before. Anyway, what it boils down to is that you have to consider what is meant by a soul. Is it a bag to carry karma around in? If anyone can answer your questions in a way you find satisfying, then you are too easily satisfied, and haven't even scratched the surface. -Lorenzo --- Life is a 3D, sensurround, ecstatic farris3@llnl.gov explosion of experience, but only on the cutting edge of the present moment. If that's not where your mind is, you miss it. :-) From: salc@ml.com (Sal Cataudella) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Soul/Impermanence Date: 8 Dec 1993 23:42:57 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) >I have a few questions on the premises of Buddhism, which to the best of my >knowledge haven't been addressed here or in the books i've read.... I am not an expert on Tibetan Buddhism. Rather, I am a Pure Land Buddhist. However, I don't think it matters in this case. The book that I am using is "Gospel of Buddha" by Paul Carus. You might find the answers to your questions in this book. You asked about the soul, death, and impermanence. Let me tell you what it says in LIII:9-14 "There is rebirth of character, but no transmigration of a self. Thy thought-forms reappear, but there is no ego-entity transferred. The stanza uttered by a teacher is reborn in the scholar who repeats the words. Only through ignorance and delusion do men indulge in the dream that their souls are separate and self-existent entities. Thy heart, O Brahman, is cleaving still to self; thou art anxious about heaven but thou seekest the pleasures of self in heaven, and thus thou canst not see the bliss of truth and the immortality of truth. Verily I say unto thee: The Blessed One has not come to teach death, but to teach life, and thou discernest not the nature of living and dying. This body will be dissolved and no amount of sacrifice will save it. Therefore, seek thou the life that is of the mind. Where self is, truth cannot be; yet when truth comes, self will disappear. Therefore, let thy mind rest in the truth; propagate the truth, put thy whole will in it, and let it spread. In the truth thou shalt live forever. Self is death and truth is life. The cleaving to self is a perpetual dying, while moving in the truth is partaking of Nirvana which is life everlasting." >...so how about a soul which is 'not constantly' evolving? Where by >'not constantly' evolving i don't mean static but rather unpredictable. >Why this unusual definition ? because it also seems that in a way >constant change is static too. Everything follows the law of karma and is therefore predictable. Sure, there is an element of chance in the evolution of things, but evolution is a constant phenomena. If things were totally unpredictable then how could anything exist? >_ Reincarnation - I'm not going to touch the question of 'what' >get's reincarnated if there is no soul. My question is whether >being 'stuck' in the wheel of life is truly 'bad' and that one should seek to >attain escape from this (Nirvana). This leads me to the next question... According to the Gospel of Buddha Nirvana is the extinction of hate, desire, and delusion. If you want to live you life with these three things then I guess it is not so bad. However, if you don't want this then yes it is a bad thing. This judgement is up to you. >_ Nirvana - If this is the complete and total escape from,(or cessation of) >suffering, doesn't this (just like a complete and total death) contradict >the basic impermanence tenent that nothing stays the same, forever? >Therefore isn't this state unattainable and undesirable by the very >definition Buddhism? It says in XXVI:7-13 "The Buddha teaches that all conformations are transient, that all conformations are subject to sorrow, that all conformations are lacking a self. How then can there be Nirvana, a state of eternal bliss? And the Blessed One, in this connection, on that occasion, breathed forth this solemn utterance: There is, O monks, a state where there is neither earth, nor water, nor heat, nor air; neither infinity of space nor infinity of consciousness, nor nothingness, nor perception nor non-perception; neither this world nor that world, neither sun nor moon. It is the uncreate [parinirvana]. That, O monks, I term neither coming nor going nor standing; neither death nor birth. It is without stability, without change; it is the eternal which never originates and never passes away. There is the end of sorrow. It is hard to realize the essential, the truth is not easily perceived; desire is mastered by him who knows, and to him who sees aright all things are naught. There is, O monks, an unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed. Where there not, O monks, this unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed, there would be no escape from the world of the born, originated, created, formed. Since, O monks, there is an unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, and unformed, therefore is there an escape from the born, originated, created, formed." >_ Buddha attaining Nirvana and then coming back? If Nirvana is somehow >attainable, and the Buddha did attain it, how can there be various emanations >of The Buddha, since that can be interpreted as coming back? I don't know about Tibetan Buddhism, but as far as I know there are various aspects of Buddha, not just the earthly historical one called Gautama Buddha. Gautama Buddha did obtain Nirvana and will never be reborn. However, there is a universal Buddha which does appear from time to time in different forms to guide us, but this is outside the normal wheel of being. On the other hand, all Buddhas are the same in essence. >These questions have really been bugging me for a while and i'm glad i got >them out! i'm not trying to be a wise guy or trying to somehow prove anything >about Buddhism. I know that this is the right path for me; i'm just >curious that's all! That's okay. I only hope that I have helped you in some way. Praise Amida Buddha! Cris Fugate fugate@plains.nodak.edu From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Thu Dec 9 16:08:53 1993 Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 16:02:29 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 8 Dec 1993 to 9 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 12 messages totalling 599 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Encyclopedia of Buddhism (4) 2. A note to Self smugglers (2) 3. To be or not to be 4. is there an atman in the house? (2) 5. distortions 6. Mind is the Buddha 7. lineage and succession ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 16:52:05 EST From: Mathieu Boisvert Subject: Re: Encyclopedia of Buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > Does anyone on this list know whether or not work continues on the > _Encyclopedia of Buddhism_ that was begun in the early 60's under the > editorship of G. P. Malalasekera and was being published by the Sri Lankan > government with support from UNESCO? > I don't know whether any fascicule have been published after 1984, but when I was in Sri Lanka in 1986, I inquired about this reference work and was told that it was not being continued. Maybe someone has taken over the task, but I doubt that Malalasekera is still working on it. Mathieu Boisvert Departement des sciences religieuses Universite du Quebec a Montreal ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 16:52:43 EST From: leigh Goldstein Subject: Re: A note to Self smugglers ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Wed, 8 Dec 1993, Richard P Hayes wrote: > About the doctrine of non-self, John Richards writes: > > Once it is accepted that pronouns and proper names have a plurality > of different kinds of properties to which they can correctly be > applied, it is not at all unreasonable to argue that pronouns and > proper names can be used to refer to a series of discrete moments > that are linked to one another through a causal relationship. Thus Thanks for your long-windedness. This was a very clear explanation of what seems to be good approach to this problem. However, there remains the perception of a permanent identity in oneself and others. Normally, when I use 'aatman' or self (by the way, is the aa pronounced differently than the normal way of saying atman?), I am referring to this non-existent, falsely perceived object. Now if when I consider someone, I am perceiving a false self, than if a third party perceives that same person, they must be perceiving a different false self, as their false projection of their erronious perceiving-mind would be different than the false projection of my erronious perceiving-mind. Now this person has three false selves: their own self projection plus two others. No wonder the world is over populated! Now in order to get liberated, do all these three selves require extinction? Why should the false self projected by the person themself have any greater ontological importance than that generated by others? After all, they are all equally not there. Or perhaps it is the erronious perceiving-mind (I'm sure there is a correct Abhidharmic term for the mental entity falsely perceiving a permanent self) that requires extinction. Then why say the self requires extinction, when really it is this component of mind that requires extinction? Furthermore, although the permanent self may not exist, in the same way the hair of a tortoise or Mexican food does not exist, this component of mind must have a higher degree of existence, since it is presumably observed to function by a conventional valid cognizer (i.e., someone who is awakened may no longer perceive a permanent self Leigh, but they should perceive an ignorant mind which thinks it has a permanent self). Therefore, unlike the typical Zen-like claim that we are already enlightened since the self is already non-existent, enlightenment would be seen as an actual change in the structure of mind, wherein a functioning component is removed (kind of like performing a frontal lobotomy on yourself without surgical experience or anesthesia, only less likely to succeed). Anyway, am I completely mistaken here or what? Sincerely, Dazed and Confused ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Dec 1993 16:52:57 EST From: John Richards Subject: To be or not to be ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On this matter of self and anattaa, I fear we are in danger of being too preoccupied with the actual word. What it is really getting at though, surely, is whether, really, in the final analysis, there is anything in us that is NOT born and distructible. Every religion it would seem (except _possibly_ Buddhism and Marxist Communism) agrees that there is, though the terminology will clearly differ along cultural and traditional lines. I would not suggest for a moment that "later Buddhists" sat down and said, "How can we smuggle the Self back in by a back door?" But what clearly did happen was that the need to express the fact of there being a "something" beyond change and decay kept needing to be expressed, and since there was a firm foot of traditional terminology against the door of using the word "self", other forms of expression were used, amongst them the ones I cited - Buddha-nature, the Unborn, etc. If, of course, existence is just a series of separate momentary experiences, as the Abhidhamma would have us believe - just a sort of .............. then perhaps there IS nothing else, but if the LIGHT of consciousness behind the flickering camera shots of our EXPERIENCE of waking consciousness is not just a ............, then perhaps, in one way or another, we need a word for it. Early Buddhism was not unreasonably reacting against current popular Hindism's assertions about THE ATMAN, which had apparently become as reified as the popular Christian "soul", and so preferred to deny and reject the word. The question remains however - What do various Buddhists at various times mean by implying there is something eternal and lasting in us, whether we call it the Buddha-nature, the Unborn (and therefore Undying), or whatever? That is why I said, and think, that the Buddha was subtler than simply to deny reality to "self". Indeed, like all great religious teachers he seems to be encouraging the search for self-identity, but warning firmly against allowing oneself (sic!) to identify with anything changing or impermanent. Otherwise, what is the logic in saying, "Whatever is unsatisfactory is not yourself (ie. not really you)"? (Yam dukkham tad anattaa.) We do not need to get ourselves all in a tizz about the WORD "Self". What the Buddha was dealing with (as all religion is) was, "What AM I, _really_? The Abhidhamma would have us believe everything is kha.nika, momentary, just ....................... (Even the paper, or the screen, are not really there.) and that there IS nothing else. God help us, in that case! (if I may coin a scholarly phrase.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 08:31:43 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: is there an atman in the house? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Bob, >D: `The problems you state were not discussed "early on," but were part of >the medieval debate stock arguments contra Buddhism.' > >B: Perhaps our point of difference here is "problems." By "early on" I mean >sometime earlier than your "medieval." (Just this morning someone showed >me a copy of Walshe's Diigha Nikaaya translation [...] As someone else recently mentioned, a translation of the Brahmajaala with Buddhaghosa's commentary and excerpts from Dhammakiitti's sub-commentary is available: Bhikkhu Bodhi. _The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views: The Brahmajaala Sutta and its commentaries_, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1978. Very useful for studying traditional exegesis on this text (and despite several weird anomalies - due, no doubt, to when it was done - I still like Rhys Davids' old translation in the SBB series, especially his notes). Now to the substance. I wasn't suggesting that either the question of self or the notion of the middle way was late. I was suggesting that the sorts of questions/problems/whatever you were raising about them (i.e., "neither self nor not self," a middle way that allows some sort of self back in, etc.) came late (as I suggested, Nagarjuna is the first one to utter that specifically, as far as I can tell). The notion that some sort of self, less immutable than the Hindu aatman, but not restricted to the mutable skandhas, was to be affirmed became the position of the pudgala-vaadins, who renamed their "self" pudgala (person[ality]). These, the earliest "aatman-ish smugglers" were soundly rejected by all other early schools. The Brahmajaala's 62 rejected views are (adapted from an appendix in Bhikkhu Bodhi's book): 18 VIEWS OF THE PAST 4 based on eternalism (sassata-vaada): based on remembering 100,000 lives; on remembering 10 kalpas; on 40 kalpas; and based on speculation. 4 based on partial-eternalism (ekaccasassata-vaada) 1-3: theistic and cosmogonic myths 4: speculative dualism of an impermanent body and an eternal mind 4 based on Extensionalities (antaananta-vaada) world is finite world is infinite world is finite vertically but infinite horizontally world is neither finite nor infinite 4 based on equivocation ("eel-wriggling") (amaraavikkhepa-vaada) those refusing to make definitive claims based on: 1. fear of being wrong 2. fear of the consequences of clinging to a false view 3. fear of being caught in a self-contradiction or of being refuted 4. being too stupid 2 based on "spontaneous arising" (adhiccasamuppanna-vaada) 1. based on arising of perceptions after "dying" in the "thoughless loka", and thus not remembering the previous existence. 2. based on speculation 44 VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE 16 on "aware" immortality (sa~n~nii-vaada) The self is immutable after death, aware and 1. material, 2. immaterial, 3. both material and immaterial, 4 neither material nor immaterial, 5. finite, 6. infinite, 7. both finite and infinite, 8. neither finite nor infinite, 9. of uniform awareness, 10. of diversified awareness, 11. of limited awareness, 12. of boundless awareness, 13. exclusively happy, 14. exclusively miserable, 15. both happy and miserable, 16. neither happy nor miserable. 8 on "unaware" immortality (asa~n~nii-vaada) The self is immutable after death, unaware, and 1. material, 2. immaterial, 3. both material and immaterial, 4. neither material nor immaterial, 5. finite, 6. infinite, 7. both finite and infinite, 8. neither finite nor infinite. 8 on neither "aware" nor "unaware" immortality (n'evasa~n~iinaasa~n~nii-vaada) The self is immutable after death, neither aware nor unaware, and 1. [Same list as for "unaware"] 7 on annihilationalism (uccheda-vaada) 1. annihilation of self composed of the four material elements (mahaabhuutas) 2. annihilation of divine, sense-sphere self [1 & 2 = kaama-dhaatu] 3. annihilation of the divine, subtle-material sphere self [= ruupa- dhaatu] 4. annihilation of the self belonging to the infinite space base [1st aruupya-dhaatu] 5. annihilation of the self belonging to the infinite consciousness base [2nd aruupya-dhaatu] 6. annihilation of the self belonging to the nothing-at-all base [3rd aruupya-dhaatu] 7. annihilation of the self belonging to the neither aware nor unaware base [4th aruupya-dhaatu]. 5 on Views (Skt: d.r.s.ti) about Nirvana in this life (di.t.tha-dhamma-nibbaana-vaada) 1. Nibbaana here and now is enjoying the five sense pleasures 2. Nibbaana here and now in the first jhaana 3. Nibbaana here and now in the second jhaana 4. Nibbaana here and now in the third jhaana 5. Nibbaana here and now in the fourth jhaana Now if you can smuggle an aatman through that tightly-knit net, power to you! If read carefully, I don't think you can reduce that net to a "neti, neti" [no pun intended] that tacitly invites or affirms another, unarticulated "self." It is not that there is a "self" which avoids predication, but rather that (as Richard recently noted) the proper referents of the word "self" are variable, multivocal, multicontextual causal conditions, which have causal [but not self-same identity] continuities with preceding conditions and which, upon the attainment of nibbaana, do not become immortal. In other words, "self" does not have an actual "real" referent; it is a praj~napti (heuristic concatenation) for complex sets of variables that, properly understood, are not reducible to "a self." >In any case, I am not arguing for putting any more atman back into >Buddhism than necessary. I am comfortable enough with a middle way >between two extremes -- which, by the way, is not the same as the Jain >position noted above (#3), is it? It's not necessary; and whether a particular version of what is supposed to be "middle way" is or isn't like Jainism, depends on how one formulates it. (Hua-yen Buddhism, e.g., unquestionably takes a "both/and" position that is very Jain-like.) > I would also like to note that my >friend Murti, the Hindu, was adamantly opposed to distinguishing a (Rhys >Davids) "Original Buddhism" -- complete with atman -- from a later >Buddhism of "monkish elaborations." (Curious? No?) I once asked Murti, given his understanding of Yogaacaara as a transcendental idealism, how could their notion of vij~naana contradict the third link of pratiitya-samutpaada? He answered, their notion of vij~naana has nothing to do with the vij~naana of pratiitya-samutpaada. To have said that, he must either have never read a Yogaacaarin text (which is unlikely), or have been blinded by his own philosophical predilections. There is much that is valuable in Murti's treatment of Madhyamaka and Buddhism, but we need to recognize and bracket those places in his writings and ideas where other agendas are at play. >>D: `Incidentally, the Buddhist response to the objections against option >1 was the aalaya-vij~naana or citta-santaana.' > >>B: And is not the aalaya-vij~naana the grand daddy of the now infamous >hongaku? Not hardly. That honor goes to tathaagatagarbha, which some texts, such as the Lankavatara and the Awakening of Faith hopelessly confute. *************************** I am leaving tomorrow for Taiwan (will be back in Jan.), so I will be unable to respond further should there be any more postings on these topics. I'll jump back into the fray once I return. *************************** ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 08:32:08 EST From: CIESIN_SC@MVAXZ.ERIM.ORG Subject: distortions ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In writing about the first jhanna on Nov. 30, Richard Hayes mentioned the five principle obstacles (niivara.na) to serenity: 1) desire for pleasures of the senses 2) ill will, 3) sloth and torpor, 4) restlessness and worry, and 5) distraction. I've come across bits and pieces of references to these recently, but have no organizing framework of their history, context and function within Buddhist cosmology. I have heard them called the five distortions of the five wisdoms, but don't know what the corresponding wisdoms are, and how it all works. evidently there is an organization of distortion, ignorance, obstacles into families of "sins"??? Would Buddhaghosa's Field Guide to the Five Agregates that Richard mentioned be a good starting point? i would like to know more about this all. if anyone could offer an overview, commentary, recommended reading for where to begin to learn more, i would be grateful. also, can someone tell me how to subscibe to Buddhist-L? thank you, i enjoy following your thinkings, suzanne.czurylo@um.cc.umich.edu ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 08:33:54 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Encyclopedia of Buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Rob Gimello writes: > > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Does anyone on this list know whether or not work continues on the > _Encyclopedia of Buddhism_ that was begun in the early 60's under the > editorship of G. P. Malalasekera and was being published by the Sri Lankan > government with support from UNESCO? I have a bound volume of Vol. IV (to Dvesha), Edited by Jotiya Dhirasekera. This was obtained for me as a gift by a Sinhalese friend who told me that there are two more fascicules out in Ceylon. Unfortunately these were not bound; so not worthy to be given as a gift! Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 08:35:55 EST From: Prof M Pye Subject: Re: Encyclopedia of Buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- For me this is a very topical enquiry. I am hoping to get some information about this from a personal contact (supervisee) when he returns from Sri Lanka in March. The Encyclopedia received support from UNESCO via the Inter- national Association for the History of Religions. The support dried up, correctly enough, because of non-delivery, though (in my capacity as Secretary General of the IAHR) I tried to keep it alive as long as possible. This was about 1986 - 1987. I am sorry I do not have exact information about the last issues to appear directly to hand, but IV 2 (1984) sounds familiar. I would be most interested to hear of any later issues. The purpose of my present enquiries is to see whether there would be any chance of making a case for recontinuance of the subsidy. I would have to make a case during early summer 1994 for consideration by the CIPSH General Assembly in autumn 1994. The amount would not be great in itself, say $2000 or $3000, but this would be important in the Sri Lanka situation. I would expect the response (from the committee on which I shall myself be sitting) that funding could be reconsidered if production in fact recommenced. I.e. delivery first, fund- ing afterwards. Unesco agencies can be very responsible about money!!! This might not in fact work for the Sinhalese. Looking ahead, I wonder if there is room for a whip round for the first reappearing issue (or two) to ensure that it actually happens. The best placed agency to handle it would be the IAHR under whose auspices the grant has previously been received. Could we find say, $10000 from the Buddhist world to ensure renewal of publication, as a one-time fund managed by the IAHR, to be followed up by UNESCO/CIPSH ? This would be a most welcome initiative. I hope to hear more. Michael Pye ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 08:42:16 EST From: John Richards Subject: Mind is the Buddha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Without wishing to get into a squabble with more learned scholars than myself, the following quotations at least show that the ideas I have drawn attention to are, to say the least, more influential in highly considered Buddhist writers than is sometimes recognised. THERAVADA Pabhassara.m bhikkhave citta.m. Ta.m ca kho aagantukehi upakkilesehi upakkili.t.tha.m - AI.10 (similarly 'Sik.sa 234) Rupaa saddaa rasaa .. Maaradheyya.m atikkama, aadicco va virocati - S. I.113 Yathaa aapo ca tejo ca .. tamo tattha na vijjati - Ud. 9 (Even a highly respected modern Thai teacher!) The true Buddha, the Buddha that is clear, radiant knowing, we can still experience and attain today - Achan Chah, True Home 5 MAHAYANA (There is, of course, much more, but I am afraid my knowledge of the Mahayana is, to be kind to myself, "patchy".) Citta-maatra - eg. Lankavatara, Sagathaka vv. 483-487 Svadhaara.m hi yathaa kha'nga.m ... eva.m citta.m svadarsa.ne - Lanka 568 TIBETAN >From the marvellous Palace of Heaven shines the ray of light by which all sentient beings are illuminated and seen - Milarepa 1.39 Since I realised that Buddha and my mind are one, I no longer wish for accomplishments - Milarepa 2.406 The Buddha-face of the Self-Mind - Milarepa 1.234 Oh how marvellous it is to know that Mind-Nature, like the sky, is pure - Milarepa 2.509 ZEN Without the Buddha-mind, where can one seek the Buddha? - Hui Neng 52 >From Gautama Buddha down through the whole line of Patriarchs to Bodhidharma none preached aught beside the One Mind, otherwise known as the Sole Vehicle of Liberation - Huang Po 70 This pure Mind, the source of everything, shines forever and on all with the brilliance of its own perfection. But the people of the world do not awake to it .. not knowing that Mind and the object of their search are one - Huang Po 36 Mind is the Buddha and Cessation of thought is the Way - Huang Po 67 The nature of consciousness (hsin) is not born - Fa Yung The Buddha mind is ten thousand times more clear than a mirror - Bankei q Watts, Way of Zen 162 You should unrelentingly and one-pointedly turn the light inwards on That which is not born and does not die - Hsu Yun 41 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 08:42:44 EST From: leigh Goldstein Subject: Re: A note to Self smugglers ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dan Lusthaus sent the following e-mail to Leigh Goldstein and asked him to forward a copy to this distribution list: Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 19:25:48 -0500 From: Dan Lusthaus To: leigh Goldstein Subject: Re: A note to Self smugglers >Now if when I consider someone, I am perceiving a false self, than if a >third party perceives that same person, they must be perceiving a >different false self, as their false projection of their erronious >perceiving-mind would be different than the false projection of my >erronious perceiving-mind. Now this person has three false selves: their >own self projection plus two others. No wonder the world is over >populated! The text you should look at is Vasubandhu's _20 Verses_ (Vi.m'satika), available in several English translations (in T. Kochumuttom's _A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience; S. Anacker's _Seven Works of Vasubandhu_; for instance). Karma, according to Vasubandhu, is collective, not solipsistic, and we congregate with and are born into groups that see things pretty much the way we do. Hence what appears like a river of water to us will appear as a river of pus and blood to preta, like a river of flame to a hell-denizen, and so on. So humans more or less misperceive the same sort of "self" in themselves and others. >Now in order to get liberated, do all these three selves require >extinction? Since there is no self, it can't be extinguished. (how would you put out an imaginary fire?) > Why should the false self projected by the person themself >have any greater ontological importance than that generated by others? There is no ontological self, so hierarchizing projections is a psychological, not an ontological endeavor. > >Or perhaps it is the erronious perceiving-mind (I'm sure there is a >correct Abhidharmic term for the mental entity falsely perceiving a >permanent self) that requires extinction. Then why say the self requires >extinction, when really it is this component of mind that requires >extinction? One term for the "erroneous perceiving mind" is prapa~nca. And various texts - Paali, Naagaarjuna, Yogaacaaric, etc. - talk about putting prapa~nca to rest (prap~ncopa'sama). For the Paali side, see the splendid (recently cited on this list) Bhikkhu ~Naa.nanada. _Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought_, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1986. Furthermore, although the permanent self may not exist, in >the same way the hair of a tortoise or Mexican food does not exist, this >component of mind must have a higher degree of existence ... Do unicorns have a higher degree of existence than centaurs? Or than round squares? A chimera doesn't exist. > ...since it is >presumably observed to function by >a conventional valid cognizer (i.e., someone who is awakened may no longer >perceive a permanent self Leigh, but they should perceive an ignorant mind >which thinks it has a permanent self). Have you ever seen a self? If so, the Vatican would probably like to meet you! What is cognized as a "self" is a mirage. To be real, according to most Indian Buddhist schools, requires that something produce an observable effect in the world. This is supplemented by some Buddhists (to differentiate mirages from valid cognitions) with the notion that the effect must have an "enjoyer", i.e., one who can experience that effect (you can't drink mirage water; you can't cognize an invariant self). Your conclusion that enlightenment is envisioned more as a removal of or purification from certain mental obstructions (aavaranas) rather than as a recognition of an original self is valid, and is at the heart of what is driving some of the critical buddhist reproaches of hongaku (original enlightenment) thought. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 08:43:54 EST From: "S. Weinstein" Subject: Re: Encyclopedia of Buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Bob, The following fascicles of the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism have been published since 1986: Vol. IV, fasc .3: Demonology - Dhammadhaatu Vol. IV, fasc. 4: Dhammadhaatu - Dve.sa Vol. V, fasc. 1: Earth - Extrasensory Perception Vol. V, fasc. 2: Extrasensory Perception - Goli Vol. V, fasc. 3: Good and Evil - Hung-i The editor of these volumes is W.G.Weeraratne. Dr. Malasekera, I believe, passed away some years ago. I have been getting my copies through a personal contact. Stan ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 09:38:09 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: is there an atman in the house? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dan, Thanks for your detailed and patient replies. I will have more than enough to mull over until your return in January (quite apart from all the stuff I have waiting on my desk at the moment). Have a good trip to Taiwan. Bob M ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 14:07:01 EST From: B Bocking Subject: Re: lineage and succession ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- A note of thanks to all respondents who have suggested lines of enquiry. Is there any study on Theravada lineages I should know about? Kind regards Brian Bocking ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 8 Dec 1993 to 9 Dec 1993 ************************************************* From: Tyagi%HouseOfKaos.Abyss.com@portal.unix.portal.com Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Soul/Impermanence (Sal) Date: 10 Dec 1993 18:11:10 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) 931209 Sal Cataudella asks: |...I have a few |questions on the premises of Buddhism, which to the best of my knowledge |haven't been addressed here or in the books i've read.... I'll answer it from the position of a renegade. :> |_ Existence of a soul. If there is no soul or essence, then when one |dies, isn't that 'permanent'? There is an essence. It is called 'buddha-nature'. Death is simply change of state. What we call 'our body' is simply a form which constantly undergoes transition. It is at base impermanent, yet its substance is not impermanent. The buddha-nature is permanent. |And doesn't this contradict the basic |impermanence tenet? Doesn't some sort of soul that is always somehow evolving, |or changing, thru reincarnation and other means fit better with the |theory of impermenence,which to me seems to mean that nothing stays the same? No, because the buddha-nature is not individual, personal. Masks change, they live and die. Personalities (mask-forms) live and die, grow and decay. They exist, but they are not real (i.e. they are not consistent). |In other words, it seems that being dead forever contradicts somehow |the concept of impermanence... The difficulty here would seem to be the phrase 'being dead forever'. The dilemma would center on what it means to 'be alive' and whether at the 'death stage' such 'living' actually ceases. |I see how a 'static' soul has no place in a philosophy which |emphasizes that no thing stays the same forever, but then neither does |having nothing at all happen for the rest of infinity after one dies... |Just seems too static, that's all. It is different to say that the World of Forms is impermanent and that the essence which provides substance for that formal world is static. Think of it like the 'Conservation of Energy'. The idea is that at one level there is strict impermanence. At others (the level of buddha- nature for example) there may be strict permanence. At another (the level of sunyata) there is neither permanence nor impermanence. |...so how about a soul which is 'not constantly' evolving? Where by |'not constantly' evolving i don't mean static but rather unpredictable. Here you seem to wish to retain a Western concept of 'soul' or the Hindu concept of 'atman'. They are very important and powerful concepts, yet they do not seem to work very well with the Buddhist 'anatman', which posits that nothing about the individual self retains any kind of permanence. Predictability seems rather different than permanence. I don't know how you are comparing them. |Why this unusual definition ? because it also seems that in a way |constant change is static too. Of course it is. You seem to be mixing your levels of description. It is not that the impermanence is also impermanent (though this is arguable) but that the transitory world (samsara) is impermanent. |_ Reincarnation - I'm not going to touch the question of 'what' |get's reincarnated if there is no soul. A Buddhist nun answered me when I asked her this and I thought she had it aright. It is the buddha-nature which is reincarnated, through the force of karma. |My question is whether |being 'stuck' in the wheel of life is truly 'bad' and that one should seek to |attain escape from this (Nirvana). >From the standpoint of one stuck in the wheel, it can be said to be 'bad', yes. From the standpoint of one who is not so stuck, no, it is just as 'good' or 'bad' as any other place. |_ Nirvana - If this is the complete and total escape from,(or cessation of) |suffering, doesn't this (just like a complete and total death) contradict |the basic impermanence tenent that nothing stays the same, forever? Again, it isn't that nothing stays the same, forever (what could this mean?), but that the universe of form is transitory. Perhaps what you are saying here fits well with Nagarjuna's equating of Nirvana and Samsara (in that they are equally permanent and impermanent in sunyata). |Therefore isn't this state unattainable and undesirable by the very |definition Buddhism? Yes, but that doesn't make it valueless to attempt to attain it. |_ Buddha attaining Nirvana and then coming back? If Nirvana is somehow |attainable, and the Buddha did attain it, how can there be various emanations |of The Buddha, since that can be interpreted as coming back? The expression is notoriously faulted. The Buddha never went away. |These questions have really been bugging me for a while and i'm glad i got |them out! i'm not trying to be a wise guy or trying to somehow prove anything |about Buddhism. I know that this is the right path for me; i'm just |curious that's all! Well done! This newsgroup needs more questions. So many answers. Every time a question is asked and considered it grows new wings. |Sal Cataudella |salc@gfx.dmg.ml.com Tyagi Nagasiva Tyagi@HouseofkAos.AByss.com From: sengupta@sunyit.sunyit.edu (Sam Sengupta) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Soul/Impermanence Date: 10 Dec 1993 18:15:50 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) In article <2e37j9$624@gap.cco.caltech.edu> salc@ml.com (Sal Cataudella) writes: >-Hi!!! >_ Existence of a soul. If there is no soul or essence, then when one >dies, isn't that 'permanent'? And doesn't this contradict the basic >impermanence tenet? Doesn't some sort of soul that is always somehow evolving, >or changing, thru reincarnation and other means fit better with the >theory of impermenence,which to me seems to mean that nothing stays the same? I am not a Buddhist, but I would try to answer it as best as I can. When one "dies", one, indeed, dies. No, it does not contradict the basic impermanence tenet. The death of the "one" as a fact does not contradict the understanding that everything changes. Death is necessary for change, this is one thing we cannot deny. So, as a feature of existence, yes, death is fundamental to the extent that one could claim it to be a "necessary" to existence. Why do we need an evolving soul? Evolving to what? Who gets evolved? When I die, my brain, which is the repository of all my memory and past actions, dies with it. If this is dead and unusable, how would it get involved in reincarnation? My position on this would be a strong departure from traditional Buddhism -- I believe this was concocted at a latter stage -- I would admit though I do not have "proofs" as such for my claim. I cannot believe that Buddha himself could advocate this position on the issue of reincarnation. The reason is simple. Who insists on reincarnation? Is it not the person who is trying to become, trying to evolve, trying TO BE? Is he not the person who is afraid that he is not upto some standard? Can you imagine Buddha taking this stand? >I see how a 'static' soul has no place in a philosophy which What is a "static" (or, its converse, "dynamic") soul? >emphasizes that no thing stays the same forever, but then neither does >having nothing at all happen for the rest of infinity after one dies... >Just seems too static, that's all. Excuse me! When a leaf dies and falls on the ground, do we see any existential inconsistency in it? We do not when we look at the total picture. Who was this "I" before it was born? If existence could somehow configure itself to allow the birth of this "I" into this world, to teach him, to mould his personality through a number of avenues at its disposal -- and, at the end, recovers in its fold all its physical elements -- where will be this "I"? In order for it to endure the loneliness of the infinity, it must exist in the first place without the brain and the body. If it is not there, why complain? > >...so how about a soul which is 'not constantly' evolving? Where by >'not constantly' evolving i don't mean static but rather unpredictable. >Why this unusual definition ? because it also seems that in a way >constant change is static too. > But, then the onus would be on you to show us why we would need souls in the first place. Do this first. Why can I not exist, live a very rich and meaningful life, be creative and everything, and eventually die just like a "leaf" of a live tree -- and all these, without requiring a soul? >_ Reincarnation - I'm not going to touch the question of 'what' >get's reincarnated if there is no soul. My question is whether >being 'stuck' in the wheel of life is truly 'bad' and that one should seek to >attain escape from this (Nirvana). This leads me to the next question... This is the crux of the matter. Hey, being "stuck' in the wheel of life may be bad, may be good, but do I have a choice? Can I be outside this stupid, idiotic, wonderful, fantastic wheel and be in 'Nirvana'? To know and understand that THIS IS IT, to know and to appreciate that this life is full of Dukhsa, etc. is what matters. This understanding is what ultimately matters, is it not? Otherwise, it is life on an escapist mode -- even to that person who thinks his 'nirvana' would deliver him out of his daily portion of sorrow and misery. This was not Buddha's intent. Buddha could not have said -"Be illumined and conquer your sorrow". He would rather say: "Be, and face your sorrow!" > >_ Nirvana - If this is the complete and total escape from,(or cessation of) >suffering, doesn't this (just like a complete and total death) contradict >the basic impermanence tenent that nothing stays the same, forever? >Therefore isn't this state unattainable and undesirable by the very >definition Buddhism? Yes and No! What does this mean to ATTAIN 'nirvana'? Is there an I with its full blast of ego entering and reveling in nirvana, occasionally coming back to report to us what kind of state it is? Who is this I attaining it? Something could be classified as desirable or undesirable if I could but know it. In this case, alas, I haven't a clue -- let alone claim that there is/isnt a cessation of suffering. Perhaps, it is like a black hole -- when it swallows this I, there would be no I to report back. Perhaps, its a figment of imagination -- why bother so much about things which is right now unessential? > >_ Buddha attaining Nirvana and then coming back? If Nirvana is somehow >attainable, and the Buddha did attain it, how can there be various emanations >of The Buddha, since that can be interpreted as coming back? These are all his disciples doing. Dont pay too much attention on symbols and forget the concrete things that matter. Suffering is the problem, its understanding is the issue -- not nirvana. Besides, are we really sure that Buddha would claim that he attained 'nirvana'? > > >peace, > >--sal >-------------------------------------------------------------------- >Sal Cataudella salc@gfx.dmg.ml.com >Merrill Lynch >GSI/GFX Systems Warmest Regards. Saumen Sengupta (sengupta@sunyit.edu) > > -- Sam Sengupta (Saumen Sengupta) Dept of Computer Science SUNY Institute of Technology. (315)735-0874 (Home) From: pjm@isis.cshl.org (Pat Monardo) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 16 Dec 1993 12:18:34 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) In article <2el0ad$1uv@pdx1.world.net> stephenc@moe.corollary.com (Stephen S. Chang) writes: >What does emptiness achieve? In emptiness, there is nothing, In emptiness, there are the thousands of things. >no happiness, no suffering, no goal, no concept, This sounds pretty exciting to me >nothing at all, not even the idea of achievement. But in the Why on earth would anyone care about the idea of achievement? Are we gluttons for punishment? >real life, this concept can't be put in practise, to do so fortunately, this is true. >you can't be "happy" because it's a violation of emptiness. a violation of emptiness, that's a good one. if it can't be put into practice, then it is not subject to right or wrong practice. >So what's good about Buddhism? there's nothing good about Buddhism. that's why i like it. it's ultimate goal of >enlightment is only non-existence which tends to >turn a living person into stone. > how can non-existence turn a living person into stone? you are a living person, then you are a stone, sounds like existence to me. i can move. move. move. any mountain. -- pjm@isis.cshl.org (Pat Monardo) From: farris@dmark.llnl.gov.noname (Lorenzo Farris) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 16 Dec 1993 12:25:04 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) In article 1uv@pdx1.world.net, stephenc@moe.corollary.com (Stephen S. Chang) writes: > What does emptiness achieve? In emptiness, there is nothing, > no happiness, no suffering, no goal, no concept, > nothing at all, not even the idea of achievement. But in the > real life, this concept can't be put in practise, to do so > you can't be "happy" because it's a violation of emptiness. > So what's good about Buddhism? it's ultimate goal of > enlightment is only non-existence which tends to > turn a living person into stone. - S. Chang I am no scholar of Buddhism, but I will give this a shot. Emptiness is not supposed to 'achieve' anything. Emptiness is a translation of the word 'sunyata'. I am told by a very wise person that it is a rather poor translation. Emptiness is not good or bad, or a technique. It is a fact of existence. First of all, describe what it means not to be empty. Emptiness is not something you can put into practice. You can only be aware of it. How to become aware of it? There are many people that are much more qualified than me to tell you how. How does one violate the wetness of water? The brightness of the sun. These are just properties inherent in these things, as emptiness is an inherent property of existence. Everything you know and love and fear and hope for in this existence will not last. In this they are empty. Your sense of self arises from a set of desires, predilections, fears, preferences, learned from the facts of your biological existence, and from the people around you, and this self is always changing, although it has an illusion of continuity and stasis. This self is empty. All the matter you perceive around you is empty space and energy. The physical world is empty. The most fundamental fact of life: death, reveals emptiness. What good is this? When you become aware of emptiness, and restructure your mindset in accordance with this awareness, it is very liberating. You lose self-importance, as you realize the emptiness of your self and your existence. And before you get on my case about this: self-importance is not the same as self-esteem. The fundamental tenets of Buddhism: suffering is a fact of existence, and this suffering arises from clinging to, putting our hopes in, fighting, fearing, giving importance to, that which is transient, that which is empty, that which, being without inherent, independent existence, is unreal. With this awareness, you stop interacting with your ideas of the world around you. You interact instead with the world itself. After all, if the world is empty, just imagine what your thoughts about the world are. :-) Awareness of emptiness allows you to let go of your expectations about the world, and allows you to experience it as it is. Emptiness is a poor translation. It has connotations in English that really don't fit in with the Buddhist concept. In one sense, it reflects aspects of the Western concept of emptiness. In another sense, it might be better translated as fullness, at least within my experience of it. Remember, whenever you come across words about other cultures. Built into the original language is an entirely different way of perceiving the world, and English cannot accurately represent the underlying world view. And there are many people who, while perhaps having airs of knowingness, and perhaps even scholarly status and recognition, don't necessarily know what they are talking about. Of course, I might not know what I'm talking about either. ;-) -Lorenzo --- Life is a 3D, sensurround, ecstatic farris3@llnl.gov explosion of experience, but only on the cutting edge of the present moment. If that's not where your mind is, you miss it. :-) From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 15 Dec 1993 to 16 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1993 16:04:32 -0500 There are 11 messages totalling 380 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Antioch Bodh Gaya Program (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 15 Dec 1993 16:06:10 EST From: GEOSH@antioc.antioch.edu Subject: Antioch Bodh Gaya Program ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Namaste, First some technical details of the antioch Buddhist Studies program. The BSP is a three month program in Bodh Gaya, India. The group is composed of 28 students and 4 or 5 faculty members. The program begins with a week of orientation in London. The theory behind this is to help students get adjusted to a different culture that is still relatively similar to their own, before being plunged into something that they have never experienced before. The next stage is 4 or 5 days in Delhi, where the students basically are on their own as far as what they decide to do; there are some planned trips with the program leaders, and meetings during the evening to discuss the first impressions of the Indian Culture. We had to come to grips with a wide range of things, from little children begging to three wheeled rickshaws playing tag among the buses. From there, the group travels to Bodh Gaya, where they stay in the Burmese monastary for 9 weeks. The meditation practicum is required of all students; it is broken up into 3 differnt types. The first three weeks is spect practicing Vipassana. A teacher from a monastary in Calcutta comes in for the duration and gives instruction and advise. The group is dived into four or five smaller group where they can get together and discuss experiences and thought. A meditation journal is also a requirement. The middle three weeks is spent doing Zen; last year we had a rinzai zen teacher from New York come in and give the instructions. The last three weeks of meditation are with a tibetan rimpoche from Kathmandu; this takes the form of meditation in the morning, and Dharma talks in the evening. (All three meditations are both morning/evenning; 6:00 in the morning, 5:30 in the evening; the vipassana and zen also have meditative breakfasts). Also for zen and vipassana there is a weekend retreat at the end at one of the other temples in town. There are three major classes offered, anth, philosophy, and history, and two languages; hindu and tibetan. The students have a choice of taking two of these; the third class is the meditation. The fourth class is the three weeks spent at the end of the program doing independant research in various parts of india and other countries. A final week is spent back in the monastary makeing presentations, fininishing papers, and doing the final choras at the mahabodhi temple. To put my perspectives on the program in perspective, it helps to know my particular background. My first year and a half here were spent mainly in math and comp sci courses. I took an asian philosophy introductory course the beginning of my second year, and started taking a few more philosophy courses after that, primarily western philosophy. Some of the people I ran into in the philosophy courses had been on the program, and had told me what it was like. The thing I remember most that got me interested was being told that it was a great place to study. I had wanted to get away from the same type of people that won't give credit for a course because it has a certain word in the title; yes we have them at antioch also. A basic philosophy behind the program is that meditation is and has been one of the most imprortant parts of Buddhism. Academic learning and meditation are both necessary parts for what we call from our cultural perspective at antioc 'whole person education.' For me, the actual meditation in the morning and evening were almost academic exercises in the study of buddhism; the intensive meditation was waking up every day and being in India. One of the points that meditation is used to provide 'insight' into is the rising and passing away of everything. Vipassana for example, you concentrate on the rising and falling of your diaphram, and say to yourself 'Breathing, Breathing.' If something comes along that is more 'obvious,' say a bus horn (there was plenty of these) or a pain in your leg, you say to yourself 'feeling, feeling' or 'hearing, hearing'. After a while, that becomes less 'obvious' and you gently push your concentration back on to your breathing. The pain is just a pain, and soon it isn't a pain anymore, it is just a feeling. To quote, 'this too, shall pass.' I had never been out of the country before I went to india, so it was an intensive experience. To go from eating our american cuisine to eating rice and lentils at least once everyday, and being on a vegetarian diet after being a meat and potatos midwesterner was quite a shock. One of my greatest fears was what kind of food I was going to eat. There wasn't even any cheese anywhere! After a while though, I began to get accustomed to the foods, and even found some that I still like to make; Tibetan momos-vegetable villed steamed dumplings. (I have the recepie if you are interested.) For independent research, a group of us traveled together up to Kathmandu. My research project was on Buddhist Cosmology and the Symbolism of the Stupa. Kathmandu was almost as much a shock coming from India as India was from London/America. Kathmandu had pizza, cinnamon rolls, music cassettes, hot water, you name it. I was there for three weeks, and then did the long journey (24 hour bus trip) back to Bodh Gaya. Returning to Bodh Gaya was like coming back home. I came to the realization that I had survived, and it wasn't actually all that bad. I almost preferred Bodh Gaya to the more westernized Kathmandu. This was the most profound emphasis that all things pass, and are only take on a good/evil meaning when you apply a label to them. As it became cliche among the group to say things like 'Why do I have to do this paper? It's all sunyata anyways." I am very glad I went on the program. I highly recommend it to anyone who is interested. I've run out of steam today, but if you have anything you'd like to ask, please do. Currently our philosophy professors do not have accounts. They are Ramesh Patel and Dismas Masolo. Dismas is an african professor we hired last year, and Ramesh is a noted eastern philosopher, mainly on the Bhagavad-gita. I'll talk with them when I get the chance about having net-discussions; it will probably be the first or second week of January when our school starts again. Peace. Geosh ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1993 09:59:34 EST From: GEOSH@antioc.antioch.edu Subject: Re: Antioch Bodh Gaya Program ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Antioch College/University is in Yellow Springs, Ohio, about a 20 minutes east of Dayton, Ohio, USA. This is not to be confused with the Antioch of somewhere in the middle east (?) from which christianity sprang. The school has no religious affliation, (other then being an official school of the YMCA, but that was, oh, in the 20s, and only for three months). Our Education Abroad has several programs; study programs in Egypt, a women's studies in Europe, a political studies European Academic Term, and a couple others, including the Buddhist Studies Program. Geosh ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 15 Dec 1993 to 16 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From: bombadil@netcom.com (Tom Snider-Lotz) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 17 Dec 1993 05:37:50 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) Stephen S. Chang (stephenc@moe.corollary.com) wrote: : What does emptiness achieve? In emptiness, there is nothing, : no happiness, no suffering, no goal, no concept, : nothing at all, not even the idea of achievement. But in the : real life, this concept can't be put in practise, to do so : you can't be "happy" because it's a violation of emptiness. : So what's good about Buddhism? it's ultimate goal of : enlightment is only non-existence which tends to : turn a living person into stone. : - S. Chang Stephen, I think what the emptiness achieves is a lack of barriers between the person and the world. Rather than being stone-like, the person is alive, aware, and unafraid. The person can experience happiness and unhappiness; the important thing is that the person isn't dominated by a need to avoid unhappiness or a need to cling to happiness. The person can have goals, too, but isn't dominated by the need to achieve them. Most Buddhists strive to achieve enlightenment, for example, but they know that the key to achieving enlightenment is to let it come to you rather than vice versa. Since I've achieved neither emptiness nor enlightenment, the above is all theoretical, of course. :) -- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= -- Tom Tom Snider-Lotz / Atlanta, GA also: tsnider-lotz@rosedale.org BOMBADIL (GEnie) From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Sun Dec 19 16:04:54 1993 Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 16:00:41 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 18 Dec 1993 to 19 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 10 messages totalling 579 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Mind seeing Mind (6) 2. Mind seeing mind (2) 3. Thinking about thinking 4. HoTe Lucky Laughing Buddha with Children ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 18 Dec 1993 16:28:58 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind John Green writes: > My understanding of this is that there could be no "things" without the > nmind drawing boundaries and giving names, thus creating "things." > Whatever exists would exist without mind, but not as "things." One > man's meat is another man's poison, but without two minds to identify > two "things" called meat and poison, there would be neither meat nor > poison. I am not sure why one would say that something requires a name to qualify as a thing. Surely poison was killing people long before anyone gave it a name. As Patan~jali said: "A man who drinks alcohol without knowing that it is alcohol will just as surely fall on his face as the man who knows what he is drinking." This seems to show that one man's poison may very well be another man's poison. As for meat, I never go near the stuff. > To me this is not sophistry, but a useful reminder not to take culture, > habits, language, the representational systems used to communicate and > organize, as the very things represented. They are only systems. If we > allow them to mediate our perception, we dilute it. Why should knowing what one is perceiving dilute one's perception? Why could it not be seen as enriching our experience? Was anyone ever so stupid as to take a word for something as the very thing represented? This really does not seem to me like a very serious thing to worry about, but perhaps you can give me examples of cases in which people have gotten so confused that they failed to separate their systems of communication from the things they were communicating about. > As for the mind perceiving itself, isn't that like the eye seeing > itself? It can look at a reflection of itself, but not at itself. That's the very point that is being contested. Why should one see the mind as being analogous to the eye (or the finger or any number of things that cannot do to themsleves what they can do to others? Why not see the mind as anaologous to a lamp that illumines itself as well as illumining other things? (This latter analogy was a favourite among many Buddhist, by the way.) Surely if there is anything to be learned by this process of using analogies and counter-analogies, it is that the very practice of using analogies is of very limited value. Let's leave analogies to the poets so that we can get down to some serious thinking. Richard Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 05:46:29 EST From: Andrew Fort Subject: Re: Mind seeing mind --------------------------- Original Message --------------------------- > Meanwhile, here's how I use the koan in my classes. At the beginning > of every year I tell my students that if all they do is mimic what I > say, they will surely fail the course. On the other hand, if they do > not have the good sense to agree with me, or to provide very good > reasons for not agreeing with me, they will just as surely > fail the course. There you go being clever again, Richard. Do you mind if I steal this when I start teaching my Buddhism class in January? Andy Andrew O. Fort RQ021RE@TCUAMUS Associate Professor, Religion (817) 921-7440 Texas Christian University Fort Worth TX 76129 ------------------------------------------------- Please feel free, Andy. Just be prepared to be unpopular. RPH ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 05:49:03 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind Richard Hayes writes, "Why should knowing what one is perceiving dilute one's perception?" The French symbolist poet Stephane Mallarme answered that nearly 100 years ago when he wrote, 'The most beautiful rose is the one absent from all bouquets.' But Richard Feynmann, one of our era's great physicists, made a similar point in describing his childhood walks with his father. His father did not encourage him to learn the names of birds, trees, etc. as this was not inherently knowledge. Instead he encouraged the young Feynmann to observe their relationships, actions, to describe their manifestations in particular observations. This, Feynmann felt was the essence of the scientific approach. Knowing the name, or thinking we know the name, of something, is inherently conservative. What we cannot name often fills us with wonder and curiosity whereas linguistic familiarty breeds contempt. "Oh that's just a sparrow." (That is why in fact there's often so much political struggle about how we name each other. If I distinguish boy from man, but call all women "girls" then I am seeing and in a sense, creating, a different world, a different social reality than if I do make the distinction. To put it another way, when I was a boy, my mother was a girl. But my wife is not.) Nietzche: A joke is the epitaph of a feeling. By analogy, a name is the epitaph of a perception. Richard writes, "Was anyone ever so stupid as to take a word for something as the very thing represented?" God evidently, at least some kabbalists believe so. Let there be light, and there was light-- the word "or" (light) was taken as inherently creative. It was said that those who commanded the power of language were also able to create, as the tale of two rabbis who used magical words to create a calf which they dined on each week. (The Hebrew language uses the same word for both word and thing.) The quest for such power in language is the core of the poet's dream, and the magician's, and the hierophant's. The Sanskrit seed syllable is said to have similar creative properties. But Richard is quibbling here. The real point is not that one stupidly mistakes a word for a thing, but rather that one speaks, writes and thinks as though each word represents a thing in one to one correspondence. That theory we are all stupid enough to believe in, even though we know better. Thus Augustine, a very bright man, proposed a purely ostensive theory of language, as Wittgenstein dissects in the early pages of his Philosophical Investigations. Richard writes, "Perhaps you can give examples in which people have gotten so confused that they failed to separate their systems of communication from the things they were communicating about?" At the ostensive level, this is unlikely (unless one is a kabbalist or magician, see above.) But at the level of discussion of ideas, this is a common enough error. A very interesting discussion of this can be found in Metaphors We Live By, a book by linguists which shows how certain hidden metaphors dominate our discourse. One example of such a metaphor: ARGUMENT IS WAR. He marshalled his arguments. He destroyed his thesis. He torpedoed his examples. He knocked down his points. etc. etc. There is no inherent reason why the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR should dominate our discourse-- it is just an analogy. But until we perceive the hidden metaphor, we unconsciously tend to stay within its boundaries. Suppose we changed our metaphor to, ARGUMENT IS DANCE (the authors argue). This would imply a different attitude towards our discussions, one of mutuality and cooperation, getting in step with one another, rather than defeating our opponent's views. Richard writes, "The very practice of using analogies is of very limited value." Russell Baker wrote, "Arguing by analogy is like trying to eat soup with a fork." (An analogy.) The problem Richard does not grasp-- and that some poets do-- is that analogy is inescapable. There is no thought without language ( I hope Richard will agree with that sound principle of Wittgenstein's) and all language is, at root, metaphor. There is not a single abstract word that does not have its root in some physical concrete phenomenon. Therefore, analogy is inescapable in argument, and therefore while it may be of limited value, it's the only game in town. Unless Richard wishes to construct a pure, unmetaphoric language in which each word corresponds to only one meaning. I believe the Queen of Hearts tried that in Alice in Wonderland with limited results. Richard Hayes writes, "Let's leave analogies to the poets so that we can get down to some serious thinking." Ah, but William Carlos Williams wrote, "Poetry is the reality on which science is based." The truth is, all who use language are stuck with analogies; some poets, the great ones, are extremely sensitive to this and reading them often increases our own sensitivity to the metaphors we live by. Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 05:53:01 EST From: John Green Subject: Re: Mind seeing mind Richard Hayes writes: > I am not sure why one would say that something requires a name to > qualify as a thing. You're right. I said the mind draws boundaries and gives names, thus creating things. How about if I just say the mind draws boundaries, thus creating things? Of course there could be things without names. If someone's mind hasn't drawn a line around a part of "all that is" and decided that it is a "thing," then with or without a name it can't be a "thing," because "thing" itself is a construct, a representational convenience that cannot exist without mind. The "thing" we call "poison" would still exist as it is if there were no mind to perceive it and call it poison, yes, but it wouldn't be a "thing," or "poison." Only a mind can make it one of those. A tree falling does not make a noise if there is nothing to hear it. It generates sound waves, but there is no noise, because no ear drums vibrate. It is the vibrating ear drum that we register as noise. The moon's reflected image on a pond cannot exist without a light-sensitive receptor to record it. The receptor, the eye or a camera, because of its location and sensitivity, gives the reflection its color, its size, its definition and its position. Take away the eye in that particular position and that reflected image exists no more, though the moon's reflected light is still bouncing off the water in exactly the same way. All "things" are like that, little slices of "all that is," created by minds in specific circumstances with specific vantage points, capacities, limitations and communication needs. Without mind, there would only be "all that is," and no "things." > Why should knowing what one is perceiving dilute one's perception? Why > could it not be seen as enriching our experience? Was anyone ever so > stupid as to take a word for something as the very thing represented? I didn't say anything about knowing what one is perceiving, or, as I would prefer, knowing the "word" for what one is perceiving. I mentioned mediation, which is different. It is perceiving the "word" instead of, ahead of or mixed with the thing, having perception distorted by the intervention of a preconceived notion, a word and its baggage. A broad cover term for this is "prejudice." I mentioned "diluted perception," to give a different emphasis. In an awakened state, as I currently suppose, "things" would still be known and could be wielded as tools, but the stream of impressions would flow independently, fresh and vivid, not distorted by inapplicable concepts derived from old impressions, and not diminished by habituation. John Richards' comment that "things" don't exist invoked this perspective for me, so I called it a useful reminder. I'm not at all sure if I took it in the sense he intended it though. > Why not see the mind as anaologous to a lamp that illumines itself as > well as illumining other things? I'll start doing that as soon as my mind does that. I have no memory that I have ever directly perceived the part of my mind that notices, and I can't do it right now. I only have second-hand information about that entity, data it has gathered for me that suggest, but do not show, how it operates and what exactly it is. Yet, apart from this testimony, I have nothing to offer but analogies. I'm still seriously thinking about it! John Green jxg@math.ams.org ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 09:55:43 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Thinking about thinking Rodger Kamenetz writes: But Richard Feynmann, one of our era's great physicists, made a similar point in describing his childhood walks with his father. His father did not encourage him to learn the names of birds, trees, etc. as this was not inherently knowledge. Instead he encouraged the young Feynmann to observe their relationships, actions, to describe their manifestations in particular observations. I fail to see how this is supposed to be a reply to my observation that giving names to things can enrich our experience of them. Surely one does not have to make a choice between observing the behaviour of birds and knowing their names. I have never had the slightest bit of trouble doing both at the same time. I have never had the sense that my ability to observe the habits of black-capped chickadees has been deadened by the fact that I have learned one of the names that cvan be applied to them. On the contary, by knowing what these birds are called, I can read about them in books that point out aspects of chickadee behaviour that I might otherwise have failed to notice. Rodger continues: What we cannot name often fills us with wonder and curiosity whereas linguistic familiarty breeds contempt. This has not been my experience. I extend my condolences to anyone whose experience is accurately described by Rodger's claim. He goes on: Richard writes, "Was anyone ever so stupid as to take a word for something as the very thing represented?" God evidently, at least some kabbalists believe so. Let there be light, and there was light-- the word "or" (light) was taken as inherently creative. I stand corrected. I guess someone HAS been so stupid after all. Now that I think about it, I once trained under a Buddhist teacher who was very fond of getting people to recite some dizzy-headed dhaara.nii in every waking moment of the day. He said it was supposed to make the world a better place by filling it with compassion, and it was supposed to make us better people by filling us with compassion. When I asked him to explain how reciting (with a heavy English accent) the Korean pronunciation of Chinese characters that had once been used to try to capture the phonetic structures of Indian gibberish was going to make the world become a better place, he explained that I was not being very sincere about my practice. ("Sincerity" is a code word that Buddhist teachers often use for blind and uncritical obedience. And soon as it became quite clear to me what my teacher meant by the word "sincerity", it also became quite clear to me that it was time for me to move on.) In reponse to my question "Why should knowing what one is perceiving dilute one's perception?" John Green says: I didn't say anything about knowing what one is perceiving, or, as I would prefer, knowing the "word" for what one is perceiving. I mentioned mediation, which is different. It is perceiving the "word" instead of, ahead of or mixed with the thing, having perception distorted by the intervention of a preconceived notion, a word and its baggage. A broad cover term for this is "prejudice." I mentioned "diluted perception," to give a different emphasis. Now I see more clearly what you were saying, and I think we probably agree. Let me state what I think we are both trying to say, and you can tell me if I am misrepresenting your thoughts. Prejudice as a state of being so certain about how something or someone is going to be that one fails to experience anything that would cause one to modify one's beliefs about it. Surely prejudicial thinking is something that can occur without words (unless you accept the very questionable view of Wittgenstein that all thinking is in some sense verbal). I am not convinced that my cat has any vocabulary at all, but she is fairly obviously quite prejudiced about a lot of things. That is, she sees or hears certain things and reacts to them in ways that are quite inappropriate; she is, for example, quite terrified by the sound of a running faucet. This, it seems, is a prejudice of sorts, since she does not allow herself to notice that water running from a faucet hardly ever does her any harm. Surely prejudice, or the lessons one has learned from experience, are causually independent of verbal thinking in that one can be prejudiced with or without verbal thinking, and one can use words with or without being prejudiced in one's use of them. So if we want to avoid being prejudiced, then I think we ought to work on curbing the habit of making hasty generalizations and then being unwilling to change our views. I doubt that trying to curb our tendency to think in words will be very effective. On the contrary, I think that using language judiciously can be a useful part of an overall program of learning to be more mentally flexible and less prone to partiality, intolerance, dogmaticism and various other habits of thinking that most of us would agree are detrimental to the cultivation of good character. In an awakened state, as I currently suppose, "things" would still be known and could be wielded as tools, but the stream of impressions would flow independently, fresh and vivid, not distorted by inapplicable concepts derived from old impressions, and not diminished by habituation. The way you have stated this still makes it sound as if you are suggesting that concepts and habituation necessarily distort and diminish our experience. What I would be inclined to say is that concepts can distort experiences if the concepts themselves are distorted. But surely not all concepts are equally distorted. And surely not all habits are bad. If you think they are, then I think you may be prejudiced against habits. Let me state this by using an analogy (so Rodger can follow along): trying to avoid bad mental habits by avoiding verbalized thinking is like taping guitar picks over your nostrils to avoid sticking beans up your nose. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 09:58:45 EST From: Tom Lowe Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind Roger K. wrote on 12/19.93: >The truth is, all who use language are stuck with analogies; some poets, the great ones, are extremely sensitive to this and reading them often increases our own sensitivity to the metaphors we live by. The physical sciences are for the most part nothing more than the use of mathematics as a metaphor for reality. Regards, Tom _________________________________________________________________________ Tom Lowe, Box 2050, Jackson, MS 39225-2050 The tygers of wrath are wiser tlowe@ccaix.jsums.edu than the horses of instruction tomlowe@well.sf.ca.us -Blake ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 10:16:55 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind Tom Lowe writes: > Roger K. wrote on 12/19.93: > > >The truth is, all who use language are stuck with > analogies; some poets, the great ones, are extremely sensitive to > this and reading them often increases our own sensitivity to the > metaphors we live by. > > The physical sciences are for the most part nothing more than the > use of mathematics as a metaphor for reality. Is this not stretching the meaning of metaphor rather thin? It seems that when one says that ALL language is analogy or that every tool used by the intellect is a metaphor, then one is taking two very good words out of service. Analogies are analogies and metaphors are metaphors, and there is something to be said for using the words in such a way that they apply to some things and not to others. The thinking I am doing right now as I respond to your comments does not strike me as being aptly called analogical reasoning, nor are the words I am using metaphors (except in the trivial sense that words represent objects and are not identical with the objects they represent). (I know you were being ironic, Tom. But just in case some naive and unsuspecting reader takes you seriously, I responded as if you were not being deliciously facetious.) Richard Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 10:18:19 EST From: Don Phelps Subject: HoTe Lucky Laughing Buddha with Children Does anyone know of scholarly research on HoTe. To begin with, I assume the name is that of a chinese character(s), could someone tell me what the proper spelling would be. The legend is that there was an old Chinese monk who came down from the cold mountain to the city where he would charge for his "psychological counseling" in which he would first demand payment from the customer, then allow the question which he would answer. Offended my such commercialism in a monk, he drew criticism and ill-will. One day some of the folks having the ill-will toward HoTe followed him out of the city. As he headed back to the mountain, his trail would through the villages where the children would run out to great him, and he would pick them up in his arms and the children would crawl about on him. With the money earned from his counseling sessions, the monk had purchased gifts which he gave the children. Returned to the high mountain hermatage, the monk was again traveling light. Is there any resarch into the origins of this similar tale and that of Santa Claus? Just curious this time of year. -- Don Phelps, POBOX 9739, SAN RAFAEL CA 94912-9739, USA (415) 459-4503 dphelps@simenv.com UUCP Mail: marinbbs.uu.holonet.net (415) 331-6241 >>>>> ----- JOY LOVE PEACE ----- <<<<< ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 14:08:17 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind Contra: Richard, I am sure Tom Lowe is serious about his remark. I cited Mallarme and Feynmann together precisely to show that what poets and scientists do is not fundamentally irreconcilable. The language of physical science is mathematics, yet there is no inherent reason why mathematical language should be apt in describing physical reality. Unacknowledged metaphors, such as the metaphors we live by I cited in the last post, dominate scientific discourse. (Thomas Kuhn speaks of them as paradigms.) When paradigms shift, new discoveries can be made. (Plato made a similar remark in re: the relation of poetry and politics, "When the mode of music shifts, the walls of the city come down.") As meditation helps to clarify, all sorts of processes go on in our brains-- if Richard wants to call all of them "thinking" that is fine, but reasoned discourse requires a language. Richard would like to confine metaphor and analogy to their function as formal figures of speech, but that does not answer the argument that our language is fundamentally metaphorical. Unlike Richard, I don't think we have to choose between language and experience because the two are not separable. I am only pointing out that the gain we make in knowing the name of an object, is paid for by a certain loss-- our language confines as it articulates. New discoveries are made when we see in a new way, which means abandoning, altering or modifying old names. THis is a dialectical process. What I want to ask Richard is, what is his theory of language? Perhaps I am misreading him, but it seemed to me that he was in effect proposing an ostensive theory of language, in which each word corresponds in a fixed way to an object. I would appreciate if Richard would use many analogies and metaphors in his reply, and perhaps a few colored illustrations, so that I might be able to follow his arguments. Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 15:02:51 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind > Unlike Richard, I don't think we have to choose between > language and experience because the two are not separable. ointing I don't recall Richard saying that we have to choose between language and experience. I recall him saying that we need not abandon language in order to have experiences that are somehow truer to reality. I think he said that language can actually enhance one's appreciation of reality rather than deadening or distorting our experience of things as they are. This view was put forward as an alternative to the view that linguistically mediated experience is like washing one's feet with one's socks on. But Richard does not believe that language and experience cannot be separated. The appreciation of music, dance and sport all seem to be examples of non-linguistic experience. The sensation of a very cold shower on a winter morning in Montreal strikes me as quite non-verbal, unless "AAAAAaaaahhhh!!!" counts as language. Solving a spatial problem and playing chess strike me as examples of reasoning that are not at all verbal. Watching my cat figure out how to open a door is something that both the cat and I can do non-verbally; she doesn't solve the problem verbally, and I don't think in words as I watch her solve it, and yet I would say that both of us are thinking. Seeing a certain expression on a child's face and realizing she could use a hug seems like a kind of reasoning in which there is no verbal component. But, while all of these strike me as examples of non-verbal (and also non-metaphorical and non-analogical) thinking, none of them strikes me as being ipso facto any more or less true to reality than when I sit down and think about how to respond to a student who asks about how the locative absolute is used in Sanskrit or how the present participle of middle-voiced verbs is formed. > our language confines as it articulates. veries Sometimes, but not always. It also breaks one free of confinements. Communicating one's ideas is a way of breaking out of the prison of our individuality, as is listening to another's ideas. Sometimes the very act of trying to express something enables one to see it much more clearly. Sometimes the failure to be able to articulate something helps one recognize how profoundly confused one is about something. Why characterize all these things as confinements? That seems like a very inept metaphor. > What I want to ask Richard is, what is his theory of language? Let me beg off trying to explain my theory of language, since I don't really have one yet. I'm still thinking about it. Among the things I'm still thinking about is why anyone should have a theory of language at all. There is no doubt that most of the Indian Buddhists whom I study did have theories of language and evidently felt it was important to do so as a fundamental part of coming to terms with reality. At the same time I have to confess that I am still far from understanding why exactly they felt this way. If I'm lucky, I'll die before I figure it out. > Perhaps > I am misreading him, but it seemed to me that he was in effect proposing an > ostensive theory of language, in which each word corresponds in a fixed way > to an object. Yes, you are misreading me, Rodger, just as Wittgenstein was misreading St Augustine in order to caricature his theory of language. I am quite unable to figure out why you would attribute such a view to me. I guess I had always hoped that I didn't seem quite that naive. Thank you for showing me what a victim of self-deception I have been. It's like seeing my face reflected in an adobe wall. Richard Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 18 Dec 1993 to 19 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From: kucera@image2.nlm.nih.gov (Richard Kucera) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 19 Dec 1993 12:47:52 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) In article <2esae0$nn4@pdx1.world.net> mrs@crash.cts.com (Mark Steele) writes: In <2el0ad$1uv@pdx1.world.net> stephenc@moe.corollary.com (Stephen S. Chang) writes: >What does emptiness achieve? In emptiness, there is nothing, >no happiness, no suffering, no goal, no concept, >nothing at all, not even the idea of achievement. But in the >real life, this concept can't be put in practise, to do so >you can't be "happy" because it's a violation of emptiness. >So what's good about Buddhism? it's ultimate goal of >enlightment is only non-existence which tends to >turn a living person into stone. The word "emptiness" is a most unfortunate translation. (I don't have a better one at the moment either...) I would venture to say emptiness could could point to emptiness of Ego, subjectivity, etc. agony agony agony my favorite word...:-) Watts gave a few translations that might make it relevant: Emptiness as blank mind is the way to become a "stone buddha" in the words of Hui Neng (sp?). Blank mind, the end results of trying to get rid of desire(because we suffer because we desire), is not the most true or fruitful meaning of emptiness. The real meaning of emptiness is like space(although i disagree, i feel that void is *not* space). You can't knock a nail into space, but you can have a nail in space.... Another meaning comes from sunyata, emptiness, which can also mean relativity. You make what you think is a localized change, but it changes everything else. So what does it mean to be responsible for everything you try to change...what does it mean to have what someone changes affect you and change you? What does it mean to try to change something? Sunyata can also mean "not hung up, nothing to be hung up on". Sunyata doesn't mean nothing, like our nihilism(oh there's just nothing, nothing really exists, i don't exist you don't exist etc), it means "no thing". It doesn't deny the material universe in all its holy spiritual mind concrete gritty reality--it debunks concepts about it. And it's only a means used by a teacher in a teacher/student living dialogue. It's not a standalone concept which can be exported and sold... Emptiness happens all the time...it's not as if you can stop and stand outside yourself and consciously put something into practice(well, you can put something into practice, but it's never what it is not, that is, it doesn't turn from practice into emptiness, then again...). -- (* /* ;;; // " Richard Kucera kucera@nlm.nih.gov From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Mon Dec 20 16:04:13 1993 Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 16:00:03 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 19 Dec 1993 to 20 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 5 messages totalling 115 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. The unseen seer (2) 2. Children's books 3. Mind seeing Mind 4. Mind Knowing Mind - Go Back a Little ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 05:22:32 EST From: John Richards Subject: The unseen seer Long live academia! We start off with the extemely important question of whether the mind can be aware of itself - which quickly becomes an erudite discussion on theories of linguistics! One more quotation on the original subject. Vij~naataaram are kena vijaaniiyaat? BY WHOM (or BY WHAT) SHALL THE KNOWER BE KNOWN? (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 2.4.14) ("The water takes its colour from the vessel containing it." - (Rumi), so I hope you will forgive a quotation from a different tradition.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 05:23:13 EST From: JOSEPH ADLER Subject: Children's books _The Mountains of Tibet_, by Mordicai Gerstein (Harper & Row, 1987), is a charming illustrated story based on the _Tibetan Book of the Dead_. It's very short -- a read-to book. Joseph Adler Kenyon College AdlerJ@Kenyon.Edu ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 05:56:47 EST From: "Louise C. Mead" Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind Richard talking about Richard, is that anything like Mind seeing Mind. The laughing Buddha must be enjoying this debate. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 06:39:42 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: The unseen seer John Richardson: > We start off with the extemely important question of whether the mind > can be aware of itself - which quickly becomes an erudite discussion on > theories of linguistics! The turn into theory of language was just a detour. You'll have to pardon Rodger and John G. and me for being unable to stay on topic. Now let's get back to the issue at hand. Perhaps you can tell us why you regard this topic as an extremely important question. What is it that depends on a satisfactory answer to this question: > Vij~naataaram are kena vijaaniiyaat? > > BY WHOM (or BY WHAT) SHALL THE KNOWER BE KNOWN? As you know, this line can also be translated: WHY SHOULD ONE KNOW THE KNOWER, BOZO? (I translate the indeclinable ARE as BOZO simply because ARE is a particle that one normally uses to address one's social or intellectual inferiors. VIJAANIIYAAT is in the active voice and the optative mood, which implies doubt or counterfactuality. And KENA may also be treated as an indeclinable meaning HOW or WHY?) So, while I would refrain from the rather rude tone of the Upani.sads, I will invite you to explain why it is important to know the knower. Once that is settled, it might be easier to keep our minds focussed on the Path rather than straying off into the woods to discuss linguistics. Richard Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 08:56:07 EST From: jwsmith@io.org Subject: Mind Knowing Mind - Go Back a Little If we look at the traditional distinction of nama and rupa in the Pali Cannon, we find that "mind" can be shown to represent the last four of the five khandas - feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. Translations of the actual terms into English are open to debate, but I would suggest that now is not quite the right time! Mental formations, such as the hinderance of ill-will can be known via consciousness of mental objects when it arises. However when the object passes, the supporting conditions for consciousness are no longer present and the consciousness ceases. The key thing to remember in this debate of "mind knowing mind" is the Buddha's remark that all conditioned phenomenon are subject to the marks of transcience, dissatisfaction, and non-self. There is no permanent mind, just the arising and passing away of phenomenon of what is considered "mind". I hope this exercise of definition helps to clear up the problem. With metta Jason Smith jwsmith@io.org ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 19 Dec 1993 to 20 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Tue Dec 21 16:28:08 1993 Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 16:01:17 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 20 Dec 1993 to 21 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 15 messages totalling 788 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. The Screen-Saviour 2. Skip Martin 3. The unseen seer 4. Mind seeing Mind -Reply (2) 5. aayu-khaya 6. Minding the mind (2) 7. Two heaps of worthless junk compared (3) 8. Mind seeing mind (2) 9. Two heaps of worthless junk compared -Re 10. Latitude and discretion ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 16:39:38 EST From: John Richards Subject: The Screen-Saviour ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard. It is very naughty to try and wind people up, or to act as a sly foil to make them commit themselves further into the mire! If it were not so, I should have to refer you to John, chapter 3 verse 10. > let's get back to the issue at hand. Perhaps you can tell us why you > regard this topic as an extremely important question. What is it that > depends on a satisfactory answer to this question: > > ..... > So, while I > would refrain from the rather rude tone of the Upani.sads, I will > invite you to explain why it is important to know the knower. Once > that is settled, it might be easier to keep our minds focussed on the > Path rather than straying off into the woods to discuss linguistics. Resisting the invitation to an excursus on Sanskrit particles, upama.m te karissaami. Ever since I got Windows 3.1 my standard Screen Saver has been the phrase "eva.m dra.s.tavya.m sa'msk.rta.m" in large Sanskrit letters, drifting across the screen. "So should one see conditioned things". You will of course recognise the source, the famous verse, in the Diamond Sutra, et al. Taarakaa timira.m diipo ... Like a shooting star, spots before the eyes, a flickering flame .. Try it, and you will see graphically the relation of the abiding screen to the passing, changing objects, and the way in which the screen can represent everything else - but not itself (except as an icon). The One remains, the many change and pass. Heaven's screen forever shines, earth's icons fly. (Shelley was, of course, a dedicated Platonist, and the Platonic distinction between Being and becoming was startlingly similar to the Indian ideas on the subject.) If it were not for the Unborn, the Unmade, the Unconditioned, there would be no escape from the born, made and conditioned. But we bear that Screen-Saviour within us all - Amita-bhaa, the Buddha of Infinite Consciousness! How are we to become aware of it? Not directly, as the knife cannot cut itself - but intuitively, in a mind stilled and clarified by samadhi. Pa~n~naa natthi ajhayato. The more you talk about it, the more you think about it, The further from it you go. (Seng Ts'an) (You will be pleased to hear, I am now going to take a rest from participating in Buddha-l!! I have 4 churches to look after over Christmas! Happy Christmas, Richard. Repent (turn round), and be saved!) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Richards Pembrokeshire (UK) Internet - jhr@elidor.demon.co.uk CompuServe ID - 100113,1250 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 16:39:52 EST From: "Paul G. Hackett" Subject: Skip Martin ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Fellow BUDDHA-L subscribers, It is with great sorrow that I must inform you that Richard "Skip" Martin died this past Saturday at his home in Charlottesville, Virginia. As Buddhist Bibliographer and curator of the Tibetan collection at the University of Virginia, Skip Martin was known to many of us as a teacher, an inestimable source of knowledge, and as a friend. He will be missed. Paul G. Hackett pgh2z@Virginia.edu University of Virginia ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 16:42:13 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: The unseen seer ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Mon, 20 Dec 1993, John Richards wrote: > BY WHOM (or BY WHAT) SHALL THE KNOWER BE KNOWN? (Warning: this message is long due to my lack of knowledge so please don't read it unless you want to help me clarify some things.) It seems likely to me that the different components of mind will differ in their ability to self-perceive. Although I have been trying for a while to gain a precise understanding of what the five skandhas are, I haven't, and from this discussion I gather I am not unique in this. As I understand it, the second skandha includes feeling or sensation. I can feel the texture of the keyboard, not my fingers. I can sense the position of my fingers, which may be a kind of self perception, but it is one part of self (sensing mind) perceiving another part (form or fingers). The argument that being aware of vision is not different from vision doesn't seem valid. For example, vision gets poorer with age, but awareness of vision does not. Therefore vision is different from awareness of vision. Vision is aware of light and form, but awareness of vision is aware of a perceiver and an object of perception. You might define the eye-consciousness as that which is aware of light and form; it seems clear to me that something more profound than eye-consciousness is aware of vision; perhaps this same mental factor is aware of hearing and of touching, in which case it would again be different from ear-consciousness and skin-consciousness, etc. The third skandha, perception, pehaps refers to the identification of objects. For example, my awareness of this CRT is compounded of both raw sensations of color and form, and the presence of an identified object which appears to have a cohesive, separate existence. Here we find that most people are aware of objects, but are not aware of a mental component within themselves which performs this task. We simply assume those objects there as we perceive them (until we examine them). Therefore the mental component which perceives perception must be different than that which perceives. In Dwight Godard's Buddhist Bible the skandha's are called form, sensation, perception, discrimination, consciousness. More recent translations use the term 'mental formations'. This does not seem to me to be an improvement in clarity, although it may well be a decrease in innaccuracy. In any case, this seems to be responsible for attraction or aversion toward the perceived objects. That in me which observes my desire or fear seems quite different from that which generates desire or fear. It is focussed on an object which appears to be internal (desire) rather than external (object of desire), nor does it generate a emotive response to its object. What does the fifth skandha refer to? Does the fifth skandha have sub-components, such as layers of awareness? I would make the argument that a Buddha is clearly self-knowing or aware by any meaningful definition of those terms, and yet that which knows cannot be different from what it knows in this case, or the Buddha's awakened state would be a composite object. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu "Laugh while you can, monkey boy." ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 16:48:55 EST From: nrs2460.bhc1@pcmail.dcccd.edu Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind -Reply ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Friends - I have a question. Is everything anyone wishes to discuss on BUDDHA-L Buddhism? What does the Kabbalah have to do with Buddhism? And what does the theory of language have to do with Buddhism? And, even if some general theory of language has to do with Buddhism, then what does X's theory as opposed to Y's theory have to do with it? Of course, if BUDDHA-L doesn't have to do with Buddhism, then my question is answered. Or if Buddhism = everything that anyone subscribed to BUDDHA-L wishes to discuss, then my question is answered. But I had hoped that we'd kind of hover around the subject, if you know what I mean. A discussion on poetic diction, Mallarme, and analogy seems to have limited application to Buddhism. I can read about pre-, post-, and supra-modernist theories of language on lots of other lists. If I wanted to. Cheerfully, without the desire to offend, Nancy Smith nrs2460.BHC1@pcmail.dcccd.edu ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 20:18:22 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: aayu-khaya To rbm@poe.acc.virginia.edu: Ordinary people are not likely to realize that those who pursue philosophy correctly study nothing but dying and being dead. Given this, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but death all their lives, and then to be troubled when that for which they had all along been preparing finally came. PHAEDO 64a pekkata.m yeva ~naatiina.m pass laalapata.m puthu ekameko va maccaana.m govajjho viya niyyati evamabbhaahato loko maccunaa ca jaraaya ca tasmaa dhiiraa na socanti viditvaa lokapariyaayam yathaa sara.nam aaditta.m vaarinaa parinibbaye evampi dhiiro sampa~n~no pa.n.dito kusalo naro khippamuppatita.m soka.m vaato tuula.mva dha.msaye Look, as their relatives are watching and wailing greatly, each one of the mortals is led away like a cow to slaughter. Thus are people tormented by death and aging. Therefore the wise, knowing the way of the world, do not grieve. In the same way that he might use water to extinguish a shelter that has caught on fire, the wise, learned and skilled man extinguishes grief as quickly as it arises, as the wind blows away a tuft of cotton. Sutta-nipaata 579-80, 591 Being neither philosophical nor wise, I shall miss your wonderful missives, my virtual friend. quiet delete buddha-l rbm@poe.acc.virginia.edu With affection and affliction, cxev@musica.mcgill.ca ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1993 22:00:17 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Minding the mind Jason Smith writes: The key thing to remember in this debate of "mind knowing mind" is the Buddha's remark that all conditioned phenomenon are subject to the marks of transcience, dissatisfaction, and non-self. There is no permanent mind, just the arising and passing away of phenomenon of what is considered "mind". To this helpful reminder of the canonical position, which to my knowledge no Indian Buddhists ever rejected, it might be added that later scholastics debated among themselves on how exactly the "mind" knows itself. As far as I am aware, there were two hypotheses. 1. The word "mind" is really just a term of convenience given to a series of consecutive mental events. When one mental event passes away, it is immediately followed by a second event that has the preceding event as its object. Since this succession is very rapid, it seems as if each mental event is simultaneously aware of its object and of itself. Thus the "mind" is never aware of itself in the present but is always one moment behind. 2. It is agreed that "mind" is merely a term for a series of mental events. Nevertheless, each mental event really is simultaneously aware both of its object and of itself being aware of its object. This position was taken by Dignaaga and Dharmakiirti, who felt that it was important to avoid the infinite regress involved in saying that an action of awareness must have a second action of awareness to be aware of the awareness, and the second requires a third and so on ad infinitum. Incidentally, one of the concerns that Dignaaga and his friends seem to have had was how to account for the practice of those forms of mindfulness in which thought is said to be aware of itself and of the mental events that accompany it. Others may know of other hypotheses that Buddhist scholastics considered. If so, it would be interesting to hear about them. To the best of my knowledge, there were no Buddhists (in India, at least) who accepted a view of a Self that stands permanently and inertly outside the mental aggregates and functions as an unseen seer that witnesses mental events. Such a theory was usually seen as being unnecessary and laden with problems of its own; there was no virtue in adopting a problematic theory unless it was needed to account for a phenomenon that could not be accounted for in any other way. Even the "person" of the notorious pudgala-vaadins was in a state of constant flux and was in no way like the static mirrorlike Man (purusha) of the Saa.mkhya system and the Epic literature. The same can be said of the doctrine of the basic awareness (aalaya-vij~naana) adopted by some of the Vij~naana-vaadins. Recall the statement in the La"nkaavataara when the Buddha is asked why he had not taught this rather bizarre doctrine of the basic consciousness from the very beginning: `I did not teach it, lest some fools take it that I was talking about a self (aatman).' In looking back over several messages that John Richards has been sending in during the past couple of weeks, I get the impression he would feel more comfortable if he could find a permanent Self lurking around in the shadows of the five aggregates. Would it be impertinent to ask why? Is it supposed that finding this skulking shadowy self is going to make life in general, or Buddhist practice in particular, easier in some way? If it makes sitting or thinking any easier, or if it facilitates smiling at crabby bus drivers or being more patient with overwrought undergraduates, then by all means let's make room for the damn Self and declare the last 2500 years of Buddhist philosophy fundamentally wrong. There are reasons why I'd prefer to leave the Self out in the cold and barren reaches of the philosophical wasteland, which I shall state forthwith. But since this will require a longness of wind that will surely clutter the cyberways, let me state my case in another message. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 07:01:15 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Two heaps of worthless junk compared This message is being prepared by a human being who is using a computer. The human being and the computer are fairly different from one another in appearance and behaviour, but there are some striking similarities, especially when both are viewed from the reductionist perspective of Buddhist abhidharma. In particular: * Both the computer and the human being are modular; they are very complex systems made up of parts, some of which are concrete and physical (hardware, ruupa-skandha) and some of which are more abstract and organizational (software, sa.mskaara-skandha). * Both the computer and the human being have several input devices and various output devices; in computers they are called ports, and in human beings they are called dvaara (doors). * In both of these systems, the modules can be replaced one at a time with the result of changing the overall behaviour of the system. In both of these systems, one could, over the course of several years, gradually replace every module until eventually one had a system that had not a single module that was identical with the system that one began with. Despite this modular substitution, one could speak of having the same computer or the same human being, and one could say of either one that it had changed over the years. * In each case, what makes the whole system dynamic and functional is the very fact that it is modular and can undergo changes that adapt it for various situations. If the systems were fixed and inert, they would lock up and crash. They would not work at all. * In neither case is the complete system made by a single maker. Nor is it used by a single user. Nor does it have a single purpose. Each has thousands of designers, makers, users and functions. Not only is this true of the system as a whole, but it is true of every part. Each is the complex creation of a vast multitude of creators and purposes, but there is no need to speak of a Creator or of a Telos or of a Logos. Allow me to quote verbatim from an article that is now in press: This view of the human being and its place in the world that I have been describing is not the view of any one Buddhist thinker. Rather, it is a mosaic put together over the course of some fifteen centuries by scores of Buddhist philosophers from south and central Asia. These philosophers differed from one another in many respects, but they shared a preoccupation with the problem of change and transformation, and they agreed on the principle that modularity is the only way to account for such change. Like Charles Darwin and other nineteenth century biologists of Europe, who built their theory of evolution upon the ideas of modularity and dissociability and in so doing argued against the essentialism of anti-evolutionists such as the paleontologist Georges Cuvier, the Buddhists of India developed the idea that change is possible only in modular beings who are capable of replacing their various components at differing rates of change. If there were such a thing as a being whose consciousness was simple rather than modular, such a being could neither learn nor think nor perform any kind of mental activity. And so any being who is capable of thinking about anything at all must be modular. And of course the more complex a modular being is, the greater the likelihood of internal inconsistency and other forms of physical and psychological chaos. Complexity is both good news and bad news. The good news is that it enables us to function at all. It is the very nature of life, and without it there could be nothing that was in any sense alive. The bad news is that most of the time we are all mixed up, itching and confused. And the only way to scratch the itch is to disassemble the components. Here is something that I find puzzling (and therefore quite interesting): Most people feel fairly comfortable in saying about a computer that it is nothing more than an organized arrangement of hardware and software that could have been otherwise but happens to be as it is. People do not feel a need to say that in addition to all these hard and soft components there is a computer that has computerhood; rather, they say the computer IS these hard and soft components taken as a whole. Oddly, however, people are reluctant to say the same things of themselves. This may show that most human beings are a lot smarter and much less sentimental about computers than they are about human beings, especially those human beings about whom they say "This is I." Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 09:52:52 EST From: Jason Smith Subject: Re: Minding the mind ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I'm certain that there are many studied theories on the matter of the mind knowing the mind. The two that Richard Hayes presented are interesting. However, at the risk of being accused of "flaming", I wonder if the answer to our question is to be found somewhere besides the learned considerations of others. What about the meditative work? Buddhism is about the confirmation of the dhamma (dharma) for oneself. The problem of the infinite regress does not happen in practice. As for the matter of the mind being a thought-moment or two behind the present, the gap is very small. There really is no evidence that there is anything behind which the mind is lagging. The matter of non-self is interesting. Most students of the practice that I know struggle with it. Overcoming this wrong view is essential for success in the path. Have a look at the Path of Purification for confirmation. Do we revise what we teach because it is difficult to comprehend? Simply, no. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 10:05:00 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: Mind seeing Mind -Reply ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Mon, 20 Dec 1993 nrs2460.bhc1@pcmail.dcccd.edu wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Friends - > > I have a question. Is everything anyone wishes to discuss on > BUDDHA-L Buddhism? > > What does the Kabbalah have to do with Buddhism? And what does > the theory of language have to do with Buddhism? And, even if > some general theory of language has to do with Buddhism, then > what does X's theory as opposed to Y's theory have to do with it? > Of course, if BUDDHA-L doesn't have to do with Buddhism, then my > question is answered. Or if Buddhism = everything that anyone > subscribed to BUDDHA-L wishes to discuss, then my question is > answered. > > But I had hoped that we'd kind of hover around the subject, if > you know what I mean. A discussion on poetic diction, Mallarme, > and analogy seems to have limited application to Buddhism. I can > read about pre-, post-, and supra-modernist theories of language > on lots of other lists. If I wanted to. > > Cheerfully, without the desire to offend, > > Nancy Smith > nrs2460.BHC1@pcmail.dcccd.edu ------------------------------------------------------ Nancy --- Thank God (or Whomever/Whatever) the various xxyy-modernist theories of language are dying, dead, obsolescentizing, whatever... Continuing forward (?) . . .I have no idea what the Kabbalah have to do with Buddhism -- but I would love to know. I am what might be called a "Buddhist ecumenicist", and I am astonished at how little interest there is in this area not only by the JCIs (the Jewish-Christian-Islamic crowd), but also from the "pure, clear" Theravadins. I did ask about "upaya" recently and only received one response. And, no, I have absolutely no intention of getting involved in this one. Can Buddhists accommodate VARIOUS rationalizations of the religious experience, or is this not a permissible question? (I feel that I am entitled to ask at least one question w/o having to get embroiled.) And what, precisely, are "Buddhists"? If you are really interested in the Kabbalah, let me remind you of Heifetz, Harold, comp. *Zen and Hasidism; the Similarities between Two Spiritual Disciplines* Wheaton Ill.: Theosophical Pub House, 1978. (NO -- I am not saying that the Kabbalah and Hasidism are the same thing -- but whatever.) Bob M ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University Compuserve: 71640,1036 St. Louis, MO 63130-2030 (314) 862-5418 (voice) ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 10:10:08 EST From: Anna Yamada Subject: Re: Mind seeing mind ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Now, to test these assertions, or possibility of assertions, would one not find an ally in cognitive science? The mind as a neural net. Memory as RNA transcriptions--chaotic, ephemeral, redolent, redundant, error-prone, and easily upset. Perception as synapses carrying charges via squirts of neurotransmitters, whose delicate balance can mean the difference between genius and schizophrenia states, between mania and catatonia, between agitation and vegetative coma, between Brooke Shields and her Calvins? Seriously folks, I've been in a coma. There is awareness without perception, sensory or otherwise.--and it is a bitch to go through. Ditto, slice up someone's temporal lobes and they will still have awareness. Pith a frog and it will know you've done so (or at least its eeg will fire off some very angry charges). Point-being: these theories must have some basis or demonstratability in external reality for them to be useful, if not true. In Japan, they do use meditation to help cure schizophrenics, or at least bring some insight to the onset of symptoms and thus lessen the dis-ease of the condition. In Japan, Morita therapy addresses the actions of the ill, not the thought content or style. Functionality is not cure, but if a person can fake it long enough, while being made aware that he/she is totally full up with symptoms, what is the difference? These are approaches based on zen. Has anyone heard of Zen-Madness? I really would like to know if anyone on this list has a bib or knowledge of how these theories can be put to good use for the help of the mad and less-than-mad in external, not cyber or dojo, reality. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 13:36:01 EST From: Dylan Tweney <6500dft@UCSBUXA.BITNET> Subject: Re: Two heaps of worthless junk compared ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard, regarding your informative and entertaining comparison of computers and human beings: >And the only way to scratch the itch is to disassemble the components. Does this mean that the only way to straighten things out is to take everything apart, to reduce the whole construction to its constituents? If I did that with my computer, I'd be unable to follow discussions on BUDDHA-L any more; at least until I put it back together. So, regarding the "disassembly" of one's self: is this merely for the purposes of understanding how we're put together? In order to find the problem components and fix them? To put the parts back together in better order? Or are we supposed to leave everything scattered, and not try to put things back together at all? In other words, is the disassembly of the self something that's done in for its own sake (in order to get rid of the self as a whole) or is it done for therapeutic (to fix the self) or educational (to learn about the self) purposes? I'd be interested both in the answers that Buddhist or canonical philosophy has given, and in your own opinion. And my apologies if I've stretched your analogy too far. Dylan Tweney UC Santa Barbara ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 13:36:13 EST From: "Peter D. Junger" Subject: Re: Two heaps of worthless junk compared ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Bravo! But I do have one small quibble when Richard says: >Here is something that I find puzzling (and therefore quite >interesting): Most people feel fairly comfortable in saying about >a computer that it is nothing more than an organized arrangement >of hardware and software that could have been otherwise but >happens to be as it is. People do not feel a need to say that in >addition to all these hard and soft components there is a >computer that has computerhood; rather, they say the computer IS >these hard and soft components taken as a whole. Most computer types don't talk about hardware; they say that a computer is a "LISP machine" or a "Unix box", which suggests to me that they tend to fall into a "software only" view of reality. And when one asks them where the software _is_ they are likely to wander off into the most peculiar metaphysical jungles, which would perhaps not merit mentioning were it not for the fact that issues involving the patenting and copywriting of software become metaphysical illnesses for which the only known (meta/metta)physic is a study of Buddhist logic. With metta, ---Peter Peter D. Junger Case Western Reserve University Law School, Cleveland, OH Internet: JUNGER@SAMSARA.LAW.CWRU.Edu -- Bitnet: JUNGER@CWRU ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 13:36:27 EST From: Tim Williams Subject: Re: Mind seeing mind ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In addition to Hirai's book on Morita therapy, thera are a series of books by David Reynolds, all covering the same ground, the most thorough being " Playing Ball On Running Water." Usually referred to as Zen disease, there are also a collection of teishos by Rinzai, titled " Notes To A Sick Friend" that I read in Japan last year, though I've not seen it here in English. Moountain View Zen Center in California also has a trilogy, the first called "That Which You Are Seeking Is Causing You To Seek" that address the sickness as identified as depression. Ikkyu also had a short treatise on Zen sicknesses. Tim Williams On Tue, 21 Dec 1993, Anna Yamada wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > Now, to test these assertions, or possibility of assertions, would > one not find an ally in cognitive science? > > The mind as a neural net. Memory as RNA transcriptions--chaotic, > ephemeral, redolent, redundant, error-prone, and easily upset. > > Perception as synapses carrying charges via squirts of > neurotransmitters, whose delicate balance can mean the difference between > genius and schizophrenia states, between mania and catatonia, between > agitation and vegetative coma, between Brooke Shields and her Calvins? > > Seriously folks, I've been in a coma. There is awareness without > perception, sensory or otherwise.--and it is a bitch to go through. > > Ditto, slice up someone's temporal lobes and they will > still have awareness. > > Pith a frog and it will know you've done so (or at least its eeg will > fire off some very angry charges). > > Point-being: these theories must have some basis or demonstratability > in external reality for them to be useful, if not true. > > In Japan, they do use meditation to help cure schizophrenics, or at > least bring some insight to the onset of symptoms and thus lessen the > dis-ease of the condition. > > In Japan, Morita therapy addresses the actions of the ill, not the > thought content or style. Functionality is not cure, but if a person > can fake it long enough, while being made aware that he/she is totally > full up with symptoms, what is the difference? > > These are approaches based on zen. > > Has anyone heard of Zen-Madness? > > I really would like to know if anyone on this list has a bib or > knowledge of how these theories can be put to good use for the > help of the mad and less-than-mad in external, not cyber or dojo, > reality. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 13:36:40 EST From: nrs2460.bhc1@pcmail.dcccd.edu Subject: Two heaps of worthless junk compared -Re ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Well, now, to look at Richard's analysis - If we think of ourselves and others as computers, will we also treat animate beings like computers? It seems that something will be lost. And what is the difference, if it is not in a stage of increased volition and sensitivity, an observation which often leads to the "mistake" of attributing a soul to animate beings? You will remember Descartes's cruelty and stupidity with animals when he tried to prove that they were merely machines. Or does this koan require treating computers the way we treat the higher animals? Should we send Pentiums more electricity to assuage their hunger? (I know we have to keep their cages cooler, that's for sure.) Isn't it in the Dhammapda where Buddha enjoins people not to kill things without cause, as they want to live as we want to live? (I am quite clear, Richard, that you are very kind to animals, so please don't think I'm criticizing you in your behavior.) I just think that certain ideas may lead to certain behaviors in certain naive folks. And that's another question I have. Does the philosophy of Buddhism, as opposed to the meditative practices of Buddhism, cause behavioral change? Do people do or refrain from doing things (on as microscopic a level as you'd like) because of Buddhist philosophy, or does the philosophy come afterward to explain the behaviors made natural by practice? Which came first, the chicken or the silicon chip? Scrambledly, Nancy Smith nrs2460.BHC1@pcmail.dcccd.edu ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 13:36:52 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Latitude and discretion ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Nancy Smith is absolutely right. Discussions of poetics, philosophy of language and other systems of mysticism have absolutely no relevance to Buddhism or Buddhist scholarship. Everyone knows that Buddhist scholarship in the West is self- contained and self-sufficient with no relatino to other systems of thought. Besides, thinking about language is irrelevant for those who spend their lives translating from Sanskrit to English. Gosh, why should a translator have a theory of language? Language is entirely transparent-- Buddhism can be translated into Western terms via hand held computer, just the way it was translated into Tibetan, Japanese and other cultures effortlessly and with no problems of interpretation. Certainly no problems with language, nothing that a Berlitz couldn't handle: just punch in dukkha and you'll get suffering. Personally, I blame the moderator! If he would just hold his finger in the air, or hold up a flower and smile- instead of insisting on putting his ideas into words all the time, we'd probably get somewhere.Meanwhile, if we canjust get everyone who talks about what we're not interested in to shut up, oh what a happy nice place the world will be. Cheerfully, enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 20 Dec 1993 to 21 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Dec 22 17:35:01 1993 Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 16:03:14 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 21 Dec 1993 to 22 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 11 messages totalling 738 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. The unseen seer 2. Thinking about thinkers who think 3. Minding the mind 4. Logos 5. two heaps, etc. (2) 6. Buddhism and Language 7. Humans vs Computers was two heaps.. 8. Two heaps (2) 9. Course syllabus available ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 17:00:08 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: The unseen seer ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Leigh Charles Goldstein writes: > > > As I understand it, the second skandha includes feeling or sensation. I > > can feel the texture of the keyboard, not my fingers. I can sense the > > position of my fingers, which may be a kind of self perception, but it is > > one part of self (sensing mind) perceiving another part (form or fingers). > > The argument that being aware of vision is not different from vision > > doesn't seem valid. For example, vision gets poorer with age, but > > awareness of vision does not. Therefore vision is different from > > awareness of vision. Vision is aware of light and form, but awareness of > > vision is aware of a perceiver and an object of perception. > > Leigh, > I don't think this is quite right. The second khandha is one's > feeling response to the mind's object. If you touch a burning surface, > there is an experience of heat i.e. the first aggregate and there is > a response of pain i.e. the second aggregate. > > > You might > > define the eye-consciousness as that which is aware of light and form; it > > seems clear to me that something more profound than eye-consciousness is > > aware of vision; perhaps this same mental factor is aware of hearing and > > of touching, in which case it would again be different from > > ear-consciousness and skin-consciousness, etc. > > Surely this is what is meant by subsequent mind consciousness > that assembles sensory and mental data in various ways. > > > The third skandha, perception, pehaps refers to the identification of > > objects. For example, my awareness of this CRT is compounded of both raw > > sensations of color and form, and the presence of an identified object > > which appears to have a cohesive, separate existence. Here we find that > > most people are aware of objects, but are not aware of a mental component > > within themselves which performs this task. We simply assume those > > objects there as we perceive them (until we examine them). Therefore the > > mental component which perceives perception must be different than that > > which perceives. > > Agreed. In fact identification is a much better translation of sa~n~naa/ > sa.mj~naa than the common English rendering of perception which is far > too vague. > > > In Dwight Godard's Buddhist Bible the skandha's are called form, sensation, > > perception, discrimination, consciousness. More recent translations use > > the term 'mental formations'. This does not seem to me to be an > > improvement in clarity, although it may well be a decrease in innaccuracy. > > In any case, this seems to be responsible for attraction or aversion > > toward the perceived objects. That in me which observes my desire or fear > > seems quite different from that which generates desire or fear. It is > > focussed on an object which appears to be internal (desire) rather than > > external (object of desire), nor does it generate a emotive response to > > its object. > > Well, yes. I think that is a major part of it. I take sankhaara as > meaning 'fashioning' or 'constructing'. One fashions or constructs a pot, > for example. This is a quite literal rendering > of it, but I think the point is that it is the mind's 'doing'. > > > What does the fifth skandha refer to? Does the fifth skandha have > > sub-components, such as layers of awareness? I would make the argument > > that a Buddha is clearly self-knowing or aware by any meaningful > > definition of those terms, and yet that which knows cannot be > > different from what it knows in this case, or the Buddha's awakened state > > would be a composite object. > > I don't think there is any difference in ordinary non-meditational > experience between saying that successive (not necessarily adjacent) > consciousnesses have objects of different orders of complexity and > saying that consciousness has layers. The case for consciousness is > the same as for e.g. sense data. Without careful observation we experience > the physical world as a varied totality. Similarly, consciousness is > complex until or unless we can catch the fleeting shifts. > > Well, I think for the earlier Buddhists both the body (gross and subtle) > and the mind (gross and subtle) of a Buddha are composite objects. > However, there is something known which is not composite. The knowledge > of that effects and transforms the mind and to some extent the body of > one who has known or awakened to that. Of course many Mahaayaanists > would want to say more than this. > > Lance Cousins > > -- > Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester > Home Address: > 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, > MANCHESTER, > UK, M20 4QA > Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 > Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 07:01:49 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Thinking about thinkers who think One occasionally hears people dismissing the value for Buddhists of intellectual work such as scholasticism and philosophical reflection. My old friend Gregory Schopen, for example, has dedicated most of his prodigious scholastic talents to showing how little influence the Buddhist intellectuals had on the quotidian life of Buddhist monks and lay folk. Gregory comes by his anti-intellectualism honestly; he's from a farming community in the American midwest where a good tractor mechanic had considerably more social standing than a good abhidharma specialist. In his note of December 2, John Richards refers in passing to the work of scholars "who much prefer analysis and classification to uncomfortable sessions of sitting cross-legged for protracted periods." One could just as easily dismiss the work of practitioners of dhyaana who prefer sitting cross-legged to uncomfortable sessions of thinking for protracted periods. But what is the point of being so dismissive of those who do not have the same mentality as oneself and who do not share one's own prejudices? In a somewhat similar spirit of questioning the practices of the Buddhist scholastics to whom I had referred in one of my messages yesterday, Jason Smith brings up an interesting topic for further reflection. With reference to the various scholastic theories on whether thought can think about itself (or whether the mind can know itself), he says: ...I wonder if the answer to our question is to be found somewhere besides the learned considerations of others. What about the meditative work? The classical Buddhist scholastics, of course, would answer that their philosophical musings WERE their meditative work. For the likes of such people as Naagaarjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaaga, Dharmakiirti and Kamala"siila, the central practice was thinking systematically and thoroughly and critically about things. They saw this kind of work as an effective method of dislodging some of the deeply embedded prejudices and habits of thinking that impede the discovery of reality. Unless one does some serious work at uprooting the kinds of prejudices that have developed through hasty and uncritical acceptance of what one has been taught, one's experiences will simply reinforce one's opinions. Put a shallow thinker into deep samaadhi and chances are pretty good he will simply come out deeply opinionated. (Sorry, I forgot to include women in that statement. Yes, they can also be deeply opinionated.) I think Jason has put his finger directly on the central problem when he says: Buddhism is about the confirmation of the dhamma (dharma) for oneself. I would tend to agree that one of the central weaknesses in much of the edifice of Buddhist discipline is that it is too often all about CONFIRMING the Buddha's teachings for oneself rather than INVESTIGATING those teachings to see whether or not they are true. For this process of investaigation to have any wholesome effects at all, I would submit that it must be attended by a genuine willingness to set aside teachings if they are dubious. Paul Williams stated the matter quite well in his book _Mahayana Buddhism_ when he observed that praj~naa is usually glossed as ni"scaya (certainty, conviction) and adds `The problem with the world is not that there is too little praj~naa but that there is far too much.' Alas, the human race is awash in a sea of firmly held convictions. If only a few more of them were warranted! Jason concludes by saying: Do we revise what we teach because it is difficult to comprehend? Simply, no. Is one permitted to ask: why not? Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 08:43:02 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Minding the mind ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard P Hayes writes: > To this helpful reminder of the canonical position, which to my > knowledge no Indian Buddhists ever rejected, it might be added that > later scholastics debated among themselves on how exactly the "mind" > knows itself. As far as I am aware, there were two hypotheses. > > 1. The word "mind" is really just a term of convenience given > to a series of consecutive mental events. When one mental > event passes away, it is immediately followed by a second > event that has the preceding event as its object. Since > this succession is very rapid, it seems as if each mental > event is simultaneously aware of its object and of itself. > Thus the "mind" is never aware of itself in the present > but is always one moment behind. I don't know if this amounts to a third hypothesis, but the Pali abhidhamma tradition is somewhat more complex than this if still on the same lines. You actually have a series of mind door consciousnesses which assemble experience as we ordinarily know it. > 2. It is agreed that "mind" is merely a term for a series of > mental events. Nevertheless, each mental event really is > simultaneously aware both of its object and of itself > being aware of its object. This position was taken by > Dignaaga and Dharmakiirti, who felt that it was important > to avoid the infinite regress involved in saying that an > action of awareness must have a second action of awareness > to be aware of the awareness, and the second requires a > third and so on ad infinitum. Richard, There must be something wrong here. I don't know much about the logicians; so I may be just misunderstanding. However, I don't see how there could be an infinite regress without infinite time. Clearly in practice you can only go a short way with awareness of awareness of awareness, etc. before you get fed up or confused. (It can of course be a good koan!) I can see how this could be an objection to some forms of the Yogaacaarin theory of bhaagas, but I don't see how it could be a problem for theories which place second and third order awareness in later moments of consciousness. Or is it supposed that consciousness is always self-aware in experience? I would have thought this blatantly untrue. > Incidentally, one of the concerns that Dignaaga and his > friends seem to have had was how to account for the > practice of those forms of mindfulness in which thought is > said to be aware of itself and of the mental events that > accompany it. > This is not a problem if you consider that there can be forms of mind door consciousness which assemble all the results of previous awarenesses. Note that the developed form of this theory is characteristic of late Pali writers who may be responding to some of the concerns of North Indian Buddhist thinkers. > Others may know of other hypotheses that Buddhist scholastics > considered. If so, it would be interesting to hear about them. To > the best of my knowledge, there were no Buddhists (in India, at > least) who accepted a view of a Self that stands permanently and > inertly outside the mental aggregates and functions as an unseen > seer that witnesses mental events. Such a theory was usually seen as > being unnecessary and laden with problems of its own; there was no > virtue in adopting a problematic theory unless it was needed to > account for a phenomenon that could not be accounted for in any > other way. Agreed. > Even the "person" of the notorious pudgala-vaadins was in a state of > constant flux and was in no way like the static mirrorlike Man > (purusha) of the Saa.mkhya system and the Epic literature. Have you a source for this? As far as I know, the position of the Personalists was that the person was indescribable and its relationship to the five aggregates was indescribable. Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 08:43:31 EST From: Don Phelps Subject: Logos ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard P Hayes writes: > there is no need to speak of a Logos. In the midst of a most erudite enjoyable message, you choose to negate Logos. Despite much possible scholarship to support the negation, I assert the struggling interfaith gnostic(panna) mystic (one who experiences in their own body) may look to Bodhi Dhamma as affirmation of Logos. Let Logos be defined using the phrase from a French concordance: Logos = The expression of concept. The Buddha taught that even after the Buddha's teaching completely declines, is completely corrupted, and disappears, that the concepts of the Dhamma will again arise and be expressed whole and complete by another Buddha. In a Tathagata, the concept of Dhamma arrises and is expressed independently. In experiential conformation of the teaching, each disciple is to verify the concepts of the Dhamma in actual experience which express the concepts. Thus, there is in the nature of reality the expression of concept of Dhamma. This self expressing concept of nature, Dhamma, and the force of expression of this concept of Dhamma, I call Logos. This Logos is understood to have existed before the present Buddha Sasana. This Logos must have existed before the first Buddha Sasana. This Logos is unborn and eternal, not subject to decay. Nature expressing supramundane knowledge of itself. Humans experiencing expression of concept about human mentality. Metta, Don ...If mind won't know mind, who will mind the mind? -- Don Phelps, POBOX 9739, SAN RAFAEL CA 94912-9739, USA (415) 459-4503 dphelps@simenv.com >>> --- JOY LOVE PEACE --- <<< ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 08:43:58 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: two heaps, etc. ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard's analogy between computers and humans is fine as far as it goes, but he takes it further than that. That computers and humans are complex and modular is fine; that this proves that computers have no telos is doubtful, that it proves that humans have no telos is even more doubtful. The differences between computers and humans are more suggestive: I've never met a computer that could program itself; while that is exactly what human beings seem capable of.Prayer, meditation, contemplation and study are examples of self-programming. To my mind, the interesting discoveries about mind, self and consciousness are not going to be found throughmedieval logic or introspection. They are to be found in neurophysiology, pharmacology, and other scientific studies of the brain. If Buddhism is based on reality, then the reality of brain and perception as understood today ought to be acknowledged, and Buddhist theories of skandhas, etc. ought to be tested dialectically.It seems to me clear that if one believes a certain theory of consciousness, one is apt to experience it in meditation or contemplation-- no doubt many a Freudian has had visions of the ego, id etc. as vivid as any skandhas. The quarrel I have with Richard's approach is that he seems to want to prove that there is no self and that there is no creator deity. That is fine, but that is not what I understand to be what the historical Buddha is saying. What I understand about the second issue is that the Buddhist message is that regardless of whether there is or isn't a c.d. that will not help with the problem of suffering. What I understand about the first issue is that the Buddha was reluctant to give answers about it. Perhaps with good reason. I'd be happy for correction from my learned friends and colleagues should my summary in the preceding paragraph be incorrect. Thanks. Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 08:44:23 EST From: "Randall R. Scott" Subject: Buddhism and Language ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Bob, Regarding our on-going discussion of the relationship between Buddhism and the theory of language, what is wrong with proudly standing up and declaring one's cognizance of, say, a generalistic metaphorical linguistic point of view? Even the exoteric Buddhist traditions (not to mention Islamic Sufism in its own way, cf. Ibn Arabi) ultimately "cling" to variegated and intertwined notions of upaya, sunyata, paramartha satya, and other esoteric dimensions of the Dharma, which are beyond rational thought but nevertheless crudely and momentarily so cloak themselves so that, for example, we have something to talk about on Buddha-L. As Kukai (774-835, Heian Period) said upon introducing tantrism to Japan: "The Dharma is beyond speech, but without speech it cannot be revealed. Suchness transcends forms, but without depending on forms it cannot be realized. Though one may at times err by taking the finger pointing at the moon to be the moon itself, the Buddha's teachings which guide people are limitless [i.e. upaya, sunyata, and, perhaps, an intimation of paramartha satya]." (Hakeda, *Major Works of Kukai*, p. 145, brackets mine.) That words "capture" anything is of course an illusion. That words reflect how an individual and the moment happen to coincide, is not. In my "theory of language," words both reflect emotivity and point their audience toward emotivity, but, in my view, thinking that one can translate emotion into words is like taking the finger for the moon itself. We (or at least I) do it all the time, but then we commit what in Islam is called *shirk* (arrogantly "assigning partners to God") and what in Christianity is called blasphemy. The reifying of the Dharma -- and thus anatman/muga/no-self or -substance, anitya/mujo/transience, and dukkha/ku/dis-ease -- by an "apotheomorphic" theory of language pretty much misses the Buddhist mark in my *book* because it ineluctably leads to a dualistic (good vs. evil) and otherwise discriminating consciousness. (Even Buddhaghosa in his Visuddhimagga -- i.e. the "pure, clear" path! -- intimates toward upaya and thus nondualism.) Randy Scott Washington University in St. Louis ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 08:57:29 EST From: Jim Cocks Subject: Humans vs Computers was two heaps.. In a recent post Rodger Kamenetz comments: >The differences between computers and humans are more suggestive: I've >never met a computer that could program itself; while that is exactly what >human beings seem capable of.Prayer, meditation, contemplation and study >are examples of self-programming. I would not argue with the notion that computers do not meditate, pray, or contemplate. However, there are numerous artificial intelligence programs that do "learn" and recent advances in neural nets are more dramatic. Furthermore, this computer software is modeled on what we currently know of how the human brain functions. An interesting read on this topic is an old book by John Lily called _Programming and metaprogramming in the human biocomputer_. It is probably out of print. Cheers, Jim Cocks ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 12:28:49 EST From: Bill Carter Subject: Re: Two heaps Richard P Hayes writes: >There are reasons why I'd prefer to leave the Self out in the cold >and barren reaches of the philosophical wasteland, which I shall You "prefer to leave the Self out in the cold" as in "whether or not there is one, I prefer that it not be"? You say; >People do not feel a need to say that in >addition to all these hard and soft components there is a >computer that has computerhood; rather, they say the computer IS >these hard and soft components taken as a whole. Oddly, however, >people are reluctant to say the same things of themselves. So the whole is the sum of the parts and nothing more. Computers are made of parts, and people are made of parts, so why should people have any more self than computers do? And it is odd that people are reluctant to accept this obvious conclusion? Hmmm. We have a good dictionary here and I looked up "self". You get a number of definitions, of course. First your Western version; "the integrated unity of subjective experience specifically including those characteristics and attributes of the experiencing organism of which it is reflexively aware." This isn't all that objectionable, is it? Not much like a computer. Hinduism; "Atman". Sorry, not very meaty. Buddhism; "a dynamic unstable conglomerate of skandhas that in itself possesses no inherent substantiality or enduring quality and that continues in constant flux until final dissolution at death." Much more computer-like for sure, but only in the context of this definition. Well, I think I'll scurry off and experience something subjective. I know I'm insubstantial but I'll just have to pretend. ___________________________________________________________________ Bill Carter Thus Something and Nothing produce billc@devnull.mpd.tandem.com each other. -Lao Tzu ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 13:46:19 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Course syllabus available re: FORT SUR Introduction to Buddhism (A. Fort at TCU) Andrew O. Fort has made his syllabus for an introductory course on Buddhist thought and practice available for members of BUDDHA-L to examine. He welcomes comments from those who care to provide them. The syllabus is available under the name FORT SUR. If you wish to fetch a copy to your site, please send a one-line message to the LISTSERV (NOT to BUDDHA-L). The address is listserv@ulkyvm.louisville.edu. The message should say: GET FORT SUR Please remember to switch off automatic signatures that your system may append to messages, since these cannot be interpreted by the automated listserv, and it will send you an impersonal message, which as a human being you will probably take personally (thereby bringing much unnecessary suffering into your self-reflective consciousness continuum). In case you wish to see what other files are stored at BUDDHA-L, issue this command: GET BUDDHA-L FILELIST Please note that you may include more than one command in a message to LISTSERV, provided that each is on a separate line. Richard Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 14:35:54 EST From: James Peavler Subject: Re: two heaps, etc. ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- According to Rodger Kamenetz: > The differences between computers and humans are more suggestive: I've > never met a computer that could program itself; while that is exactly > what human beings seem capable of.Prayer, meditation, contemplation > and study are examples of self-programming. I believe this begs the question. I think one part of the discussion going on here is whether the mind can program itself. It is certainly possible (particularly given your next statement) that these practices are capabable of making the mind think it is programming itself. > To my mind, the interesting discoveries about mind, self and > consciousness are not going to be found throughmedieval logic or > introspection. They are to be found in neurophysiology, pharmacology, > and other scientific studies of the brain. If Buddhism is based on > reality, then the reality of brain and perception as understood today > ought to be acknowledged. By golly, I think this makes a lot of sense. As Fyneman said (by the way his father DID teach him the names of the birds too, in spite of what someone claimed in another message) the rules of the game require that one reason from what one knows is possible (he refused to speculate on the nature of an anti-gravity device, for example, because in principle it could not operate underconditions we now know as physics. Therefore, we must certainly incorporate what is known about brain chemistry, physiology, etc. into our discussions of what mind is (even though we may later prove that some of what we 'know' is wrong). Otherwise we find ourselves thinking without any constraints, and we might as well think one thing as another. By the way, as an aside, if you mean 'medieval logic' to be a pejorative term you are displaying an ignorance and prejudice against some extraordinary thinkers who did, in fact, wrestle with some of the same concerns we are discussing here, and some of whom came up with arguments that would have seemed quite reasonable to many Buddhist thinkers. > It seems to me clear that if one believes > a certain theory of consciousness, one is apt to experience it in > meditation or contemplation-- no doubt many a Freudian has had visions > of the ego, id etc. as vivid as any skandhas. Yup. Some folks believe that prayer, meditation, or exercise reprogram the mind. Maybe they do. I would certainly agree that they cause the mind that thinks that to think that. Maybe that is the same thing. > The quarrel I have with Richard's approach is that he seems to > want to prove that there is no self and that there is no creator > deity. I doubt very much that richard wants to PROVE that there is no self and no creator diety. It is not possible, following any rules of scientific inquiry or logic that I know of, to PROVE the non existence of anything for which there is no evidence FOR. The "self" shares that problem with the "diety" that there is absolutely no convincing direct evidence for its existence, hence no reason to postulate its existence as an a priori for any argument about the nature of nature. To speculate about the nature of either is very entertaining at cocktail parties, particularly at this time of year, but does not get one much closer to the reality of reality (if any). > What I understand about > the first issue is that the Buddha was reluctant to give answers > about it. > Perhaps with good reason. I think this is quite correct. Back in August I quoted a longish quotation in which the Buddha was reported as having been overheard to say that he would not answer questions about such speculative matters because id did not lead to the cessation of suffering. I could post it again, but it was just an English translation from Lucian Stryke's big anthology of Buddhist texts, and anyway this message is already way too long. > Thanks. Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm > -- Jim Peavler My opinions do not exist. Albuquerque, NM That is why they are called peavler@plk.af.mil opinions. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 14:51:15 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Re: Two heaps Bill Carter asks: > You "prefer to leave the Self out in the cold" as in "whether or > not there is one, I prefer that it not be"? No. As in "no matter what I may or may not prefer, I have not yet seen any compelling reasons to accept the idea of a Self existing over and above the constantly changing set of characteristics to which the English pronoun `I' can felicitously be applied." > So the whole is the sum of the parts and nothing more. Computers are > made of parts, and people are made of parts, so why should people have > any more self than computers do? And it is odd that people are > reluctant to accept this obvious conclusion? Yes, I find it quite odd. I find it so odd that I would probably never believe that people could be quite so dense were I not provided with such a rich supply of evidence of this density on a daily basis. The problem, I gather, is that people look at a fairly simple machine (such as a chariot, to use the example that Naagasena used to convince King Milinda in that wonderful philosophical novel entitled `Milinda's Questions'), and they look at an extremely complex organism such as a snail or a human being. The difference in complexity is so great that people assume there is not merely a difference in degree but also a difference in kind. The illustration of the chariot is intended to question that assumption and to suggest that: as the whole is nothing greater than the sum of its physical parts, the human being is nothing more than the sum of its physical and mental parts. The doctrine that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is called holism. The philosophical doctrines I have been describing are therefore anti-holistic, since they take the position that the person or self is nothing more than the sum of its physical and mental parts. (Please note that the claim is never made by Buddhists that the person can be reduced to its purely physical parts; on the contrary, the very philosophers who argued against holism also argued against the doctrine of materialism, according to which an adequate account of any living organism can be given by describing its material parts and their mechanical and chemical interactions with one another.) Why would anyone reject holism? Well, just to give one very quick reason for being suspicious of the doctrine of holism, it raises the very difficult question of how much complexity a set of organized parts must have to qualify as a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. The two pennies lying next to one another on my desk are not an organism in any normal sense of the word. If I stack one on top of another, they become more organized, but I am not sure they yet qualify as an organism. I could add some glue to them so that they are more permanently organized, but even this does not yet make the stack of pennies more than the sum of the two pennies plus the glue. One could easily imagine sticking more and more items from my desk onto this growing aggregate and eventually making some kind of object that even served some practical purpose (even if only to serve as a paperweight or as an example in a philosophical dialogue). But at each stage of development, one can eagerly ask "Is the whole yet greater than the sum of its parts." It is not obvious at what point one will say "WHEN!" The above problem is difficult, I said. That does not mean it is necessarily insoluble. Indeed, many people have proposed various kinds of solution. Nancy Smith yesterday reminded us of Rene Descarte, who must have been a Buddhist, since his first name is the French word for `reborn'. But he also apparently got lost easily, since his surname means `some maps'. In any case, our friend Descartes opined that human beings differ from animals in that the latter can be explained in terms of their mechanical parts, while the former cannot. Most Christian scholastics were quite comfortable with that division, since it gave primacy to Man (as women were called in those days) who was allegedly made in the image of God. Imago dei (in the image of God) was taken to mean that Man, like God and unlike all other living beings, has a rational faculty. Descartes, although critical of the Church in many matters, nevertheless ended up accepting quite a number of cherished Christian principles, including the principle that Man is uniquely Godlike. Many other European thinkers, although they found plenty of holes in Descartes's arguments, nevertheless accepted the same principle (as, in fact, did many Confucians; the doctrine was not confined to Europeans, upon whose doorstep it is now fashionable to lay every intellectual sin of humanity). But I digress (what else is new?). The point is that drawing a sensible line between a mere agglomeration of organized parts and a Whole that is greater than the sum of its parts is not at all easy. If you don't believe me, try it. Alternatively, ask an even more radical question: what good does the doctrine of holism serve? Is it necessary? If not, perhaps we can live without it. > We have a good dictionary here and I looked up "self". You get a > number of definitions, of course. > > First your Western version; "the integrated unity of subjective > experience specifically including those characteristics and attributes > of the experiencing organism of which it is reflexively aware." This > isn't all that objectionable, is it? Not much like a computer. It's not at all objectionable. The Buddhists gave it another name. And they said it was complex and therefore impermanent and therefore would be a source of pain if one became attached to it. And they said it was one of the parts of the person. And they said that the person was not greater than the sum of its parts, even if this part was included. And they said this part was not the Self. And they said there was no Self aside from those physical and metnal parts. At last, we agree, I think. Richard Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 21 Dec 1993 to 22 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Thu Dec 23 16:05:44 1993 Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 16:00:36 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 22 Dec 1993 to 23 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 6 messages totalling 337 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Two heaps of worthless junk compared 2. A choice of methods (2) 3. The unseen seer 4. What dictionary? 5. Impotence ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 16:47:01 EST From: Carol Zaleski Subject: Re: Two heaps of worthless junk compared ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The difference between a computer and a human being is neatly captured by the first sentence of Richard Hayes's original message on this theme. I quote: "This message is being prepared by a human being who is using a computer." An unproblematic sentence. It might raise the eyebrows of some input devices, though, if he had written instead: "This message is being prepared by a computer who is using a human being." Or, as Confucius put it, "a gentleman is not a utensil." But this is an ethical, not an ontological or epistemological view. We don't need a Self, but we do need the ethical category of the person, and we do need to make distinctions in order to keep that ethical category open. This message has been prepared by a Soul who is using a small part of a Brain. Happy holidays, Carol Zaleski Smith College ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 20:32:03 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: A choice of methods My goodness, Rodger Kamenetz, how you do have a knack for getting me all confused! In one and the same message you made the following statements: 1. To my mind, the interesting discoveries about mind, self and consciousness are not going to be found through medieval logic or introspection. They are to be found in neurophysiology, pharmacology, and other scientific studies of the brain. 2. I have with Richard's approach is that he seems to want to prove that there is no self and that there is no creator deity. That is fine, but that is not what I understand to be what the historical Buddha is saying. Now which is it going to be, Rodger? Are we going to follow the ways of open-ended scientific inquiry, in which one formulates hypotheses and tests them with a mind that is truly open to abandoning those hypotheses in the light of new evidence? Or are we going to restrict ourselves to doing an exegesis of what the historical Buddha said? Or are we to do a little bit of both, so long as we carefully avoid anything that was said by medieval scholastics? I beg that we abandon the course of textual exegesis. First of all, the task of discovering what the historical Buddha really said is absolutely hopeless. And even if we degree by some arbitrary fiat that a certain set of texts were the very words of the Buddha, I assure you that it is exceedingly difficult to know with any degree of certainty what exactly those words meant at the time they were uttered. One thousand years after the Buddha died, Vasubandhu (often called the second Buddha) lamented that the words of the Buddha still remained, but the understanding of what those words meant had perished from the earth. When it comes to making a reasonable stab at deciphering the hopeless hodge- podge of words that have come down to us in dozens of languages, many of them as yet undeciphered, I suppose we are in an even worse situation than Vasubandhu was in. That leaves us with the second approach: following the ways of open-ended scientific inquiry. Somehow I had the impression that that is precisely what I have been advocating for the last twenty-five years or so. (One some other lists, this penchant of mine for critical thinking reportedly gives some pious Buddhists migraines. That's good. It confirms that everything is suffering.) Apparently I come across to you as a medieval dogmatist (which is at least a change of pace from being thought of as an infidel or an apostate). You have evidently formed the notion that I am setting out to prove a certain set of doctrines. I believe that if you were to read what I have written on this issue carefully, you would see that all I have tried to do is to show that there is no evidence that compels us to accept one particular conception of self that (I think) that John Richards has been advocating. Showing that one is NOT compelled by the evidence to accept a doctrine is different from showing that one IS compelled to accept its contradiction. If we accept the Pali Canon as evidence of what the Buddha taught, then you are right in suggesting that the Buddha did not come up with all the elaborate arguments against the existence of a creator deity that later Buddhist scholastics did. He contented himself with saying that the theory that the world was created by a lord (issara) is ridiculous (hassaka). The Buddha's pronouncement was characteristically short and to the point, but not much more than a bald assertion. The reason I like the scholastics is that their recorded thoughts are much more sophisticated and profound than the recorded thoughts of the Buddha. They had to be sophisticated. They had opponents who actually produced brilliant counterarguments and who provided trenchant criticisms of Buddhist dogmas. The Buddha, on the other hand, apparently never had a worthy opponent. Almost every damn time he opened his mouth, people agreed with everything he said and fell down at his feet and begged to be his disciple. One can't learn much from a guy who never has to defend his position against real critics. If you're interested in scientific inquiry, I'd recommend staying avoid from people who collect falling-down disciples. Here's an example of the kind of benefit that comes from having discussion with people don't let sloppy errors go unchallenged. Lance Cousins has pointed out, quite correctly, that: ...the position of the Personalists was that the person was indescribable and its relationship to the five aggregates was indescribable. That is correct, not my statement that Even the "person" of the notorious pudgala-vaadins was in a state of constant flux and was in no way like the static mirrorlike Man (purusha) of the Saa.mkhya system and the Epic literature. It would have been more accurate to say: Even the "person" of the notorious pudgala-vaadins was not said to be like the static mirrorlike Man (purusha) of the Saa.mkhya system and the Epic literature. Thanks for the correction, Lance. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 10:06:03 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Re: A choice of methods ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- First of all, Richard, anyone who is able to persuade you that you are confused must be doing something right! I opt for the scientific method. My point in citing the historical Buddha does not contradict this, though I see how you might think it so. In my view, it is a more scientific attitude to have no position on self or creator deity than to have one. So I was happy to cite the Buddha as an exemplar of such an approach. I found your own views to be less open minded and less scientific in that regard than what I take to be the basic Buddhist position.I read the end of your piece as arguing that people who think there's a self are sentimental and not very smart-- as compared to the way they think about computers. I have reread your piece and I do not think that is an unfair reading.In short, I wasn't arguing for textual exegesis or dogma as the best ways for finding the truth about the mind. Again I do not wish to slight the Buddhist medieval philosophers.But I gather they had to rely on logic, introspection, experience, and poetics-- excuse me, arguments based on analogies-- as their basic tools of analysis. I do not think these methods are any longer the best ones for arriving at the truth about the mind. It seems to me those who will be teaching us most about that are studying the biochemistry and electrochemistry of the brain. To put it another way, I think the brain is the best analogy for the mind we have going right now.In fact, I intend to quit my day job and put on my lab coat, as soon as a lab will have me. Where is Jochen Kleinschmidt when we need him? Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 10:06:26 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: The unseen seer ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein writes: > > I don't think there is any difference in ordinary non-meditational > > experience between saying that successive (not necessarily adjacent) > > consciousnesses have objects of different orders of complexity and > > saying that consciousness has layers. The case for consciousness is > > the same as for e.g. sense data. Without careful observation we experience > > the physical world as a varied totality. Similarly, consciousness is > > complex until or unless we can catch the fleeting shifts. > > Would this apply to various states of samadhi or jnana? As the > practitioner progresses, which of the skandha's is changing? > A rather large subject! In the longer term it does apply to such states, but it is claimed that it is possible with experience to remain for a long time in a single state. By and large once mastery has been achieved then different jhaanas and so on are in practice experienced as something like layers of consciousness or at least as occurring as if simultaneously. This at least is what the theory says if you think it out properly. Certainly as the practitioner progresses, all the five aggregates change. > It seems like the earlier Buddhists have a transient, composite and > functional entity, the Buddha's mind, perceiving as an object of awareness > something which is not composite. However, this non-composite object is > having an effect on the Budddha's mind, and is therefore functioning, and > must be composite. Well, I don't think they would agree with that. They would take the view that something can be an object of the mind without operating in a causal manner. It is the knowledge which has an effect on the mind. Of course we are talking about a mind which is of a very different order to the normal mind - transcendent (lokuttara) is the term used. In modern parlance a mind which is highly integrated and unified (yuganaddha), combining a deep peace and a profound wisdom. Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 10:06:42 EST From: Bill Carter Subject: Re: What dictionary? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I was asked to post info on the dictionary from which I pulled those definitions of "self". To me this is a fairly interesting subject. Anyone have other different or unusual definitions? Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 1981, and the definition was on page 2059. ________________________________________________________________________ Bill Carter Changes in one's train of thought produce billc@devnull.mpd.tandem.com corresponding changes in one's conception of the external world. - Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 10:39:10 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Impotence I've never met a computer that could program itself; while that is exactly what human beings seem capable of. Prayer, meditation, contemplation and study are examples of self-programming. Rodger Kamenetz Rodger Kamenetz evidently runs around with a different crowd than I do. Most of the people I know have a hell of a time re- programming themselves in any significant ways. Most meditation centres that I have attended are full of people who are trying very hard, but with only limited success, to become more compassionate, more patient, more disciplined, more focussed. But anyone who has ever tried to make even minor modifications in his or her character knows what a difficult thing it is. I must have continued smoking for another ten years after I became absolutely convinced that smoking was one of the most stupid things a person can do. It also took about ten years to become a complete vegetarian after I was intellectually and emotionally convinced that there is no excuse for eating animals. Both of these changes took a lot of effort, because I had so many habits to change. And because I got so little help from my immediate human society. I may be unusually slow at making changes in my lifestyle, but from what I hear others say, it is a very common problem. The Greeks had a name for this phenomenon. They called it akrasia, which literally means impotence. It was the term they used to describe the condition in which a person knows what is right and good but lacks the power to achieve it. Akrasia is not only a lack of will power, although a weak will may be part of the problem. All of us who would like to live much simpler lives suffer from akrasia insofar as society is just not set up to enable people to live lives of material simplicity, unless one makes a radical break and opts to live as a vagabond (which can be translated into Sanskrit as bhikshu). The Buddhists also had a name for akrasia. They called it anaatman. If you read the text of the Buddha's first sermon as recorded in the Vinaya, he presents the anaatman doctrine in just this way. If the body were the self, then one could simply say "Let my body be like this, let it not be like that," and the body would change accordingly. But the body does not change according to our wishes. So the body is not the self. The body is not the self because it is not in our control. It gets sick when we want to be healthy, fat when we wish to be slender, and dead when we wish to continue living. We have akrasia with respect to it. But the Buddha did not stop there. We also have no control over our consciousness or even over our character (sa.mskaara-skandha). We also have akrasia with respect to our very personalities. So how do we become empowered? How do we get what the Greeks called enkrasia? Nearly all Buddhists, even those who endorse so-called self-power forms of doctrine, acknowledge the importance of getting help from outside, in the form of good friends (kalyaana-mitra, translated into Tibetan as geshe) and in the form of keeping company with noble and good people. Enkrasia requires a sangha, a community. Try modifying your character without the support of friends, Rodger, and you will see how impossible it is for a people to reprogram themselves. We're just about as hopeless and impotent as computers. As one pile of worthless junk to another, I wish you the best of friendship. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 22 Dec 1993 to 23 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Fri Dec 24 16:17:49 1993 Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 16:12:12 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 23 Dec 1993 to 24 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 15 messages totalling 822 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Science and stuff 2. Of Minds and Machines 3. Two heaps, three comments 4. two heaps, etc. 5. Impotence (4) 6. Conscientious objectors 7. two heaps, etc. -> obsolete Buddhism 8. The unseen seer (2) 9. Membership List 10. The scientist, the robot and the Buddha 11. Holiday schedule ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 17:03:34 EST From: James Peavler Subject: Science and stuff I am sorry to butt in here again, but someone recently said that the more scientific position is to leave open the question of whether there is an independently arising self (to use a phrase that hasn't ben used here yet) or a creator diety, rather that to state that neither exists. That is incorrect, for the same reason that it would be incorrect to leave open the question of whether there were 15-legged dinosaurs. If there is no demonstrable, measurable, reproducible, testable, deniable evidence for the existence of something, the correct scientific position is to assume that it does not exist. This is the reason Feynman would not speculate on an anti-gravity device. He did not say, "It may be possible someday, if all of the laws of physics we now know turn out to be wrong." He did say that given what we know about the laws of physics in nature it is not worthwhile to speculate on the possibility of an anti-gravity machine. Given what we know about the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, neurobiology, pharmacology, etc. it is not worthwhile to speculate on the possible existence of an independently arising, transcending self-creature nor of a preexisting creating-creature. The correct scientific position is to assume that neither exists until such time as one single demonstrable, measurable, reproducible, testable, deniable shred of evidence to the contrary shows up. Now, I will quietly bow out. This has been a very interesting and valuabe discussion. Thanks to everyone for carrying it on. -- Jim Peavler My opinions do not exist. Albuquerque, NM That is why they are called peavler@plk.af.mil opinions. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 17:04:57 EST From: Guy Isabel Subject: Of Minds and Machines > I've never met a computer that could program itself; > while that is exactly what human beings seem capable > of. Prayer, meditation, contemplation and study are > examples of self-programming. > Rodger Kamenetz (Ab)using the computer/human analogy, I would equate hardware with body and software with mind. In this light, humans (re)program only their minds, even though one could say that by so doing they have (re)programmed their selves (mind + body). As regards computers, one should similarly look for _software_ that can modify itself, whether or not this means that _computers_ can program themselves. Self-modifying software has been around for decades and is certainly not uncommon. So-called 'stealth' viruses, for instance, modify their own code to elude detection by signature-based antivirus software. It is just as hard to write self-modifying software as it is for a human mind to reprogram itself, but it can be done. Of course computers and humans are different -- humans come in shades other than beige --, but self-programmability does not seem to me to be a discriminating factor. Guy Isabel ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 17:07:08 EST From: nrs2460.bhc1@pcmail.dcccd.edu Subject: Two heaps, three comments Friends - I must warn you that this is probably only a tangentially Buddhistic post, and so I'm doing what I said I wished other people wouldn't do - namely, floating out into realms of general, as opposed to Buddhist, philosophy. But if everyone else is gonna go down the big river, I'll be lonesome here by myself. I have three short comments. 1. Physical, material things show no inclination to complexify. Thus, it is hard to indicate how evolution to complex beings occurred from sheerly material items. This is one of Whitehead's points about the origin of the universe. Thus, it is a statement of faith to say that the origin of thinking/mind/life is material, given what we know of material processes. 2. Could it be that the breakpoint from not-complex-enough-to- consider to complex-enough is being alive, as described by biologists? (There were 7 requirements, I believe - things like self-generated motion, reproduction, digestion, etc.) 3. I keep getting interrupted by work. I can't remember what 3 was. I think it was the fact that the computer programming/neural biochemistry analogy is just about dead and useless, as I perceive research in psychophysiology. Remember the behaviorism analogy? Or Freud's hydraulics? A very happy holiday season to all of you, with or without selves! (Isn't this a time when almost all religions have some celebration, from Hanukkah to Christmas to Rohatsu (isn't that Buddha's birthday?) to the presentation of Shiva as a bar of light to the Winter Solstice??) Nancy Smith nrs2460.BHC1@pcmail.dcccd.edu ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 17:08:19 EST From: Bill Kish Subject: Re: two heaps, etc. Rodger Kamenetz: > To my mind, the interesting discoveries about mind, self and > consciousness are not going to be found throughmedieval logic or > introspection. They are to be found in neurophysiology, pharmacology, > and other scientific studies of the brain. If Buddhism is based on > reality, then the reality of brain and perception as understood today > ought to be acknowledged, and Buddhist theories of skandhas, etc. ought > to be tested dialectically. I'm curious if either you or others on BUDDHA-L occasionally entertain the notion that Buddhism might in fact be obsolete. What if anything is there in Buddhism which might make it an attractive alternative to a modern philosophy of mind which a) is not in conflict with our progress in science and b) is motivated by a clearly defined soteriological aim (i.e. giving people knowledge they can actually use to end their suffering) ? Bill Kish ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 17:09:45 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Re: Impotence Richard I thank you for your friendship as do I think many of us. And thanks for the extremely useful terms enkrasia and akrasia. That programming or reprogramming the mind is extremely difficult, I know very well. Ditto the body as a glance at the mirror informs me most mornings. Sangha would be helpful and I think indeed this electro-sangha extremely helpful in that regard, as well as the help and love of those around us. Granted we re-program with difficulty, but we do occasionally succeed. So that is a difference with computers. Another point: we have the intention to do so. So here's another difference worth noting. I wonder also, currently embarked on a course of dog training, whether animals can intend to improve themselves? To put it another way, what is it in the mind that creates intention to improve, and is this a uniquely human quality? I have read stories and legends of Tibetan Buddhists cultivating a solitary life, far from any sangha, presumably for reprogramming..... What of these solitary meditative traditions? I presume that sometimes the imperfections and nuisance of community outweigh the benefits of noble companions. Best, Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 17:11:57 EST From: CSP1%PSUVM.bitnet@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Subject: Re: Impotence Dear Richard: With sincere hopes of helping you empower yourself, this secular kalyaanamitra wishes to gently suggest that you still have a few problematic habits to work on in the forthcoming future. . .a number of which have recently come to the forefront on Buddha-L. Although your kind acknowledgement of Professor Cousins learned (and correct) restatement of your somewhat erroneous explanation of the Pudgalavaadin position is a wonderful step in the right direction, if you'll pardon my pontificating, there's still too much in your recent postings that is highly reminiscent of the Astley-Heine exchange of last month. Perhaps we might move on. In that regard, might I ask if anyone on the network has read Professor Cousins' extremely exciting and historically important treatment of the five theses of Mahaadeva in the second volume of _The Buddhist Forum_ edited by Tadeusz Skorupski. Apart from the fact that Professor Cousins confirms my own notions suggesting that the rise of Buddhist sectarianism was wholly decided over matters of Vinaya (and not doctrine), his article is of exceptional importance for those of us interested in early Indian Buddhist history. Coupled with Richard Gombrich's extremely creative reassessment of material in the Diipava.msa, published in the second of Heinz Bechert's edited volumes on the date of the Buddha, which enables Gombrich to date the Buddha's death to wihin a few years of 405 BCE (!), we have much new material to consider. I'd certainly look forward to a discussion of these new issues, and set the Richard and Rodger debate to rest for now. I thought my return from Calgary would be uneventful, especially with Dan L. away from his computer, and with Ian and Steve quiet for the moment. Come on guys, at least let the conscience of Buddha-L get over his jet-lag. Dr. Charles S. Prebish Pennsylvania State University E-Mail: csp1@psuvm.psu.edu Religious Studies Program Voice Mail: 814/865-1121 108 Weaver Building Fax: 814/863-7840 University Park, Pa 16802 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 19:14:46 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Conscientious objectors Chuck Prebish takes his job as the Conscience of BUDDHA-L seriously, and we are all the better for it. In saying that the recent debates have acquired the qualities of the Heine-Astley debates of November, I assume you are referring to the charge of using fallacious arguments, and especially the informal fallacy known as _argumentum ad hominem_. That was the principal charge brought against our two esteemed colleagues on that occasion, as I recall. In response to Chuck's conscientious intervention in this matter, I would like to make one clarification and one tentative proposal. 1 Clarification According to The Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Peter A. Angeles (no relation to Los): argumentum ad hominem: arguing against a person, or rejecting a person's views by attacking or abusing his or her personality, character, motives, intentions, qualifications, etc. as opposed to providing evidence why the views are incorrect. Example: "What John said should not be believed because he was a Nazi sympathizer." In the discussions that have been going on during this past week, I have not seen anyone attempting to discredit a view by impugning the character or the qualifications of the author of those views. There have certainly been some textbook examples of various other informal fallacies, but this one has not been much in evidence. (For those of you who are looking for something really entertaining for you and the kids to do during the holiday season, you might see how many of the 40 fallacies listed in The Dictionary of Philosophy you can find in a single day's worth of BUDDHA-L messages. You'll be really amazed! You'll be even more amazed if you try to keep count of how many fallacies occur during an advertising break on your favourite commercial television program.) I think it is possible that Chuck, and perhaps a few others, may be missing the ironic tone of some of the teasing that those of us who love to argue do to each other. With only one or two very rare exceptions, I have hardly ever seen a message posted on BUDDHA-L or its cousin BUDDHIST that struck me as genuinely ill- willed or malevolent in tone. I HAVE seen a lot of teasing and hazing, but none of it (unless I am really quite obtuse) has seemed intended to be unpleasant or to be taken as a real attack on another person's character. Therefore, while I sincerely appreciate Chuck's efforts at being the Conscious of BUDDHA-L, I also think his radar detector for personal abuse may be a little too hair-triggered sometimes. (I must confess, for example, that I did not see any argumenta ad hominem or anything that struck me as ill-intentioned in the famed Heine-Astley exchange either.) 2 Proposal BUDDHA-L is a list dedicated to Buddhist studies, which is a multi-disciplinary field. Its membership list therefore includes historians, social scientists, students of literature, students of comparative religions and students of philosophy. (I use the term "student" in its widest application, to include amateurs as well as professional teachers in these disciplines and the people being formally trained by them.) While this variety is one of the strengths of the list, it also has some real drawbacks. One of the drawbacks, I think, is that much of the volume of the list has often been dominated by people whose prime interest is philosophy. Since philosophy is not everyone's cup of tea, and since philosophical discussion usually requires a great deal of space, the non-philosophers on BUDDHA-L often feel frustrated at the number of philosophical messages and at their length and at the fact that philosophers never resolve anything. (As a philosopher, I can assure you that nothing is more tedious to us than questions that actually have answers.) What I propose, therefore, is that I look into the possibility of starting up an entirely new discussion list that is dedicated exclusively to Buddhist philosophy (and to the various other philosophical traditions with which Buddhism has come into contact thorugh the centuries). That way, those few of us who are primarily interested in doctrines and ideas, and we who benefit from writing and reading rather long and carefully written messages, can take our interminable dialogues elsewhere and leave the BUDDHA-L list relatively uncluttered with our irritating nattering and picking of irrelevant nit. This is only an idea, but it is one that I would most happily pursue if I felt there might be some interest -- perhaps thirty or forty people. If the name is not already taken, I would call it DOGMA-L. And I would invite my poetic friend Rodger (whose messages really do delight me) to start up a list on Buddhist poetry called DOGGER-L. If you would include yourself as a potential contributor to or reader of a list on Buddhsit philosophy, please send an e-mail message to my address (not to BUDDHA-L). I promise to keep your name confidential. Yours in perennial longness of wind and conscientious objection, Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec - 2 - Contents 1 Clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 i ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 08:32:45 EST From: Marc Wachowitz Subject: Re: Impotence Richard Hayes wrote: > Most meditation > centres that I have attended are full of people who are trying > very hard, but with only limited success, to become more ^-- maybe replace this with "and therefore" :-) > compassionate, more patient, more disciplined, more focussed. When one is trying to make oneself better, the internal battle between the unliked behaviour and the good intentions is like the left hand fighting the right hand, without realizing that both are the same body. Incremental changes may happen, but with the high price of increased fragmentation and convulsion. However, in the light of choiceless awareness the absurd situation becomes clear and the battle ends, leaving harmony. Even feelings of hate are thus transformed to creative compassion. It is said once a thief came to Nagarjuna, asking to become his disciple. The thief told that he had already asked many other teachers, but they had all rejected him because he could not give up stealing. Nagarjuna accepted him without the condition of stopping being a thief. He only asked him to maintain awareness of whatever he was doing, whether he were eating or stealing. Some weeks later, the former thief came to Nagarjuna and reported that he was no longer a thief. All interest in stealing simply ceased. "Instead of saying to myself, 'I have to become a nicer person' and trying to do that, I should simply be aware of what I'm doing - for example, noticing that every time I meet a certain person I cut her off. When I've seen myself doing that a hundred times, something happens. That pattern drops away and I'm a nicer person, though I'm not acting on the sentence 'I should be a nicer person'. Awareness has no sentences, no thoughts in that sense; it's simply awareness. This is what sitting is: not getting caught in our minds, not getting caught in the effort to get somewhere, to become a buddha. ... If you're trying to hold onto awareness, that's a thought. We use a word like awareness, and then people make it into something special. If we are not thinking (try it for just ten seconds: just stop thinking), our bodies relax, and we can hear and notice everything that's going on. In the minute we stop thinking, we are aware. Awareness is not something we have to try to be; it's an absence of something." -- Charlotte Joko Beck, teaching at the Zen Center of San Diego, in her new book "Nothing Special: Living Zen", which I warmly recommend. Her previous book "Everyday Zen: Love and Work" is also excellent. [Note that here "thinking" is only meant in the sense of self-centered, emotional thinking; it does not at all mean that functional thinking were anyhow bad. Not just my opinion - she also states that elsewere.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ * wonder everyday * nothing in particular * all is special * Marc Wachowitz ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 08:33:42 EST From: Marc Wachowitz Subject: Re: Impotence Rodger Kamenetz wrote: > I have read stories and legends of Tibetan Buddhists cultivating a > solitary life, far from any sangha, presumably for reprogramming..... What of > these solitary meditative traditions? I presume that sometimes the > imperfections and nuisance of community outweigh the benefits of noble > companions. Some so-called wise men (and probably also women) say: It is of little use to leave the marketplace move to the mountains, since you will be taking the confusion of the marketplace with you whereever you go. Without that you will be alone even in the market- place but not lonely even in solitude. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ * wonder everyday * nothing in particular * all is special * Marc Wachowitz ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 08:35:08 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: two heaps, etc. -> obsolete Buddhism > > I'm curious if either you or others on BUDDHA-L occasionally entertain the > notion that Buddhism might in fact be obsolete. What if anything is there > in Buddhism which might make it an attractive alternative to a modern > philosophy of mind which a) is not in conflict with our progress in science > and b) is motivated by a clearly defined soteriological aim (i.e. giving > people knowledge they can actually use to end their suffering) ? > > Bill Kish Buddhism is not a philosophy, is it? Buddhism claims to have dead but accessible (through prayer and invocation) and living Buddhas and highly realized adepts who embody the truth in their state of being, and who can guide others to that state. I think also that devotion to the teacher is a significant part of many Buddhist teachings, and that it is said that without confidence in the teacher, the teachings themselves are not useful. Finally, wasn't it said elswhere on this list that the ultimate refuge is the Buddha, or the Dharma-kaya, or the truth, and not the Dharma or Sangha? So no particular philosophy would be a refuge, just a temporary means, eh? It also seems that a tradition of transmission is like a lit flame being passed down from teacher to student through the generations. While it may be possible to start a fire from a very precise written description of how to do so with two sticks, I understand it is nearly impossible, and even proficient aborigines prefer to carry lit coals around with them. I would expect that as the times require different teachings and methods, the Buddhist lineage holders would respond. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 "Laugh while you can, monkey boy." ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 08:36:59 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: The unseen seer On Thu, 23 Dec 1993, L S Cousins wrote: > > It seems like the earlier Buddhists have a transient, composite and > > functional entity, the Buddha's mind, perceiving as an object of awareness > > something which is not composite. However, this non-composite object is > > having an effect on the Budddha's mind, and is therefore functioning, and > > must be composite. > > Well, I don't think they would agree with that. They would take the view > that something can be an object of the mind without operating in a > causal manner. It is the knowledge which has an effect on the mind. I beleive that this would be the early Buddhist view, but I don't quite follow the logic of it. If someone were to hold that last position, without claiming the operation of a Buddha's mind is inexplicable, they would be saying one could have knowledge of an object which is not operating in a causal manner. Yet that object is one of the conditions of the knowledge. For example, if the object were not present, neither would the knowledge be present. In order for the knowledge to know of the presence of the object, to be sensitive to the object's presence, it must be affected by the object. For if something is not affected by something else, how can it's existence or functioning be affected by that something else? >From Guy Newland's _The Two Truths_ pg. 100: "Jay-dsun-ba ... argues ... a consciousness directly realizing emptiness ... realizes itself... " (That very condensed quote is from an argument against defining ultimate truths as the objects of ultimate cognizers, in brief: the knower must know itself, since there is a memory of the subjective aspect of knowing something, and since postulating a knower of the knowing leads to infinite regression; this is applied to a consciousness realizing emptiness. This consciousness knows itself, and it is itself a relative truth, therefore some objects of ultimate cognizers are relative truths.) He continues: "... Jay-dzun-ba's argument ... gives the impression that direct realization is a dualistic mind. ... Jam-yang-shay-ba avoids this problem by insisting that the exalted wisdom consciousness directly reaizing emptiness realizes nothing but emptiness. ... He cites Tson-ka-pa's _Ocean_of_Reasoning: ... the vanishing of all elaborations of dualistic appearance in the perspective of [a consciousness] directly realizing suchness. " Clearly we have two very important and highly repected authorities who are within the _same_ interpretation of the _same_ school of Buddhism (Ge-luk-ba Prasangika Madhyamika), who do not agree on whether exalted wisdom consciousness is self-aware or not! My question is, if these guys are fully realized, then wouldn't they just know the correct answer to this from their own experience? And if they are not, why are their writings on these subjects taken so seriously? Or are their differences merely linguistic choices in the expression of the ineffable, made on soteriological (I love that word) grounds? ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 08:48:28 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Membership List --------------------------- Original Message --------------------------- Can anyone tell me what mantra I must use to call up the membership list from listserv? I remember doing this many months ago, then carefully filing away the instructions about how it is done, and then -- well, you know the rest. Might it not be a useful procedure for the management to send out a page of such general instructions, say once a month, for the sake of the disorganized? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University Compuserve: 71640,1036 St. Louis, MO 63130-2030 (314) 862-5418 (voice) The mantra, to be sumbitted to LISTSERV@ulkyvm.louisville.edu is REVIEW BUDDHA-L If you would like to see the list arranged according to country, say REVIEW BUDDHA-L COUNTRY (The last time I did this, I noticed that we had four subscribers from Saudi Arabia and only two from Japan.) If you are are disorganized as I am, Professor Morrell, perhaps I should send this information out daily. Richard ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 12:46:29 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: The scientist, the robot and the Buddha I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and examining both myself and others is really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living. Socrates Apology 38a Avoid evil. Do good. Keep the mind pure. This is the discipline of all the buddhas. Dhammapada Although it has become post-modernistically fashionable to say that Buddhism has no essence, I think the above verse from the Dhammapada comes close to capturing what every Buddhist tradition would regard as the goal of Buddhist practice. For the sake of convenience, then, I think we could regard this as the essence of Buddhism. It seems quite close to what Socrates, the paradigmatic philosopher of Europe, saw as the noblest pursuit of life and as that without which life was not worth living. And so I would say that the very essence of Buddhism is philosophy, understood in the Socratic sense of the term. Bill Kish asks whether science has rendered Buddhism obsolete. To me the answer is pretty obviously no. I think of Science as an enterprise of discovering the structure of nature; technology as an enterprise of putting the knowledge of the structure of nature towards goals that human being pursue; and philosophy (of which genus Buddhism is a species) as an enterprise of reflecting on which goals human beings ought to be pursuing. These enterprises are interrelated, but none can ever replace the other two. (The most frigething aspect of modern society to me is that technological thinking has become some dominant that it has nearly pushed both science and philosophy out of our daily lives.) Science, I would argue, is essentially an enterprise of understanding the structure of the world as it is (and perhaps as it has been in the past). If it is to succeed in this task, it can never be restrained by considerations of taste, morality, politics or currently accepted intellectual fashions. It can also never allow itself to be governed by considerations of what is practical or useful or financially profitable or pleasing to the general public. Whenever scientists allow themselves to be used as instruments of policy-makers (to do such things as building weapons or developing products that appeal more to consumers), the cease to be scientists in any meaningful sense of the word. They become whores in the service of politicians and merchants, who are themselves whores in the service of an increasingly unthinking and rapacious public. Buddhism, as I have argued above, is essentially an enterprise of making judgements about the relative values of actions. It is never merely a matter of knowing what is the case, but must concern itself with having something to say about what ought to be doing in light of what is the case. It is essentially idealistic, practical and value-driven, in contrast to science, which is essentially realistic, indifferent to utility, and value-free. Science cannot make Buddhism obsolete, because it is an essentially different enterprise. Technology makes magic obsolete in the sense technology does much more efficiently what magic does rather poorly: enable people to reach certain material goals. Mechanized computers may make accountants obsolete. In general, one thing replaces another only when the two things are different means of arriving at the same goal and one is much more effective than the other. Neurophysiology, cognitive science and quantum mechanics will never replace abhidharma, because these sciences are asking an entirely different set of questions for entirely different purposes. In the final analysis, it makes not the smallest bit of different to a Buddhist how or why the brain functions. Knowing the biochemistry of the brain tells one absolutely nothing about how to keep the mind pure or how to discern good from evil. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 13:04:28 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Holiday schedule Jim Cocks will be mercifully out of reach of his computer terminal until January 4, so I will be moderating BUDDHA-L until then. But I will be out of reach of my computer terminal for three days: Monday through Wednesday of next week (27-29 December). If messages come in during that time, they will not get forwarded to BUDDHA-L until Thursday, 30 December. Tomorrow I am running a crucial scientific experiment that involves, among other things, trying to determine whether or not Santa Claus still brings presents to naughty long-winded Buddhist adults. This means I will not be forwarding mail to BUDDHA-L quite as often as I normally do. In fact, it's quite possible the experiment will take all day, so there may be no BUDDHA-L postings at all tomorrow. But service will resume on December 26 (which Canadians call Boxing Day -- Canadians are such a pugilistic bunch!) for one day. I hope these gaps in BUDDHA-L delivery will not do irreparable harm to the field of Buddhist studies, but it's a risk we have to take in the name of service to higher forms of self-indulgence (even though it's a bear to indulge a non-self). Have a nice Saturday. Richard (Designated Regent to the Monitor) ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 15:07:15 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: The unseen seer Leigh Charles Goldstein writes: >> Well, I don't think they would agree with that. They would take the >>view that something can be an object of the mind without operating in a >>causal manner. It is the knowledge which has an effect on the mind. >>I beleive that this would be the early Buddhist view, but I don't quite >>follow the logic of it. >If someone were to hold that last position, without claiming the operation >of a Buddha's mind is inexplicable, they would be saying one could have >knowledge of an object which is not operating in a causal manner. Yet >that object is one of the conditions of the knowledge. For example, if the >object were not present, neither would the knowledge be present. In order >for the knowledge to know of the presence of the object, to be sensitive >to the object's presence, it must be affected by the object. For if >something is not affected by something else, how can it's existence or >functioning be affected by that something else? If you argue that, you will have a problem with non-existent objects (as for example in science fiction), with conceptual objects (as in mathematics, etc.), with impossible objects (the classic son of a barren woman, etc.), with objects of dream or visualization and with some meditational objects. This at least is the traditional objection. Furthermore, the unconditioned is so different from any other kind of object that it is not at all clear that the same rules could or should apply. >Clearly we have two very important and highly repected authorities who >are within the _same_ interpretation of the _same_ school of Buddhism >(Ge-luk-ba Prasangika Madhyamika), who do not agree on whether exalted >wisdom consciousness is self-aware or not! My question is, if these guys >are fully realized, then wouldn't they just know the correct answer to this >from their own experience? And if they are not, why are their writings on >these subjects taken so seriously? Or are their differences merely >linguistic choices in the expression of the ineffable, made on soteriological >(I love that word) grounds? I would have thought that at least from the Abhidhamma period (and probably earlier) dhamma debate is itself a form of meditative exercise to sharpen the wisdom faculty - to be balanced of course by faith, concentration, vigour and mindfulness. There seem to me to be two important features of such debate. Firstly, it requires intellectual precision and rigour (i.e. more than that individual would normally exercise). Secondly, it requires an element of the unexpected. Otherwise the whole thing becomes very exact and coldly precise in a way that rigidifies the mind. Or, worse - metaphysically exciting in a way that titillates the mind. (Each of these being a kind of obsession.) Probably at all periods the bulk of this kind of training went on between teachers and pupils and among groups of fellows. It is of course there in the literature, but it is easy to forget that it is a meditational training and not purely an intellectual discipline. However, if you do see it this way, then you will expect an element of the koan. In the beginning, of course, the system you are learning will itself force you to look at things in new ways. Later it will need the introduction of ever more subtle issues. Even better, if you can prove the precise opposite of what people were taught in the beginning! I suppose this comes down to agreeing with your last sentence (above). Lance Cousins -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 23 Dec 1993 to 24 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Sat Dec 25 16:16:40 1993 Date: Sat, 25 Dec 1993 16:12:13 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 24 Dec 1993 to 25 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 4 messages totalling 378 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. The unseen seer 2. The scientist, the robot and the Buddha (3) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1993 22:02:48 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: The unseen seer On Fri, 24 Dec 1993, L S Cousins wrote: > Leigh Charles Goldstein writes: > > >If someone were to hold that last position, without claiming the operation > >of a Buddha's mind is inexplicable, they would be saying one could have > >knowledge of an object which is not operating in a causal manner. Yet > >that object is one of the conditions of the knowledge. For example, if the > >object were not present, neither would the knowledge be present. In order > >for the knowledge to know of the presence of the object, to be sensitive > >to the object's presence, it must be affected by the object. For if > >something is not affected by something else, how can it's existence or > >functioning be affected by that something else? > > If you argue that, you will have a problem with non-existent objects (as for > example in science fiction), with conceptual objects (as in mathematics, > etc.), with impossible objects (the classic son of a barren woman, etc.), > with objects of dream or visualization and with some meditational objects. > This at least is the traditional objection. In the case of non-existent objects, they are not objects of knowledge. If someone tells me a story, it calls up images in mind, which are objects of knowledge. These objects themselves (mental imaginings) exist, however I may also falsely credit them with being factual, with reflecting material objects. That error, which can be corrected by ordinary mental reasoning and investigation, does not alter the fact of the relative existence of the false image. If the false image did not exist, no one would bother to read science fiction! This false image is clearly a composite object and capable of causing effects. A similiar argument would apply to conceptual objects and impossible objects. > Furthermore, the unconditioned is > so different from any other kind of object that it is not at all clear that > the same rules could or should apply. Agreed. The unconditioned must affect sentient beings for Dharma to have any real value. Otherwise why seek realization? However, it is not clear to me what rules apply that allow it to do so without itself being a functioning entity. (Now that you mention it, I remember that this is a question I have pondered for many years.) A stab at an answer: the unconditioned acts on the conditioned by dissolving false conception habits of the mind. The unconditioned is not a positive entity but the absence of an imagined condition, inherent existence. Therefore, what a Buddha knows is the ultimate incorrectness of the perception of conditioned phenomena (as well as their relative validity). Since the perception of relative phenomena is ultimately invalid, it is no surprise that it can cease upon investigation of phenomena. In this case, it is like ceasing to be affected by a mental imagining, as when frightened by a scary movie, one realizes it is only a film and calms down. Since it is the falseness of an assumed quality of the film, (that it represents material events that are occuring now before one's eyes) which is realized, and which produces change, one could say that it is nothing that produces the change, or that realizing the true nature of the film produces change; but these phrasings could be misleading in either a nihilistic or materialist manner. Another way to say this is that the true nature of things doesn't produce an effect. The true nature is what remains when false conceptual projections are removed, and it is the ceasing of the functioning of the false conceptions that produces the change. Well, I'm sure the above argument is exactly as correct as the above argument. > > I would have thought that at least from the Abhidhamma period (and > probably earlier) dhamma debate is itself a form of meditative exercise to > sharpen the wisdom faculty - to be balanced of course by faith, > concentration, vigour and mindfulness. There seem to me to be two > important features of such debate. Firstly, it requires intellectual precision > and rigour (i.e. more than that individual would normally exercise). > Secondly, it requires an element of the unexpected. Otherwise the whole > thing becomes very exact and coldly precise in a way that rigidifies the > mind. Or, worse - metaphysically exciting in a way that titillates the mind. > (Each of these being a kind of obsession.) This makes a lot of sense and puts what I have been reading in perspective. Somehow I didn't get this tenor of an exercise from the texts. I know that in some periods, more politicaly powerful Tibetan schools outlawed schools they disagreed with and/or confiscated their property. However, If I read the disputes over sublte doctrinal matters in this light, then instead of casting doubt on the Dharma they support it. Also, I hope it is not too bad for the two errors you mentioned to occur to some degree, or I should probably get off this list right now for the sake of my practice :). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 25 Dec 1993 09:51:23 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: The scientist, the robot and the Buddha >And so I would say that the very essence >of Buddhism is philosophy, understood in the Socratic sense of the >term. How many modern philosophers define their activity in terms which you project that Socrates himself would have approved? (What a question!) >Bill Kish asks whether science has rendered Buddhism obsolete. To me the >answer is pretty obviously no. I think of Science as an enterprise of >discovering the structure of nature; technology as an enterprise of putting >the knowledge of the structure of nature towards goals that human being >pursue; and philosophy (of which genus Buddhism is a species) as an enterprise >of reflecting on which goals human beings ought to be pursuing. Isn't it true that the Buddhist path could be described as an approach to ultimate reality, that awakening is awakening to the truth of things, and that Science is also concerned with these things? I think there is a considerable overlap in intention between at least some Science and some Buddhism; and I think that in the region of overlap the superiority of Buddhism can be demonstrated, in that the description of reality, or the nature of things, provided by Buddhism is both more profound and more accurate than that currently provided by Science, and also more practical in that it yields a Technology that is capable of providing people with some kinds of happiness and satisfaction. [That was basically what I had to say. The rest is very detailed and should be skipped unless you are terrifically interested in this.] >Buddhism, as I have argued above, is essentially an enterprise of making >judgements about the relative values of actions. It is never merely a matter >of knowing what is the case, but must concern itself with having something to >say about what ought to be doing in light of what is the case. While it seems to me there is considerable truth in this view, consider the four noble truths, one of the most prevalent Buddhist doctrines. Although they specify actions to take, the fundamental orientation of the way they are phrased, at least in translation to English, is as a description of how things _are_ that itself forces any reasonable to person to a certain course of action. It also seems that most prescriptions for behavior, such as Vinaya, are presented as efficient means to realization, and not as ends in themsleves. One strong point of your argument is that the Western structure of Science, Technology, and political power, is missing any hard way of examining motivation, intent or ultimate goal. Most of our society uses the powers of modern technology to fullfill the human animal's greed and fear, with a gloss of moralistic window dressing. Buddhism can certainly provide that missing, one would think critical, discipline (why the hell are we doing all this, anyway? Because we are driven by compulsions doesn't make them the best course of action, etc...) which you pointed out in your quotations also seems to be the aim of some of the Socratic material. However, just because we need a functional theory of ethics, and Buddhism can provide a theory of ethics, doesn't mean Buddhism _is_ a theory of ethics. (If I am using the term 'ethics' properly). [Be warned the rest of this message is incendiary. Please don't read any further. Especially if you disagree. --Leigh] >Neurophysiology, cognitive science and quantum mechanics will never replace >abhidharma, because these sciences are asking an entirely different set of >questions for entirely different purposes. In the final analysis, it makes >not >the smallest bit of different to a Buddhist how or why the brain functions. >Knowing the biochemistry of the brain tells one absolutely nothing about how >to keep the mind pure or how to discern good from evil. Maybe one could even go further. _Perhaps_ the biochemistry of the brain can never explain the possiblity of awakening, of transmigration, nor of the very existence of the five skandhas, all of which are important processes of the universe, and therfore fails even as a theory of the human mind. I will even take a brave step further into the danger zone: _perhaps_ the natural order that Science pretends to 'discover' is actually our own (or someone or something's arbitrary) creation in the first place, as is the scientific 'explanation'; and Buddhist accounts of magic are not entirely mythical. Obviously Science is of great benefit to humanity, a remarkable acheivement of modern culture, and Buddhism perhaps must maintain compatibility with Science as a form of relative truth as well as a cultural preoccupation. In any case reconciling Buddhism to Science is probably important for its propagation in the West. I once heard a Lama say: "If I have said anything that causes you doubt about the Dharma, just forget that I said it." And he had, and I did. It made sense at the time. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 25 Dec 1993 14:43:37 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Re: The scientist, the robot and the Buddha Richard Hayes writes, In the final analysis it makes not the smallest bit of difference to a Buddhist how the brain functions. Knowing the biochemistry of the brain tells one absolutely nothing about how to keep the mind pure or how to discern good from evil. Richard has laid out a scheme for neatly separating science, technology and religion. I do not think it quite this simple. I do not think science can help us discern good from evil, but what about pure mind, or quiet mind, or other states of mind cultivated by meditation? IF such states are real-- and I think so-- they ought to have material effects on the physical basis of mind-- the "kuten" to borrow the Tibetan term for the physical basis of the oracle. And if this is so, then conceivably, via technology, we may be able to work backwards from physical basis to mental state, thereby producing quiet mind, or pure mind. Certainly in psychopharmacology, the ability to design drugs which, in a pinpoint manner, can systematically suppress brain chemicals such as serotonin, suggests that in the future, the cultivation of mind through drugs will be a live possibility. (The current bestseller Listening to Prozac is suggestive on this score.) I do not propose that such drugs would ever substitute for doing it the hard way, through meditation and contemplation. They may simply serve as reference points, however. On the other hand, one of the fascinating points about Listening to Prozac is the dismay the author, a psychotherapist, feels in finding that patients recover without necessarily gaining insight, through the drug alone. I suspect that Buddhist practitioners would be likewise horrified by the suggestion that what once took years of practice to achieve could be replicated more quickly and easily through biotechnology. Science and technology change our view of who we are and what we are and thereby effect philosophy. Knowing that my brain is composed of various parts such as cerebrum, medulla oblongota, cerebellum, etc. each with functions separable functions does give me a different sense of my thinking than, say, Lucretius had, who believed that consciousness emerges from a spot under the armpits. The more scientific view suggests a modular, multiple, orchestral consciousness, not a univocal one. Similarly knowing that the DNA in my body, my dog's body and in the leaves of the sweet olive tree outside my window are similar suggests a commonality in diversity not otherwise immediatley evident. Is science merely throwing out metaphors? OR is mind, through science, trying to tell us something? Because of this question, I cannot accept Richard's neat allocation of labor. Best wishes for the season, Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 25 Dec 1993 15:50:39 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Re: The scientist, the robot and the Buddha Leigh Goldstein asks: > How many modern philosophers define their activity in terms which you project > that Socrates himself would have approved? Quite a few. Not being a social scientist, I cannot quote hard data, but my impression, gained from having quite a few friends who are certainly philosophers and may even be (depending on what you mean by the word) modern, is that most of them are still motivated primarily by the spirit of Socrates. But now that the question has been answered, may I ask what was the purpose of asking it? > Isn't it true that the Buddhist path could be described as an approach to > ultimate reality, that awakening is awakening to the truth of things, and that > Science is also concerned with these things? derable The way I would state it is that the ultimate concern of Buddhism is happiness and human well-being, and that knowing the true nature of things is instrumental (and therefore secondary) to that. To put it another way, if it should turn out that one could (as Rodger Kamenetz suggested) attain ultimate satisfaction without knowing anything about ultimate reality, then I suppose Buddhists would be pleased to dispense with having to know anything about ultimate reality. (The sheer fanatasy integrated into much Buddhist literature suggests a willingness to dispense with even ordinary reality, never mind ultimate reality.) The ultimate concern of science, on the other hand, is knowing the real nature of things, with utter disregard for what implications such knowledge might have for human (or any other kind of) happiness. This suggests to me that science and the species of philosophy known as Buddhism have very different ultimate concerns, although it is probably inevitable that they happen to stumble upon similar views of reality from time to time. > I think there is a considerable > overlap in intention between at least some Science and some Buddhism; and I > think that in the region of overlap the superiority of Buddhism can be > demonstrated, in that the description of reality, or the nature of things, > provided by Buddhism is both more profound and more accurate than that > currently provided by Science ds a I agree that Buddhism is much better than science at doing the work of philosophy. But I think it is undeniable that science is much better at doing the work of science than is Buddhism. There is scarcely a single insight in all of Buddhist philosophy that has any scientific value. That is not to say anything negative about Buddhism; it is simply to say that Buddhism is pretty bad at being science, but it is very good at being philosophy. If one tries too much to combine the two, one gets a strange amalgam that is both very bad philosophy and very bad science (although it might be very good at selling books to the disinformed public). > One strong point of your argument is that the Western structure of Science, > Technology, and political power, is missing any hard way of examining > motivation, intent or ultimate goal. wers of It is no accident that science (about which, by the way, there is nothing particularly Western) is missing a hard way of examining motivation; historically, scientists trained themselves to ignore questions of motivation or utility, since these considerations were thought to get in the way of discovering the true nature of things. One has only to think of how eager nearly all governments in the world have been to suppress certain findings of scientists, and how eager most governments and business enterprises have been to ignore the warnings of scientists about certain public policies. Indeed, governments have replaced organized religions as the main forces behind the suppression of scientific investigation. The discovery of truths that might make people question policies is the greatest single threat to policy-makers (whether they be political, religious or commercial). It has therefore always been hard for practising scientists to divorce themselves from the predatory interets of policy-makers. That they have failed to make this divorce during most of this century is much of what has made this century so particuarly hellish, arguably one of the most dangerous and precarious in human history. > [Be warned the rest of this message is incendiary. Please don't read any > further. Especially if you disagree. --Leigh] Don't worry about me. I'm made of pure asbestos. But I pass your kind warning on to others. IF YOU CATCH FIRE EASILY, PLEASE DELETE NOW! > Obviously Science is of great benefit to humanity, a remarkable > acheivement of modern culture, and Buddhism perhaps must maintain > compatibility with Science as a form of relative truth as well as a > cultural preoccupation. Science is neither a great benefit nor a great hindrance to humanity, any more than reality itself is a great benefit or a great hindrance. Reality is merely reality, and science is merely a means of trying to arrive at a fair approximation of the structures of reality. To dismiss science as relative truth is simply to be prejudiced in favour of a Buddhist method of marginalizing realities that seem incompatible with whatever dogmas one is least willing to examine critically. The two truth theory, in other words, is merely a technique of immunizing certain dogmas from critical investigation; the very essence of true science, on the other hand, is to refuse to try to immunize any pet theory or hypothesis from critical scrutiny. > In any case reconciling Buddhism to Science is probably important for its > propagation in the West. I think we agree on this. It is much more important for Buddhism to try to show that it is not contrary to science than it is for science to show that it is not contrary to Buddhism. > I once heard a Lama say: "If I have said anything that causes you doubt > about the Dharma, just forget that I said it." And he had, and I did. > It made sense at the time. The lama's statement is a beautiful illustration of precisely what I take to be the central difference between Buddhism and science. The goal of a lama is to instill confidence in the Dharma, which is a particular picture of reality; so important is this confidence, that the lama asks his audience to ignore anything that might shake that confidence. The goal of the scientist, on the other hand, is to raise doubts about every picture of reality. There, we managed to get through that entire discussion without a single flame. That is good, because the issues are important -- far too important to consign to the flames. May the discussion continue. Richard Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 24 Dec 1993 to 25 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Sun Dec 26 16:06:23 1993 Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 16:01:54 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 25 Dec 1993 to 26 Dec 1993 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 8 messages totalling 379 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Important scientific discovery 2. The scientist, the robot and the Buddha 3. Toofu no koto (2) 4. horrified Buddhist practitioners 5. Buddhism and Science 6. obsolescence? 7. Skip Martin ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 25 Dec 1993 16:47:20 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Important scientific discovery Yesterday I referred to an important scientific experiment aimed at discovering whether or not Father Christmas delivers presents to naughty Buddhist adults. It is with deep shame that I must report that I learned this afternoon that the entire funding for this research ($0.75 for the price of a used woolen stocking) was provided by a source that had a hidden political agenda. It was apparently their aim to catch Father Christmas in the act of discriminating against non-Christians, and they hoped to use the fruits of my honest scientific labours as evidence to be used against Saint Nick in a class action lawsuit. I immediately withdrew my name from the project. (In retrospect, I realize I should perhaps have been more wary of a funding agency calling itself the Multicultural Vigilante Corps.) On a much more happy note, I am delighted to report that Santa Claus had nothing to worry about, since after all he did not fall into the trap set for him by my funders. That is to say, he brought me a present! And not just any present, but a present perfectly suited to my needs. Imagine my delight when I discovered in my stocking the coveted two-volume _Dictionary of Tofu Humour_, edited by Hu Dat Gai, published by Giggling Carrot Press in Boise, Idaho. (Hu Dat Gai will be known to some of you as the editor of the _Theatre-goers Guide to Theravadin Monastic Musical Comedy_.) For those of you who are unfamiliar with the work, the _Dictionary of Tofu Humour_ is a priceless collection of every witty remark, joke, ditty, funny anecdote and humorous essay that has been recorded on the subject of tofu. The entries are arranged according to country, and subarranged chronologically. This makes it very easy to discover, for example, what amusing things were being said about tofu in Kenya in the latter half of the sixteenth century. The work is accompanied by a complete author index, so with only a little work it is possible to find all the tofu jokes made by Mozart, Shakespeare, Oscar Wilde, H.L. Menken, P.G. Wodehouse, Joseph Stalin or any other humourist you can think of. Let me share with you just one delightful anecdote. One St Andrew's Eve, Lady Llwllyllmeoghdh invited the Prince of Wales for dinner. After serving the main course, the Prince said "What was that substance? It was without any doubt the most tasteless thing one has ever put in one's mouth. And the texture was perfectly repugnant." Whereupon, Lady Llwllyllmeoghdh replied: "That was tofu, Sire. Would His Majesty like another piece?" Well, you should have SEEN his face! Isn't that droll? The book is a must for every witty vegetarian on your shopping list. On the other hand, you may wish to wait until the CD-ROM version becomes available. Yes, Virgnia, there is a Santa Claus. And I am pleased to report that he is politically correct. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 08:47:12 EST From: Marc Wachowitz Subject: Re: The scientist, the robot and the Buddha Rodger Kamenetz wrote: > I do not think science can > help us discern good from evil, but what about pure mind, or quiet mind, or > other states of mind cultivated by meditation? There have been some measures of brain wave activity in Soto Zen monks, and the results where certainly interesting for the scientists. On the other hand, there have been some supposedly enlightened ones who said that the effects being measured could be produced by any sufficiently trained person (and possibly in the future also with drugs) but would have little to do with enlightenment - they were merely side-effects of some kinds of practice. Mental states are just mental states - enlightenment is enlightenment. As a poster on soc.religion.eastern recently wrote: Confusing one with the other is like confusing the smell of food with eating the food. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ * wonder everyday * nothing in particular * all is special * Marc Wachowitz ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 08:48:30 EST From: "Dr. I. Astley" Subject: Re: Toofu no koto Kono jissukusshon wa, atama wo TOOFU no kado ni butsukeru you da na Mina-sama ni, meri kurisumasu neeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Ian Astley e-mail: astley@mailer.Uni-Marburg.DE Philipps-Universitaet, FB 11 Tel.: [+49] 6421 28-3662, FG Religionswissenschaft -3661, Liebigstr. 37 or -7035 D--35037 Marburg Fax: [+49] 6421 28-3944 Germany ---PLEASE NOTE the new postal code!--- ---AND the new e-mail node address!--- ******************************************************************** ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 08:49:30 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: horrified Buddhist practitioners Rodger Kamenetz writes: > I suspect that Buddhist practitioners would be > likewise horrified by the suggestion that what once took years of practice > to achieve could be replicated more quickly and easily through biotechnology. The mistake that most beginners (and some who are not) make is to suppose that the aim of a teacher is to produce results quickly. Certainly, if I am taking a meditation course, much of my attention is on making very sure that people do not progress too rapidly. So I certainly would be horrified and with very good reason too. Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 13:11:00 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Buddhism and Science Leigh Charles Goldstein speculates: _perhaps_ the natural order that Science pretends to 'discover' is actually our own (or someone or something's arbitrary) creation in the first place, as is the scientific 'explanation'; and Buddhist accounts of magic are not entirely mythical. It is not entirely clear to me what you are suggesting here, Leigh. It looks as if it may be a version of the idea that what is called scientific discovery is in truth no more than the fancy of people who are called scientists, and that the creative process of scientists is in no significant way different from the creative process of playwrights, poets, novelists and mythwrights. There are many versions of this view of science available. One version of it, well know in North American circles, is advanced by Christian Fundamentalists who argue that the Biblical creation myth ought to be taught in biology classes alongside the hypotheses currently considered by biologists to to be most likely to be true. Despite the fact that most biologists have countered the arguments of Fundamentalists that evolutionary theory ought to be regarded as merely one more creation myth among many, Fundamentalists have had a strong influence on publishers of school textbooks, many of whom try to produce textbooks that will have a chance of being purchased by the boards of education in states in which there is a significant number of Fundamentalists. (I don't know what the current situation is, but about ten years ago I knew a biology teacher in Colorado who was forced by his local school board to teach biology from a textbook in which the word "evolution" did not occur until the very last chapter, and even then was presented only as one of several theories. It is rather amazing that a relatively small religious authority could have so much influence on the way science is taught in state-supported schools. It also illustrates, contrary to what many believe, that scientists actually have very little real power or influence in our society. Irrationality, dogmatism and superstition still reigns supreme on this continent.) Another version of the above view of science is espoused by a wide range of intellectuals representing many disciplines in the Humanities (which may have some bearing on why in some scientific circles the Humanities are better known as the Inanities). Essentially their argument is that scientific method is culturally determined and represents the values of a particular subculture, that is, a group of people who have succeeded in gaining a dominant central position in world culture and have managed to marginalize alternative views of the world. (I have heard versions of this theory espoused in various ways by Marxists, feminists and deconstructionists, as well as by politicians whose success at the poles depends on paying lip service to what they often call multiculturalism). Is your view of science like one of the two views stated above, or do you have a third version of the view? Please let me know which view of science you actually hold, since I hate wasting people's time refuting views that they do not in fact entertain. You entertain one further speculation, Leigh: _Perhaps_ the biochemistry of the brain can never explain the possibility of awakening, of transmigration, nor of the very existence of the five skandhas, all of which are important processes of the universe, and therefore fails even as a theory of the human mind. This way of stating things makes me suspect you may be siding somewhat more with a kind of fundamentalist position (albeit Buddhist rather than Christian), since you are taking a particular set of Buddhist dogmas as a standard for assessing proximity to truth. You seem to be suggesting something like this: Insofar as a method of research enables one to explain transmigration and the existence of the five skandhas, it can be regarded a reliable and trustworthy method for arriving at the truth. It is a bit odd, even from a Buddhist point of view, to speak of the five skandhas as things that exist. The tendency among Buddhist philosophers is to regard the five skandhas as mere names given to collections of dharmas; as with all collections, the skandhas are considered unreal, whereas the dharmas in the sets are considered real. Thus one can collect the dharmas into five sets known as skandhas, into twelve sets known as aayatanas or into eighteen sets known as dhaatus; none of these sets is more than a convenient fiction used for the purposes of instruction. Alternatively, one can gather all these dharmas into one set known as a person. As for the individual dharmas collected into these various sets, there were many disputes among Buddhists as to which dharmas (if any) were ultimately real. Unfortunately, there was hardly any method (aside from appeal to tradition) to settle these questions. Perhaps the only method that one could appeal to for settling abhidharmic disputes would be a kind of pragmatic test. That is, if a teaching produces certain results, such as helping people arrive at a predetermined goal, then it can be regarded as pragmatically true. The pragmatic test, however, is notoriously ineffective at enabling one to decide among competing theories. It has long been recognized, for example, that one could successfully launch a rocket to Jupiter whether or not one followed a geocentric or a heliocentric theory of planetary motion; thus the practical results would "confirm" both theories, despite the fact that the two theories are logically incompatible. If all you are interested in doing is arriving at a given goal, there are usually a multiplicity of theories (or what Thomas Kuhn calls paradigms) available that will enable you to do it. This is why Buddhist discipline can tolerate so many practices and so many theories; it is goal-centred rather than method-centred. If, on the other hand, what one wishes to do is to arrive at the most comprehensive understanding of things, it will take a method much more refined than Buddhist discipline and a set of theories much more sophisticated than Buddhist dogma. If you want to understand reality, bet on science. Bet on Buddhism if all you want to do is to convince yourself that you are healthy and virtuous in a sick and vicious world. This is why I think it is better to recognize that Buddhism and science (despite a handful of accidental similarities) are essentially different enterprises designed to proceed along very different paths. Buddhism is goal-centred, while science is method-centred. I see no reason to mix them together into a single enterprise. On the other hand, I do see a very good reason NOT to confuse them, namely, that confusing them tends to tempt one to say that one of them is superior to the other and that one has made the other obsolete. Say that too often, and you may actually bring about the conditions in which one or the other is lost. Whichever one were lost, I think we would all be the poorer for it. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 15:18:37 EST From: Anna Yamada Subject: Re: Toofu no koto Soo naraba, enryonaku ni tabenasai zo. Shinnen wa mada desu. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 15:20:50 EST From: Galen Amstutz Subject: obsolescence? Bill Kish writes: > >Rodger Kamenetz: >> To my mind, the interesting discoveries about mind, self and >> consciousness are not going to be found throughmedieval logic or >> introspection. They are to be found in neurophysiology, pharmacology, >> and other scientific studies of the brain. If Buddhism is based on >> reality, then the reality of brain and perception as understood today >> ought to be acknowledged, and Buddhist theories of skandhas, etc. ought >> to be tested dialectically. > >I'm curious if either you or others on BUDDHA-L occasionally entertain the >notion that Buddhism might in fact be obsolete. What if anything is there >in Buddhism which might make it an attractive alternative to a modern >philosophy of mind which a) is not in conflict with our progress in science >and b) is motivated by a clearly defined soteriological aim (i.e. giving >people knowledge they can actually use to end their suffering) ? > >Dear Bill and others, A mundane response (I'd like to hear more about this from all): a) What there is in Buddhism which is not found in modern science is what all religions offer, namely characteristically "religious" forms of mythic and poetic communication. So far the 20th century doesn't suggest that mythic and poetic communication goes away with the presence of science, but rather they find new ways to complement each other. "Religious" traditions program, or guide, or interact with, or shape, or behavior-modify [choose your epistemological favorite flavor] human experience [the human "information process"], at both individual and social levels, in ways not duplicated by raw scientific styles of communication [or for that matter, by analytic philosophical styles]. Therefore we tend to keep them around. b) The basic epistemological sense of "emptiness," as in Buddhism, is widely agreed upon in the late 20th century. On the other hand I am doubtful about how well most of the myth and poesis--as well as many of the analytical concepts, which are as arbitrary as anything else--in classical Buddhism fit the needs of the late 20th century. Has anything of a fundamentally creative nature really been added to Asian Buddhism in the last 800 years? We have to keep some of the mythic and poetic sensibility. At certain intellectual levels, however, like Bill and others, I wonder if various medical and information theory concepts from the modern world tradition might not more effectively get the intellectual job done than the traditional Asian intellectual constructs--even if Buddhist scholars have a lot of vested interests in managing those traditional intellectual constructs! So the question is, which aspects of "Buddhism" are going to be of use in the 21st century, and which aspects are going to be scholarly arcana of historical interest only. As you know, arcana is what has already happened to most of the Japanese Buddhist tradition as far as most of the Japanese public is concerned--and this is probably not because people in Japan are stupid, or don't know their real interests. The fact may be that large parts of "Buddhism" are not feeding them something they can use very well. from: Galen Amstutz, Department of Religion, 231 Williams Bldg. R-15, Florida State University, Tallahassee FL 32306-1029 (904)644-0213 fax:(904)644-7225 ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1993 15:21:58 EST From: Galen Amstutz Subject: Re: Skip Martin Dear Paul, On behalf of Tessa Bartholomeusz, Kathleen Erndl and myself (who had been expecting to meet Skip during his planned convalescence down here) accept and convey our sadness about Skip's recent death. We had been looking forward to him. from: Galen Amstutz, Department of Religion, 231 Williams Bldg. R-15, Florida State University, Tallahassee FL 32306-1029 (904)644-0213 fax:(904)644-7225 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 25 Dec 1993 to 26 Dec 1993 *************************************************** From: sanders@iitmax.iit.edu (Greg Sanders) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 23 Dec 1993 14:02:13 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) I'm trying to respond to your post, Stephen. I practice Zen Buddhism, and am somewhat a beginner. I've been practicing intensively for a few years. Where I wrote "you" here, I mean it generically ("one"), not personally. You ask about emptiness, but instead seem to want to know about Buddhism. In article <2f2fad$n88@pdx1.world.net> stephenc@moe.corollary.com (Stephen S. Chang) writes: > I really appreciate such generous replies to my post. >My question, however, has nothing to do with the understanding >of emptiness as many of you tried to convey. My question is >how do you practice Buddhism with its ultimate realization is >emptiness. Perhaps they wish to empty your teacup, seeing it as full of emptiness? Further, emptiness is NOT nirvana and not "realization" or enlightenment. Actually, I'm going to put in my own $0.02 on emptiness. Emptiness and impermanence are closely related. Essentially, emptiness is an observation about reality: nothing has any abiding truly permanent fixed character- istics. It is only in your mind (your ideas) that anything is non-empty. The concepts that you have, or that anyone has, (standing over against emptiness in your mind) are just ideas. Drop the ideas and there is nothing to be said, nothing that can be said. In Genjo-koan (in Dogen's Shobogenzo) there is a line, "unsuspected universes lie in all quarters." Consider how that line describes you. I suspect you are forever discovering unsuspected universes in yourself. All that you are is just the effects of countless causes, which gave/give rise to you. You have no existence independent of anything else, let alone independent of everything else. You are empty of any fixed permanent unchanging characteristics, unknowable. > Maybe I can make myself clearer with the following questions: > >Is ultimate state of Buddism "non-existence/emptiness"? No. In my humble opinion (IMHO), you can see the ultimate state as one of non-attachment. Implicitly, you then don't judge things as desireable or undesireable. Explicitly, you do not crave this and have aversion to that. The ultimate state is like a fire that no longer draws. The desire/aversion having been exhausted, the fire dies out. You are emptiness now, always have been, and always will be. You are not newly created when born, nor are you destroyed when you die. You are not your body, and you are not your mind or the combination of body and mind. >If emptiness makes you to deny everything(including the notion >of denial, or emptiness itself) can you still have desires >and yet not obssesed? To the best of my understanding of what is asked in these three lines and to the best of my understanding of Buddhism through practice, this question has no connection to an accurate understanding. Thus, I can't even say it seems correct or incorrect. More generally, you can ask yourself whether you can have desires without attachment or obsession. >Is denial also a violation of emptiness? if so emptiness >can't be achieved with denial. I'm not sure how to interpret this question. If you deny something, you don't see it as empty. Emptiness is not some "thing," and is not subject to being achieved. Is being a human male or female "achieved?" >Are desires violations of emptiness? if so emptiness >can't be achieved with desires(including desire to >achieve emptiness). Hmmm. "Violations of emptiness" Interesting way to put it. Yes, they are. If you truly see/experience emptiness, this leads ultimately to extinction of desire. Let me offer an example of my (perhaps Buddhist) understanding of desire. The desire of men for women is somewhat the very prototype of desire. (if you dislike my choice of prototype, feel free to rewrite) Now, this desire is in some large measure an innate part of being human and of how the human mind is "wired," as well as a pervasive aspect of human society. In all fairness, no matter how deeply you go in practice, true mature love of partners for each other remains because in all fairness it can be said to transcend mere desire of all the various sorts involved. But, it is perhaps fair to describe the desire as natural or innate rather than merely arising from ideas or from reality conditioned by your ideas. What really happens with increasing awareness of emptiness is that you see that beauty passes and that the sweet winning behavior of today will pass (perhaps becoming less or more winning, but certainly different). So you don't get attached to the beauty or try to "freeze" your partner's behavior of today -- you don't set up demands and expectations in your mind that they will not change. You love the actual person (giving), not your ideas about the person (taking). Loving someone doesn't have to be a process of "getting something out of loving them." It is a fact that reality, exactly as it is, is always right in your face. Free of attach- ment, you are one with the flow of reality exactly as it is. The word "happiness" has strong connotations of having your expectations or desires met. When you merge with the flow of reality without overlaying it with your thoughts and desires, without expectations and goals, you find that reality, exactly as it is, turns out to be crisp intense and quietly joyous, no matter what. But NOTHING has changed when this happens. Life is inherently always like this and always has been. It happens in your ordinary life, as it is, with pains and failures all intact. When you are "in your thoughts" on the other hand, nothing will set you free of them: it's like one who dreams and must awaken to be free of the dream. >If you are to live with relization of emptiness, do you >beome a human shell with hollow heart? no emotion, no desires, >..., etc. like a stone? You are like stone as long as you are without realization of emptiness. See the last part of the long paragraph above. Actually, you must go beyond the mere realization of emptiness, but even in plain ordinary everyday practice you will get beyond to the point where you and life flow in harmony after a few years of real practice. Seeing the emptiness is pretty universal after a while, but that is not true liberation in any sense of the word. Going beyond, emotions become natural, flowing. You become authentic, rather than self conscious. Beyond this, genuine awakening erases the illusion of separation: self vs. other. I haven't realized my true nature, but everyone I know who has done so in some measure agrees that awakening doesn't lift you out of ordinary life in any way: there's nothing you "get." >How are you living you life? by denials? do you still have goals? Only a full Buddha would be truly free. >do you have any desire such as socialing with people, or even posting >articles in internet? Do you eat food? Would the most profound realization (strike that -- would even total realization) change this? Other people are not "other." That would be like one wave on the ocean thinking all the other waves are "other." There is ONE ocean. If you, as a wave, directly experience that you are the ocean, your interactions fall into place, just like your actions with respect to yourself fall into place. >Do you have any assurance, either by realization or experience, >of what's going to happen to you after death? IMO -- No one does. >Is it possible that Buddism is only logical but not true? One's understanding, yes. But the real article as actually lived, no. Buddhism comes out of human experience, not out of logic. It's not a production by means of logic. Is reality true? -- Greg greg@steve.iit.edu From: chak@cs.tu-berlin.de (Manuel Chakravarty) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 23 Dec 1993 14:03:54 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) Please be careful and don't interchange emptiness and nothingness or non-existence. ``Emptiness'' means the ``emptiness of inherent existence'' or if it suits you better ``lack of inherent existence'', i.e. nothing exists independently from the `rest'. To answer your question: > Is ultimate state of Buddism "non-existence/emptiness"? I want to refer to a stanza from the ``The Three Principal Aspects of the Path'' written by Je Tsongkhapa (a great Tibetan lama): Moreover when the extreme of existence is dispelled by appearance, and the extreme of non-existence is dispelled by emptiness, and you know how emptiness is perceived as cause and effect, you will not be captivated by extreme views. He writes ``the extreme of non-existence is dispelled by emptiness'' so for him the view of emptiness is not non-existence but even an antidote to the view non-existence! You can think of emptiness as something between (the extreme view of) existence and (the extreme view of) non-existence. The concept of emptiness denies that there is a single thing existing independently from all the other things but it also denies that there is _nothing_. Buddhism _is_not_ nihilism! > If emptiness makes you to deny everything(including the notion > of denial, or emptiness itself) can you still have desires > and yet not obssesed? A person fully realizing emptiness knows that every object appearing to him or her is not existing independently of him or her and that all the positive or negative attributes of the object are mere projections of mind. But such a person won't deny that an object functions in certain ways and that furthermore other beings develop delusions like attachment, hatred, or confusion with respect to the object. Knowing this such a person develops great compassion for all the beings caught in the web of such delusions. > Is denial also a violation of emptiness? if so emptiness > can't be achieved with denial. Correct! Emptiness can't be achieved with pure logical reasoning whatsoever. Logic reasoning can help us in developing an generic image of emptiness but the final step realizing emptiness is beyond logic, beyond approvement or denial. It can only be reached by intuition guided by a compassionate teacher. > Are desires violations of emptiness? if so emptiness > can't be achieved with desires(including desire to > achieve emptiness). Again. A desire for the realization may be of benefit for some time but before achieving the realization you have to be free from any clinging at a concept. > If you are to live with relization of emptiness, do you > beome a human shell with hollow heart? no emotion, no desires, > ..., etc. like a stone? Definitly, no. I'm not able to describe how it `feels' to have gained a full realization of emptiness as I am not enlightened. But your description is surely wrong. Having realized emptiness (of inherent existence) you are beyond desires in our sense. That does not mean `no desires' or `no emotions' like emptiness neither means (inherent) existence nor non-existence. This sounds alogical. Why? Because emptines can't be completely decribed with logic as I said before. > How are you living you life? by denials? do you still have goals? > do you have any desire such as socialing with people, or even posting > articles in internet? Being enlightened your are not clinging to goals or desires (not even the internet ;-) You are beyond these things. Having fully accomplished your personal happiness, you are striving to give the same happiness to all other beings without discrimination. If posting to the net helps you will also post to the net, why not? > Do you have any assurance, either by realization or experience, > of what's going to happen to you after death? A fundamental thesis of Buddhism is that every being seeks happiness and moreover that everything we do comes from this searching for happiness. Being enlightened (or having fully realized emptiness) you are perfectly happy and will never suffer again. So what about death? It simply doesn't bother you. > Is it possible that Buddism is only logical but not true? So what is `true'? The whole idea of emptiness is that there is no truth existing independently of you... All the best, Manuel From: kcox@sdd.hp.com (Keith Cox) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 23 Dec 1993 14:27:13 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) In article <2f2fad$n88@pdx1.world.net>, stephenc@moe.corollary.com (Stephen S. Chang) wrote: > Is ultimate state of Buddism "non-existence/emptiness"? No. The ultimate goal of buddhism is the cessation of suffering in the present. Further, to equate emptiness and non-existence is incorrect, as has been amply pointed out here. > If emptiness makes you to deny everything(including the notion > of denial, or emptiness itself) can you still have desires > and yet not obssesed? 'emptiness' doesn't make you do anything. Further, to deny something is to give it existence. Confirming and denying are intellectual excercises that have nothing to do with anything as far as the cessation of suffering is concerned. > Is denial also a violation of emptiness? if so emptiness > can't be achieved with denial. One cannot violate emptiness, only experience it. And yes, you are right, in fact emptiness cannot be achieved at all. 'Perceived' perhaps comes closer to the truth. > Are desires violations of emptiness? if so emptiness > can't be achieved with desires(including desire to > achieve emptiness). 'Clinging Desire' is the culprit, the origination of suffering. Noble Truth #2. > If you are to live with relization of emptiness, do you > beome a human shell with hollow heart? no emotion, no desires, > ..., etc. like a stone? The buddha's life was a demonstration of infinite compassion and love. One would assume that a true follower of the buddha's path would emulate the buddha's life. > How are you living you life? by denials? do you still have goals? > do you have any desire such as socialing with people, or even posting > articles in internet? All of the real bodhisatvas are silent. You won't read their posts on the net. The rest of us are following the eightfold path the best we can. > Do you have any assurance, either by realization or experience, > of what's going to happen to you after death? If you are in life, you are already in death. If you achieve realization of the present, you are assured of what is happening in the present. That is sufficient. > Is it possible that Buddism is only logical but not true? The buddhism that you believe in is obviously not true. So, what is your point? Peace! -- Internet: kcox@sdd.hp.com Of course, the opinions expressed herein are mine and mine alone. From: farris@dmark.llnl.gov.noname (Lorenzo Farris) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Emptiness? What does it achieve? Date: 23 Dec 1993 14:27:52 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) In article n88@pdx1.world.net, stephenc@moe.corollary.com (Stephen S. Chang) writes: > I really appreciate such generous replies to my post. > My question, however, has nothing to do with the understanding > of emptiness as many of you tried to convey. My question is > how do you practice Buddhism with its ultimate realization is > emptiness. Maybe I can make myself clearer with the following > questions: Is the ultimate realization of buddhism emptiness? > Is ultimate state of Buddism "non-existence/emptiness"? There is no ultimate state. No ultimate existence. No ultimate non-existence. > If emptiness makes you to deny everything(including the notion > of denial, or emptiness itself) can you still have desires > and yet not obssesed? Your idea of emptiness doesn't correspond to the concept as used in buddhism, as I understand it. Buddhism doesn't deny anything. Emptiness doesn't make you deny anything. It doesn't make you do anything. It is a property of existence. Understanding emptiness will just change your attitude in relation to your perceptions. That's all. Desires don't go away. Pain doesn't go away. Pleasure doesn't go away. > Is denial also a violation of emptiness? if so emptiness > can't be achieved with denial. Again. You can't violate emptiness. You can't achieve emptiness. It just is. > > If you are to live with relization of emptiness, do you > beome a human shell with hollow heart? no emotion, no desires, > ...., etc. like a stone? Hardly. Emotions, desires, suffering, they are all still there. The realization of emptiness makes you more human, in the sense of living and experiencing in the immediacy of the moment, and less human in the sense that you step out of the common human tendency to indulge in the self-inflicted agony that arises out of attachment. To be unattached is not the same as being emotionless. If anything, the better I understand emptiness, the less attached I become to the circumstances of my world, the deeper and richer my emotions become. I feel much more alive, the greater my understanding. > > How are you living you life? by denials? do you still have goals? > do you have any desire such as socialing with people, or even posting > articles in internet? You seem to have a preset notion of what buddhism is, and what emptiness is, that doesn't seem to be at all affected by responses to your first posting. I find this post of your reflects almost the identical ideas of your first. > > Do you have any assurance, either by realization or experience, > of what's going to happen to you after death? That is precisely one of the important points of buddhism. You don't. There is no assurance. You live your life right now, as though this moment is the only moment of consciousness that your being will ever experience. The only things we are assured of is that we will die, and we don't know when. THIS is emptiness. No matter what you do, who you love, what you build, what you cherish, who loves you: You will die. You can either worry about things you do and don't have, which won't matter, or you can live this moment for itself. Emptiness means that all you will ever have, all you will ever be, is in this moment. So pay attention to it, because as quickly as it arises, it is gone. --- Life is a 3D, sensurround, ecstatic farris3@llnl.gov explosion of experience, but only on the cutting edge of the present moment. If that's not where your mind is, you miss it. :-) From: Tyagi@HouseOfKaos.Abyss.com Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Questions regarding Buddhism Date: 24 Dec 1993 19:00:19 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) 931223 [away for 3 days or so after this] Steven Chang continues to pose doozies. :> |But, |being a person searching for the real truth, I really wish you have |patience with me and can give me some guidences: Search diligently! Search hard! Do not relent when difficulties arise! Accept nothing short of the Ultimate Truth! Yoicks! Tally ho! |1) The goal of Buddism is to end sufferings which are the results | of attachments to desires, therefore, cutting off all desires | is the pathway to Nirvana? Releasing them. 'Cutting them off' only works if you can do so at the ROOT. Most people cut them off by avoiding the objects of their desires. This is an effective means of avoiding the feelings, but it is not the same as Nirvana. |2) Is Nirvana, described as the ultimate serenity, equals to nothingness? | if not, what is there? is there a "self" in Nirvana? There is no self (anatman) anywhere to be found. Try as we might, we cannot discover it. Nirvana is the 'going out' like a candle flame of our urgency in life. We find peace and therefore are called 'serene'. |3) Buddha displays individuality, such as Amita Buddha of the West,...etc, | does Buddha still have a "self"? The Buddha is not a person, it is a title for people who come to realize their lack of consistent identity. The Buddha doesn't 'have' anything, for the Buddha doesn't grasp anything and retain it. |4) Entities who have achieved Nirvana are not equal to Buddha? There are | 3 stages of enlightments which elevate entities out of the reincarnation | cycle, of which Buddha being the highest. Why is there such distiniction | when in fact there is nothing to distinquish. Depends on the tradition. Some have elongated out the Nirvana-making process. Some claim it happens 'gradually', others say it is 'instantaneous or not at all'. Neither is accurate. They are only attempting to counter the extremity of their compatriots. No Master would hold to one extreme or another, especially when it comes to intellectualizations about the process of letting go of attachments. Distinction is a tool used to allow people to come to release, to Nirvana. If it is siezed-upon then it becomes an obstacle. This consistently happens within the various traditions. That is why competition develops and why dogmatism of form comes to be. It is a symptom of the dukkha within our society and within the traditions themselves. |5) The entire theory of Buddhism is based on the concept of "causes and | consequences", this would only make sense if reincarnation exist. | Is there any proof of reincarnation? Does any of you actually | know what you previous life was? See the various 'levels of truths'. There is the 'lesser level of truths' in which the Four Noble Truths hold. There is also the 'greater level of truths' in which cause and effect/consequences are also considered to be devoid of substance. Ultimately language and thought cannot comprehend the meaning of experience. This the real lesson within such divisions. Reincarnation is a concept without basis. It has its manifestation in that bodies continue to be born and are manifestations of buddha-nature, yet the whole idea that there is some kernel which retains identity from life to life is just as false as to say that there are/were Immortals in Taoism. We may or may not benefit from a study of 'previous lives'. This is similar to the study of dreams. They may be simply confusing. They may lead us to enjoy our lives tremendously. |6) How important is meditation in Buddism? Is meditation a requirement | to Nirvana? Absolutely required. Take care that you do not underestimate the meaning of the term 'meditation', however. |7) Second time I ask this question, a very important question to me. | Is there any assurance that Buddhism is true, and not just some | sort of a logical model derived from human thinking? Are there | any proofs, or even just experiences beside being logical? Buddhism is not something which can be true or false. It is a religious tradition of Asian society which travels about like a vagabond. It does use logical models within its sometimes complicated disciplines. All such models are products of human thinking. The Buddha was human, after all. Logic isn't everything. Mythology and poetry are great indicators of Truth. The Buddha's mother was impregnated by an Elephant. Christ's mother was virgin. Krishna could make himself into hundreds of physical bodies. There is much truth here, not very much of it logical, and many will tell you that none of this is 'True'. They are correct only when they consider it literally, just like most of the teachings of Buddhism and religions on the whole. |S. Chang Tyagi Uzt From: Tyagi@HouseOfKaos.Abyss.com Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Questions regarding Buddhism Date: 28 Dec 1993 07:35:41 -0800 Approved: nabil@world.net (Aaron Nabil) 931228 You wrote: |Stephen S. Chang (stephenc@moe.corollary.com) wrote: |: being a person searching for the real truth, I really wish you have |: patience with me and can give me some guidences: | |If you are really interested in truth, you are not going to get it by |trying to figure out and categorize every aspect of the spiritual path. How can you be so sure about this? What makes you so sure that we can come to know what does NOT lead to realization? |It really helps to just meditate. You'll gain understanding more quickly |through direct experience. Direct experience of what? Why can't we experience research or discussion directly? Is posting to the Internet somehow an 'abstraction'? Why can't sitting and typing diligently be a meditation? What is meditation but concentration of mind? Does this appear in behavior in only specific forms? Who can say what meditation really is? |Nirvana and reincarnation are really pretty remote issues, don't you |think? Real truth that matters has to do with developing mindfulness |here and now, which helps break the cycle of desire, and alleviate |suffering in this lifetime. Not to some. Nirvana is an ever-present goal, a very important reason to strive within a discipline. Without the goal of Nirvana, some would never sit down and meditate at all. Reincarnation is another good incentive, albeit a somewhat negative version. If you don't get awakened then you might come back as a slug, or worse, a hungry ghost! |I'm not saying that your questions are silly, they're not-- but to |paraphrase Lao Tzu, "The Way that can be named is not the Way." Sounds like you may be trying to name it. Tyagi Uzt From: Automatic digest processor Date: Sat, 1 Jan 1994 16:17:38 -0500 Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 31 Dec 1993 to 1 Jan 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 4 messages totalling 354 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. A note to Self smugglers ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 1 Jan 1994 11:15:46 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: A note to Self smugglers > From: Dan Lusthaus > >Now if when I consider someone, I am perceiving a false self, than if a > >third party perceives that same person, they must be perceiving a > >different false self, as their false projection of their erronious > >perceiving-mind would be different than the false projection of my > instance). Karma, according to Vasubandhu, is collective, not solipsistic, > and we congregate with and are born into groups that see things pretty much > the way we do. Hence what appears like a river of water to us will appear > as a river of pus and blood to preta, like a river of flame to a > hell-denizen, and so on. So humans more or less misperceive the same sort > of "self" in themselves and others. > This makes sense and I will check your references. However, consider: a river has relative existence, so it is reasonable that all human observers sharing part of their mind observe basically the same phenomena. If someone saw the hairs of a tortoise, though, it is a different case, since it is not even relatively existent. Therefore, it would be more amazing and require more explanation if a crowd of people seeing the horns on a rabbit saw the same horns. Perhaps this could be solved with a third category of relative phenomena: illusions like a mirage, validated phenomena like a table, and illusions invalidated only by a consciousness performing ultimate analysis. The third category including inherent existences, selves, etc. > Do unicorns have a higher degree of existence than centaurs? Or than round > squares? A chimera doesn't exist. As above, chimeras don't exist, but neither do tables. Nevertheless tables function and chimeras don't, so the Ge-luk-bas grant tables the status of relative truths. Since a group of healthy people would all confirm the existence of both a table and the self of the possesor of the table, in some sense that self is more 'real' than a chimera that is unconfirmed by healthy observers. No mechanism exists for perception of the chimera (only a diseased percervier thinks he sees the chimera, but he actually only sees symptoms of his disease and misinterprets them). Some actual mechansim exists for not only an individual to perceive a self, but for a group of different observers to perceive what appears to be the same self, just as if it existed as an external entity. This mechanism exists in the same way the teeth of a rabbit or the shell of a tortoise exists. > Have you ever seen a self? If so, the Vatican would probably like to meet > you! What is cognized as a "self" is a mirage. To be real, according to > most Indian Buddhist schools, requires that something produce an observable > effect in the world. This is supplemented by some Buddhists (to > differentiate mirages from valid cognitions) with the notion that the > effect must have an "enjoyer", i.e., one who can experience that effect > (you can't drink mirage water; you can't cognize an invariant self). On page 127 of _The Two Truths_ by Guy Newland, he write: Also, an inherently existent self is an example of something that is real in relation to the world, but is not a concealer- truth. On the same page he describes a mirage that is water as "unreal in relation to the world". (A mirage that is water is also not a concealer-truth since it does not exist). (Guy Newland is attempting to describe Ge-luk-ba definitions here.) Consider someone's 'personality' in the conventional sense of the term. This has effects, and has enjoyers, and it sometimes seems to me to be what I mistake for an inherently existing self. Is it the 'inherent existence'of the pesonality which is like a mirage? It is truely amazing how the more I consider this, the more it resembles a very tangled ball of yarn. It is easy for me to read these doctrines and sort of assume I have understood until I engage this sort of discussion. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 31 Dec 1993 to 1 Jan 1994 ************************************************** From: kish@paul.rutgers.edu (William Kish) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Questions regarding Buddhism Date: 4 Jan 1994 10:44:52 -0800 Approved: toshi@cco.caltech.edu (Toshi Takeuchi) Tyagi@HouseOfKaos.Abyss.com writes: > > What is Nirvana but coming to the here and now? The Sanskrit "nirvana" is often translated as "to blow out". This much has been expressed before on s.r.e by a number of people. I wanted to add how nirvana is treated in the Gelugpa order of Tibetan Buddhism. Actually, I think most of what follows (excluding my "soap-box" section at the end) is common to all of Tibetan Buddhism, so if anyone knows of any exceptions, please pass them along. The Tibetan for "nirvana" is "myang-'das". "myang" is short for "mya-ngan", which means "grief, trouble, misery". "'das" is short for "las-'das-pa" which means "to go beyond". So a working definition of "myang-'das" would be "to go beyond grief". A longer definition of "mya-ngan" is given in "Analysis of the Perfection of Wisdom" by mkhas-grub-bstan-pa-dar-rgyas (Kedrup Tenpa Dargye, 1493-1568). This work is a commentary on the Abhisamaya-alamkara (Ornament of Realization) by Maitreya (dictation taken by Asanga :), which in turn is a commentary on the Buddha's jumbo-sized Prajnaparamita Sutra. Kedrup Tenpa Dargye says wrt "myang-'das": nyon-sgrib-pa-lus-par-spangs-pai-so-sor-brtag-'gog (Break it down !) nyon - short for "nyon-mongs", aka "klesha" aka "mental affliction" sgrib - "obstacle" nyon-sgrib - "mental-affliction-obstacle"; these are the kleshas and their seeds, e.g. anger as well as the potential for anger pa-lus-par - "lus" means "body", and the whole phrase is idiomatic for "in their entirety" (literally "no body left") spangs-pai - "eliminate" so-sor - "one by one" brtag - "analyze" 'gog - "cessation" So a working rendering of this definition would be: (Nirvana is) A cessation which comes through seeing directly, one by one, the four arya truths, and therefore eliminating in their entirety mental afflictions and their seeds. A few comments are needed here, and they are specific to the Gelugpa exegesis of this phrase. First, "noble truth" as the phrase is commonly read, is a misnomer. They might very well have a sense of nobleness about them, but the reason they are "arya truths" is because that's what an arya sees moments after seeing emptiness directly. An arya (noble one), by definition, is someone who has seen emptiness directly. Second, "arya truths" and the direct seeing of them is implied by "analyze, one by one". [Begin Soap-Box] So the upshot here is that a minimum requirment for nirvana (there are supposedly four types of nirvana, but that's another thread) is that the kleshas and their seeds - all of them - are completely and irreversibly expunged. These mental affliction obstacles have as their root a deeply ingrained belief in something called inherent existence. An inherently existent thing is something that exists by its own power, independently of anything else. When Buddhism says that self and phenonmena are empty, inherent existence is what these things are empty of. I think its not too uncommon these days for people acquire an intellectual understanding of what it means to lack inherent existence, particularly if they ponder what modern physics must imply about themselves. But IMO, the real acid test for having seen emptiness *directly* occurs on the emotional level, which is where the kleshas are the most firmly entrenched. Anger and defensiveness are almost always reliable indicators of a belief in our own inherent existence, e.g. Stated another way, ignorance (belief in inherent existence) is the fuel for the fire of desire and aggression (kleshas). When their is no more fuel for the flame, the flame goes out - nirvana. [End Soap-Box] > Tyagi the tease -Bill Kish From: kish@paul.rutgers.edu (William Kish) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Questions regarding Buddhism Date: 5 Jan 1994 10:19:26 -0800 Tyagi@HouseOfKaos.Abyss.com writes: > > James: > |>What is Nirvana but coming to the here and now? > | > |This is a confusing question. How can you come to here and now if you're > |already there? > > BING BING BING Now why are you trying to get there? Here you are. But where is "here" ? Any sense of "here" you might have is just your own mind, as you already know. But this insight by itself is not Nirvana. The walls and floor of your room are "here" as well, and even though they are empty (i.e. lack inherent existence), they will never reach Nirvana. Even for sentient humans, everyone is already "here", but there is no limit to the richness of "being here". There is no limit to the subtely of experience and the skillfulness to be had in meeting situations. And yet all the people that are "here" seem to have limitations. All the people that are "here" seem affected in varying degrees by ignorance of what Marc Wachowitz called "Wholeness". I prefer Holeness, but either way, the usual notions of being (here) and time (now) are just your mind chasing its tail. Resting in these usual conceptions is not Nirvana. And I don't mean that what we usually impute as "I" or "ego" will ever reach Nirvana - it won't, and hence its silly to try and reach Nirvana as some sort of personal goal. Thats why we practice anyway :) That's why its important to sit on your zafu and do your technique anyway, *especially* if you don't feel like it, *especially*" if you'd rather be doing just about anything else ! Resistance to meditation practice means you realize that "you" will never reach nirvana by meditating. If, at this point, you consistently give into the urge to find something that feels good, your mind will always be chasing its tail. And even though it might seem as though you are "here" right "now", its more like being a squirrel on one of those little exercise wheels. Thats why doing what is sometimes referred to as "formal sitting meditation practice" *everyday* does in fact have the primacy that James referred to. You will never, ever, get anything out of formal sitting practice, unlike driving or reading or lager consumption or sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Not that people don't try anyway, but sooner or later they realize that they aren't going to get anywhere. And if they keep sitting and studying anyway (and a correct presentation of "view" will make this point), then ideas like "here" and "now" will eventually give up the ghost. > |--James > > Tioga -Bill Kish From: ad656@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Jai Maharaj) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: KARMA: We Mold Our Lives Like a Potter Fashions a Pot Date: 12 Jan 1994 06:15:34 -0800 KARMA: We Mold Our Lives Like a Potter Fashions a Pot Karma has quite a karma. Long after India's seers immortalized it in the Vedas, it suffered bad press under European missionaries who belittled it as "fate" and "fatalism," and today finds itself again in the ascendancy as the subtle and all-encompassing principle which governs man's experiential universe in a way likened to gravity's governance over the physical plane. Like gravity, karma was always there in its fullest potency, even when people did not comprehend it. The early seers who brought through the Vedas were practitioners, mystics and divine oracles who put into practice the knowledge of karma. To them, Karma -- from the root kri, "to do" -- was a power by which they could influence the Gods, nature, weather, harvests and enemies through right intent and rites righteously performed. Thus by their actions they could determine their destiny. Through the ages, other realized souls explained the workings of karma, revealing details of this cosmic law and, when the tradition of writing came into vogue, recording it for future generations. In this way they established karma as perhaps the fundamental principle of Hindu consciousness and culture then and now. Primordial and unborn, karma is anadi, "beginningless." Its Rig Veda definitions are linked to the performance of the homa, the potent fire rite that temporarily opens a window between the three worlds -- physical, subtle and causal. With Sanskrit mantras, mudras and meditative powers, Vedic priests precipitated a flow of shakti from highly evolved souls, Mahadevas, residing in inner worlds, securing the blessings of the Gods, insuring happiness for the clan. Neglecting the rites or misperforming them made negative karma and invited calamity and loss of wealth. Communities were tight knit, and the clan prospered or suffered collectively. When one person did transgress, elders suspected not so much an individual's willful intent to do malice as malperformance of the homa. The ritual was held responsible for sustaining a spiritual force-field strong enough to ward off demonic entities that torment, confuse and misguide weak individuals. Priests assumed primary responsibility for the well-being of the community. Indologist Herman W. Hull, author of The Vedic Origins of Karma, writes: "In the context of Vedic ritual thought, good and bad apparently refer to a valuation of action based on ritual exactitude: good being equated with the correct performance of the rite, bad with the incorrect performance." Swami Vivekananda, who spoke and wrote on karma extensively, commented on this understanding of the law: "The Vedic doctrine of karma is the same as in Judaism and all other religions, that is to say, the purification of the mind through sacrifices and such other external means." The Upanishads (circa 1500-600 bce), the philosophic treatises of the Vedas, show how karma relates to the individual and his or her actions -- with questions of morality, responsibility, reward and retribution. They clearly command the individual to be responsibly concerned about personal conduct and not expect the priesthood alone to secure and safeguard one's karma through the performance of sacred rites. As Sage Yajnavalkya says in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: "What becomes of this man? Indeed, one becomes good by good action and bad by bad action." Karma in Mystical Vision The yogis of the ancient Sankhya philosophical system offered a deeply mystical vision. They scrutinized karma to profound levels of magnification and stressed its bearing on the soul of man. What they saw was a plasmic jelly pulsating within the subtle bodies of each person. Embedded in this plasma, which persists from life to life, are the seeds of all past thought and action. In each lifetime, certain of these karmic seeds are released into the nerve system with coded impulsions and tendencies affecting present actions. The effects were most commonly understood to determine three spheres of life: a) jati, family and occupation; b) ayus, health and length of life; c) bhoga, quality and enjoyment of life. Karma as a Cosmic Building Block To the rishi seers, karma appeared with such fundamental force and substantive reality that they perceived it as one of the thirty-six primary evolutes of form, called tattvas, which range from Parashakti, pure consciousness, to prithivi tattva, earth. Karma is number eight, called niyati tattva, a spiritual-magnetic energy form. This identification of its magnetic quality is a crucial clue to understanding how karma "comes back," rather than just "goes out." Each karma, or action, generates a vibration, a distinct oscillation of force, a vasana, or subliminal inclination that continues to vibrate in the mind. These vasanas are magnetic conglomerates of subconscious impressions. Like attracts like. Acts of love attract loving acts, malice attracts malice. And each action, karma, continues to attract until demagnetized. This is accomplished through re-experiencing it, or resolving it with understanding -- rather than compounding it with reaction -- or through other subtler spiritual means and practices. Karma Goes Global "What goes around comes around," sings country Western singer Willie Nelson. His ballad about "getting back what you give out" dominated US and European radio waves for years and became the West's homespun Upanishad on the Hindu concept of karma. You can hardly watch TV today without a subtle lesson in this cosmic law of cause and effect. Everywhere, karma has squeezed through the white picket fences of non-Hindu religions and irrevocably attached itself to the global ethic emerging worldwide. But karma has suffered a chronic association with the word fate. Fate is a Western idea, derived largely from the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. It means, with wide variation, that one's life has been set by agencies outside oneself. Karma is exactly the opposite. "`It is the coward and the fool who says this is fate,' goes the Sanskrit proverb," said Swami Vivekananda. "But it is the strong man who stands up and says, `I will make my fate.'" KARMA GLOSSARY karmabhanda: The bonds of actions, i.e., being bound to rebirth. karmadosha: Sinful work or vice, blunder; evil consequences. karmadushta: Corrupt in action. karmaja: Act-born; resulting or produced from an act, good or bad. karmajiva: Livelihood earned by work, trade, profession. karmakshaya: Annihilation of work. karmakshetra: Place of religious acts. karmanirhara: The removal of bad deeds or their effects. karmanishtha: Diligent in performing religious actions. karmapaka: Ripening of acts, matured results of acts of former births. karmaphala: The fruit of actions. karmarambha: The commencement of an act. karmashaya: "Holder of karma." Describes body of the soul. karmasamya: Equipoise of karma. karmasiddhi: Successful action. karmatyaga: Abandoning worldly duties and obligations. karmavasha: The necessary influence or repercussion of actions. karmavidhi: Rule of action; mode of conducting ceremonies. karmayoga: "Union through action;" selfless religious service. kriyamana karma: Actions being made. Karma being created. papa: Wickedness, sin, crime. Wrongful action. Demerit from wrongdoing. prayaschitta: Penance. "Predominant thought or aim; weighing heavily on the mind." prarabdha karma: Actions set in motion. Sanchita karma released to bear fruit in one's current life. punya: Holy, virtuous; auspicious. Meritorious action. sanchita karma: The entirety of all karmas of this life and past lives. Reference: A Sanskrit English Dictionary, Sir Monier Monier-Williams. [KARMA is pronounced as "karmuh," the "uh" being subtle.] ***************************************************************** Copyright 1993, Himalayan Academy, All Rights Reserved. The information contained in this news report may not be published for commercial purposes without the prior written authority of Himalayan Academy. [The idea is simply we don't want people putting it in magazines or newspapers that are for sale without our permission. Redistribution electronically (for free), photocopying to give to classes or friends, all that is okay.] This copyright notice may NOT be removed, or the articles edited or changed without the prior written authority of Himalayan Academy. Send letetrs to the editor to: hinduism@mcimail.com ***************************************************************** Offered in this forum by Jai Maharaj, Vedic Astrologer jaimaharaj@mcimail.com -=Om Shanti=- -- |_|_|_|_| jai maharaj |_| |_| mantra corporation jyotishi |_|_ _|_| 808-948-4357 jaimaharaj@mcimail.com | | | | | vedic prediction sciences From: km@nota.Eng.Sun.COM (Kevin Marshall) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Some questions about Buddhism Date: 21 Jan 1994 11:19:47 -0800 In article <2hn0t3$k1c@gap.cco.caltech.edu>, pgs@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Soderquist) writes: Let me congratulate you on your skepticism. Excellent! A practice, to me, means that which one has verified to be true for oneself. > > The Soul: I see no reason to believe that human consciousness can > exist apart from the body, or that the body needs any "supernatural" > agency to support sentience. There is a large body of testimony from all periods of human history that beings are able to affect the material world in a way not consistent with the laws of physics. Take it or leave it. You may choose to leave it... > . > . > . > Karma: How can one be free from karma, i.e., how can it be possible > that one's actions cease to have consequences? The way I understand it, is that an enlightened being's arm moving through the air does move the molecules of the air around - yes there is cause and effect. It is the mental/spiritual effect on the enlightened being's conciousness that has no consequences. >I don't see how anyone > is ever free from cause and effect, even if they are "enlightened." > Who decides what constitutes "good" and "bad" karma? Good and bad are irrelevant (in some senses) to an enlightened being. >Is there any > reason to believe that the universe follows a given moral code? I believe humans have the capacity to evolve to higher conciousness. A moral code can be a by-product of that evolution. > > Dharma: I think the very idea of universal truth is a big human > hangup, and extremely difficult to justify. "Common to all human > beings" is enough of a stretch for me. Perhaps in some corner of the > universe there are sentient beings who don't suffer from attachment - > why not? Ah, but are there any beings that *you* have experienced that don't suffer from attachment? That is the more interesting question. >What good is Buddhism to them? IMHO I would guess they would experience other beings suffering and want to alleviate it... namaste Kevin Marshall From: pjm@isis.cshl.org (Pat Monardo) Newsgroups: soc.religion.eastern Subject: Re: Miscellaneous Things on Buddhism Date: 25 Jan 1994 02:01:12 -0800 In article <2i0s1b$6jb@noc1.world.net> fstawit@icomp01.lerc.nasa.gov (Tawit Chitsomboon) writes: > >Here are some more excerpts from "A Buddhist Charter" of Buddhadasa. >Enjoy! > >12. Buddha-dhamma is essentially scientific, not philosophical. > But worldy people study it as philosophy and , therfore, > do not benefit from it in any way. i disagree completely. yes, it can be said that buddhist philosophy is the study of enlightenment on a basis of unenlightenment, but it seems to me that the Buddha encouraged the humans (Buddhas are not humans) around him to practice debate. i think alot of tension is generated from not appreciating the distinction between Buddha practice and Human practice. > >17. A true Buddhist follower does not take anything single-mindedly, > for it is just a stream of 'idappaccayata' (Conditionality) i dont really understand what is meant by anything, but i think this is good practical advice. the concept of pure food is misguided. you should be aware of the differences in the food you eat tho. i dont think there is such a thing as pure food, tho. > >27. Reincarnation, or lack of it, depends on its causes and > contributory factors. So, don't declare any strict viewpoint > (don't say it tactlessly) nope. reincarnation is true. the Buddha clearly teaches that anyone who denies the fruits of the good life, a good rebirth in the higher worlds, is teaching falsely. -- pjm@isis.cshl.org (Pat Monardo) From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 27 Jan 1994 to 28 Jan 1994 Date: Fri, 28 Jan 1994 16:00:14 -0500 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests Topics of the day: 1. Third Precept ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 28 Jan 1994 14:48:44 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: Third Precept ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Fri, 28 Jan 1994, L S Cousins wrote: > As far as I know, the idea that monks could legitimately marry is virtually > unknown for the first millennium and a half of Buddhism's history, unless For myself, I find that it is very difficult to seriously consider the emptiness of a very sexy woman who is right in front of me, to consider that pursuing the strong drive to have sex will only bring me suffering and not happiness as it seems to promise, and that true love is not ultimately real. I mean, I am intellectually convinced of all the above, but when it comes right down to it, sexual attraction and the satisfaction it promises seems real. It would be very tempting for me to attempt to rationalize my desire for a lover as part of my path, or as Tantra, etc.; but for me the simple fact is that my insight is weaker than my sex drive. I also think sexuality can be part of a path to awakening, but it would be hypocritical for me to pretend that was the principal motivating factor for me. Also, it is pretty clear to me that while sexual relationships have brought me some kind of personal growth, my insights into Dharma have all (or mostly all) occurred during periods of intense practice and celibacy. The Tibetans have a biography of Drugpa Kunely (sp?) whose only spiritual practice was to wander Tibet seducing the most beautiful maidens, drinking strong drink and singing bawdy songs. In one scene, he calls one of the Karmapa incarnations on having lust for a beautiful woman attending one of the Karmapa's Dharma talks. Karmapa laughingly acknowledges his error. Drugpa says that while wild sexuality is appropriate practice for himself, the Karmapa (one of the all time great Tibetan teachers) risks grave danger in getting into sexuality. (Excuse the idiomatic American. We haven't spoken English here for a very long time.) One of the problems with considering celibacy for Americans, besides attempts to justify an involuntary reflex, is our puritanical culture. I was raised to feel that sex is shameful, unmentionable, and requires strict control. I don't think this is just my own experience; America has a strong history of censorship in books and film. Even Catholic Europe seems sexually liberated to an American. Spiritual classics like the life of Drugpa Kunely indicate that Tibetans (and I think this was also true of classical China and Japan) have much healthier attitudes about sex. But when an American, a member of a generation struggling to re-embrace sex as a healthy human activity, comes across strong Buddhist indictments of sexuality, it is hard to accept. I know several people who turned away from Buddhism on reading, for example, about meditations on the grossness of the human body as antidotes to desire. I suspect it would be good to make a distinction between the neurotic repression of sexuality based on fear and hatred of our own natural feelings and desires, and either sexual discipline to facilitate calm abidance or transendance of sexuality based on profound insight. ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 27 Jan 1994 to 28 Jan 1994 *************************************************** Date: Tue, 1 Feb 1994 16:00:24 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 31 Jan 1994 to 1 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 6 messages totalling 725 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Third Precept ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 1 Feb 1994 08:37:29 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: Third Precept ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Perhaps not Buddhism at its best. I tend to value more highly the > intrapersonal implications of the variegated but interrelated Buddhist > teachings rather than the interpersonal attempts at prescription and > proscription. > The represenatives of Tibetan teachings that I have encountered all encourage people to accept those parts of Buddhism they can accept and relate to, without worrying about those parts which they cannot. The whole project seems to be performed on a voluntary basis. So I don't think even a celibate bhikku would disagree with your stand. At some point a person may wish to take a vow because they see it would have value for them. This is very different from being subjected to some religious legal restriction. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Feb 1994 08:38:05 EST From: "Randall R. Scott" Subject: Re: Third Precept ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Mon, 31 Jan 1994, Leigh Charles Goldstein wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > Throwing in my two cents again, I am always amazed reading early Buddhist > texts by the importance given celibacy, both in the vinaya and in sutras. > Sexual desire and being in love both get a very bad rep in terms of > attaining enlightenment. > > However, I've seen a list of what is needed for a doctrine to be Buddhist. > > "All Buddhists assert a doctrine of selflessness[61]. It is one of the > four seals certifying that a doctrine is Buddhist: > > All produced things are impermanent; > All contaminated things are miserable; > All phenomena are selfless; > Nirvana is peace." > > [page 41, _Dependant Arising and Emptiness_, Elizabeth Napper, Wisdom > Publications, Boston, 1989.] She goes on to say that Hinayana Buddhists > limit selflessness to the selflessness of persons; here she seems to primarily > distinguish the various Buddhist schools on the basis of the "measure of > selflessness". > > However, in terms of the Twelve Nirdanas, the Four Noble Truths, the > Eightfold Path, the Five Precepts, where do the different schools separate? > I'm sure there is a wealth of material on where, when and why the schisms > appeared, and I recall from this list that some of them address the > acceptable behavior of people at different stages of the path. > I have met Japanese Zen masters who were alcholics, and others who committed > adultery; similiarly for Tibetan masters. Would one say that there is a > difference between theory and practice here, and if so, how far back does > this difference go in time? Would we be likely to know if, for example, > Shakyamuni Buddha himself drank wine and had girlfriends? Is the history > of Buddhism as recorded in doctrinal statements an accurate or complete > description? > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu > POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 > BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 > Leigh, This is precisely, in part, what I refer to when I perceive the early pre-Mahayanists striking as it were a Middle Way which certainly at the same time prescribes celibacy and, thus, proscribes the (in this case sexual) passions. It appears an inflection of "the moral life" certainly accompanied the philosophical mediation which the early Buddhists (or the Buddha himself perhaps) posited between the Upanishadic eternalists and the Materialists/libertines/nihilists (no soul, therefore: eat, drink, and do Mary). I suppose the sexual passions were seen as impediments to quieting the commotive, elemental dharmas. For me, however, any articulation toward a "moral" life runs the risk of reification and its extension -- namely: dogmatic, egoistic condemnation. Perhaps not Buddhism at its best. I tend to value more highly the intrapersonal implications of the variegated but interrelated Buddhist teachings rather than the interpersonal attempts at prescription and proscription. We all need assistance in developing prajna, but, please...let's not make the Dharma into a Westernistic "Law." The notion of karma is moralistic enough! (I supposed even Buddhism, inheriting the notion of Hindu karma, still felt obliged to play a sociologically instructive role.) Etc. Randy Scott Washington University in St. Louis ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 31 Jan 1994 to 1 Feb 1994 ************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Feb 2 16:07:39 1994 Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 16:00:26 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 1 Feb 1994 to 2 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 9 messages totalling 383 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Three answers (2) 2. Swans 3. Why has Boddhi Dharma left for the East (2) 4. Third Precept 5. J.McRae's " Chinese Buddhism Bibliography" now in the Coombspapers 6. Zen Films 7. Teaching Introduction to Asian Religions? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 1 Feb 1994 21:28:45 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Three answers Galen Amstutz asked: 3 questions: 1. Don't Peirce and Frege have something to do with the well-known nonBuddhist philosopher Kant? 2. Are you arguing that philosophy is ontologically walled off from other forms of human conceptualization? Please explain in terms of pratityasamutpada. 3. Please quote your favorite Indian sutra passage illustrating how philosophical clowning around is conducive to moral or intellectual edification. Three answers: 1. Yes. They were born born after he died. 2. I don't understand the question. I suspect it may be gibberish. 3. What would a quote prove? I could quote you a sutra, but it might be false. And if you believed it and were harmed thereby, I would be responsible. Rather than take that risk, let me answer you with an hypothesis, which you may test at your leisure by your favourite rigorous methodology. Hypothesis: if clowning does not conduce to your moral edification, then you are probably morally ineducable. I read my e-mail only once a month. If you have a follow-up question, Galen, I'll try to answer it in March. Or on April Fool's Day. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 08:36:56 EST From: Robert Kelly Subject: Re: Swans ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- A swan is a large goose. HaMsa (Latin anser) = goose, swan, is a persistent image of the transmigrating entity ('soul,' consciousness, etc., according to whatever system is at hand) well before Buddhist times; comes to mean holy person of great realization. I assume that the huge increase in goose population in the NE USA is a very good sign. Though these geese are not white. The swans of the Hudson River have increased greatly as well, and may be seen floating even by Manhattan from time to time, and there are bays half a hundred miles upstream crowded with them, white indeed. rk ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 08:37:24 EST From: Don Phelps Subject: Re: Why has Boddhi Dharma left for the East ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Tim Brown writes: > I recently saw the movie Why Had Boddhi Dharma Left for the >East. Although it was one of the most beautiful films I have seen, it >was also one of the least comprehensible. The movie is 2 hours and 20 >minutes long and can't have more than a page or two of dialogue. Has >anyone out there in BUDDHA-Land seen this movie? If so, I would >welcome any understanding or insight you have on it. Thanks. Seems this belongs in Buddhist more than Buddha-L, but for this group's discussion of pedagogical Buddhist films, etc. So, if I am not pardoned for this response, please e-mail me. TNX I also heard above comment from a majority of friends with whom I saw this film. Imagine a monk returning from a 40 year wilderness retreat, and saying, "That was `most beautiful' but it had, at most, `a page or two of dialogue'." Ha Ha Ha :-) I mean this would really be a funny cartoon. Just like cartoons where our character runs off of the edge of a cliff. This speaks to how different our "show" consciousness is from path. Buddhist practice involves one in a discipline of focused concentration in the stillness. This movie is a most enjoyable stillness for those of us beginners who seem to need a "page or two of dialogue" even for the mere moment of 2 hours 20 minutes (vs 40 year example). The movie is an incredable teaching tool, I thought, for beginners. The movie involves the audience in doing awareness, while following a story that echoes the Sutras, with images that follow formal rules of Kasina preparation right out of the pages of the Vissudhimagga. (I agree with Karl Lorenz' discussion of sutra echoes.) An exam could be, count the number of meditation objects in the film. It has so many. Some examples: When you were watching the preparation of the fire, then staring into the red hot central part of the fire, this followed the formal rules of kasina preparation and practice of Vis. The tree (was it Cherry) that was in bloom as a lone disk of white against the backdrop of the distant green mountains, this is a formal presentation of the white kasina. Presumably it had been consciously planned that way in the monastery's garden. The view over the tops of the stalks being blown in the wind, this is classical description of wind kasina. Each of these kasinas is worthy of our attention for days. To have them all in just 2 hours 20 minutes was so much, so "fast". I wanted to drink in each, removing my impediments for just being with the stillness during the pace in which where was obviously more to get in each image than I would ever be able to accomplish. The film delivers kasinas beautifully prepared, such that many have given up their whole worldly life for their contemplation, but we get these for less than an hour's wages! Conclusion: this film would be very good for class discussion. (It is powerful arguement for revision of the precept against shows.) But, perhaps good for more than just beginners. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 08:37:44 EST From: LAVOIE MARIO Subject: Re: Three answers ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > Galen Amstutz asked: > 3 questions: > 1. Don't Peirce and Frege have something to do with the well-known > nonBuddhist philosopher Kant? > > Three answers: > 1. Yes. They were born born after he died. Well, there's a little more to it. I am far from being a scholar as regards Kant as well as Peirce, but I may be able to put a little more meat in seems to be a rather dry sandwich. Peirce himself wrote that his categories were built up as a reinterpretation of kantian categories as they could be found in the Critique of Pure Reason. The relation between kantian philosophy and "peirceanism" can also be seen elsewhere. Kant wrote his Critique partly to go against Descartes's "Discours de la methode". Descartes advocated a view of mind as totally independent of matter (the good ol' Cogito Ergo Sum...). Descartes's method was a way to uncover the totally abstract nature of conceptual mind. Kant wanted instead to demonstrate in his Transcendental Estheatic (forgive my sometimes wierd english word-writing, please, this is not my language and I am improvising) that there must exist an external part of reality (space) which plays an extremely important part in shaping our experience of the world, experience out of which we make up those "transcendental categories" that are the very basis of our conceptual mind. This is precisely in this conception of a mind shaped partly through its experience of an external reality that a link between Peirce and Kant can be found. Peirce had a conception of mind according to which, even though there exists what we could call a "basic shape" of the mind (or maybe we could say potentialities for experiencing, or basic cognitive abilities and apparatus), the mind takes its full existence through the experience of an external reality (while Descartes considered it could fully exist without ever having any experience but itself), which is not that far from that of Kant. Therefore, the whole of peircean categories take root in both a theory of reference (relation with an external world) and of logical categories aimed at giving a formal shape to what an experience could be for a mind. By the way, Pierce was probably the best specialist both of Kant and of scholastic christian philosophy in the whole of North America in the nineteenth century (if you want to have another link between Kant and Pierce). He worked throughout his life with the original german and latin texts to look for inspiration for his own writings. Mario Lavoie University of Quebec in Montreal d156745@er.uqam.ca ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 08:38:02 EST From: LAVOIE MARIO Subject: Re: Third Precept ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > > > Perhaps not Buddhism at its best. I tend to value more highly the > > intrapersonal implications of the variegated but interrelated Buddhist > > teachings rather than the interpersonal attempts at prescription and > > proscription. > > > > The represenatives of Tibetan teachings that I have encountered all > encourage people to accept those parts of Buddhism they can accept and > relate to, without worrying about those parts which they cannot. The > whole project seems to be performed on a voluntary basis. So I don't > think even a celibate bhikku would disagree with your stand. > > At some point a person may wish to take a vow because they see it would > have value for them. This is very different from being subjected to some > religious legal restriction. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu > POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 > BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 > I agree with the basic principle according to which we see most Tibetan teachers telling us we may take the parts of those teachings relevant to us and to our lives and not those with which we feel deeply uncomfortable and unwholesome. However, there ARE some basic principles that are unavoidable as regards the buddhist way of life: extremely simple statements like: not to harm others, or vows about working for the benefit of all beings, etc.. What generally seems to be at issue with moral precepts in buddhism (at least as far as my limited experience and knowledge goes) is closer to never getting into any kind of obsessive behavior/frame of mind. As regards sexuality : (If I remember well, this discussion began with questions related to sexual drive) Wanting to stay away from sexual intercourse and love relationships can be as obsessive as it is to get into just any "thrill". I personnaly believe that the obsession of North American culture is manifested pretty much (maybe more) in the guilty puritanism running rampant these days on north american campuses. Fear and guilt are as much of an obsession with the object of fear as is the passion for it. In general, my discussions with tibetans about sex have been both light hearted and funny. In a culture where a notion such as sexuality seems not to cause any moral problem in itself, it is possible that the use of practices such as thinking about what your girlfriend or boyfriend, (or whatever ...) ;-) will look like when she's dead to get rid of fixation on her body might be fine, but in a culture based on fear and guilt as regards sexuality, those practices become manifestations of an unwholesome sexuality... and the whole practice becomes a justification for mental obscurations and fears instead of a way to get rid of them. However, by any means, the principles according to which we shall never behave in a way we know will harm others still applies for every single buddhist. This one no serious buddhist teacher would ever say we can go without. That makes things both simpler (no extreme fixed code of behavior) and harder (we need to use our judgement all the time and take personnal responsibility for anything we do) Mario Lavoie Montreal d156745@er.uqam.ca ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 08:38:33 EST From: tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Subject: J.McRae's " Chinese Buddhism Bibliography" now in the Coombspapers ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear Colleagues, Re: recent message by Dr John McRae of Cornell University announcing his "Bibliography of recent work on Chinese Buddhism" >----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > >The following is the bibliography for my contribution to an article to be >published in an upcoming issue of the _Journal of Asian Studies_. The >lead author and guiding force in this project is Dan Overmyer. Note that >the following is intended to cover writing on Chinese Buddhism done in the >last ten years and suitable for general, not specialized, audiences. >[...] >I think it's fair to assume that Matthew Ciolek of Coombspapers will snap >this up and put it on his ftp site. Right, Matthew? I hope this is of >use to my colleagues and friends around the world. > >[...] Thank you John, for your excellent, as always, piece of work. The bibliography will be placed (in the next few hours) in the Electronic Buddhist Archives section of the OtherArchives area of the Coombspapers Soc.Sci.Research Data Bank at the ANU. Access: ===== 1) anon. ftp to: coombs.anu.edu.au 2) gopher to: coombs.anu.edu.au, port 70 3) www to: http://coombs.anu.edu.au/CoombsHome.html with many regards, -================================================== Dr T. Matthew CIOLEK tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Coombs Computing Unit, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia =================================================== ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 13:57:47 EST From: JHUBBARD@smith.BITNET Subject: Re: Zen Films ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- John Powers writes: >A pretty good (and pretty long) film on Zen is "Principles and Practice of >Zen", produced by Films for the Humanities in Princeton, NJ. It has some nice >footage on Rohatsu, and it does a good job of showing the process of entering >a monastery. But it's really long, and it drags in parts. The same group also I would have to say that this film (co-produced by NHK and a Belgium (?) station) is difficult, unless the aim is to inspire the students (not a bad aim, of course) rather than give a very accurate picture of the situation. In combination with _Fancy Dance_, however (not available in a subtitled version, to my knowledge and thus of some limited value) _Principles and Practice of Zen_ has superb heuristic value (*especially* regarding the romantic version of how one gets into a monastery presented in _P&P of Zen_). Jamie Hubbard, Smith College ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 13:58:50 EST From: Beata Grant Subject: Re: Why has Boddhi Dharma left for the East ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Wed, 2 Feb 1994, Don Phelps wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Tim Brown writes: > > I recently saw the movie Why Had Boddhi Dharma Left for the > >East. Although it was one of the most beautiful films I have seen, it > >was also one of the least comprehensible. The movie is 2 hours and 20 > >minutes long and can't have more than a page or two of dialogue. Has > >anyone out there in BUDDHA-Land seen this movie? If so, I would > >welcome any un > > Conclusion: this film would be very good for class discussion. > (It is powerful arguement for revision of the precept against shows.) > But, perhaps good for more than just beginners. > I am always on the lookout for good films -- especially ones that could be used in the classroom. I've never heard of this particular one, however. Is it new? Where is it made? Is it available on video? I would certainly appreciate further details. Many thanks! Beata Grant Washington University in St. Louis bgrant@artsci.wustl.edu ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 15:14:01 EST From: JHUBBARD@smith.BITNET Subject: Re: Teaching Introduction to Asian Religions? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- John, Good luck on the course, and I would appreciate it if you could give me/ the list some feedback on how it goes. I have experimented several times with different forms of computer conferencing in the classroom, with varying degrees of success. Once I even wrote a role simulation program for a class! The past semester I used the Bulletin feature of the VAX VMS system to give the students access to Lists related to Buddhism, and during the January (I taught an interterm class!!) I used the Daedalus Integrated Writing Environment for conferencing (both real-time and async), peer review of writing assignments, and collaborative learning. All in all I am positive about the conferencing aspect (I am using DIWE again this semester), though you need to somehow enforce regular participation or it seems to lag (of course, the gung-ho folks will take off, but then you have the same dynamics of a classroom discussion, and one of the purposes of the electronic conference is to change that dynamic). The peer review of writing assignments seems to be well-received by the students and encourages their writing in a more "public" fashion, that is, not only trying to guess what I want to hear. I also enjoy discovering what other students find important, interesting, impossible, etc. in the writing of their peers. DIWE also has a writing coach built in that will guide a student through the "discovery" stage of writing as well as other aspects of the adventure. (This module, incidently, is based on Aristotle's _Rhetorics_ and _Topics_, and working with it has influenced me to change my thinking re. the value of Topical Buddhism vs. Critical Buddhism.) In any case, let us know how it works. Jamie Hubbard, Smith College ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 1 Feb 1994 to 2 Feb 1994 ************************************************* Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 16:00:06 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 4 Feb 1994 to 7 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests Topics of the day: 1. Update on the fetters (1) 2. Third Precept ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 18:11:24 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Update on the fetters The Indian scholastics, building upon a foundation found in canonical passages, enumerated a set of ten fetters (sa.myojanaani) that functioned to keep one tied to the wheel of suffering. In much the same way that modern physical scientists have discovered many atomic elements that were unknown to the Buddha, modern Buddhologists (most of whom are secrret practitioners of a dark science known as Religious Studies) have managed to find many more methods of keeping the human mind bound and gagged. It would take a very long message to enumerate all the new forms of intellectual bondage that have arisen in the present century, but it may be worth outlining a few of the most serious ones. Here, then, is a modest beginning to an updated list of fetters that keep one from moving forward on the noble path. (In the interest of keeping lists of fetters divisible by five, I restrict myself to the five silliest ideas that have had a following among intellectuals in the twentieth century.) * Deconstructionism: Founded on the premiss that all hierarchies of any kind whatsoever are intrinsically unjust and must therefore be torn down. Structures, in other words, must be deconstructed (or allowed to deconstruct themselves). A hierarchical structure, it is argued, always results in some entities being centralized, privileged and dominant, while others are marginalized and dominated. If the domination of the many by the few (also known as elitism) is to be eradicated, then any person, institution, set of ideas or values that shows any signs of rising to prominence must be immediately and systematically devalued. Even propositional values, such as truth and falsity, must be exposed as inherently unjust notions. (If carried out successfully, the results of careful deconstructionism should resemble something like daytime television or the American system of public education: a perpetual mediocrity machine. In Canada, this impoverished hypothesis is known as multiculturalism, and proclaiming it is about the only method of getting a research grant.) * Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Founded on the premiss that everyone's judgement is equally vitiated by self- deception, and therefore no one is capable of honest and accurate self-knowledge. Since accurate self-understanding is impossible, anyone who claims to have any insight into himself (women, of course, are a happy exception to this rule) is ipso facto deluded. Particularly suspect are those who strive for any kind of virtue, since the perception of virtue is merely a veiled form of congratulating anyone whose qualities resemble one's own. (Made popular by a terminally neurotic German named Martin Luther, the hermeneutics of suspicion has had champions in every generation; Nietzsche, Freud and Woody Allen have been recent examples.) * Historicism: Founded on the premiss that the value of any idea can be assessed only by the standards of the age in which the idea was formulated. According to the Historicist, for example, the Four Noble Truths and Noble Path may have been a valuable solution to problems peculiar to the eastern Gangetic valley at the time of Gotama Buddha, but these solutions do not necessarily have any applicability in other cultural or historical settings. (Historicism was originally true only in Germany in 1927, but somehow it came to be true in North America in 1967, at the moment when some dean of a well-known Faculty of Education took one too many hits of LSD. Since the only intellectual theory opposing it in the Americas is Christian Fundamentalism, endorsing historicism is seen in America as a sign of great intellectual sophistication.) * Psychologism: Founded on the premiss that the process of determining the truth and falsity of a theory is a cognitive act that takes place in the brain (or, in males, the penis), and therefore the thorough investigation of the central nervous system can serve as an adequate replacement for the medieval pseudo-sciences of logic, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. (In the past decade psychologism has been bolstered by cyberneticism, the theory that human beings think pretty much like desktop computers, except that human beings have less RAM and are more likely to get sexually transmitted viruses.) * Sociology of Knowledge: Founded on the premiss that historicism and deconstruction taken separately are not quite silly enough and must be combined synergistically to arrive at nearly maximum absurdity. According to this new hypothesis, it is not merely a person's time and place in history that determines what propositions are considered valuable; social rank, economic class, gender, race and other ethnic affiliations, and age all play a role. Ideas are to be seen not as the principles by which one tries to live one's life, but rather as the verbal and cognitive counterparts of bludgeons, cudgels, hand-grenades and assault rifles, all part of the arsenal by which the strong systematically oppress the weak and by which the weak retaliate against their oppressors. These views are fetters not only in the sense that they prevent many modern people from making any progress on the Noble Path, but also in the sense that they impede most modern students from even being able to gain a basic understanding of what classical Buddhists were trying to say. Although I am confident that none of you are quite so intellectually challenged as to be tempted into endorsing any of the above theories, no doubt some of your colleagues hold views somewhat like them (if you are fortunate enough to have a job at all). Advice from any of you who have figured out ways of helping your students cut through these hideous intellectual knots would be most appreciated. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Associate Professor Associate Member Faculty of Religious Studies Dept of Philosophy McGill University -- Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 09:42:14 EST From: Jan Nattier Subject: Re: Third Precept ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In a message of February 3, L. S. Cousins refers to > such texts as the > Apadaana and the Jaatakas where the Buddha-to-be is shown as > partnered for many lives with Yasodharaa in the development of > the perfections. If I understood your message correctly, you seemed to be implying that these stories suggest a certain validation of marital life in early Buddhism. But (in the absence of corroborating evidence, which I'd very much like to hear about if you have it) I wonder if we should take these repetitive pairings simply as another example of what I sometimes call "jaataka logic": viz., "this has happened before..." (By that I mean that in the jaataka stories we rarely see an appeal to karma theory as normatively understood -- "be good and good things will happen to you" -- but rather, the tales usually seem to follow a line more like "things have always been this way: so-and-so is just as lousy a person now as he was in his previous lives.") In other words: there are many examples of people who appear together, in one life after another, without there being any validation of the relationship itself. Is the story of the Buddha-to-be and Yasodharaa an exception? > Of course the _Sigaalovaadasuttanta_ already deals with the > relationship between man and wife. However, not many early texts > are directly concerned with such matters. This is no doubt because > they took general values of lay life in this area for granted. Perhaps, but I suspect that a more important cause may be the provenance and orientation of the literature in question. That is, 100% of the literature in the Pali canon was produced (or at least redacted) by monastics [does anyone know of an exception?], and 99% of it by monastic males (the only exception I know of being the _Theriigaathaa_). So we're hearing from just one segment of early Buddhist society. But more important: Buddhism begins as one of the "shrama.na movements, rejecting all sexual activity and viewing human relationships (especially family relationships) as something to be transcended. Whenever significant segments of the Buddhist community have moved away from this stance to allow family life back into the picture (as in medieval Japan or the modern West), this has represented a radical break with tradition. > So for example > there is the presence of the Queen as one of the seven treasures of a > Cakkavatti king. Right -- but it's important to remember that the Buddha-to-be had a choice (as predicted by the sages consulted by his father): become *either* a Buddha *or* a cakravartin. The two realms were viewed, by the author(s) of this story, as utterly incompatible. > One might consider whether a high > valuation of celibacy is a product of a high valuation of the value of > the sexual energies or a result of repressed rejection. Perhaps both > are possible? Perhaps. But, once again, given the provenance of Buddhist literature, I think that a "high valuation of the value of the sexual energies" is extremely unlikely. I vaguely remember a passage in the Pali canon [does anyone know where it occurs?] in which the Buddha declared that if there were another instinct as strong as the sex-drive, he never would have achieved enlightenment. Much as many of us in the late 20th century might wish things had been otherwise, I think we have to take seriously the fact that early Buddhism was very close to what Leonard Zwilling has called the "sex-negative" end of the scale. Jan Nattier Indiana University (jnattier@ucs.indiana.edu) End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 4 Feb 1994 to 7 Feb 1994 ************************************************* From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Tue Feb 8 16:11:01 1994 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 16:00:05 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 7 Feb 1994 to 8 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 12 messages totalling 638 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Little Buddha (4) 2. Madhyamiktive decontusionism 3. Naagaarjuna, Derrida and Godzilla (2) 4. Translating `dharma', `fa' and `hoo' (2) 5. Third Precept 6. Books about Practice 7. dharma and fa ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 16:16:57 EST From: AHELM@utxvms.cc.utexas.edu Subject: Re: Little Buddha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Look for a spring release on "Little Buddha." Cheers, Anthony Helm ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 20:08:12 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Madhyamiktive decontusionism Jeff Samuels asks several questions, to which I supply a few answers. 1. Is deconstructionism truly a fetter? The question is poorly formulated if one begins from the premiss that nothing is truly or falsely anything (or nothing for that matter). So I can only conclude that this question is being asked by someone who endorses such logocentric notions as true and false. And to such a person, the question is so silly as not to require an answer. 2. Is it possible to consider Naagaarjuna the first deconstructionist? Judging from the fact that this has been done by Robert Magliola and David Dilworth, I suppose it must be concluded that it is possible to consider such a thing, in approximately the same way it is possible to consider Socrates the first Unitarian or Jesus of Nazareth the Last of the Mohicans. To those who have a very high tolerance for exegetical inaccuracy, almost anything can be considered anything. And to a practising Deconstructionist, anything can be considered anything (except, of course, what it actually is; considering anything to be what it actually is, c'est un vrai faux pas, because that would be to endorse the logocentric phallusy of identity, et ca serait droitement gauche). 3. How does Deconstruction differ from the method employed by Naagaarjuna in his Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa? By the term `method' I assume you are referring to the technique used by both of using fallacious reasoning, equivocation, sophistry and straw man arguments. In this respect, the two methods are quite similar. But there are also important differences. Deconstructionists use a lot more virgules (also known as soliduses) to show the identity/difference of all ideas/expressions. Indeed, I think it can safely be said that the principal achievement of Deconstructionism is to rescue this nearly forgotten dingbat, namely the `/' mark, from typographical obscurity. For a few other minor points of comparison, may I suggest that you read Paul Williams's article "On the interpretation of Madhyamaka thought" in Journal of Indian Philosophy 1991, pp. 191-218. And then move on to Bimal Matilal's "Is Prasanga a form of deconstruction?" in JIP 1992, pp. 345-362. That will warm you up for a seventy page orgy of logo- centric drivel by an intellectual dwarf from Canada named Richard Hayes, "Nagarjuna's appeal" Journal of Indian Philosophy 1994 (forthcoming issue). These article may not be entirely convincing, but they may at least help one realize that the issues are somewhat more complex than an e-mail message can handle with any degree of accuracy. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 05:51:56 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Naagaarjuna, Derrida and Godzilla Gentle readers of BUDDHA-L: Brace yourselves for a message on the topic of Naagaarjuna and Deconstruction that is almost entirely free of flippant dismissals of the former and satirical caricatures of the latter. This message really is an attempt to deal succinctly with differences between the two. Let me warn you at the outset that this comparison is limited by the fact that I know next to nothing about Deconstruction, and therefore much of what I say about it may be inadvertently inaccurate. Experts in the subject are invited to amend whatever errors I make. There are several important ways in which Naagaarjuna differs from Derrida (whose name I have seen associated with Deconstruction). Two of the most important differences, I think, are 1) in the subject matter and range of issues dealt with by the two authors, and 2) in the method by which the two writers make their cases. On the question of subject matter, Naagaarjuna is first and foremost a metaphysician, who makes an attempt to present and defend what he considers to be a correct understanding of the teachings of the Buddha, whom he calls the best of teachers. The failure to get the right understanding, says Naagaarjuna quite explicitly, will result in a failure to experience the bliss of nirvana. Naagaarjuna, then, is primarily an apologist for Buddhism and a critic of non-Buddhist teachers; more, he is an apologist for a particular way of construing the teachings of the Buddha and a critic of ways that he clearly considers wrong. He is a polemicists who considers some ways of seeing the world not only as false but as harmfully so. As to subject matter, Derrida, from what little bit I have been able to piece together from painfully wading through some of his literary droppings, seems to me far more interested in theories that pertain to social issues (a topic in which Naagaarjuna shows not even a minimal interest). Derrida seems to be concerned, for example, with exposing various ways in which people of European educational background first assumed that Europe presents a cultural standard by which all other cultures are to be judged, and then tried (without success) to back away from the type of intellectual parochialism and imperialism that they called Eurocentrism. He tries to explore why the essentially European experiment of making a serious attempt not to be ethnocentric (an experiment which few other cultures in modern times have tried) was doomed to failure. And he occupies himself with exposing and then deliberately inverting several of the preferences that traditional thinkers assumed (or argued) were grounded in good metaphysics and good psychology: the preference of presence over absence, truth over falsity, good over evil, reason over emotion, order over chaos, ideas over actions, intellect over sense-experience, etc. Derrida's agenda is so very different from anything that Naagaarjuna even thought of attempting that I see little point in even attempting a serious comparison. It's not even like comparing apples and oranges. It's more like trying to compare apples and orangutans. As to method, Naagaarjuna is tediously systematic. He has essentially one very formal analytic trick, which he applies quite uniformly and predictably to every topic he undertakes to discuss. After one has read two chapters of the MMK, there are no surprises in the next twenty-five chapters. His method is as flat as a griddle and as dry as a mouthful of soda crackers. Derrida, on the other hand, is equally tedious, but only because he is so perfectly unsystematic. One reads for pages without finding anything that even resembles a formal argument. Insofar as he has a case to make, Derrida makes it by juxtaposing words and phrases in ways that are supposed to expose their inherent ambiguities and polysemy. He is a trickster, a kind of philosophical Coyote or Anansi who beguiles and seduces and surprises and cajoles and entertains but never makes the fatal blunder of being in any way straightforward or clear. Derrida's writing is to principled argumentation as masturbation is to a sexual relationship with another person (which is to say, it is much more satisfying to oneself, of no use whatsoever to anyone else, and a way of keeping oneself almost perfectly immune from the pain of rejection). There is, I think, one other difference. Two thousand years after Naagaarjuna wrote, people are still struggling with him. He is substantial enough to warrant serious study. It is quite a useful intellectual exercise to try to find the subtle errors in his reasoning. As for Derrida, on the other hand, I doubt very much that anyone (outside of North Carolina) will be reading Derrida even fifty years from now (except for purely historical purposes, such as trying to figure out what the hell happened to humanity in the twentieth century). If my prediction turns out to be wrong, would someone please dig me out of my grave and whisper the news to my grinning skull? Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Associate Professor Associate Member Faculty of Religious Studies Dept of Philosophy McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 08:00:29 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Translating `dharma', `fa' and `hoo' Thanks to Robert E. Morrell for his well-taken warning against `Buddhobabble'. It reminded me of something my mentor, Bimal Matilal, told me at the beginning of my graduate career in Sanskrit: `You will know you have mastered the Sanskrit language when you can write an article on Indian philosophy without using a single Sanskrit word.' Robert E. Morrell clearly indicated that his principal concern was to begin a discussion of how Buddhist technical terms are to be translated from their JAPANESE contexts (emphasis Morrell's). In particular he expressed a wish to discuss how `hoo' (dharma) might be rendered. I very much look forward to such a discussion (in which I expect our colleague Yamabe-san may play a key role). Given that the emphasis is on Japanese, I hope it will not be taken amiss if I discuss the term `dharma' as used by classical Buddhists in India; this may even shed some light on how the term can be understood in Chinese and Japanese. As Bob Morrell points out, the Sanskrit term `dharma' seems to have quite a few dimensions in Buddhist literature. But I think it may have somewhat fewer than it first appears to have. In fact, I think it has only one principal meaning, although it has acquired other senses through metonymy. The principal meaning of the term `dharma', I submit, is something like a characteristic, attribute, trait or feature. Rather than being an element of existence (as Stcherbatsky and other early Dharmatologists rendered it), a dharma is really more of an patterned feature of experience. It is just a noticeable trait, such as a colour or a sound or a smell. It may be a sensible trait (known through the five external sense), or it may be an intellectible one (known not through the external sense faculties but through the mind, regarded as an internal sense faculty); in either case, it is a trait. It is not far from what Peirce called it a `phaneron' and what other philosophers have called a `phenomenon'. By metonymy, `dharma' means a particular species of the genus trait. In this context it means a good trait. Even more particularly, it may mean a good mental trait. In this connection, one thinks of the term `buddha-dharma', which in many passages means the essential virtues whereby a Buddha may be recognized and distinguished from non-Buddhas. The term `dharma-kaaya' also means the collection or group or set of psychological virtues, as opposed to the Buddha's material properties (`ruupa-kaaya'). One key member of the set of virtues essential to a Buddha is his wisdom. And so `dharma' comes to mean the totality of the Buddha's wisdom. By synecdoche, `dharma' comes to mean teaching, since the teachings of the Buddha are expressions of his wisdom. Since some of the teachings of the Buddha were rules, a `dharma' can also be a rule. A Vinaya rule, for example, is usually called a dharma. Perhaps Jan Nattier or Alan Sponberg can comment on why `dharma' was translated into Chinese as `fa', which is usually translated into English as law (in the jurisprudential sense of the term). Is this translation influenced by the dharmas in Vinaya codes, which might very well be taken as a legal code of some kind? Does the Chinese term `fa' (like English word `law' and the Latin `regula') also have connotations of a discernible pattern, and thus a method, order or principle? Can one use `fa', for example, to talk of something like the laws of nature or the laws of logic? (If so, then `law' or `regularity' might not be a bad rendering of `dharma', `fa' and `hoo'.) Or does Chinese `fa' more resemble the Latin term `lex' (akin to `legare', to ordain, to appoint), which seems to refer only to acts of human ordering but not to natural ordering? Does Chinese `fa' have any overlap in meaning with the Latin `ius' (whence English `jury', `jurisprudence', etc.), which means a solemn oath that binds one to a certain set of duties and obligations and thus bestows upon one certain rights that are commensurate with the duties one has undertaken? All these questions can also be asked about the Japanese `hoo'. The answers to these questions could have some bearing on why some scholars prefer to avoid while others prefer to employ the term `law' as a translation of `fa' and `hoo'. I eagerly await comments from our Sinological and Nipponological colleagues. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Associate Professor Associate Member Faculty of Religious Studies Dept of Philosophy McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 08:47:42 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Third Precept ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Jan Nattier writes: >If I understood your message correctly, you seemed to be implying >that these stories suggest a certain validation of marital life in >early Buddhism. But (in the absence of corroborating evidence, which >I'd very much like to hear about if you have it) I wonder if we >should take these repetitive pairings simply as another example >of what I sometimes call "jaataka logic": viz., "this has happened >before..." (By that I mean that in the jaataka stories we rarely >see an appeal to karma theory as normatively understood -- "be >good and good things will happen to you" -- but rather, the tales >usually seem to follow a line more like "things have always been >this way: so-and-so is just as lousy a person now as he was in his >previous lives.") In other words: there are many examples of >people who appear together, in one life after another, without >there being any validation of the relationship itself. Is the story >of the Buddha-to-be and Yasodharaa an exception? This is, I think, really a different aspect of Buddhist mental theory. Many texts discuss the attraction of like for like i.e. the tendency of people to gravitate to similar people and the tendency of mental habits to repeat both within life and subsequently. So I would perhaps see more in the Jaatakas that you are suggesting in a short note. But yes, I do think that the story of Yasodharaa is an exception. The Jaataka collection culminates with the story of Vessantara in which Yasodharaa in her previous human life is a key player. In fact the whole point of the story is that giving up his partner is the last and most difficult renunciation of all - more difficult even than giving up life and limb or even than giving away one's own children. Again in the Apadaana of the Elder Nuns she is depicted as presenting herself precisely as the Buddha-to-be's partner in developing the perfections. On the more general issue of validation of marital life in early Buddhism. I feel confident that this is well-attested from the late canonical period onwards. That is the picture presented in Pali literature from then on and it is the situation in Southern Buddhism today. The question of the early period is more difficult because of a relative lack of evidence. I myself feel we should not give too much weight to an argument from silence here. There are some passages which present the other side of the story. Most important of all is the necessarily close relationship between donor and recipient of alms. The laity must always have had a central role. >> Of course the _Sigaalovaadasuttanta_ already deals with the >> relationship between man and wife. However, not many early >>texts are directly concerned with such matters. This is no doubt >>because they took general values of lay life in this area for granted. >Perhaps, but I suspect that a more important cause may be the >provenance and orientation of the literature in question. That is, >100% of the literature in the Pali canon was produced (or at least >redacted) by monastics [does anyone know of an exception?], and >99% of it by monastic males (the only exception I know of being >the _Theriigaathaa_). So we're hearing from just one segment >of early Buddhist society. We know that at least some Buddhist texts were recited by lay people as well as monks, but I agree that the texts were preserved by the Sangha in general. Unless you believe that 99% of the Pali Canon is the work of the Buddha himself and hence the work of a male, I have no idea why you would think that females played no part in the creation of Buddhist literature. More relevant than the fact that it was preserved by 'just one segment' of society (i.e. by a community of mendicants of both sexes with very diverse social origins) is the fact that the literature was severely constrained by the requirements of oral preservation. I thinked this forced a certain narrowness of focus. > But more important: Buddhism begins >as one of the "shrama.na movements, rejecting all sexual activity >and viewing human relationships (especially family relationships) >as something to be transcended. Whenever significant segments >of the Buddhist community have moved away from this stance to >allow family life back into the picture (as in medieval Japan or the >modern West), this has represented a radical break with tradition. I don't accept this. It is the Protestant Buddhist attempt to go back to an ideal (and invented) past which is the break with tradition. Family life has certainly been very much part of the picture for ordinary Buddhists for at least the last two thousand years. >> So for example there is the presence of the Queen as one of the >>seven treasures of a Cakkavatti king. >Right -- but it's important to remember that the Buddha-to-be had >a choice (as predicted by the sages consulted by his father): >become *either* a Buddha *or* a cakravartin. The two realms >were viewed, by the author(s) of this story, as utterly incompatible. Quite, but the choice is between a high ideal and an even higher one. Both are of great value. >> One might consider whether a high valuation of celibacy is a >>product of a high valuation of the value of the sexual energies or a >>result of repressed rejection. Perhaps both are possible? >Perhaps. But, once again, given the provenance of Buddhist >literature, I think that a "high valuation of the value of the sexual >energies" is extremely unlikely. I vaguely remember a passage in >the Pali canon [does anyone know where it occurs?] in which the >Buddha declared that if there were another instinct as strong as the >sex-drive, he never would have achieved enlightenment. Much >as many of us in the late 20th century might wish things had been >otherwise, I think we have to take seriously the fact that early >Buddhism was very close to what Leonard Zwilling has called the >"sex-negative" end of the scale. I think you have perhaps misunderstood the point I was making here. Perhaps I didn't put it very clearly. Still, 'given the provenance of Buddhist literature' it seems quite likely to me! If we are going to stereotype the views of Buddhist monks, it seems to me that they are likely if anything to overvalue the centrality of sexuality. In fact, however, having had dealings with quite a lot of Buddhist monks, I suspect that they vary in their views and attitudes at least as much as the rest of the community. I have known a few who are quite outstanding individuals. If the ancient Sangha was anything like them, then it would have been a most remarkable organization which it would be quite dangerous to generalize about. I have known other monks of whom I would not say that ! I rather suspect that this sort of mixture has been the case from very early days. In fact this is not really much to do with Buddhism in particular. The question is rather why did Indian society give such a strong value to sexual renunciation. I suspect that a proto-tantric direction was present from the beginning i.e. the aim was to transform a powerful (almost magically conceived) force. Such a view of course makes the importance of sexual restraint potentially even greater. L.S. Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 08:56:10 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: Little Buddha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Mon, 7 Feb 1994, Mark Joseph Larrimore wrote: > > It's Bernardo Bertolucci's latest Asian fantasy, and was premiered > at the Berlin Film Festival in December. I'm not sure when it's due > to be released on this side of the Atlantic... Are there Italian > film-director Bodhisattvas? I heard that Dzongshar Kyentse Rinpoche was present with Bertolucci in some capacity during the film's production. I know that he is interested in making films, and that he has a project in mind regarding one of the Dalai Lamas (the one who abdicated). So there are probably film-director Bodhisattvas, anyway, and it is just their bad luck if they are not Italian, too. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 09:01:50 EST From: Marc Wachowitz Subject: Books about Practice ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Due to much work I'll not be able to complete the intended extensive list of books about Buddhist practice in the near future; here's a shorter one with few commentaries. It should still be sufficcient for a while ... - Charlotte Joko Beck, "Everyday Zen: Love and Work" Introduces Zen as a practical way (or should I say non-way? :) of life, without an unfortunate separation of "practice" vs. "normal life"; with many insightful remarks about everyday psychic problems. Good overview. Without hesitation I can recommend this as a first book about practice. - Charlotte Joko Beck, "Nothing Special: Living Zen" Places a stronger emphasis on "Great Life" (nevertheless concerned with practical experience of real people, not exalted phantasy); particular- ly important for "advanced" practitioners. Like Robert Aitken remarks: "Joko Beck speaks from the timeless and the perennial, so her metaphors of ordinary things and everyday incidents illumine my mundane life." - Chogyam Trungpa, "Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism" A very clear overview of the traps and chances of spirituality. One may particularly need it if one doesn't think one would need it, both early in practice and later :-) - Shunryu Suzuki, "Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind" Introduction to Soto Zen; beautiful in its fundamental simplicity. - Robert Aitken, "Taking the Path of Zen" An excellent introduction into Rinzai Zen, with many good hints about sitting, obstacles and a short part on koans. - Philip Kapleau, "The Three Pillars of Zen" A rich collection of texts about Zen practice (mostly Rinzai style). The following two are not exactly Buddhist, but if you are serious about spirituality I'd recommend looking at them; both may in their particular way be useful in avoiding a narrow view, and provide helpful irritation: - Jiddu Krishnamurti, "Freedom from the Known" A summary of what is sometimes called the "pathless path", or formless meditation. Don't misunderstand his style of negating concepts as some negativity towards life. - Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, "Tantra: The Supreme Understanding" Very extended commentary on Tilopa's "Song of Mahamudra" (please don't believe anything written here unless you see it clearly for yourself). [This has little to do with the popular sexual aspects of tantra.] Take care. All the best, Marc ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ * wonder everyday * nothing in particular * all is special * Marc Wachowitz ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 09:16:14 EST From: Palma Adriano Subject: Re: Little Buddha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- he was also acting IN the movie itself ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 09:20:02 EST From: Jim Cocks Subject: Re: Little Buddha I have received many responses to the question of when this film will be released in the USA. Since it has been made clear that the film has been released in Europe and will be released in the USA in the spring I have not posted to the list any postings restating this release info. Cheers, Jim Cocks ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 13:01:29 EST From: Tim Brown Subject: Re: Naagaarjuna, Derrida and Godzilla ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard Hayes writes: >blunder of being in any way straightforward or clear. Derrida's >writing is to principled argumentation as masturbation is to a >sexual relationship with another person (which is to say, it is >much more satisfying to oneself, of no use whatsoever to anyone >else, and a way of keeping oneself almost perfectly immune from >the pain of rejection). Yet from what I understand higher Tantric Buddhism (from a couple of Intro. to Buddhism classes), much higher Tantric practice involves consort with a partner either real visualized. Which is to say that mental masterbation, in some cases may actually benefit not only onself, but all of humanity. And therfore by association, if not actual connection, one could apply the same reasonning to Derrida's writing and argue that he was just trying to enlighten us poor folk stuck in undeconstructed Smasara. Tim Brown ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 13:01:54 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: dharma and fa ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Aside from some comparative studies of the older style translations (meaning roughly from Kumarajiva through Paramartha) with the "new" translations (meaning Hsuan-tsang's terminology), and the move away from neo-taoist terminology (post-Tao-an and Kumarajiva), insufficient attention has been payed, I think, to why earlier translators chose the terms that they did to render Sanskrit. Technical vocabulary was derived from many sources, including the Lao-Chuang tradition (e.g., su [for samv.rti] as 'conventional consensus' is found in Chuang Tzu, though, English translators often render su as "mundane" or "worldly"), the Mohists and Neo-mohists (especially certain cognitive and logical terms), etc. As for Fa, it originally meant "method, plan, fixed pattern, model (exemplary)" and was (pre-Buddhism) extended to mean the "Law of the Land", statutes, rules, etc. The Chinese political-philosophical school associated with Han Fei Tzu, et al., usually called the Legalists (whom Waley redubbed the Realists), who were the first unifiers of China and proposed a strict system of explicit rewards and punishments were called the fa chia (Fa School), since their "method" was to implement "law" according to a "model" they constructed that they perceived to be a synchronous "pattern" between the natural and political domains. Since the Legalists had fallen into severe disfavor in the Chinese mind, it has always seemed curious to me that the Buddhists should have picked the term fa, with its unavoidable Legalist overtones, for one of their basic terms. Sometimes "dharma" was transliterated, but the only major occurrence that has stuck is in the name of Bodhidharma (pronounced in modern Chinese: Puti Damo; Japanese renders the latter two syllables Daruma, which, if you put the stress on the first syllable, comes close to Dharma). ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 13:57:02 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: Translating `dharma', `fa' and `hoo' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In terms of looking for an English equivalent to the Sanskrit Dharma, note that at least as early as 1971 the word dharma is found in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (second edition). Almost any American with even a passing interest in oriental regligions or meditation is familiar with the word dharma, although he may be as puzzled as the academic scholars of Sanskrit as to its true meaning. I don't know how native speakers of other languages regard lexical acquisition, but English has always been eclectic (or less politely, bastardized); and Americans, for the most part, don't hold linguistic prejudice as to the original ancestry of a word. We will misuse and mispronounce it as democratically as any of the other English words. While we may be willing to make great sacrifices to keep, say, Vietnam American, we aren't concerned at all about keeping American American. In regard to attempts to explain the apparent diversity of meanings for the word Dharma, it is interesting to note the parallel case of the Hebrew word Torah; this word is used to refer to the primary sacred text of Judaism, the secular law, the sacred law, the study of the cosmic or spiritual structure and functioning of the universe, and the study and practice of spiritual development. I believe these usages date at least to the middle ages and the time of the writing of the Zohar. As I am no expert in these matters I can't guarantee this information; nevertheless it suggests that there is a natural, functional, lexical tie between these various meanings. (I suppose it is possible for the influence of Buddhist teachings spread through Sufi and Islamic lineages to the writers of these Judaic texts to be responsible for this similiarity, but this seems unlikely). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 7 Feb 1994 to 8 Feb 1994 ************************************************* From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Feb 9 16:57:34 1994 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 16:00:22 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 8 Feb 1994 to 9 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 17 messages totalling 558 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. further to glossing 'dharma' (5) 2. dharma and fa 3. Translating `dharma', `fa' and `hoo' (3) 4. Tibetan Fonts 5. images of the feminine in Indo-tibetan buddhism (3) 6. Mandalas 7. Buddhist Studies Review 8. "Fa" (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 16:52:36 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: further to glossing 'dharma' --------------------------- Original Message --------------------------- Dear Professor Hayes:- Please pardon this intrusion, but I am motivated by your recent posting on Buddha-L with regard to rendering *dharma* (or, of course *dhamma*) in Japanese, English, Chinese or whatever. It seems to me that your excellent survey of the logic of its various polysemous usages and senses (I refer to polysemy without prejudice, I hope, in as much as I could not agree more with your position on Derrida and deconstructionism) motivates something I put forward some years ago, namely that ther is a single English gloss that comes at least accetpably close to covering the range of senses you have catalogued. The central gloss I put forward then and wish to submit now is PRINCIPLE. It seems to me that this doe not, in English, carry with it the entailment of elemental property that you properly reject. At the same time, it is something a bit more than a mere feature, trait or attribute; that is, it is, as you say to start with, 'characteristic.' I mean this in approximately the sense in which the latter term is used in 'characteristic value/Eigenvalue' in mathematics. I suspect, by the way, that part, at least, of the answer to why Chinese renders *dharma* as *fa* is to be found in the fact that the terminology opf the translation comes in good measure from the antecedent Confucian terminology, where, after all, principles, traits and characteristics are indeed to be understood as approximately legislated, something to be at least managed and kept in force by authority. If this is all nonsense i have put forward, please say so; if not ... Sincerely, F. K. L. Chit Hlaing Anthropology and Linguistics FAX:217-244-3490 University of Illinois 109 Davenport Hall 607 S. Mathews Avenue Urbana, IL 61801 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 08:40:57 EST From: "Ying Zhang (REL)" Subject: Re: dharma and fa ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I am not surprised that Buddhism would choose fa as their basic term. Fa chia as a school probably was not favored by most of the rulers in Chinese history. But its term fa has long been incorporated into ru chia since Han Dynasty. Good rulership should have both fa and ren (kindness, ru chia's main term). Chinese always say that " a country must have fa, and a family must have fa". Fa clarifies what is right and what is wrong, and without fa, everything would be in chaos. So it seems logic for Buddhism to choose fa as such an important term. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 08:42:43 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: Re: Translating `dharma', `fa' and `hoo' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- To respond to the last part of Leigh Goldstein's post, I also saw the parallel in the multiplicity of meanings of "torah" and "dharma", particularly the sense of "torah" as meaning both "the way" and the law. Torah, like dharma is also equated specifically with Wisdom. The hymn, "it is a tree of life to them that hold fast to it' derives from Proverbs, where "it" refers originally to Wisdom, though in the hymn it is taken to refer to Torah. However, I do not believe there is a meaning of Torah that corresponds to dharma as "phenomenon" or "constitutive element". The closest one comes to that idea is the kabbalistic concept that the Torah itself preceded the world and is in itself a blueprint or plan of creation. There is also the sense that the Torah is in its deepest reading (sod, or secret) one long name of God and that therefore knowledge at that hermeneutical level is knowledge of God. Which leads me to a point-- Richard Hayes' concise "declension" of dharma was couched in rhetorical terms (synecdoche, metonymy). Is there within Buddhist thought (as there is Jewish thought) a hermeneutical method for deriving such meanings? Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 08:46:31 EST From: Nobuyoshi Yaambe Subject: Re: Translating `dharma', `fa' and `hoo' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Just a few words on dharma and "hoo." According to Todo's etymological dictionary of Chinese characters, the ancient epigraphic form of the character "fa" consists of three elements: to withdraw, water, and a "unicorn." Todo says that Chinese emperors kept "unicorns" on a small island in the garden of their palace. Since the island was surrounded by water, "unicorns" were forced to withdraw and couldn't go out. In Todo's opinion (although not unanimously accepted), this was the original image of the character "fa," and thus the character signifies the framework that restricts our behaviors. Therefore it means any "patterns" to be followed and particularly "law" in the jurisprudential sense. In modern Japanese, "hoo" means both legal codes (as in "hooritsu") and laws of nature (as in "hoosoku"). Cf. The Law of Mora = "mora no hoosoku." By the way, Professor Hayes, can I raise a tiny question, please? How would you translate the word dharma-dhaatu? Nobuyoshi Yamabe ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 08:47:40 EST From: Gary Burstein Subject: Tibetan Fonts ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Several people have asked me to summarize the information I received after requesting information regarding Tibetan fonts. Here is the summarization, I hope it is useful. Also, I do not know the validity of the info as I have not checked it out yet. There is a Tibetan keyboard that works in windows 3.1 produced by Bob Bryant at 1131 W. Arthur, Chicago Il. 60626. I recently bought it and I think it works, but as far as I can figure out, producing letter stacks is quite complicated, though I haven't yet given it a thorough try. This package comes with two Tibetan fonts. The second thing I can say is that Corel Draw v.4.0 will produce true-type fonts. So the thing to do would be to scan all the characters you want, convert the TIFF files to whatever Corel needs and then do the font. I worked at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, India during 91-92, and one of the projects I worked on was implementing the tibetan language on IBM and Mac computers. There are several font packages out, mostly for macs, but the good thing about the libraries work is that they are trying to promote it as a standard because it is the first font and keyborad system developed by tibetans for tibetans, so the keyborad layout actaully makes sense. a computer company in India manufactures boards that go on the bus of IBM machines, and wil switch the whole machine over to tibetan with a few key strokes. Right now, the library is cataling their Tibetan manuscript collection with the font on a 486 with SCO Unix. As for getting a copy of the font, you can try writing the library at: The Library of Tibetan Works and Archives Publications Department Gangchen Kyishong Dharamsala, 176215 India but I don't know if they are in a position to distribute?? You can also try CDAC for information on the IBM boards. They have developed for Tibetan, Thai, Hindi, Devangari, Urdu, etc. I have some old brochures from them, but you could write them directly (perhaps they are on the Net?) Centre for Develpoment of Advanced Computing Pune University Campus Ganesh Khind Pune 411 007 India Ask them for info on the GIST technology for tibetan and a list of distributors for the modules. The most common fonts on the Mac are now available for PC's - these are: Pierre Robillard's LTibetan and the Druk Mac font by Peter Lofting Both of these build up stacks from "parts" and not all stacks found in mantras etc are supported. Both require a PC running MS Windows with Adobe Type Manager and /or Truetype. - It is not always easy or quick to use these fonts as (as far as I know) there is not yet an easy entry system for either of these fonts. Both these use different encoding schemes (they are not interchangeable). There exist a few programs for using Tibetan on "basic" PS's (8086/80286) and dot matrix printers: These include Peter Ebatson's Atisha system and the TTPS system - these probably give as good a result as you are ever going to get on such equiptment. The Tibetan! fonts and WordPerfect macros by Tony Duff and Gerry Weiner produce nice output on LaserJet or PostScript printers. Thier Post Script fonts are scaleable and also should work on PostScript Image setters. Their fonts encode each stack as a seperate character and only the vowel signs are added to the stacks. Thier font sets have a total of about 700 individual characters. And they have two styles one based on the Indian hot metal font as used by the Baptist Mission Press for Das's dictionary - and a more calligraphic looking font but with roughly the same general proportions. These fonts require WordPerfect 5 (or later) for DOS and a laser printer. The PostScript versions of these fonts can be made to work with Windows and Adobe Type Manager (-this requires minor changes to the encoding array of the fonts as some of the positions used are not supported by all Windows applications and the method used to switch between the various fonts can cause problems in Windows) You can find out more about most of these systems (and others) in the ACIP Release Three documentation. TIBETAN FONTS FOR IBM-PC AND MACINTOSH **Tibetan! Ver. 4.0 WYSIWYG Tibetan Word Processor Tibetan! offers true WYSIWYG display; spelling checker with full Tibetan dictionary; the ablility to print output to any printer at all; fully scaleable typefaces of the highest quality; and direct support for Tibetan-Sanskrit; all within the context of WordPerfect 6.0. "The new package comes with six postcript fonts; a commplete Tibetan keyboard layout; manual, plus many details about producing Tibetan pecha, rules of Tibetan grammar and so on". Address for contact: The Tibetan Computer Company P.O. Box 4957 Kathmandu, Nepal (977)-1-472-678 **TIBETAN FOR WINDOWS TIBETAN FOR WINDOWS makes it possible to use Tibetan in the Microsoft Windows environment for IBM compatible computers. You see Tibetan script on the screen as you type in Wylie or other input modes. The software also claims to be able to exchange Tibetan files between IBM PCs and Macintoshs; print your text to almost any graphic printer and the Tibetan File Converter to translate between Wylie, ACIP, Machintosh LTibetan and phonetic formats. Cost: $50. For more info write to: Bob Bryant 1311 W. Arthur Chicago, IL USA 60626 **TIBETAN FONTS FOR MACINTOSH by Pierre Robillard Package contains manaul, disks, keyboard stickers $59.95 -System 7 compatible postscript Type I and True Type fonts -works with Apple Style Writer and Personal Laser Writer LS printers -includes System 7 custom keyboard layouts -includes English fonts with diacritics for transliterated Sanskrit -works with word processors, desk-top puvlishing programs, databases, etc. -capable of printing Tibetanized Sanskrit for mantras -includes desk accessory Tibetan-Sort for creating a sort key for use in databases -includes WylieEdit for typing in Wylie trasnliteration for automatic conversion to Tibetan. -includes _new_ "TibetanEcit II" for typing Tibetan fast! -"Mac Keymeleon II" is required if you use system 6.0x or wish to create your own custom keyboards. Avaliable from Snow Lion for $ 120.00 **SAMBHOTA Tibetan Publishing Software for Windows 3.1 [No details available. The sample fonts look great] Sambhota 3929 Orchard Ct. Boulder, CO 80304 Phone-Fax (303)442-5410 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 08:48:11 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Tue, 8 Feb 1994, Richard P Hayes wrote: > --------------------------- Original Message --------------------------- > Dear Professor Hayes:- > Please pardon this intrusion, but I am motivated by your recent > posting on Buddha-L with regard to rendering *dharma* (or, of course > *dhamma*) in Japanese, English, Chinese or whatever. It seems to me that > ....... > ...... > ... > Sincerely, > F. K. L. Chit Hlaing ----------------------------- Although I introduced the issue, I really would rather listen than participate any more than I did in my initial proposal, in which I stated that I was interested in how one could legitimately render Dharma OUT OF A JAPANESE CONTEXT, I.E. HOO/NORI. The peripheral insights are fascinating, but I have yet to receive even an unacceptable suggestion as to how I might, for example, render Jien's phrase, "nori no kado." "Gate of Law" (my secret preference)? "Gate of the Dharma"? "Gate of Principle"? . . . Consider also the "Three Refuges": "I take my refuge in the Principle" (?) Hmm. Could one not say: "I take refuge in the Law of Buddha"? A bit wordy, perhaps, but at least it is in English and it clearly states that this is not the Mosaic Law. We have to draw the line at infinite transliteration somewhere, and I propose that this is as good a place as any. Bob M ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 08:49:55 EST From: Robert Kelly Subject: Re: Translating `dharma', `fa' and `hoo' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Just a vote in favor of dharma as translation of _dharma_. It is now just shy of two hundred years since the word was first used in English (by the great --tho much lately berated-- W. Jones). It doesn't mean Law unless Law swells to be unrecognizable. (The six Laws of Naropa?) Exactly because Dharma has a range of meaning no English word has, it has a right to be considered for absorption into English. (That's how "weekend" made its way into French, not that the French lacked Samedi et dimanche....) The real vexation for me is how to english _klesa_ --- I've never heard a reasonable (by which I mean not utterly misleading) translation. Any insights out there? (The silliest I know is "negative emotion" as if the "positive" emotions were exempt...) Fearfully, RK ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 09:31:25 EST From: James Sanford Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Hoo/fa/dharma. Gee, folks, maybe I'm just denotatively challenged, but I've never really thought that hoo and nori meant exactly the same thing. Much less would I hope for more than partial overlap between fa (Chi) and ho (Jpn)-- in spite of the use of an identical logograph (morpheme-ograph?). And to find a single English gloss that also covers Dharma-- even just its Buddhist usages? It all seems pretty unlikely to me. Jim Sanford, aka, jhsanfor@gibbs.oit.unc.edu ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 10:38:07 EST From: "Dr. I. Astley" Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Bob Morrell's plea for an answer to his original question prompts me to offer a possibly half [un]acceptable suggestion. Firstly, though, I think it proper to point out that although the various suggestions as to the origin of the term _dharma_ and the general question of translating it, are very helpful and, as Bob says, fascinating, I suspect that what lies behind the poor fellow's question is the assertion of the need to interpret the Japanese occurrences in terms of their own context. I find it instructive to examine why _fa_ was used in meditations on statecraft in ancient China, and I would also submit that essential elements can also be detected in the Japanese Buddhist usage. However, _hou_ in Japanese Buddhist sources refers to the teaching or the way of the Buddha in all its various aspects, and as such etymological considerations are secondary. ``Nori no kado'' also occurs in many other contexts, often read _hou-mon_. I have translated this in the context of the _Rishukyou_ (the PP in 150 'sloka) as ``Dharma-Gate'', for which piece of brilliant execution of the translator's art my editor beat me mercilessly about the head. ``Dharma-Gate'' is cheating, in a way, but it's now down in black and white for all to see, with only the convenience of brevity to commend it (which, probably, is quite a lot, despite everything). If I had been beaten harder (i.e. somewhere where more damage might have been done) I would have plumped for ``Gateway to the Dharma'' (only half cheating) or ``Gateway to the Path'' (not cheating, honest, but does need a bit of explaining ...). _Hou_ stands for the sum of what the Buddha taught, his teaching as a method by which one may come to sever the bonds of suffering existence (here there is an echo of the original Chinese sense, since ``laws'' or sanctions were measures which necessarily followed upon or were appropriate to given transgressions, and which led to a rectification of disturbances to the harmonious conduct of the affairs of the country; and an echo also of the use of _hou_ to indicate ritual and other techniques which are conducive to the attainment of enlightenment). Path is also understood as a direct expression of the truth experienced, practised and taught by the Buddha. I would make a point of the use of ``towards'', since the relationship between _hou_ and _mon_ (nori--kado) is not specified in the compound or by the particle _no_, which has a far wider connotation than the English ``of''. I think it is essential to bring in some idea of movement, change brought about through active involvement of the individual, since this is necessarily implied in the expression. Thus I would express reservations about Bob Morrell's secret favourite (I'll stand you a beer, instead,OK?), ``Gate of Law''. I hope that wasn't more than two screenfuls, sorry it was only one paragraph. Ian Astley e-mail: astley@mailer.Uni-Marburg.DE Philipps-Universitaet, FB 11 Tel.: [+49] 6421 28-3662, FG Religionswissenschaft -3661, Liebigstr. 37 or -7035 D--35037 Marburg Fax: [+49] 6421 28-3944 Germany ---PLEASE NOTE the new postal code!--- ---AND the new e-mail node address!--- ******************************************************************** ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 10:38:25 EST From: SUJATA GHOSH Subject: images of the feminine in Indo-tibetan buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Hello, I am currently researching the icnographical representations of female deities within the Indo-tibetan Buddhist pantheon. Could anyone recommend an appropriate treatise on buddhist art or recent articles related to this field? Any help would be much appreciated. Sujata GhoshSujata Ghosh Concordia University Montre [s_ghosh@pavo.concordia.ca] ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 11:23:13 EST From: SAMUELS JEFFREY Subject: Mandalas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Is anyone out there aware of any sources which investigate mandalas in general and the Tibetan view and use of mandalas in particular (beside Tucci). I am quite surprised to find so few sources. Thanks, Jeff Samuels samuels@ucsu.colorado.edu ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 11:24:04 EST From: "Charles S. Prebish" Subject: Buddhist Studies Review ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- ANNOUNCEMENT TO MEMBERS OF BUDDHA-L _Buddhist Studies Review_, published in London under the able editorship of Russell Webb, is currently celebrating its tenth anniversary. _Buddhist Studies Review_ is the bi-annual journal of the Institut recherche bouddhique Linh-So'n and the Pali Buddhist Union. Widely known in Europe, it has published articles by Heinz Bechert, Hubert Durt, Paul Harrison, Peter Harvey, Ria Kloppenborg, Etienne Lamotte, Joy Manne, K.R. Norman, Charles Prebish, Russell Webb, Karel Werner, and others. Despite the high quality and broad scope of its articles, translations, and reviews, it has not been extensively available in the United States. During the last year, as the result of a shared interest in the academic study of Buddhism, Russell Webb and I had several discussions about how to make this journal more available to scholars in North America. Our conclusion was to establish an editorial office in the United States. In that regard, I have been appointed as North American Treasurer and Assistant Editor. Anyone wishing to subscribe to this important journal can contact me, at my Penn State address, for an application. The cost for an annual subscription will be $11 for individuals and $19 for institutions. Additionally, _Buddhist Studies Review_ would like to encourage North American scholars to offer manuscripts for possible publication in the journal. Manuscripts may also be sent to me at my Penn State address. Please feel free to contact me with any questions or inquiries about the journal. Dr. Charles S. Prebish Pennsylvania State University E-Mail: csp1@psuvm.psu.edu Religious Studies Program Voice Mail: 814/865-1121 108 Weaver Building Fax: 814/863-7840 University Park, Pa 16802 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 11:29:42 EST From: SAMUELS JEFFREY Subject: Re: images of the feminine in Indo-tibetan buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Sujata, There is a very comprehensive bibliography on Tibetan religion and culture by Geoffrey Samuel which includes a number of sources on female deities and art in Tibet. This bibliography can be downloaded from the anonymous ftp site: coombs.anu.edu.au and it is located in the directory: coombspapers/otherarchives/electronic-buddhist-archives/buddhism-tibe tan/research. If you (or anyone else on buddha-l) are not able to access ftp sites, then you can drop me a note and I will e-mail it to you. Jeff Samuels samuels@ucsu.colorado.edu ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 11:36:24 EST From: Joe Wilson Subject: Re: images of the feminine in Indo-tibetan buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Sujata Ghosh writes: > I am currently researching the icnographical representations of female > deities within the Indo-tibetan Buddhist pantheon. Could anyone > recommend an appropriate treatise on buddhist art or recent articles > related to this field? A beginning would be Thurman and Rhie, _Wisdom and Compassion_ on Tibetan art. (Sorry, I don't have the bibliog. info with me.) You might also look at: Chandra, L. Buddhist Iconography of Tibet. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 1986. Klein, A. C. Primordial Purity and Everyday Life: Exalted Female Symbols and the Women of Tibet. In Immaculate and Powerful: The Female in Sacred Image and Social Reality, ed. Clarissa W. Atkinson and et al. 111-38. London: London, 1987. (The article by Anne Klein may or may not have iconographic relevance.) Hope this helps. Joe Wilson University of North Carolina (Wilmington) ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 13:42:22 EST From: ORZECHC@iris.uncg.edu Subject: "Fa" ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I think a rendeering of Chinese "fa" as principle would needlessly confuse readers because of the common rendering of "li" as principle. Perhaps norm might be better, though it would look a bit awkward. Charlie Orzech ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 13:42:41 EST From: ORZECHC@iris.uncg.edu Subject: "Fa" ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- although I ventured a possible translation for Chinese "fa" as norm, I must admit that in the Chinese context I almost always translate the term as teaching. Charlie Orzech OrzechC@Iris.uncg.edu ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 13:50:03 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Wed, 9 Feb 1994, James Sanford wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Hoo/fa/dharma. Gee, folks, maybe I'm just denotatively challenged, but > I've never really thought that hoo and nori meant exactly the same thing. > Much less would I hope for more than partial overlap between fa (Chi) and > ho (Jpn)-- in spite of the use of an identical logograph > (morpheme-ograph?). And to find a single English gloss that also covers > Dharma-- even just its Buddhist usages? It all seems pretty unlikely to > me. > Jim Sanford, aka, jhsanfor@gibbs.oit.unc.edu ------------------------------------- Jim --- Well, if we can't agree on "a single English gloss," how about two or three? At least two for starters -- the senses often distinguished by upper and lower case initial characters: Dharma as Buddhist Teaching, and dharma as "trait"(Hayes)/constitutive "element" (Stcherbatsky). In any case, I have yet to hear anyone tell me what to do with poor old Jien's ". . . nori no kado." If nori is not quite the same as hoo (not to mention dharma), and kado is probably not quite the same as "gate," and "no" is arguably used in a kind of appositional sense (cf. naru), but perhaps not exactly --- perhaps I should simply translate "nori no kado" as "nori no kado"? Bob ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University Compuserve: 71640,1036 St. Louis, MO 63130-2030 (314) 862-5418 (voice) > ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 8 Feb 1994 to 9 Feb 1994 ************************************************* From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Thu Feb 10 16:55:19 1994 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 16:00:29 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 9 Feb 1994 to 10 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 8 messages totalling 330 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. further to glossing 'dharma' (5) 2. Mandalas 3. Translating dharma 4. Translating 'dharma', 'fa' and 'hoo' ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 09:09:20 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Wed, 9 Feb 1994, Robert E Morrell wrote: > The peripheral insights are fascinating, but I have yet to receive even > an unacceptable suggestion as to how I might, for example, render Jien's > phrase, "nori no kado." "Gate of Law" (my secret preference)? "Gate of > the Dharma"? "Gate of Principle"? . . . Consider also the "Three > Bob M For what it's worth, I have heard Zen masters who were teaching Americans use the phrase "innumerable Dharma gates". ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 09:16:56 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I offer these comments in the spirit of a lay person, a consumer of translated texts, who is concerned about how well they capture the original meaning; maybe feedback from one such as I is useful. On Wed, 9 Feb 1994, Dr. I. Astley wrote: > Buddhist usage. However, _hou_ in Japanese Buddhist sources refers > to the teaching or the way of the Buddha in all its various aspects, > and as such etymological considerations are secondary. ``Nori no > kado'' also occurs in many other contexts, often read _hou-mon_. > I have translated this in the context of the _Rishukyou_ (the PP in > 150 'sloka) as ``Dharma-Gate'', for which piece of brilliant execution ... I have heard this term often used by some Zen masters teaching in America. I mention this because they must have felt it was effective. Of course, I don't know what terms they were translating! > cheating) or ``Gateway to the Path'' (not cheating, honest, but does > need a bit of explaining ...). _Hou_ stands for the sum of what the > Buddha taught, his teaching as a method by which one may come to > sever the bonds of suffering existence (here there is an echo of the > original Chinese sense, since ``laws'' or sanctions were measures ... Dharma-gate might mean something like "the entire Buddha-Dharma as the gateway to liberation", or it might mean something like "a specific technique that is useful in gaining an insight into reality" (such as kung-an or sitting meditation or a passage from a sutra); one way I have heard it used was "inumerable Dharma gates", implying to me some kind of opportunity to enter into the Way or Path, or enter more deeply, or a new level, etc. Also there is a question about whether this gate is a text, a practice, a spontaneous insight, a situation engineered by a teacher, etc.; what class of objects are included in the specific term (_hou_ or _nori_ (isn't that some kind of seaweed, anyway?)? > the harmonious conduct of the affairs of the country; and an echo also > of the use of _hou_ to indicate ritual and other techniques which are > conducive to the attainment of enlightenment). Path is also understood > as a direct expression of the truth experienced, practised and taught > by the Buddha. I would make a point of the use of ``towards'', since ... It seems there is a question about whether a term means "a means that might give someone an immediate doorway into a insight into the path" or "a recommended rule of behavior that ultimately brings benefit". > in the compound or by the particle _no_, which has a far wider connotation > than the English ``of''. I think it is essential to bring in some idea > of movement, change brought about through active involvement of the ... The idea might be of a gateway onto the path, or into reality. How about "access on-ramp to the Buddha's freeway (pedestrians allowed)"? An interesting sideline is the Chinese Zen masters who spoke of something like "looking for a road out", that is, looking for some way to communicate from their enlightened side to the student body's side. Apparently once on the other side, it was difficult for them to even send messages the other way. Sort of the reverse problem. If they found such a "road out" would that be a "Dharma-Gate" for the students? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 09:21:05 EST From: "Randall R. Scott" Subject: Re: Mandalas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Wed, 9 Feb 1994, SAMUELS JEFFREY wrote: > Is anyone out there aware of any sources which investigate > mandalas in general and the Tibetan view and use of mandalas in > particular (beside Tucci). I am quite surprised to find so few > sources. > > Thanks, > > Jeff Samuels > samuels@ucsu.colorado.edu Jeff, Perhaps you've seen these, but.... Excluding Jung and the Ngor work, they are not monographic in length, but are helpful and interesting anyway. 1. David Snellgrove. Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (Volume One). 2. Mircea Eliade. Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. 3. Barry Bryant. The Wheel of Time. 4. John Blofeld. The Tantric Mysticism of Tibet. 5. Peter Harvey. Introduction to Buddhism (Harvey has a fondness for Northern/Tibetan/Esoteric Buddhism). 6. If you can find it: The Ngor Mandalas of Tibet: Listings of the Mandala Deities (bSod nams rgya mtsho), published by The Center for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1991. Revised by Musashi Tachikawa, Shunzo Onoda, Keiya Noguchi, and Kimiaki Tanaka. (200 pages of mandala-schematics). And don't forget the work of CARL JUNG (and those in his wake): -- "Concerning Mandala Symbolism" (in CW9a). -- Psychology and Religion (a part of CW11). -- Man and his Symbols. 1964. -- C.G. Jung and the Humanities. 1990. -- The Symbolic Life (CW18). -- Jung's Psychological Commentaries to The Tibetan Book of the Dead and The Tibetan Book of Great Liberation (both = Evans-Wentz ed.). Randy Scott Washington University in St. Louis ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 09:22:11 EST From: Paul Swanson Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Bob, Re. "nori no kado", how about "the glue corner"; or "easy flower arranging" (as in "noriyasui"). Just kidding. Seriously, I'm not familiar with Jien's writings, but wouldn't "teachings of the Buddha" suffice, without making this an ironclad translation for "hoo" or "nori" in all contexts? Paul Swanson; swansonp@jpncun10, Nanzan ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 10:55:33 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Leigh --- "Innumerable Dharma gates." Hmmm. I'll put that in my notes. Many thanks. Bob M ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 11:12:19 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Thu, 10 Feb 1994, Paul Swanson wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Bob, > > Re. "nori no kado", how about "the glue corner"; or "easy flower > arranging" (as in "noriyasui"). > > Just kidding. Seriously, I'm not familiar with Jien's writings, > but wouldn't "teachings of the Buddha" suffice, without making this > an ironclad translation for "hoo" or "nori" in all contexts? > > Paul Swanson; swansonp@jpncun10, Nanzan -------------------------------- Paul --- Actually I rather like "the glue corner." Sort of throws a new light on the entire issue. Yes, "teachings of the Buddha" would do well enough for "hoo" or "nori". But we still have "kado" -- rather a nice image, I think. So perhaps, "Gate of the Buddha's Teaching," or simply, "Gate of the Teaching" -- the Buddha part being pretty well assumed. But I am still left with the puzzlement as to why so many insist that hoo/nori MUST be translated as "Dharma" and MAY NOT be translated as "Law."> Bob ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 11:41:03 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Re: Translating dharma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In his uncharacteristically pun-less discussion of *dharma*, Richard Hayes suggests that the "principal meaning of the word dharma is characteristic, attribute, trait or feature." He then rejects the translation, "elment," submitted by earlier blunderers. "Element," however, avoids a nasty conceptual problem that "trait" cannot easily evade. In short, a "trait" is an aspect of something else; that is, a trait (or characeteristic, attribute, etc) is a quality that must reside in the thing that it qualifies. This is precisely the kind of problem that early Buddhist philosophy attempts to avoid, for the most perniciously persistent loci of qualities is our old friend, the Self. For this reasons, when bored monks sat around typologically listing the constituents of their perceptual experiences (thought being a king of perception), they did not specify any *dharmin* to which these *dharmas* belong. The point is that only *dharmas* are real; the *dharmin* to which they allegedly belong (as in Mr. Self) do not. After Naagaarjuna shoots down all dharmas, Dharmakiirti later revives them by cleverly proposing that they are conceptually constructed in conjunction with a dharmin, which, as a locus, is itself conceptually distinguished from its qualities (dharmas). Yet, although dharma and dharmin are both only conceptual constructions, they are still indispensable, for such constructions provide the only way that we fools can tell each other (and ourselves) what we need to accomplish our goals (*artha*). It is only in Dharmakiirti's sense that we can call a *dharma* a trait or characteristic (I prefer to call them "predicates" in this sense, since Dharmakiirti himself discusses them in a linguistic context in which concepts have the same structure as language). But in calling them "traits", Dharmakiirti does not mean that they are the consituents of perceptual experience which are listed in the Abhidharma texts. According to those texts, *dharmas* are the irreducible building blocks of larger conglomerates, such as people. But for Dharmakiirti, *dharmas* are qualities abstracted from their locus from which they are in reality inseparable. (Doubters see PV 1:40-45 & 56-67 all with auto-commentary). Of course, as Richard knows, my analysis assumes certain things about the conceptual reducablity of particulars -- Dharmakiirti's thought on the subject is not entirely clear, and the problem is a rather vicious one. By complicating the issue, perpaps I have already conveyed the point of this message: *dharma* is too complicated to translate accurately. So, as others have suggested, just use "dharma." If the urge to jump into a pit of semantic vipers overwhelms you, choose whatever translation you like and explain your irresistible urge in a note. Actually, the first mention of "dharma" probably always warrants a footnote. I hope I have been sufficiently confusing. bahusa.mkli.s.tadharmasa.mghaatatvena John Dunne Study of Religion, Harvard University ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 13:09:24 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Re: Translating 'dharma', 'fa' and 'hoo' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Robert Kelly recently remarked: > > The real vexation for me is how to english _klesa_ --- I've never heard > a reasonable (by which I mean not utterly misleading) translation. Any > insights out there? (The silliest I know is "negative emotion" as if > the "positive" emotions were exempt...) > > I find the word "emotion" to be somewhat misleading, but "negative" is not. Positive mental states, although they produce *karma*, are definitely _not_ *kle'sa*. An interesting example is faith (*'sraddhaa*); a more familiar example is non-harmfulness (*ahi.msaa*). You need not take my word for it. See the *Abhidharmako'sa,* *Abhidharmasamuccaya,* or *Tri.m'sikaa.vij~naptibhaa.sya*. Perhaps a translation such as "negative mental states" is not all that bad. It certainly conveys the meaning. A more thorough translation might be, "mental occurences whose effects on consciousness will, unless eliminated, eventually produce suffering in that consciousness." This, however, seems rather verbose. In any case, any attempt to translate the metaphorical image of *kle'sa* as a kind of noisome goo that sticks to your mind seems pointless, since the metaphor gained its meaning withing a particular Indian context (cf. Jaina notions of karma and kle'sa). Kle'sically yours, John Dunne Study of Religion, Harvard University ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 9 Feb 1994 to 10 Feb 1994 ************************************************** Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 16:00:48 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 10 Feb 1994 to 11 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 11 messages totalling 538 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. dharmas and gates 2. Naagaarjuna, Derrida and Godzilla 3. 4. Translating 'dharma', 'fa' and 'hoo' 5. kilesa/klesha 6. TRANSLATING (2) 7. Dharma in Japan 8. About kle'sa 9. On the Asian Religions Discussion List (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 16:17:19 EST From: Robert Buswell Subject: dharmas and gates ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Translators always come to have their own personal preferences for rendering terms. I've come to use "approach to dharma" or "approach to the teaching" for the pan-East Asian Buddhist term fa-men, (lit. "law gate"). A "gate," after all is an "approach" or "access," and such a translation seems to me to make at least some sense in English. May the debate continue!! --Robert Buswell, UCLA ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 16:20:04 EST From: Dylan Tweney <6500dft@UCSBUXA.BITNET> Subject: Re: Naagaarjuna, Derrida and Godzilla ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Since no one is jumping to the defense of Derrida in the wake of Prof. Hayes' cogent critique, I'll stick my neck out a little here. Although Prof. Hayes clearly and thoroughly points out the many and seemingly insurmountable differences between Derrida and Naagaarjuna, it does seem that he has missed one point of contact, which may be the very point that people are thinking of when they make the comparison. That is, both thinkers seem preoccupied with *dualism*, and direct a large part of their efforts towards undermining it, or at least tilting against it. For Derrida, this works itself out in terms of characteristically 20th-century terminology--specifically, in terms of a critique of linguistic philosophy a la Saussure, of structuralism, and of a whole passel of philosophers whose names begin with H. Starting with the distinction between signifier and signified, Derrida "deconstructs" (i.e. shows the implicit and fundamental weaknesses of) a whole range of binary oppositions. The theme running through many of his arguments can be, I think, interpreted as an attack on dualism. Perhaps the same thing could be said of Naagaarjuna. By means of the tetralemma, N. tries to show the futility or incorrectness of any form of dualism. Naturally, since N. is a Buddhist philosopher he does not use the terminology nor the concepts of 20th century structuralism and Hegelian philosophy--but it may be that readers of Derrida can detect some familiar echoes in the philosophy of Naagaarjuna. In pursuing and persistently negating seeming oppositions, N. shows the same kind of tenacity which, in the 20th century, our friend Derrida will come to exhibit. To be sure, the comparison may be strained and the similarities merely general. A careful reading of both N. and D. would surely reveal many more differences than even Prof. Hayes has given us. However, it may be that the comparison serves as a starting point, one that is particularly useful for people who are irked by dualistic ways of thinking. --Dylan Tweney U.C. Santa Barbara ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 08:34:59 EST From: Tim Williams Subject: Re: Translating 'dharma', 'fa' and 'hoo' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I have always understood the word "klesa" to translate as just "difficulty." Tim twilliam@bigcat.missouri.edu --- Home of the Buddha. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 08:48:46 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: kilesa/klesha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- John Dunne writes: > In any case, any attempt to translate the metaphorical image of *kle'sa* > as a kind of noisome goo that sticks to your mind seems pointless, since > the metaphor gained its meaning withing a particular Indian context (cf. > Jaina notions of karma and kle'sa). I have some doubts about the (widely accepted) interpretation of kilesa in terms of staining and making dirty. This is clearly widely used both in tradition and in scholarship. It seems more likely that we should think of the root meaning as being something that disturbs or afflicts the mind i.e. prevents mental peace. Of course the two can be fairly close cf. the common metaphor of the pool which is disturbed and therefore becomes muddy and loses its clarity. I therefore doubt a Jain origin for this concept. If at all, this is perhaps a later influence on the usage. The case is of course different for aasava which does seem more plausibly Jain or proto-Jain in origin. Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 08:51:30 EST From: john.bullitt@metta.ci.net Subject: Re: TRANSLATING ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- John Dunne recently replied to Robert Kelly : > Perhaps a translation such as "negative mental states" is not all > that bad. It certainly conveys the meaning. A more thorough translation > might be, "mental occurences whose effects on consciousness will, unless > eliminated, eventually produce suffering in that consciousness." > This, however, seems rather verbose. Perhaps "mental torments" conveys the idea more compactly? John Bullitt john.bullitt@metta.ci.net Barre Center for Buddhist Studies ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 09:01:35 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: Dharma in Japan Ian --- Thanks for the suggestion. When I said in reply to Jim Sanford's msg that I had not yet received an answer to my initial question of translating Dharma/dharma out of a JAPANESE context, I had not yet come to your message which finally did address the issue. Since it was fairly detailed, let me select a few passages for comment, with minimal mannipulation. >...I suspect that what lies behind the poor fellow's question is the >assertion of the need to interpret the Japanese occurrences in terms >of their own context. EXACTLY! >``Nori no kado'' also occurs in many other contexts, often read >_hou-mon_. I have translated this in the context of the >_Rishukyou_ (the PP in 150 'sloka) as ``Dharma-Gate''..., If I >had been beaten harder (i.e. somewhere where more damage might >have been done) I would have plumped for ``Gateway to the >Dharma'' (only half cheating) or ``Gateway to the Path'' (not >cheating, honest, but does need a bit of explaining ...).> > >_Hou_ stands for the sum of what the Buddha taught, his teaching >as a method by which one may come to sever the bonds of >suffering existence (here there is an echo of the original >Chinese sense, since ``laws'' or sanctions were measures which >necessarily followed upon or were appropriate to given >transgressions, and which led to a rectification of disturbances >to the harmonious conduct of the affairs of the country; and an >echo also of the use of _hou_ to indicate ritual and other >techniques which are conducive to the attainment of >enlightenment). Path is also understood as a direct expression >of the truth experienced, practised and taught by the Buddha. Are you saying then that you would not consider the use of "Law" as some kind of "equivalent" for Dharma/hou/nori IN A JAPANESE CONTEXT entirely unreasonable, however you might personally prefer some other alternative? >I would make a point of the use of ``towards'', since the >relationship between _hou_ and _mon_ (nori--kado) is not >specified in the compound or by the particle _no_, which has a >far wider connotation than the English ``of''. I think it is >essential to bring in some idea of movement, change brought >about through active involvement of the individual, since this >is necessarily implied in the expression. [Hence, presumably, >"I would have plumped for ``Gateway to the Dharma'' (only half >cheating) or ``Gateway to the Path'']. Thus I would express >reservations about Bob Morrell's secret favourite (I'll stand >you a beer, instead, OK?), ``Gate of Law''. I am having such a time with little old hoo/nado that I hesitate to start a brouhaha over particles -- but anyhow... Yes, _no_ `has a far wider connotation than the English "of."' You propose "towards." But might not an equally acceptable reading be (according to my koten dictionary) "dookaku no i wo arawasu, ...to iu, ...de aru no i." As in "Chichi no Dainagon wa nakunarite." (Genji: Kiritsubo) That is, "(Her) father, the Middle Counselor..." Apposition. Nakamura's Bukkyoogo daijiten (1237) under _hoomon_ entry: "Shinri no oshie, kyoosetsu. Hotoke no oshie. Shinri e itaru kado/mon. Kaigo shita taidoo (satori) ni itaru mon/kado." To me this seems to support an appositional use: The Buddha's Teaching IS the Gate which brings us to the Truth." So I still prefer "Gate of the Law," i.e., "the Gate which is the Buddha's Law [through which we arrive at the Truth (shinri)." But please to not let go of your reservations, because I don't want to miss out on that beer. At the AAS on Boston? Bob ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University Compuserve: 71640,1036 St. Louis, MO 63130-2030 (314) 862-5418 (voice) ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 09:12:01 EST From: John McRae Subject: About kle'sa ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In support of Lance's comment below, I would like to point out that the standard translation for kle'sa in Chinese is fan-nao (bonnoo in Japanese pronunciation, I believe), using characters that clearly mean "affliction." -- John McRae, Asian Studies Cornell University jrm5@cornell.edu, 607/255-1328 ------------------------------Original message---------------------------- John Dunne writes: > In any case, any attempt to translate the metaphorical image of *kle'sa* > as a kind of noisome goo that sticks to your mind seems pointless, since > the metaphor gained its meaning withing a particular Indian context (cf. > Jaina notions of karma and kle'sa). I have some doubts about the (widely accepted) interpretation of kilesa in terms of staining and making dirty. This is clearly widely used both in tradition and in scholarship. It seems more likely that we should think of the root meaning as being something that disturbs or afflicts the mind i.e. prevents mental peace. Of course the two can be fairly close cf. the common metaphor of the pool which is disturbed and therefore becomes muddy and loses its clarity. I therefore doubt a Jain origin for this concept. If at all, this is perhaps a later influence on the usage. The case is of course different for aasava which does seem more plausibly Jain or proto-Jain in origin. Lance Cousins. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 10:45:03 EST From: John McRae Subject: On the Asian Religions Discussion List ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Some time ago Jamie Hubbard asked me to send buddha-l a preliminary report on the e-mail discussion list I have established for introductory courses in Asian religions, which is called the Asian Religions Discussion List, or asrel-l. I think I have a few moments free now, and we've had enough activity on the list that I think it can be described meaningfully, so here goes. While I'm at it, I'm going to send this to the religion list and to asrel-fac-l (mentioned below) as well. Sorry about any duplication! After receiving useful comments from Richard Hayes and Jim Cocks, the two devaraajas of buddha-hell, Tim Bryson of the Religion list, and others, and after exploring what options were open to me through listserv@cornell.edu (which does not seem to have all the commands available to buddha-l or religion subscribers) I decided to set the list up as "closed" and "unedited." This means that automatic subscription is NOT possible; supplicants have to send me an e-mail request, to which I reply with a short information file and questionnaire form. Only after receiving the questionnaire form via return e-mail do I subscribe the individual to the list. However, unlike the hard-working list owners of buddha-l, I do not review or edit messages in any way. The reason I selected the closed subscription option was in order to maintain the character of asrel-l as a teaching medium. Participation is limited to faculty and students currently involved in introductory courses on Asian religions, as well as authors of books used in those courses. I have allowed a few others to "lurk" on the list, if they are thinking about using the list in the near future in their own classes. However, I have also had requests for subscription and attempts at automatic subscription from internet surfers who found out about the list one way or another, and I've refused them. I also had one request from someone in South Africa taking correspondence courses on Buddhism, and I asked that he get his instructor involved. In retrospect, I should have allowed such individuals on the list. (Are you out there? I didn't save your name and e-mail address... Please get back to me!) Using this procedure for subscriptions is time-consuming, but it requires that each new subscriber read a few list policies before becoming involved. There's a copyright statement, an etiquette statement, and a closing signature format that everyone is asked to use. (Everyone is asked to close each and every message with their name, e-mail address, and school/course affiliation. I nag them when they forget.) When I run the subscription command, they receive a "welcome" file automatically and a longer "introduction" file that I send myself. I undertake the supervision of this e-mail list as one of the fundamental tools we should be teaching in intro courses, not as basic as writing essays, but still important. The various instructions and the experience of using the list itself are intended to have them learn good e-mail practices. I won't talk about how much time it takes me to deal with all the e-mail subscription requests and address problems, nor with the time I (gladly) have to spend helping students with using e-mail. In order to make the list more interesting, I sent out announcements asking that other faculty teaching intro courses on Asian religions take part. In the future I may decide to limit asrel-l to pan-Asian religions survey courses, but I had several requests to participate from faculty teaching courses in individual traditions, e.g., "Introduction to Japanese Religions." Given differences in semester schedules and course syllabi, we're not all talking about the same topic at exactly the same time anyway... I have decided not to allow participation by anything but religion classes though, so I've rejected requests for participation from teachers of "classics of Asian civ" and "Chinese philosophy" classes. A fine line, perhaps, but it has to be drawn somewhere. For my own class, which is an introductory survey of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese religions, students have the option of participating in the list instead of taking a conventional discussion section. I don't like to teach discussion sections myself, in part because the range of flexibility for any section is unpredictable and narrow. I would never claim that e-mail discussion sections are for everyone, but having both options available expands the range of flexibility enormously. The e-mail section is appropriate for students with scheduling problems and for those who may find it difficult to speak up in front of other people. I believe that having both options is a win-win situation, since having fewer students in the conventional sections results in better discussions. (I don't have the final numbers, but I believe our five sections are running at about 10, 10, 15, 15, and 20 students.) Participation in the list has been very good, although I've occasionally had misgivings about some of the different threads of discussion. (More on this just below.) For all the other classes, participation in asrel-l is a voluntary addition to the course. At the moment, there are 121 subscribers to the list, including faculty and students from Kenyon (Joe Adler), Calgary (Tony Barber and Patricia Dold), Indiana (David Haberman), and Washington University of St. Louis (Beata Grant). David Carpenter and some of his students at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia have tried to participate, but somehow our listserv doesn't like their e-mail addresses, for reasons that are totally inexplicable. In addition, Theodore Ludwig and John Fenton, author and co-author of two textbooks used in some of our courses, are subscribers. I would very much like to encourage more participation from authors. In addition to asrel-l, I have also set up a list for the faculty involved, asrel-fac-l. It's been pretty quiet, but it's there if we need it. And as we build up a set of list archives (including syllabi and various other teaching materials) this should become more and more useful. I'm sending this message to asrel-fac-l but not to asrel-l, for example. Note that I plan on unsubscribing all students at the end of the semester, so that each semester the list would start with a new membership. Although I only teach my own course once a year, my colleague Jane Marie Law is adding a different introductory course on women's experience in Asian religions. Thus for our own purposes here and on behalf of colleagues elsewhere I will keep the list going throughout the academic year. (But not, at this point, during the summer.) OK, with all that as preliminary discussion, how's it been going? Very, very well, I believe. The welcome file sent to each new subscriber includes an "initial question," which asks them to say why they're interested in the subject. (They're not allowed to mention distribution requirements, only personal and intellectual factors that motivate their interest in the subject matter.) The answers have been fascinating, and they've revealed what a heterogeneous group of students we have. (At least a third of my students have Asian surnames, and I know of some with Asian mothers as well.) Many students are looking for their religious roots, many are exploring religions in general, and a few are checking out the opposition. One student pointed out she was going to be doing Christian missionary work, and that started a whole discussion of missionaries in general. There were some very negative comments about missionaries, and this developed into our first mini-flame war. It was interesting to see how many messages were from students trying to douse any flames before they started, to de-personalize the issue. However, they kept submitting messages on the issue, which obviously touched a lot of them. Several of us faculty types tried to introduce background reading suggestions, brief case examples, and so forth, and I tried like hell to avoid showing a bias myself. (As you might guess, I have my own feelings about missionaries, past and present!) We seem to be past that thread, but the student who started it all asked me to unsubscribe her from the list. I told her to think it over and confirm her decision via e-mail, and she's still on the list. (She apparently doesn't remember that she can unsubscribe automatically herself, and I'm not going to tell her!) The caste system and moksha have received a lot of attention, and now we're starting to talk about Buddhism. You'd be interested to note that one student characterized what he'd heard about Buddhism as "life sucks." A Thai-American student quickly countered that, but it gave me some great material for my lecture on the Four Noble Truths the next day! (I tend to argue that it's really the third and fourth Noble Truths, and perhaps the second, that are Buddhism, not the First.) In summation, I would say that this first few weeks of asrel-l have been extremely successful. Student participation is enthusiastic, if not always as well-read as I might like. But, Jumpin' Bodhisattvas, Batman! -- we could say the same about buddha-hell, couldn't we? -- John McRae, Asian Studies Cornell University jrm5@cornell.edu, 607/255-1328 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 10:45:23 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: TRANSLATING ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Fri, 11 Feb 1994 john.bullitt@metta.ci.net wrote: > > Perhaps "mental torments" conveys the idea more compactly? The term "mental afflictions" has been used, and seems to reflect the meanings discussed in L. S. Cousin's recent post. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 13:18:27 EST From: Anna Yamada Subject: Re: On the Asian Religions Discussion List ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- So can you at least archive the goop for us non-affiliated non-entities so we can learn vicariously? oh, pretty please. ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 10 Feb 1994 to 11 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Mon Feb 14 16:07:23 1994 Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 16:00:24 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 11 Feb 1994 to 14 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 14 messages totalling 523 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. kilesa/klesha (3) 2. TRANSLATING 3. Teaching Introduction to Asian Religions? 4. Third Precept 5. Update on the fetters (2) 6. Sanskrit Buddhist texts composed in Nepal 7. BUDDHA-L Digest - 10 Feb 1994 to 11 Feb 1994 8. A sentencing in Phoenix 9. Ema and Buddhism 10. further to glossing 'dharma' (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:21:21 EST From: DanLusthaus Subject: Re: kilesa/klesha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Like John, I agree with Lance Cousin's understanding of kle'sa, and have been translating it as "mental disturbance" for some time. That seems to work in English, offering useful connotations (ordinary English usage; the wind/wave metaphor in the Awakening of Faith; the abhidharmic lists of kle'sa and upakle'sa as primary and secondary 'disturbances'; etc.). As John mentioned, it follows the Chinese, fan-nao, ("agitating irritation") pretty closely. On the other hand, aasrava (contamination) and kle'sa do get linked up (often treated as synonyms), and the other chinese term for kle'sa is indeed jan, which Mathews (#3071) defines as: "to dye; to infect; to catch a disease. To apply colour in painting". The "dying" image also gets linked to vaasanaa, the "perfuming," (the Chinese version is a tobacco-addict's nightmare, meaning literally "smoke habit"). Dan Lusthaus Bates College dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:21:45 EST From: Robert Kelly Subject: Re: TRANSLATING ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Not "mental torments," I think; surely the 'defilements' (in that sense of klesa) are seldom perceived as torments by the consciousness in which they manifest and which they in some sense control. Prime klesa manifestations like lust are seldom perceived in and of themselves as torments. So Dunne's periphrasis, though as he says verbose, is on the mark, since it stresses the result factor in the economy of the klesas. From another point of view, I would excuse "mental" and "emotional" from service in translating klesa, since both words convey or connote a degree of conscious awareness not by any means necessarily presnet in the manifestation of the klesas. Which is one reason for the vast structures of insight meditations and the like. RK ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:24:31 EST From: John McRae Subject: Re: Teaching Introduction to Asian Religions? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- >John, > > Good luck on the course, and I would appreciate it if you could give me/ >the list some feedback on how it goes. I have experimented several times >with different forms of computer conferencing in the classroom, with >varying degrees of success. Once I even wrote a role simulation program for >... >... >... >In any case, let us know how it works. > >Jamie Hubbard, Smith College ================= Jamie: I hate you! I hate you! Well, not really... But the message I sent to buddha-l and religion today, in response to your inquiry, has had me deluged with inquiries and mail addressing problems. AAARRRGGGHH! Actually, now I've set up some boilerplate files to send to interested faculty, and I'm going to offload some of the signup chores to them. Just a lot of work to keep up with it all. BTW, I wanted to ask about DIWE: How expensive is it? I tried to get the Writing Program here interested a while back, but it turns out (I found out yesterday) that one of the reasons they might not have been so excited was that some of them wrote their own similar product and marketed it! (Don't know what it's called...) And, does the writing discovery thing really work? It doesn't make all the papers the same, somehow, and keep the students from finding their own voices? Final question: Could you send me and Jan information about the newsletter: 1. How long you've been doing it, how many we send out, and how much it costs. 2. The name of the fund supporting you at Smith in this. 3. A description of what we've gotta do to take it over. I know this one is difficult, but it would be a lot more certain to get it in written form rather than dealing with this over the phone. But I'm OK with the latter, if you want... Hope all's well. (And I take back what I said above about hating you.) -- John ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:28:05 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Third Precept ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Jan Nattier's response to L.S. Cousins about the import of references to Queens, wives, and families in Pali literature seems right, and yet it makes me a little uncomfortable.She concludes by saying: ".in the late 20th century might wish things had been otherwise, I think we have to take seriously the fact that early Buddhism was very close to what Leonard Zwilling has called the "sex-negative" end of the scale." Now, this may be a correct reading of the Pali canon, but the same sort of stories are definitely interpreted differently by the Tibetans. How would a Tibetan read these stories of Kings and their families? With a non-world=denyin g approval of the family and clan structures, I would guess. And the treasures of a Cakravartin are taken as the due accompaniment of a person whose karma places him nearer the status of an arhat or Buddha than an ordinary man. In itself it is not a good argument to say that we should read jataka tales and avadanas the way Tantric Tibetans would. But aren't there Buddhist Chronicles of conquering Kings who are important and admired in themselves and whose wars construct the national consciousness and identity. Singhalese chronicles. How would readers of the Mahavamsa who welcome its political engagements receive and interpret these jataka tales? RObin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:35:42 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Update on the fetters ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Is Nagaruna the first deconstructionist? No. Why? Three reasons: 1) Derrida's critique does not destroy entitativeness except metaphorically. What he is really arguing against is the conventional designation "...is a text" or "... is an author." Or "x book was writtenby why author." But he is not really doing any ontological critiism at all. 2) Nagarguna's critique from the point of view of emptiness brings a specific realization which transcnds the world. Derrida belives, I think, that such is not particularly possible. So Derrida may assert emptiness of some kind, but he never thinks there is an emptiness to experience. 3) Nagarjuna's criticism of logocentrism does not lead to compassion or anything remotedly ressembling that. I dont' think they've got the same point. Robin ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:38:32 EST From: "K. G. Zysk" Subject: Re: Sanskrit Buddhist texts composed in Nepal ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Joel Tatelman Your comments on Buddhist texts composed in Nepal are suggestive. I am working with a Kamasastra treatise, composed in Nepal, that contains obvious Buddhist references. I should like to share with you what I notice and learn what you have noticed about these texts composed in Nepal. My email (internet) is ZYSK@ACFCluster.NYU.EDU. Look forward to hearing from you. K.Zysk ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:51:23 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Re: BUDDHA-L Digest - 10 Feb 1994 to 11 Feb 1994 ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Recently, I wrote: > > > In any case, any attempt to translate the metaphorical image of *kle'sa* > > as a kind of noisome goo that sticks to your mind seems pointless, since > > the metaphor gained its meaning withing a particular Indian context (cf. > > Jaina notions of karma and kle'sa). > Lance Cousins responded: > I have some doubts about the (widely accepted) interpretation of kilesa > in terms of staining and making dirty. This is clearly widely used > both in tradition and in scholarship. It seems more likely that we > should think of the root meaning as being something that disturbs or > afflicts the mind i.e. prevents mental peace. Of course the two can be > fairly close cf. the common metaphor of the pool which is disturbed > and therefore becomes muddy and loses its clarity. > > I therefore doubt a Jain origin for this concept. If at all, this is > perhaps a later influence on the usage. The case is of course different > for aasava which does seem more plausibly Jain or proto-Jain in origin. I was not presuming to discuss the meaning of the root (_dhaatu_) _kli.s. _Nirukti_ has always seemed a rather dubious enterprise to me. Instead, I wished merely to point out that one of the primary metaphors for _kle'sa_ is that of accretion. Such a metaphor seems to have been widely used by philosophers of the Buddha's time. Much upani.sadic speculation presumes this metaphor, as do the sa.mkhyaa and Jaina systems. In most systems of that time, one used some method (often a "binding" of the senses through withdrawl into some meditative state) to remove the accretions and thereby know and/or liberate the self. This image of removing accretions seems to also be used in Buddhism, with the exception that (according to some) nothing remains after accretions are removed. The use of the verb _aav.r_ (to cover, obscure) indicates this rather clearly -- kle'sai aavriiyate; kle'saavara.na. In any case, such a metaphor is common within the tradition, as you pointed out. Other interpretations or etymologies may be possible, but understanding the tradition must begin by understanding its own interpretations -- don't you think? By the way, as I recall, "cf." is an abbreviation for _confer_, imperative of Latin _conferre_ (to compare). In suggesting that one compare this metaphorical usage with Jaina terms, I did not at all mean to suggest that the term originates in Jainism. To discover the origin of a term whose usage dates back more than 2500 years would seem well nigh impossible to me. Induction, after all, has its limitations. John Macrae noted: > > In support of Lance's comment, I would like to point out that the > standard translation for kle'sa in Chinese is fan-nao (bonnoo in Japanese > pronunciation, I believe), using characters that clearly mean > "affliction." I am not sure I would take Chinese translations as necessarily indicative of the most common glosses used in India. Nevertheless, this translation does raise another common metaphor: illness. The kle'sas are a disease that make the patient (beings) suffer (with the sufferings of sa.msaara). The doctor (Buddha) gives us medicine (the dharma) which we must take (through bhaavanaa) so as to eliminate (nirudhyate, nirodha) the the disease. The Tibetan _nyon mongs_ is curiously vague; _mongs_ may be related to _rmongs_ (to render dumb, stupefy), but what about _nyon_? Any Dunhuang readers out there with suggestions? In any case, mental torment seems perfectly adequate as a translation. It does have the advantage of resonating with the use of he root _kli's_ in other contexts in classical Sanskrit. No comments on my suggestion that _dharmas_ have no _dharmin_ in some schools of Buddhist thought (e.g. sarvaastivaada)? John Dunne Study of Religion, Harvard University ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:51:42 EST From: John McRae Subject: A sentencing in Phoenix ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The following was in our local newspaper today (2/12/94): PHOENIX (AP): A teenager was sentenced Friday to spend the rest of his life in prison for the murders of six monks and three other people at a Buddhist temple. A judge spared Jonathan Doody the death penalty, saying he couldn't determine without a doubt whether Doody was the triggerman in the 1991 slayings. Doody, 19, was convicted July 12 of murder, armed robbery and other charges. He was sentenced to nine life terms and must serve at least 25 years on each one. Superior Court Judge Gregory Martin ordered the life terms to be served consecutively with sentences for the other charges for a total of at least 281 years in prison. No comment necessary. -- John McRae, Asian Studies Cornell University jrm5@cornell.edu, 607/255-1328 ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:52:22 EST From: Jane Marie Law Subject: Ema and Buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- A message to anyone out there: I am interested in finding some sources in Japanese, French, German, or English on Buddhist uses of ema (shrine placards, written with the characters "horse pictures") in appeasement rites. Does anybody out there know anything about this subject? Many thanks, Jane Marie Law Assistant Professor of Japanese Religions Department of Asian Studies 388 Rockefeller Hall Cornell University Ithaca, New York 14853-2502 e-mail address: jml16@cornell.edu Phone: 607-255-5095 (main office) 607-255-7777 (private office) ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 09:52:57 EST From: James Sanford Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- RE Bob on nori no kado. Next you'll be asking if kado is the same as mon. I will admit that nori no kado seems an odd xlation of nori no kado. But on the other hand if we extend that procedure maybe we can all get tenure and promotion on the basis of xeroxes of primary sources. Or, better yet, is there some awardable way to deconstruct a xerox? Jim Sanford ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 10:30:08 EST From: "Randall R. Scott" Subject: Re: kilesa/klesha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dan, Just the other day I saw a translation of "klesha" as "emotionality," which rather surprised me. I do not have the reference in front of me but I remember the translation being made by an eminent figure. Any comment? Emotivity is a central theme for me, so I am curious about any correlation between what is sometimes translated as "defilement," on the one hand, and "emotionality," on the other. Many thanks for your time. Randy Scott Washington University in St. Louis. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 13:28:44 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: further to glossing 'dharma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Mon, 14 Feb 1994, James Sanford wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > RE Bob on nori no kado. Next you'll be asking if kado is the same as mon. > I will admit that nori no kado seems an odd xlation of nori no kado. But > on the other hand if we extend that procedure maybe we can all get tenure > and promotion on the basis of xeroxes of primary sources. Or, better yet, > is there some awardable way to deconstruct a xerox? > Jim Sanford ------------------------------- Jim --- By the way -- is kado the same as mon? No, no. I take it all back. . . Still, I found the entire dharma/hoo/nori fracas quite instructive -- as much from what I did not learn, as from the little that I did. In the end, I find no convincing reason to change the error of my ways. ("Myself when did eagerly frequent..."). I think I'll just stick with "Gate of the Law". Bob ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 15:35:11 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: Update on the fetters ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- >1) Derrida's critique does not destroy entitativeness except metaphorically. >What he is really arguing against is the conventional designation "...is a >text" or "... is an author." Or "x book was writtenby why author." >But he is not really doing any ontological critiism at all. What is your source, Robin, for this sweeping generalization? Derrida would be quite surprised to learn that he doesn't engage in ontological criticism. If there is a key difference between Buddhist philosophy (not just Nagarjuna) and twentieth century western philosophy (not just postmodern or continental), it is that the Buddhists took causality seriously, whereas since Hume, western philosophers have been uneasy with it. Nagarjuna's critique of causality, by the way, problematizes the isolation and independence of the supposed referents to conventional terms such as samsk.rta, hetu, pratyaya and phala in much the same manner that Derrida problematizes our own conventional terms. Contrary to Richard's assertions, Derrida is rigorous and careful in his arguments (though frequently parrotted by sloppy rhetorical mimics), and even occasionally uses the tetralemma to good effect (binary logic is binary logic - with its either/or assertiveness- after all). >2) Nagarguna's critique from the point of view of emptiness brings a >specific realization which transcnds the world. Is that why not even an iota of distinction can be differentiated between samsaara and nirvana? An antidote to the "transcendist" claim might be: Read Madhyamakakaarikaa 25.9 to yourself ten times out loud (or treat it like a zen koan). > Derrida may assert emptiness >of some kind, but he never thinks there is an emptiness to experience. Neither does Nagarjuna. Emptiness must be emptied. Those who cling to such a misconceived emptiness are incurable - it's like grabbing a snake the wrong way (Nagarjuna says all that). >3) Nagarjuna's criticism of logocentrism does not lead to compassion or >anything remotedly ressembling that. I suppose you meant Derrida, not Nagarjuna, there. If so, then why have Derrida's efforts over the last 10+ years been aimed primarily at revitalizing ethics - not just theoretically but practically and institutionally? Nagarjuna and Derrida share something else: Their detractors have attempted to dismiss both of them by systematically misunderstanding what they say and consistently attributing positions to them that they have rejected (nihilism, relativism, etc.). ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 15:41:40 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: kilesa/klesha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > translation of "klesha" as "emotionality," >which rather surprised me.... I am curious about any >correlation between what is sometimes translated as "defilement," on the >one hand, and "emotionality," on the other. >Randy Scott I'm not sure off hand which eminent authority offered emotionality for kle'sa, but there is some VERY QULAIFIED justification based on the typical abhidharmic lists of kle'sas. E.g., in the 75 dharma scheme of the Abhidharmako'sa, there are 6 kle'sa-mahaabhuumikas: 1. misconception (moha), 2. carelessness (pramaada), 3. laziness, 4. mental fogginess, 5. lack of trust, 6. restlessness. And there are 10 minor kle'sas (paritta-kle'sa-mahaabhuumika): 1. anger (krodha), 2. resisting recognizing one's own faults (mrak.sa), 3. selfishness, 4. envy, 5. [verbal] maliciousness, 6. harmfulness, 7. enmity, 8. deceit, 9. guile, 10. conceit. Vasubandhu's _100 Dharmas_ gives a different list. 6 Kle'sa: 1. appropriational intent (raaga), 2. aversion/hatred (pratigha), 3. stupidity (muu.dhi), 4. arrogance (maana), 5. doubt, 6. [wrong] views (d.r.s.ti). and 20 sub-kle'sas (upakle'sa): anger, enmity, resist recognizing one's own faults, [verbal] maliciousness, envy, selfishness, deceit, guile, harmfulness, conceit, shamelessness, non-embarrassment, restlessness, mental fogginess, lack of trust, carelessness, forgetfulness, distraction, lack of [self-] awareness (asa.mprajanya). These certainly involve emotional components, but: 1. They are not exhaustive of emotional components (e.g., in the 100 dharma list of ku'sala [beneficial] dharmas, one finds trust, shame, embarrassment, lack of greed, etc.; in the list of specific dharmas [viniyata-dharma, i.e., those which only occur in specific, as opposed to all citta-caitta relations] one finds desire (chanda), confident resolve (adhimok.sa), memory/mindfulness (sm.rti), etc. In the list of general dharmas (those concurrent with any mental act), one finds sense-contact, pain-pleasure-neutral hedonic tone (vedanaa), volition (cetanaa), cognitive-associations (samj~naa), and attention (manaskaara). The ku'sala dharmas, while clearly also "emotional", are the antipodes to kle'sa, so kle'sa is not the exclusive domain of emotionality, nor its singular cause. 2. Much of the medieval literature distinguishes between two basic aavara.nas (obstructions) that need to be overcome: kle'saavara.na and j~neyaavara.na. The latter is invariably considered the more fundamental. These could be rendered affective obstruction and cognitive obstruction, respectively. I think the import of the distinction is not to make thinking and emotions independent spheres, each with its own generative origins, but rather to indicate that emotions are derivative of cognitive/intellective attachments and orientations. That's why, for instance, if you want to see someone go livid and demonstrate a broad palatte of emotions, say something challenging about their religious or political assumptions. Challenging the propositions they adhere to will generate the emotional fallout. Or flattery will make them purr like kittens. Incidentally, that is why, I think, Naagaarjuna concentrated his efforts on d.r.s.ti - the underlying generator of our problems lies in our attachments to unquestioned or fixated assumptions. ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 11 Feb 1994 to 14 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Feb 16 16:08:40 1994 Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 16:00:20 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 15 Feb 1994 to 16 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 5 messages totalling 335 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Naagaarjuna the Dualist: philosophiae doctor inscitus 2. BodhiNet 1/2 3. BodhiNet 2/2 4. Sri Lankan Texts 5. Mandalas ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 15 Feb 1994 17:02:09 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Naagaarjuna the Dualist: philosophiae doctor inscitus On 10 February, Dylan Tweney ably stuck his neck out in defense of Derrida by saying: Although Prof. Hayes clearly and thoroughly points out the many and seemingly insurmountable differences between Derrida and Naagaarjuna, it does seem that he has missed one point of contact, which may be the very point that people are thinking of when they make the comparison. That is, both thinkers seem preoccupied with *dualism*, and direct a large part of their efforts towards undermining it, or at least tilting against it. Yesterday, Dan Lusthaus sent this nice little Valentine: Nagarjuna and Derrida share something else: Their detractors have attempted to dismiss both of them by systematically misunderstanding what they say and consistently attributing positions to them that they have rejected (nihilism, relativism, etc.). As I have both asserted and demonstrated repeatedly, I know nothing at all about Derrida, and it has never been my intention to dismiss him in particular. Rather, I have simply tried to say that the twentieth century has been one of the most aesthetically banausic, musically cacophonous, artistically offensive, morally bankrupt, philosophically benighted, intellectually vacuous and religiously barren centuries in the history of recorded human thought, and therefore one is likely to miss the point if one seeks more than superficial similarities between great Buddhist thinkers of the classical period and the philosophical dwarfs who ply their pathetic wares in this most dreary of centuries. Surely that is a modest enough claim that I need waste no one's time demonstrating its obvious truth. So let me linger no more in the mortal present but retire at once into the deathless past. Let me speak of what Tweney says of Naagaarjuna, and lest Lusthaus house me among Naagaarjuna's detractors, let me say that what I am trying to do for Naagaarjuna is what William of Ockham was trying to do for Aristotle when he wrote at the outset of his Prologus in Expositionem super viii libros Physicorum: None but the envious should object to my desire to communicate ungrudgingly what I regard as probable opinions on this work of the great philosopher. For my aim is investigation pure and simple, and not obstinate quarrelsomeness nor ill will....And just as at times, in all modesty and without malice, I shall disprove the opinions of others, so I am patiently ready to be corrected should I ever go against truth. But let him who corrects me beware lest habitual adherence to bad principles, or bias, or hatred should make him sometimes pervert, instead of correct me. In William of Ockham, _Philosophical Writings_ Translated by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990, p. 2 This being a century that hates lengthy preambles, let me get immediately and directly to Professor Tweney's point. At the outset, I must confess that I am not sure what it means to be preoccupied with dualism. Dualism, as I understand the term, refers to any philosophical position that holds that there are exactly two categories into which all things fall and that nothing falls into both. The dualist typically holds that an adequate account can be given only by referring to both of these mutually exclusive yet interacting categories. An example of a kind of dualism that nearly every Buddhist held to was that between material and mental. In contrast, the classical Indian materialists (in some ages the most bitter rivals of the Buddhists) were non-dualists; their claim was that all so-called mental events were in truth physical events erroneously described. Opponents of dualism are usually called either monists or pluralists. In many a passage of MMK, Naagaarjuna makes it quite plain that he is neither a monist nor a pluralist, for he says that reality is neither single nor multiple. If one recalls that in Sanskrit, there are three grammatical numbers (singular, dual and plural), it appears that Naagaarjuna has explicitly rejected both monism and pluralism. Since the only possibility remaining is dualism, I suppose we must conclude that he was therefore a dualist of sorts. Now the problem that remains is: what sort of dualist was Naagaarjuna? In reply, I would argue that he was an ontological dualist. This is a person who holds the view that of every property it can be said either that it is present or that it is absent in any given subject, but not both at the same time in the same respect; and of any subject, it can be either existent or non-existent at any given time at any given place, but not both. So strong was Naagaarjuna's commitment to this principal that he constructed nearly every argument in every chapter towards the end of showing that IF a given subject were supposed to be real, then it would follow that the subject would be one in which a given property is simultaneously both present and absent. Since this can never be the case, the initial supposition must be false. Therefore, the only possible conclusion is that the given subject is not real. Naagaarjuna's arguments and assumptions were precisely the standard metaphysical claims of the classical age. He applied perfectly standard logic to perfectly standard metaphysical categories. Despite this promising start, he managed to arrive at many a wrong conclusion. Why? Because of equivocation. He used key terms in significantly different senses in different steps of an argument and thereby made ill use of the logical tools he was trying to use. This is something we have all seen many times. I suspect that when Naagaarjuna wrote MMK, he was what we would now call an undergraduate. History has not recorded what grade his professor gave the MMK. I would be very surprised if it was much higher than a C+. One thing is most abundantly clear: Naagaarjuna was most certainly not attempting to establish the ineffable unity underlying the manifold of phenomena. Nor was he anticipating the Kantian antinomies. Nor was he deconstructively teasing out the inherent polysemy of all categoramatic and syncategoramatic terms. Nor was he being mystical, transcendental or even very profound. He just plain goofed. Well, that is my plain understanding of the matter. Some may disagree. If so, let them present the textual evidence that establishes their interpretation as better than mine. By all means, follow Professor Lusthaus's sage advice: repeat MMK 25.9 to yourself ten times like a koan. But be sure you also repeat the other 500 verses of the MMK ten times also, or you'll get the wrong message from MMK 25.9. And please, let's leave Mr Derrida to the oblivion that he so richly deserves as a representative of the intellectual miasma of the second half of the present century. Yours in philosophical humility, Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Associate Professor Associate Member Faculty of Religious Studies Dept of Philosophy McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 09:41:41 EST From: GARY RAY Subject: BodhiNet 1/2 ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- B o d h i N e t (TM) - Buddhist Echomail Network ACCESS: Through BBS systems - soon to be ported as listservs. For a BBS with BodhiNet near you write to: bodhinet.nodes@tigerteam.org What is BodhiNet ================ BodhiNet was created for the purpose of exposing as many people as possible to Buddhist teachings utilizing a democratic framework. It is the hope that this democratic framework will enhance participation, while creating an online "Cybersangha" that allows for an individual understanding of Buddhism. At the same time, BodhiNet strives to maintain high quality and accuracy that will be a valuable and reliable source of Buddhist information. 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BN_BASIC Basic Buddhist Teachings - Where beginner and intermediate students can question, discuss and clarify understanding of Buddhist teachings. BN_BPF Buddhist Peace Fellowship - Information and Events Hosted by BPF National Coordinator, Alan Senauke. BN_BOOKS Buddhist Books - The latest in Buddhist practice and academic books. Great place to find bilbiographies. Studies graduate student Gary Ray. BN_EVENT Sangha Events - Events and Practice Centers. National and Internation Events that effect the Buddhist community -- retreats, conferences, projects and any other relevant information. BN_KARMA Karma Klub - For sale and detailed information regarding practice related items, books and paraphenelia. BN_ZEN Soto & Rinzai Zen - Comprehensive discussions of Zen Buddhism. Where Zen Buddhist practice and Zen academic studies can learn from each other. Host: Gary Ray - Zen Buddhist lay monk and Buddhist Studies MA Student. BUDD_ACAD Academic Buddhism - For discussion of buddhism in an scholarly framework. Host: Gary Ray, Buddhist Studies MA Student 72:1000/658 (Continued to next message) * QMPro 1.50 42-0864 * "The mind is the root from which all things grow." ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 09:41:57 EST From: GARY RAY Subject: BodhiNet 2/2 ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- (Continued from previous message) BDSTWOMEN Women & Buddhism - The role of women in Buddhism. Focused on how women, who have been marginalized in the past, can play an active role in the Buddhist community. Moderator: Kate Harper BN_DAILY Buddhism and Daily Life - How we live our lives. Very few of us live in a monastery or similar environment, how do we bring our spirituality to our every day lives? Moderator: Michael Jacob AMSTY_INT News and postings of Amnesty International - Amnesty International is an organization devoted to bringing those unjustly held, freedom. Moderator: Jennifer Pennington BN_TIBET Tibetan Bon - The indigenous religion of Tibet is intimately linked with Tibetan Buddhism. Any understanding of Tibetan Buddhist practice requires a firm grounding in Bon philosophy and practice. Likewise, a true Bon understanding lies in Buddhist doctrine. Hosted by John Bidleman BN_BON Tibetan Buddhism - Theory and practice of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture. Hosted by John Bidleman * QMPro 1.50 42-0864 * "The mind is the root from which all things grow." ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 09:48:27 EST From: Mahinda Deegalle Subject: Sri Lankan Texts ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear Colleague: I am looking for the following three texts; so far I have not been able to trace them in any US library. I will be very thankful if anyone can help me. 1. De Zoysa, Louis. A Catalogue of Pali, Sinhalese, and Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Temple Libraries of Ceylon, Colombo, 1885. 2. De Zoysa, Louis. Reports on the Inspection of Temple Libraries [of Sanskrit, Pali, and Sinhalese MSS] 2pts. Colombo, 1875; 1879. 3. De Zoysa, Louis. Catalogue of Pali, Sinhalese, and Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Ceylon Government Oriental Library, 1876. Thanks a lot! Mahinda Deegalle University of Chicago ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 09:49:18 EST From: ahale@vax.ox.ac.uk Subject: Mandalas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- An interesting comparison between the use of Mandalas in Tibetan Buddhism and the occurrance of mandala structures in Medieval Christian spirituality is provided by the following article: Zinn, Grover A., Jr. Mandala Symbolism and Use in the Mysticism of Hugh of St. Victor. History of Religions, XII (1972-73), p. 317-341 Adrian Hale Wolfson College Oxford ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 15 Feb 1994 to 16 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 16 Feb 1994 to 17 Feb 1994 Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 16:00:24 -0500 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests Topics of the day: 1. Naagaarjuna the Dualist: philosophiae doctor inscitus ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 08:40:02 EST From: Derek Heyman Subject: Re: Naagaarjuna the Dualist: philosophiae doctor inscitus ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I have 4 points to make concerning Richard's comments on Nagarjuna. 1. The argument from the Sanskrit language is invalid as a proof that Nagarjuna is a dualist, becauseNagarjuna does not say that these three linguistic categories are the only ontological categories. That reality is neither single nor multiple does not imply that it is dual. It is plausible to assume that, despite the Sanskrit language, Nagarjuna considered two to be a multiple number. To go from such a feature of language to claims bout reality would be odd. Would it mean, we should never say, I went to the beach, or we went to the beach, but only, both of us went to the beach? 2. Richard calls N. an "ontological dualist" meaning that subjects and their properties are or are not existent. Yet he then explains that N. uses arguments based on these principles to show that "the given subject is not real." But if the subject is not real, then these can not be ontological dualisms, as they apply to nothing in reality, and ontology should surely concern reality. Principles of logical reasoning, on the other hand,need not concern anything in reality. Thus we should say that these principles, which Nagarjuna has used in his arguments, are logical principles, not ontological ones. 3. It is my understanding that Nagarjuna is considered an ontological non-dualist because he has rejected independent existence such that two beings, such as subject and object, could stand over against each other. In their place, there is relational origination, meaning that everything arises through a matrix of interdependence, including that most important of dualities, subject and object, or grasper and grasped. Further, at MMK XXIV.18, he identifies that which originates interdependently with emptiness, showing that not only must independent being (svabhaava) be rejected, but relational being is no different from emptiness. This is clearly an ontological statement meaning that there is not even a dualism between being and non-being. What originates co-dependently, that is emptiness. There is only one type of being for N.: relational origination = emptiness. This is his ontology. 4. Why do I think Okham would have used his razor to slice off the crack about MMK getting a C+? Maybe because MMK is one of the most important texts in the history of Buddhism. ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 16 Feb 1994 to 17 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Fri Feb 18 16:35:28 1994 Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 16:00:35 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 17 Feb 1994 to 18 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 16 messages totalling 865 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Study of Agga~n~na-Sutta 2. Doctor dualisticus: 4 points, 4 replies (2) 3. On translating MMK 18.4 and 18.5 (5) 4. Derrida and ethics 5. kilesa/klesha 6. Nagarjuna's Ontology (2) 7. Gyogi bosatsu 8. humor 9. Classical Buddhist Nondualism 10. Nagarjuna's Ontology -Reply ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 19:05:59 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Study of Agga~n~na-Sutta The following article should be of interest to readers of BUDDHA-L. Collins, Steven. 1993. The discourse on what is primary (Agga~n~na-Sutta). An annotated translation. Journal of Indian Philosophy 21(4):301-393. Given that Collins's new translation of this important text from the Diigha-nikaaya is only 10 pages long, the emphasis on this study is in the long introduction (301-37) and on detailed annotations of particular terms and expressions. In his introduction, Collins discusses the social and economic background in which the text appears to have been written, the text's satirical nature and its relation to other texts, and a study of ideals embodied in the work. The notes to the translation are thorough and will amply repay the effort of careful study by scholars of the Pali language. Other articles appearing in Journal of Indian Philosophy, volume 21 (1993) were: Ames, William L. 1993. Bhaavaviveka's Praj~naapradiipa [A Translation of Chapter One: Examination of Causal Conditions (Prayaya)]. JIP 21:209-59. Duerlinger, James. Reductionist and nonreductionist theories of persons in Indian Buddhist philosophy. JIP 21:79-101. Franco, Eli. 1993. Did Dignaaga acept four types of perception? JIP 21:295-9. Journal of Indian Philosophy is published by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, PO Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands. It is edited by Phyllis Granoff, Dept of Religious Studies, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4K1. The assitant editor is Richard Hayes (whose address appears below). Specialists in the philosophical dimensions of Buddhism in India are encouraged to consider submitting materials to the JIP for possible publication. We also seek book review essays. Dr. Richard Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies || E-mail McGill University || Voice Tel: 514 398-3291 Montreal, Quebec, Canada || FAX 514 398-6665 H3A 2A7 || ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 20:03:50 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Doctor dualisticus: 4 points, 4 replies I have four replies to make to Derek Heyman's points on my comments on Nagarjuna. Derek says: 1. The argument from the Sanskrit language is invalid as a proof that Nagarjuna is a dualist, because Nagarjuna does not say that these three linguistic categories are the only ontological categories. This is true. He didn't say it, because for anyone as steeped in Sanskrit grammatical literature as Naagaarjuna obviously was, it went without saying that there are three grammatical numbers. Naagaarjuna did not state that there are three grammatical numbers for exactly the same reason that Derek did not say that his message to BUDDHA-L was written in English and employed verbs. The rest of Derek's remarks on this first point I concede to him, since my argument about dualism being the only thing left over when singularity and plurality are eliminated was intended as a little joke anyway (a joke of which the very whimsical Naagaarjuna might have approved, by the way). That argument was purely jocular, but I did offer more serious ones. Derek goes on to say: 2. Richard calls N. an "ontological dualist" meaning that subjects and their properties are or are not existent. Yet he then explains that N. uses arguments based on these principles to show that "the given subject is not real." But if the subject is not real, then these can not be ontological dualisms, as they apply to nothing in reality, and ontology should surely concern reality. Ontology is the study of being and reality. The main interest of an ontologist is to try to determine whether or not things that people claim to be real in fact are real. When Naagaarjuna says of a subject that it is not real, he is therefore making an ontological claim. The method by which he shows a subject cannot be real is by showing that if it were, then we should have to posit both the presence and the absence of a given quality in it at the same time. Saying that something not only is not but CANNOT be real is also an ontological claim, rooted in making a binary distinction between what is possible and what is not. It is true that Naagaarjuna uses logic, but this does not make logic the explicit subject matter of his inquiry. Rather, the binary logic is used to make claims that are purely ontological in nature. And his ontology is one that is built upon the principle of dichotomy. People who deny this are simply wrong, I claim. But I'm willing to consider textual evidence to the contrary. Derek goes on to say: 3. It is my understanding that Nagarjuna is considered an ontological non-dualist because he has rejected independent existence such that two beings, such as subject and object, could stand over against each other. In their place, there is relational origination, meaning that everything arises through a matrix of interdependence, including that most important of dualities, subject and object, or grasper and grasped. Tell me what this means, and I'll tell you where I think your understanding may be wrong. Right now it has the virtue of being too murky to be obviously wrong. Perhaps you had better quit while you're ahead. Derek concludes by saying: 4. Why do I think Okham would have used his razor to slice off the crack about MMK getting a C+? Maybe because MMK is one of the most important texts in the history of Buddhism. It would be wonderful to watch anyone's razor try to slice off a crack. Perhaps you were thinking of Ockham's putty knife? As to the importance of the MMK, I do concede it was among the most important still-extant texts written in the second century by a Buddhist from the eastern half of southern India. But the world of Buddhism would not have been impoverished in the least if the only manuscript of the MMK had been eaten by an elephant in rut and then eventually excreted and the dung used by villagers to create smoke to keep flies off their home-made beer. That (according to the official Guide for Instructors at McGill) makes the text worth no more than a C+. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 07:27:46 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: On translating MMK 18.4 and 18.5 The recent discussion on the translation of tricky terms has been most helpful and stimulating. The following two verses from MMK are a translator's nightmare, since one would like to avoid or leave untranslated practically every technical term they contain: upaadaana, karma, kle"sa, mok.sa, vikalpa, prapa~nca. My translation for these verses is purely heuristic, and I would welcome discussion from others. mamety aham iti k.sii.ne bahirdhaadhyaatmam eva ca| nirudhyata upaadaana.m tatk.sayaaj janmana.h k.saya.h|| 18.4|| When `mine' and `I' are eliminated both externally and internally, then clinging is destroyed. And from the elimination of that there is the elimination of birth. karmakle"sak.sayaan mok.sa.h karmakle"saa vikalpata.h| te prapa~ncaat prapa~ncas tu "suunyataayaa.m nirudhyate|| 18.5|| Release is due to the end of intensional actions and afflictions. Intensional actions and afflictions are due to fanciful thinking. They are due to vain thinking. But vain thinking comes is destroyed in emptiness. Note on 18.4 upaadaanam: A key term in the detailed formula of dependent arising, this term is difficult to capture in English, since it has two important but distinct connotations: 1) fuel, provisions and other requirements for supporting or maintaining a process, and 2) the act of acquiring and holding on to things. I have rendered it `clinging' (an old standard transaltion). How do the rest of you treat it? Notes on 18.5 karman: Although now an English word, it is so misunderstood in popular culture that I find it better to avoid translating Sanskrit karman as karma, since the latter term seems to confuse Californians. Since in Buddhist contexts the essence of karma is usually deliberate intension (cetanaa), I lean towards such awkward expressions as `intensional action' as a translation. Sprung hedges by using the term `karmic action'. Streng and Kalupahana both used simple `action' (which may bee too simple, since karma is not quite the same as kriyaa, which is simple action). kle"sa.h: This has been discussed a lot. I throw in my ballot for `affliction' without further comment. Other translators have used `pains' (Streng), `afflictions' (Sprung) and `defilements' (Kalupahana). Another source of controversy is whether karma-kle"sa is a dvandva (karma and kle"sas) or a genitive tatpurusha (kle"sas of karma). Sprung and I opt for the former, Streng and Kalupahana for the latter. mok.sa.h: Being deeply allergic to such terms as `salvation' (and being willing in principle to cut the tongues out of scholars who speak of Buddhist `soteriology'), I like the plain and literal translation of `release', as do Streng, Sprung and Kalupahana. vikalpa.h: This word usually means indecision, hesitation, weighing alternatives and so forth. It sometimes means fantasy or imagination. There are no internal clues to what it means here. In his commentary, Candrakiirti paraphrases by reference to `ayoni"sas manaskaara.h' (careless, unsystematic thinking). Following his lead, I have rendered `vikalpatas' as `fanciful thinking'. (Does anyone have the Tibetan for this verse? I do not have it handy.) Other translators have rendered `vikalpa' as `construct' (Streng), `hypostatizing thought' (Sprung), and `discrimination' (Kalupahana). Streng and Kalupahana, by the way, both misconstrue vikalpatas as the genitive singular of the present participle of vik.lp; since this verb is middle voice, however, it cannot take a participial form for the active voice. The term should be understood as the verbal noun `vikalpa' with the adverbial suffix -tas. prapa~nca.h: In ordinary academic Sanskrit, this term usually means the amplification or expatiation or elucidation of a theory or concept. It can also mean analytic thinking in general. In some contexts it carries the neagative sense of fraud or deceit or illusion. In other contexts it means diversity in general, or the whole world of diversity in particular; more particularly, it may mean the sensible or phenomenal world, the world of experience. In Buddhist contexts it usually refers to some kind of dysfunctional thinking (hence my `vain thinking'), but it is very difficult to know exactly what it means for Naagaarjuna. Candrakiirti links `prapa~nca' with the process of trying to express things in speech. Other translators have used `phenomenal extension' (Streng), `manifold of named things' (Sprung) and `obsession' (Kalupahana -- any idea where he got this bizarre translation?). Any other suggestions? Any clues from Chinese or Tibetan? When one considers how much variety one finds among both good translators and Kalupahana on some of these terms, it becomes a little more clear just what a slippery old eel Naagaarjuna was. It's no wonder people who try to make sense of him through English translations come away with so many (sometimes rather odd) interpretations. But perhaps through mutual discussion we can pin some of these terms down a little more precisely. Pravartaamahai! Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 09:02:18 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Derrida and ethics ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Derrida's Defense of de Man: I read Derrida's defense. It was a careful argument and not written in his usual theory-speak. I read de Man's Belgian stuff. It is quite scary. He coldly considers the possibility of a Europe without France. He coldly considers a lot of horrible things. But I don't think Derrida's defense opens him to the charge that he supports De Man's WWII journalism. The criticism most people made of De Man after those writings were discovered was that he was manifesting the weak point in deconstructivism, namely its "anti-historicism." THe idea was that this approach made you calous, because you regarded history as purely an artifact of discourse. Well, that may be a correct criticism for early post-structuralists (circa 1980). But it certainly doesn't apply to the successor movements like multiculturalism, cultural studies, Said, ...you know, the "post-colonialist discourse" people, the new feminists, the new historicismists, etc. These guys are all influenced by Derrida and Co, but take very distinct political positions and take history very seriously. Robin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 09:02:43 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: kilesa/klesha ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Maybe the translation of klesha as emotionality comes from the Herbert Guenther school, which translated it as "conflicting emotions." Robin Kornman, St. John's College ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 09:03:01 EST From: Derek Heyman Subject: Nagarjuna's Ontology ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- This is a response to Richard Hayes' "Doctor Dualist" piece. Richard says, "The main interest of an ontologist isto try to determine whether or not things that people claim to bereal are in fact real." I beg to differ. An ontologist of any interest strives to elucidate the nature of being. S/he describes the way in which things are, not merely whether or not they are. In Buddhist ontology, all phenomena are accorded a certain degree of reality. If they didn't have such reality, as phenomenal occurences, no one would be talking about them. What is important to Buddhists is how or why phenomena come to be experienced in the way that they are, and how this experience can be stopped if it is troubling. This is ontology because it concerns reality, that which is experienced. As to Nagarjuna, I did not say that logic was the explicit subject matter of his enquiry. He deals with ontology. One thing he shows is that the concept of svabhaava as used in the abhidharma is not able to account for the relational nature of the elements of phenomena. For instance, we cannot properly relate fire to fuel if each has svabhaava, own-being. What do they have instead? Do they have no being at all, as an ontology based upon thedichotomy of being and non-being would seem to imply? No, they are separated out of the phenomenal stream by conditions arising from the skandhic activity which grasps at elements of reality, reifying them individual beings, when in fact there are no truly individual beings of this kind. If there were, they couldnot be related. of course, not only are the elements of phenomena interrelated in such a way, but even the skandhas themselves are dependently arisen phenomena. Everything that can become a phenomenon is a dependently arisen phenomenon. I'm sorry if my previous explanation of non-dualism was murky. What I was saying was that, as all phenomena (I mean dharmas) are dependently arisen, including those which make up the subjective and those which make up the objective parts of experience, Nagarjuna has only one type of being to elucidate, dependently originated phenomena. Subject and object, for him, are not separate until they appear as separate phenomena, but even then, their ontology isthe same. I hope this is clearer. Good one about Okham's putty knife. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 09:03:43 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: Doctor dualisticus: 4 points, 4 replies ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Thu, 17 Feb 1994, Richard P Hayes wrote: > > The rest of Derek's remarks on this first point I concede to him, > since my argument about dualism being the only thing left over when > singularity and plurality are eliminated was intended as a little > joke anyway (a joke of which the very whimsical Naagaarjuna might > have approved, by the way). That argument was purely jocular, but I > did offer more serious ones. I have only heard the term non-dualism used by Advaita Vedantists. Is the term non-dualism used by classical Buddhists? If not, perhaps Nagarjuna would not object to being called a dualist. (My guess is he wouldn't object to being called anything but Sally.) Also, while every Dharma talk I have heard has had some humor in it, classical Buddhist sutras and commentaries seem totally devoid of humor. Is humor a specific antidote for our culture, or was reproducing books too laborious to waste precious text on jokes that would be supplied by whoever was explaining them? Maybe you can't tell a joke in Sanskrit; but I'm sure you can in Tibetan, because I've heard them laughing (whenever I come around, for some reason). Does the expense of producing texts also explain the incredible terseness of many classical Indian and Tibetan texts? Or was this simply the nature of the language and/or subject matter? > Buddhist from the eastern half of southern India. But the world of > Buddhism would not have been impoverished in the least if the only > manuscript of the MMK had been eaten by an elephant in rut and then Well, I am about to delete this post, and I assure you the world of Buddhism will not only not be impoverished, but actually enhanced. I have always hoped that baiting fools was an allowable exception to the paramitas of generosity and patience. (Not that there are any fools in _Buddha Hell_). Is there any textual support for this? (Only a coward would make statements like this through e-mail with several thousand miles between him and the object of his wit). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 09:06:15 EST From: jml16@cornell.edu Subject: Gyogi bosatsu ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I have an undergraduate student who would like to read articles or sources in English on Gyogi bosatsu. Does anyone have any suggestions? (Sorry to ask another bibliographic question.) Many thanks for the responses on ema. Sincerely, Jane Marie Law Assistant Professor of Japanese Religions Department of Asian Studies 388 Rockefeller Hall Cornell University Ithaca, New York 14853-2502 e-mail address: jml16@cornell.edu Phone: 607-255-5095 (main office) 607-255-7777 (private office) ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:47:38 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: Nagarjuna's Ontology ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Fri, 18 Feb 1994, Derek Heyman wrote: > As to Nagarjuna, I did not say that logic was the explicit subject > matter of his enquiry. He deals with ontology. One thing he shows is > that the concept of svabhaava as used in the abhidharma is not able to > account for the relational nature of the elements of phenomena. For ... > imply? No, they are separated out of the phenomenal stream by conditions > arising from the skandhic activity which grasps at elements of reality, > reifying them individual beings, when in fact there are no truly > individual beings of this kind. If there were, they couldnot be related. Just a comment from an uninformed person, but it seems like you are explaining that svabhaava, inherent existence, is defeated by explaining that objects are separated out of the phenomenal stream by the skandhas. I have also got this from other of your posts on this subject. I know this is a murky subject without consensus, but it seems to me that the false perception of inherent existence goes deeper than the mere separation of objects out of the phenomenal stream, although that is part of it. It seems like what Dsong-ka-ba would call 'not negating enough'. If I was asked to support this position, I would ask whether Nagarjuna ever specifically stated 'separation out of the phenomenal stream' as the critical error causing the false ascription of inherent existance. (I use ascription rather than conception, because in this case conception is something that babies and animals are performing as well as adult humans. Perhaps the term elaboration is more appropriate.) I guess if determining exactly what Nagarjuna is negating were simple, he wouldn't have had to do so much obstruse explanation. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:47:50 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: On translating MMK 18.4 and 18.5 ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Intensional in American English has more connotations of intensity; whereas Intentional has more connotations of intent, deliberateness. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu POB 1496 CIS 70304,211 BOULDER CO 80306-1496 USA voice 303-478-5292 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:48:03 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: On translating MMK 18.4 and 18.5 ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard P Hayes writes: > mamety aham iti k.sii.ne bahirdhaadhyaatmam eva ca| > nirudhyata upaadaana.m tatk.sayaaj janmana.h k.saya.h|| 18.4|| > > When `mine' and `I' are eliminated both externally and internally, > then clinging is destroyed. And from the elimination of that there > is the elimination of birth. > > karmakle"sak.sayaan mok.sa.h karmakle"saa vikalpata.h| > te prapa~ncaat prapa~ncas tu "suunyataayaa.m nirudhyate|| 18.5|| > > Release is due to the end of intensional actions and afflictions. > Intensional actions and afflictions are due to fanciful thinking. > They are due to vain thinking. But vain thinking comes is destroyed > in emptiness. Do you mean 'intensional' or 'intentional' ? > upaadaanam: A key term in the detailed formula of dependent arising, > this term is difficult to capture in English, since it has two > important but distinct connotations: 1) fuel, provisions and other > requirements for supporting or maintaining a process, and 2) the act > of acquiring and holding on to things. I have rendered it `clinging' > (an old standard transaltion). How do the rest of you treat it? > I think of it as 'taking on board' or 'taking possession' i.e. the process by which ideas solidify into opinions and eventually become rigid views, wishes become desires and eventually set habits or addictions, chosen lifestyles become the only right way. Hence the four kinds of upaadaana and its replacement in the momentary version of dependent origination by view (di.t.thi) or commitment (adhimokkha). Also cf. Vasubandhu's 'stage of running around after enjoyments (bhoga)', following after the stage of sexuality (maithunaraaga, etc.) (Kosha III 23). > Notes on 18.5 > > kle"sa.h: This has been discussed a lot. I throw in my ballot for > `affliction' without further comment. Other translators have used > `pains' (Streng), `afflictions' (Sprung) and `defilements' > (Kalupahana). Another source of controversy is whether karma-kle"sa > is a dvandva (karma and kle"sas) or a genitive tatpurusha (kle"sas > of karma). Sprung and I opt for the former, Streng and Kalupahana > for the latter. Surely the reference is to the threefold division of the links of dependent origination into karma, klesha and vastu, the last being karmic effect and hence irrelevant here ? So I think it must be a dvandva. > vikalpa.h: This word usually means indecision, hesitation, weighing > alternatives and so forth. It sometimes means fantasy or > imagination. There are no internal clues to what it means here. In > his commentary, Candrakiirti paraphrases by reference to `ayoni"sas > manaskaara.h' (careless, unsystematic thinking). Following his lead, > I have rendered `vikalpatas' as `fanciful thinking'. Does Candrakiirti mean it in this wider sense ? Or is he referring to its frequent technical use in the older Buddhist literature where it is closely related to dependent origination ? There I would render it as 'inappropriate bringing to mind' i.e. when you return home after a staff meeting, if you think of the person who was wasting so much time in foolish and irritating ways, this is an inappropriate thing to bring to mind and the consequence of directing attention in this way to an asubhanimitta is to arouse hatred, etc. i.e. karma and klesha. > prapa~nca.h: In ordinary academic Sanskrit, this term usually means > the amplification or expatiation or elucidation of a theory or > concept. It can also mean analytic thinking in general. In some > contexts it carries the neagative sense of fraud or deceit or > illusion. In other contexts it means diversity in general, or the > whole world of diversity in particular; more particularly, it may > mean the sensible or phenomenal world, the world of experience. In > Buddhist contexts it usually refers to some kind of dysfunctional > thinking (hence my `vain thinking'), but it is very difficult to > know exactly what it means for Naagaarjuna. Candrakiirti links > `prapa~nca' with the process of trying to express things in speech. > Other translators have used `phenomenal extension' (Streng), > `manifold of named things' (Sprung) and `obsession' (Kalupahana -- > any idea where he got this bizarre translation?). Any other > suggestions? Any clues from Chinese or Tibetan? I imagine Kalupahana is simply following the common Pali interpretation of papan~ca as 'craving, pride and views'. In fact for a term as frequent in the Suttas as this (and especially in the context of dependent origination) the general Sanskrit uses are largely (but not completely) irrelevant. (The sources are mostly collected in Bhikkhu ~Na.nananda,_Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought. An Essay on Papa~nca and Papa~nca=Sa~n~naa-Sa.nkhaa_, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, 1971.) Somewhat prior to Naagaarjuna the Mahaaniddesa (I 280; 344) already defines in terms of craving, views and pride. I suspect however that it means the mind's tendency to proliferate or diversify. Craving ('mine') , pride ('I') and views ('this alone is truth') are simply different examples of this. Lance Cousins -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:48:20 EST From: Jan Nattier Subject: humor ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In reply to Leigh Charles Gold's comment that > classical Buddhist sutras and commentaries seem totally devoid of humor I think it's less the texts themselves than their Western translations. And, of course, even with the originals there's always the likelihood that we will miss many of the funny allusions or word plays they were making. Just think about how much harder it is to read a Japanese cartoon than a Japanese article on trade talks -- and that's in a *contemporary* culture. Actually I suspect that Buddhist texts (even some of the driest commentaries) are loaded with humor. For example: In the closing line of his "Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths" (translated by M. David Eckel in a book by the same title, SUNY Press 1987) a Madhyamaka author expresses the wish, "May the merit I have gained by distinguishing the two truths cause the whole world to develop the seed of understanding." Sounds harmless enough, but the term for "seed of understanding" (as indicated by the Tibetan text) was "J~naanagarbha" -- the name of the author himself! [see Eckel p. 103; this joke is not pointed out in the book, but David called it to my attention some years ago] There are many examples of Buddhist writers taunting an opponent by pointedly using one of his "buzz" words in a hilarious way, or using word play to imply that an unwanted result will come from a certain sort of analysis. (I suspect Richard H has a whole file of such things.) But for a really accessible example of Buddhist humor, try the Vimalakiirti-nirde"sa; to my way of thinking it would be hard to find a funnier text. It's set up like a traditional Indian satire, with "Saariputra as the ignorant buffoon, focusing on minutiae while major dharmic fireworks are going on. I especially like the opening scene of Chapter 6, where all kinds of distinguished visitors -- bodhisattvas, "sraavakas, gods and goddesses -- have arrived, and "Saariputra is in essence scurrying around saying 'Oh dear! Oh dear! Where are all these cosmic visitors going to sit?!' There are several other such moments -- as when he suddenly gets worried that if this distinguished assembly doesn't adjourn before noon (the last hour at which observant monks can eat), no one will get to have lunch! Actually there's a whole book on the subject of humor in Indian literature by Lee Siegel, called _Laughing Matters_. He says in his introduction that what inspired (or provoked) him to write the book was reading in several sources that Indian literature has no comedy. In this delightful book he has certainly proved otherwise. Anyway, I think it's our own dullness, and not the absence of wit in our Buddhist predecessors, that makes these texts seem so humorless. Maybe if more of us try to translate (and interpret) with an ear for such things, they'll become more transparent to us in the future. -- Jan Nattier (jnattier@ucs.indiana.edu) ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:48:43 EST From: Derek Heyman Subject: Classical Buddhist Nondualism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein wrote: "I have only heard the term non-dualism used by Advaita Vedantists. Is the term non-dualism used by classical Buddhists?" Maitreya/Asanga mentions "the non-being of dualities" several times in his Madhyanta-Vibhaga. For instance, I.5 and I.13. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:49:11 EST From: nrs2460.bhc1@pcmail.dcccd.edu Subject: Nagarjuna's Ontology -Reply ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Not to quibble - or rather, possibly to quibble - but, if we are importing Euro-American terms from philosophy, then it is epistemology which studies what is experienced. The subject of ontology, as Richard points out, is being and reality. Being and reality does not imply an experience of such, at least for F.H. Bradley and his ilk. I have a naive question. When was the concept of dependent origination made the basis of Buddhist ontology? Is it truly the underlying primary of Nagarjuna's thought, as Derek asserts? I'm awash in the history of Buddhist thought and am not sure of the chronology of this concept in Indian Mahayana Buddhism. Your friend, Nancy Smith nrs2460.BHC1@pcmail.dcccd.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:49:51 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: On translating MMK 18.4 and 18.5 ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Finally we move beyond the doxic innuendo into actual text. For what it's worth, a fairly literal translation (I'm not trying for elegance) of Kumarajiva's Chinese counterparts to these verses runs as follows: 18.4 Inner and outer I and mine, because when they completely cease are non-existent, the various feelings instantly cease; if feelings cease, then the body ceases. (Richard's rendering for comparison) >When `mine' and `I' are eliminated both externally and internally, >then clinging is destroyed. And from the elimination of that there >is the elimination of birth. 18.5 Because karma [and] kle'sa cease, [this is] named 'liberation.' [When] karma [and] kle'sa are not substantial, entering empty 'play discourse' ceases. (Richard's, for comparison) >Release is due to the end of intensional actions and afflictions. >Intensional actions and afflictions are due to fanciful thinking. >They are due to vain thinking. But vain thinking comes is destroyed >in emptiness. Notes on Chinese terms: various feelings (chu shou): Chu signifies plural. Shou, which literally means "receive", usually translates vedanaa, not upadaana. body (shen): Shen literally means body, but often implies 'person.' karma [and] kle'sa (yeh fan-nao): Like the Sanskrit, can be read as a compound or as separate terms. The literal meaning of yeh (for karma) is of no help; Giles (#12991) offers: "patrimony, landed estate; property; calling, trade; occupation; function. Instruction; Already. Partly finished. To feel in peril. To be strong. The toothed board of a bell-stand." (go figure!). Fan-nao was described in a recent posting. liberation (chieh-t'o): literally means "to unravel/clarify and undress". Commonly used for mok.sa, vimukti, etc. I suppose "release" is appropriate. not substantial (fei shih): fei is the negative for a proposition ("it is not the case that..."). Shih often signifies dravya. It literally means "solid." Less literally fei shih might be translated "not real." empty (k'ung): Same as for 'suunyataa. 'play discourse' (hsi-lun): Hsi means 'play, trick, a theatrical production,' and lun means discourse. It's the standard Chinese rendering of prapa~nca. Notes: The Chinese ignores vikalpa (or takes it in the sense of "naming, terming"). I am wondering why Richard takes the nomative vikalpata.h as if it were ablative. Might the Sanskrit be rendered something like: The destruction of karma [and] kle'sa is mok.sa; the discriminative-thinking of karma [and] kle'sa is from prapa~nca. Emptiness eliminates Prapa~nca. The Chinese suggests several terms (dravya, 'suuntataa, etc.) that do not occur in Sanskrit. >prapa~nca.h:[...] Any other >suggestions? Any clues from Chinese or Tibetan? The Chinese is not particularly helpful. An extremely helpful work, as Richard knows, is Bhikkhu ~Naa.nanada's _Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought_, which is a careful study of the use of papa~nca and papa~nca-sa~n~naa-sa'nkhaa from the early Paali lit. through Madhymaka and even Vedaanta. I've got to run, but hope to get back to this soon. Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 15:50:19 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: On translating MMK 18.4 and 18.5 ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Finally we move beyond the doxic innuendo into actual text. For what it's worth, a fairly literal translation (I'm not trying for elegance) of Kumarajiva's Chinese counterparts to these verses runs as follows: 18.4 Inner and outer I and mine, because when they completely cease are non-existent, the various feelings instantly cease; if feelings cease, then the body ceases. (Richard's rendering for comparison) >When `mine' and `I' are eliminated both externally and internally, >then clinging is destroyed. And from the elimination of that there >is the elimination of birth. 18.5 Because karma [and] kle'sa cease, [this is] named 'liberation.' [When] karma [and] kle'sa are not substantial, entering empty 'play discourse' ceases. (Richard's, for comparison) >Release is due to the end of intensional actions and afflictions. >Intensional actions and afflictions are due to fanciful thinking. >They are due to vain thinking. But vain thinking comes is destroyed >in emptiness. Notes on Chinese terms: various feelings (chu shou): Chu signifies plural. Shou, which literally means "receive", usually translates vedanaa, not upadaana. body (shen): Shen literally means body, but often implies 'person.' karma [and] kle'sa (yeh fan-nao): Like the Sanskrit, can be read as a compound or as separate terms. The literal meaning of yeh (for karma) is of no help; Giles (#12991) offers: "patrimony, landed estate; property; calling, trade; occupation; function. Instruction; Already. Partly finished. To feel in peril. To be strong. The toothed board of a bell-stand." (go figure!). Fan-nao was described in a recent posting. liberation (chieh-t'o): literally means "to unravel/clarify and undress". Commonly used for mok.sa, vimukti, etc. I suppose "release" is appropriate. not substantial (fei shih): fei is the negative for a proposition ("it is not the case that..."). Shih often signifies dravya. It literally means "solid." Less literally fei shih might be translated "not real." empty (k'ung): Same as for 'suunyataa. 'play discourse' (hsi-lun): Hsi means 'play, trick, a theatrical production,' and lun means discourse. It's the standard Chinese rendering of prapa~nca. Notes: The Chinese ignores vikalpa (or takes it in the sense of "naming, terming"). I am wondering why Richard takes the nomative vikalpata.h as if it were ablative. Might the Sanskrit be rendered something like: The destruction of karma [and] kle'sa is mok.sa; the discriminative-thinking of karma [and] kle'sa is from prapa~nca. Emptiness eliminates Prapa~nca. The Chinese suggests several terms (dravya, 'suuntataa, etc.) that do not occur in Sanskrit. >prapa~nca.h:[...] Any other >suggestions? Any clues from Chinese or Tibetan? The Chinese is not particularly helpful. An extremely helpful work, as Richard knows, is Bhikkhu ~Naa.nanada's _Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought_, which is a careful study of the use of papa~nca and papa~nca-sa~n~naa-sa'nkhaa from the early Paali lit. through Madhymaka and even Vedaanta. I've got to run, but hope to get back to this soon. Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 17 Feb 1994 to 18 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Thu Feb 24 16:33:22 1994 Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 16:02:26 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 23 Feb 1994 to 24 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 13 messages totalling 692 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. The Mahaparinirvana Sutra (2) 2. Mahaparinirvana sutra 3. Experience versus reality 4. Nirvaa.na Suutra 5. Whose is a dharma? 6. autocommentary 7. CCS Seminar Announcement 8. My apologies 9. An embarrassment of dharmic riches 10. dharma and derma (2) 11. Dhamma/dharma ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 23 Feb 1994 16:45:21 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: The Mahaparinirvana Sutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Paul --- Can anyone help sort out the textual sources for these translations? The Taishoo Tripitaka (Issaikyoo) distinguishes three different translations into Chinese: T. 7, T. 374, T. 375. The first (T.7) appears to be a translation from a source comparable to Rhys Davids' Pali source. The other two are quite different Mahayanist translations: T. 374 ("Northern Text"), T. 375 ("Southern Text"). Bob M ----------------------------------------- On Wed, 23 Feb 1994, Paul G. Hackett wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > Concerning the Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra, there are several > works: > > Beal, Samuel, in A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures > from the Chinese. London: Trubner (1871). > Reprinted: Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publ. Co. (1970); > also excerpted in: Samuel Beal, "Allusions to the > Four Truths" The Middle Way 43(1968), pp. 74-80. > > Davids, T.W.Rhys, "The Mahaa-parinibbaana suttanta" > in Buddhist Suttas. (Sacred Books of the East XI) > Oxford UNiv.Pr. (1881); repr.: Delhi: Motilal > Banarsidass (1965). > > Thomas, William Frederick, "Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra" > in A.F.Rudolf Hoernle, Manuscript Remains of > Buddhist Literature Found in Eastern Turkestan. > Oxford: Clarendon (1916); repr.: Amsterdam: > Philo Pr. (1970). > > and, > > Yamamoto, Kooshoo, Tha Mahaayaana Mahaaparinirvaa.na > Suutra. Ube, Japan: Karinbunko (1973-5). 3 vols. > (Karin Buddhological Series 5). > > In German there is, > > Waldschmidt, Ernst, "Wunderkrafte des Buddha," in > Nachrichten der Academie der Wissenschaften, > G..ottingen, 1948, pp.48-91. > > There is also the dissertation: > > Utz, David A., An Unpublished Sogdian Version of > the Mahaayaana Mahaaparinirvaa.na Suutra in > the German Turfan Collection. Ph.D. Thesis > Harvard, 1976. > > but I haven't seen it, so I don't any more information about its > contents. > > > Paul Hackett > pgh2z@Virginia.edu > Buddhist Bibliography > Alderman Library > University of Virginia > ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 08:43:15 EST From: "Richard S. Cohen" Subject: Mahaparinirvana sutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- My interest is less in the uniquely Mahayana aspects of the Mahaparinirvana Sutra than the apparent relations it bears to a number of nikaayasAnyway, the full information for Yamoto's translation into English is: Kosho Yamamoto. _The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra: A Complete Translation for the Classical Chinese Language in 3 volumes_ The Karin Buddhological Seriess #5. Oyama: The Karinbunko, 1973. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 08:43:31 EST From: Dan Lusthaus Subject: Re: Experience versus reality ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Our good friend Richard has shown that after all this time and after all our skirmishes, his positions remain unaltered. I won't repeat all my earlier contentions (Richard keeps an archive, no doubt), but just remind those who have forgotten, or newcomers interested in an alternate take. > It seems to me >abundantly clear that the key problem recognized by the Buddha is >that human beings are prone to experience things incorrectly. Fair enough. >The aim of most practices that make up the Buddhist path is to >enable us to understand that our naive intuitions, which are based >on personal and immediate experience, are false. Coming to an >understanding of the falsity of our intuitions requires more than >simply having other kinds of experience. It also requires some >understanding of what is logically possible. In other words, it is >only through the study of metaphysics that the errors of experience >can be understood. But even when one understands them, one continues >to experience things in the same old way: incorrectly. False - or rather, twisted half-truth. The purpose of Buddhist praxis is not to abandon "experience" in favor of an intellectual appreciation of some metaphysical truth, but to develop correct experience. Exactly what constitutes "correct experience" varies from Buddhist to Buddhist, but that this is the prime imperative is invariant. We debated this earlier in relation to Buddhist evaluations of perception and inference. The half that's true is that Buddhism is interested in logical analysis, and more especially in causal analysis. The Buddha of the Pali suttas spends a good deal of his time debunking religious sentiments in favor of a clear vision of the causes and conditions that shape experience and knowledge. Logically analysing pratiitya-samutpaada is not to "see" pratiitya-samutpaada, though one might initially have to do the former in order to accomplish the latter. He who sees pratiitya-samutpaada sees Buddha. He who is still only thinking about it has a ways to go. > What really happens is something that it is impossible to >experience directly: everything perishes in the very moment in which >it arises and is replaced by something else very similar but slightly >different in a contiguous location. If you could find that Sautraantika Temple to join, they would tell you, no doubt, that what you think is impossible is not only possible, but the very condition for seeing things as they are, i.e., enlightenment. They might also recommend re-reading Dignaaga on perception. >Something else that can never be experienced, according to >Vasubandhu, is a causal relationship. We debated this before, in the context of the aggi-vacchagotta-sutta, in which we find ordinary Vacchagotta admitting to Buddha that he sees the fuel "causing" the fire. It is true that as the abhidharmists complicated the notion of causality (the Theravadins end up with a redundant hodgepodge list of over 20 types of causes; others had lists of seven, eight, etc.; Classical Yogacara reduced this list to four types), they created causal categories that are difficult to perceive. That probably contributed to Vasubandhu's decision to bale out of Vaibhaa'sika and become a Yogacarin. Paratantra there is considered an object of direct cognition. > The only thing we can actually >experience is the presence of one thing followed by the presence of >another; on seeing this, we infer that the earlier thing caused the >latter. In other words, the entire operation of dependent >origination is a mere abstraction and as such it is known only to >the intellect, and never to empirical experience. 1. Pratiitya-samutpaada is not simply a sequential list of conditions. Much of the Abhidharma literature (most surviving only in Chinese - references available on request) emphasizes that the twelve links are to be understood as simultaneous. 2. The split between intellect and empirical experience, while typical of both the cartesian and empirical philosophical traditions (and originally formulated by Richard's Greek Pratyekabuddha Plato in his famous analogy of the "divided line" in the _Republic_), smudges the actual distinctions maintained by the Buddhists between perception (in which the manas is treated as a sense organ) and inference (in which abstractions, or general "universals" are entertained). Valid inferences can produce correct statements about what is the case, but what is the case is always the unique, perceptual particulars. Buddhist "truth" is not the affirmation of an inexperientiable metaphysic (I've never heard Richard sound so platonic), but a transparent understanding of how the world of sensation operates. >Rather than saying that Being and Reality are nothing apart from >experience, I would be more inclined to say that, in a Buddhist >context, reality has almost no connection at all with experience. >Insofar as we get a grasp of reality, we do so despite our >experiences. Au contraire. Buddhism doesn't advocate abandoning experience (thinking, by the way, is also "experience"), but correcting it. Or do you, breaking with its repeated usage, take j~naana as a purely intellective term? > I am unfamiliar with Bradley and his ilk, unfortunately. > >Good for you, Derek! If you are lucky (and have good karma) you may >succeed in remaining unfamiliar with Bradley and his ilk for the >rest of your life. Amen. Dan Lusthaus dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu Bates College ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 08:52:23 EST From: Rob Gimello Subject: Nirvaa.na Suutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Someone asked about the YAMAMOTO Kooshoo translation of the "Mahaayaana" _Mahaaparinirvaa.na Suutra_. It is a translation into English of Taishoo #375 -- i.e.,the mid-5th century revised or "southern" edition of Dharmak.sema's ca. 421 Chinese translation. (Note: The reconstruction from the Chinese of the translator's Indian name as "Dharmak.sema" is uncertain, but much more likely than Yamamoto's own reconstruction as "Dharmarak.sa.") Yamamoto followed the edition found in the _Kokuyaku issaikyoo_, i.e., the standard collection of texts from the Chinese canon translated into Japanese. He also relied heavily on the Japanese "translation" contained therein. By the way, Taishoo #374 -- the so-called "northern edition" -- is Dharmak.sema's original, preserved without benefit of revision. The work was published in Tokyo, in 3 vols., in the years 1973,1974, and 1975 (a projected 4th volume, intended to comprise a concordance and other apparatus, never materialized). The publisher was a small, private institute (Yamaoto's own, I think) located in Tokyo, viz., the Karin Bunko ("Flower-Grove Archives"). As only 500 copies of the work were ever printed, it is now probably not available for purchase anywhere (except, perhaps, in some used book store in Japan, at an outrageous price), but it should be available at a number of university libraries. If you find it, however, and plan to use it -- beware; it's not a very good translation. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 08:55:33 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Re: Whose is a dharma? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Would the good Dr. Hayes be so kind as to cite more or less specific verses in the _Abhidharmako'sa_ for the interpretations that he has presented? I have not quite memorized the entire text, and I am too lazy to scrounge around for the passages in question. I would, however, like to respond. Would you please assist me to do so, Richard? Thanks. John Dunne Study of Religion Harvard University ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 08:56:24 EST From: "Charles S. Wan x2596" Subject: Re: autocommentary ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear Dr. Hayes: After so many years, I finally realized why I can't get an automechanic to fix my automobile: That's not his job. Thank you very much. Charles (csw@sarnoff.com) P.S. Commentary: In the context of the above paragraph that I just made, the word "automechanic" really means a mechanic that fixes himself, rather than an automobile. P.P.S. Commentary on commentary: :-) ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 10:52:18 EST From: Sandy Leachman Subject: CCS Seminar Announcement ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCES SEMINAR ANNOUNCEMENT "The Electronic Beowulf Project" PROFESSOR KEVIN KIERNAN, UK Department of English Wednesday, March 2, 1994 at 3:30 PM in room 327 McVey Hall (refreshments-3:00) ABSTRACT: The Electronic Beowulf is a project that aims to create a digitised image archive for the next of Beowulf, accessible to users in a variety of electronic formats. In its first stage of development the project will produce a full-colour on-line digitised facsimile available for public use at the British Library, while an international team of scholars test and evaluate the images for research and teaching purposes.In subsequent development through the middle to late 1990s the project expects not only to refine images and image capture techniques but also to add to the archive digitised copies of early transcripts, editions and collations. Already, Professor Whitney Bolton has generously donated to the British Library the 1817 collation by Conybeare to facilitate its inclusion in the project, and the Royal Library in Copenhagen has agreed in principle that the Thorkelin transcripts may be digitised. Hyper -links will be developed between these elements to provide scholars with a powerful tool for exploring the whole range of material bearing on the transmission of the Beowulf text. Ultimately, the project will issue a range of publications, such as a full colour facsimile in electronic form, a research package giving access to the full archive, and teaching versions for various educational levels. The Electronic Beowulf is one of the British Library's 'Initiatives for Access', undertaken in pursuit of its commitment to use imaging and network technology to make its collections more widely available. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 10:57:09 EST From: Jim Cocks Subject: My apologies My apologies for that last post. It was sent to this list by mistake. I meant to forward it to another but my fingers now have the habit that they think all forwards go to BUDDHA-L! Time to do some re-programming :-) Sorry, Jim ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 11:32:54 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: An embarrassment of dharmic riches Bob Morrell wrote: Some messages ago you proposed using "trait" for at least one sense of the word "dharma." I should guess that you would have no objection to using a NUMBER of English equivalents for the same word -- not just a one-to-one correspondence? Would you care to propose a VARIETY of English equivalents which you would consider acceptable for rendering "dharma" in a variety of contexts? Here is a small sample of passages from the Bhaavanaa-krama of Kamala"siila containing the word `dharma'. 1. Here are some passages in which the sense of `dharma' seems pretty clearly to be virtue. tato buddhadharmaa.naa.m karu.naiva muulam| Therefore it is compassion that is the root of the Buddha's virtues. tata.h sarvasattvaanaa.m yaavat sarvaj~nataapratilambhaaya sarvabuddhadharmaparipuura.naaya dine traikaalyamanuttaraayaa.m samyaksa.mbodhau pari.naamaya| After that, mature in the unsurpassed perfect awakening at all times during the day so that all beings attain omniscience and become filled with all the virtues of a Buddha. [Quoted in BhK from the Raajaavavaadaka Suutra] bodhicitta.m kulaputra biijabhuuta.m biijam sarvabuddhadharmaa.naam| The thought of awakening, good sir, is like the seed of all the virtues of the Buddha. [Quoted from the Ga.n.davyuuha.] 2. In this passage, the sense of `dharma' appears to be doctrine, but I am not sure. upaayakau"sala.m katamam| yatsa.mgraha.h sarvadharmaa.naam| praj~naa katamaa| yatsarvadharmaa.naamasambhedanakau"salam| What is skill in tactics? [It is that] which collects all doctrines. What is wisdom? [It is] the skill of not mixing all the doctrines together. [Quoted from the "sraddhaabalaadhana.] 3. In this passage, it appears that the term `dharma' is being used in a variety of senses. Disambiguating it in translation could spoil the apparent sense that the passage makes. Here there seems to be a good case for leaving the term unstranslated. suuk.sma.m hi ma~nju"srii.h saddharmapratik.sepakarmaavara.nam| yo hi ka"scin ma~nju"sriis tathaagatabhaa.site dharma ekasmin "sobhanasa.mj~naam utpaadayati| ekasmin na"sobhanasa.mj~naamutpaadayati| sa saddharma.m pratik.sipati| tena saddharma.m pratik.sipataa tathaagato.abhyaakhyaato bhavati For, Ma~nju"srii, the karmic obstacle that is an impediment to the true dharma [doctrine] is subtle. For, Ma~nju"srii, someone applies the term ``good'' to some dharma [trait] proclaimed by the Tathaagata; he applies the name ``bad'' to another. He impedes the true dharma. By him who impedes the true dharma the Tathaagata is slandered. [Quoted from the Sarvadharmasa"ngraha.] 4. In this passage, `dharma' seems to mean the supreme virtue, namely wisdom, but it could mean virtue in general. Of course, it can also mean a teaching about virtue and wisdom. lak.sa.naanuvya~njanaruupakaayaparini.spaadanaabhirata"sca bhavati na dharmakaayaabhisamayamaatraabhirata.h| There is attachment to the perfections of the physical body [adorned] with [the thirty-two] marks and [eighty-four] minor signs; there is no attachment to the body of Dharma [Wisdom], which consists only of understanding. [Quoted from the Dharma-sa"ngiiti Suutra]. 5. Here is an interesting passage from the BhK for which the Sanskrit is lost but which is still extant in Tibetan translation. Here also I find it difficult to replace `dharma' with any single term that works throughout the whole passage. The translation is very rough and unpolished, but I hope the gist is correct. |bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpas chos rab tu mang po la bslab par mi bgyi'o| |bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpas chos gcig rab tu gzung zhing rab tu rtogs par bgyis na sangs rgyas kyis chos thams cad de'i lag mthil du mchis pa lags so| |chos gcig po gang zhe na| 'di lta ste| snying rje chen po'o| |bcom ldan 'das snying rje chen pos ni sangs rgyas kyi chos thams cad byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi lag mthil du mchis pa lags so| Lord, don't make the bodhisattva learn too many dharmas. Lord, if the bodhisattva grasps and understands a single dharma, then all the buddhas' dharmas are in the palm of his hand. What is that single dharma? It is great compassion. For, Lord, it is by means of great compassion that all the dharmas of the buddha are placed in the palm of the bodhisattvas' hands. Finally, Dan Lusthaus complained that my prose is so dense that it requires an autocommentary. Here is the only autocommentary I have ever written. In 1973 my father bought a new car and decided to give me his old one. It was a 1960 Mercedes, still in very good condition. I was an impecunious graduate student at the time and was constantly skulking around the shadows of my department like a hungry ghost in search of a scrap of food from the high table. Needless to say, being made the owner of Mercedes totally destroyed my credibility as a hungry ghost. Whenever I begged for a scrap of bread from my masters, they taunted me by saying "If you are so hungry, why don't you sell your Mercedes?" Finally, I grew completely disgusted with the situation, and I gave the Mercedes to a friend. She sold it shortly afterwards to a collector for a small fortune. She did not even take me to dinner as a token of her appreciation for my making her wealthy. "If you are so wealthy that you can give away a vintage Mercedes," she said, "you obviously do not need to have me take you to dinner." I have never owned a car since, and it is my one ambition in life never to own another car. To be perfectly honest, I despise cars. Moreover, I resent the fact that my hatred of cars [and airplanes and firearms and computers] is so intense that it may prevent me from attaining nirvana in this life. Every time I see a car, I am reminded that its existence causes me to feel hatred and that this feeling of hatred is preventing me from becoming a saint. When I die, I wish for my body to be taken to the charnel grounds by a horse-drawn cart. Or perhaps fed to our neighbour's dog. If my body is taken somewhere by a car, I will be compelled to come back and do some serious haunting. Here ends my autocommentary. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 12:35:02 EST From: "Paul G. Hackett" Subject: Re: The Mahaparinirvana Sutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The sources for the translations of the Mahaaparinirvaa.na- suutra are as follows: Frederick Thomas: Hoernle ms 143 SA 4 as Rob Gimello said, Yamamoto: T. 375 (U-VA library has a set), and Davids: Pali text publ'd by Childers in JRAS 1874 & 1876, held in the India Office Collection. As for Beal's translation, there is no documentation of the source in the Middle Way article, and in the original publication, while he mentions the compilation of both the Northern and Southern Tripitakas in a historical context, the only specific reference he gives reads, "The works here translated are mostly standard ones, and if not strictly speaking in the Canon, are yet of great authority and are found in the libraries of most of the monasteries in the south of China." (p.9) so make of that what you will. Regarding Waldschmidt's version, the citation I gave yesterday, NAWG is an edited version of a more extensive work, a verse by verse analysis of the suutra compared with the Mahaa praj~naa-paramitaa, the dirgaagama, Po Fa-tsu, & Fa-hsien. I'm afraid my German is not what it ought to be, though it seems he is likewise working from a Pali source. Never-the- less, the citation is: Waldschmidt, Ernst, Die :Uberlieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha: Eine Vergleichende Analyse des Mahaaparinirvaa.nasuutra und seiner Textentsprechungen. (2 vol.) G:ottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (1948). It was published as part of a series: Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in G:ottingen (AGAW). Philologisch-Historische Klasse. 3 Folge . Nr. 29 & 30 Hope it helps. Paul Hackett pgh2z@Virginia.edu Buddhist Bibliography Alderman Library University of Virginia ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 13:05:48 EST From: Rodger Kamenetz Subject: dharma and derma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The word karma, according to my OED, entered the English language in 1828. THe OED (at least my old edition) does not recognize dharma, interestingly. Translating karma as karma would therefore risk contamination, since karma is a perfectly good English word (as valid as syrup or coffee) and therefore has a life of its own only tenuously related to its previous incarnation as Sansrkit. The reader will inevitably contaminate "karma" with associations ranging from book titles (Karma Cola comes to mind) to bumper stickers, my dogma ran over, etc etc. As for dharma, it is becoming domesticated, appears in some dictionaries (my Random House) and in such phrases as "He gave a dharma talk." IT will pick up denotations (roughly = Buddhist wisdom is the way I'm hearing it used) and also connotations, via all sorts of poetic means (Excuse me, you dropped your derma on my dharma.)--as it makes the journey into English, which is already happening due to the proliferation of books in English(i.e. dharma books) as well as magazines like Parabola and Tricycle. Richard Hayes' solution of translating dharma differentially by context seems about right, because there is no single word in English that has all the meanings of dharma in Sanskrit, as he has explained. However the alternative of translating dharma as dharma is attractive in that eventually the student would gain a deeper sense, via experience, of all the meanings of dharma. My suggestion would be to note that the original word is dharma parenthetically every time it appears in the translated text. This may be cumbersome but perhaps helpful in allowing the student to trace the term through all its ENglish permutations. Rodger Kamenetz enrodg@lsuvm ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 14:59:54 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Dhamma/dharma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Well, it has been quite interesting reading the considerable diversity of views on how to translate dharma. It is by the way in the latest Concise Oxford. The entry gives three meanings: 1. social custon; the right behaviour 2. the Buddhist truth 3. the Hindu social or moral law [Skr., = decree, custom] I won't defend this ! I would however like to question the assumption of many that dhamma necessarily has distinct meanings in its major Buddhist (and Hindu?) usages. In two ways: 1. The more trivial is that it is, like many things in Indian literature, often used with quite intentional multiple meanings. This shows up in some of the passages that Richard has recently cited. Should we not suspect it much more often ? (This is in addition to the fact that even narrowly defined it often crosses over the boundaries of the English terms we might choose to translate by. So for example the Buddhadharmas which have to be developed certainly include the body of 32 marks as well as mental qualities.) 2. Much more importantly, I want to argue that there are not in fact distinct and wholly separate meanings in such usages as the second refuge, the fourth establishing of mindfulness, dhamma prince, 'dhammaness' (dhammataa), dhamma eye and so on. I question whether, when in the Pali tradition we distinguish dhamma that you study (pariyatti) from dhamma that you practise (pa.tipatti) and dhamma that is penetrated (in enlightenment) (pa.tivedha), this refers to wholly different dhammas. Surely the difference is in the mode of approach not in Dhamma. Yes, the exegetes of North and South do make distinctions, but I suspect that this is for practical reasons. I suspect that they do not intend to wholly separate Dhamma from dhammas. For Edward Conze (Buddhist Thought in India p.92 f.) in the Mahaayaana, "the very distinction between 'dharma' and 'dharmas' had to be abandoned." The question for me is whether it was there to be abandoned. (See the discussion of this in Rupert Gethin's _The Buddhist Path to Awakening_ pp. 147-154). It is difficult to establish this with certainty, but I would postulate that the plural usage actually originates with the Buddha or in early Buddhism. (It doesn't seem to come from Jainism and the later occurrences in brahmanical sources are probably the result of Buddhist influence at some stage.) If so, why has the same word been used in such apparently different ways. Surely the simplest way of accounting for this is that in the Buddha's understanding they are not so different. To keep Richard Hayes happy (or at least to reduce his dukkha), I shall refer to this as the Buddha's ontology. In other words, in the early Buddhist ontology the Dhamma at large and multiple dhammas are one and the same kind of thing. I suspect that this is an insight that most of the major schools of Buddhism preserved in one way or another. What follows for translating? I would argue that if you translate dhamma/dharma separately, you are dividing what Buddhism has often sought to unite. And perhaps thereby falsifying the meaning? Moreover, in actual usage, at least for Ancient India and Southern Buddhism, there is the loss of an important quality which the word necessarily has if one frequently chants it in a devotional context. The best word I can find for that quality would be to speak of its numinosity. This perhaps slightly overstates the case, but in practice the key terms of Buddhism always have a quality which inspires an emotional response and often in practice one which is very moving. The actual value of Buddhist activities for, say the Buddhist s of Ceylon or Thailand, often lies in the touch of awe which they associate with things Buddhist. Lance Cousins -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 15:48:26 EST From: James Sanford Subject: Re: dharma and derma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Rodger Kamenetz' recent note on dharmakarma once again reminds us that it is high time to rid ourselves of that ugly neologism "Buddhaology." Are we not indeed, rather, all Dharmatologists? J. Sanford ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 23 Feb 1994 to 24 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Fri Feb 25 16:11:20 1994 Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 16:01:25 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 24 Feb 1994 to 25 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 12 messages totalling 600 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Understanding Experience (2) 2. Translating `dhamma' (3) 3. Announcement re; `autocommentary' 4. dharma and derma 5. searching for American Buddhist Congress details (2) 6. Experience versus reality (part 2) 7. Experience versus reality (part 3) 8. Heian Buddhism for French majors ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 16:30:15 EST From: Derek Heyman Subject: Understanding Experience ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The main point of Richard Hayes' message: "Rather than saying that Being and Reality are nothing apart from experience, I would be more inclined to say that, in a Buddhist context, reality has almost no connection at all with experience. Insofar as we get a grasp of reality, we do so despite our experiences." Although Dan Lusthaus has already done an excellent job in responding to this, I would add one point. Buddhist-oriented philosophizing originated with an experience, the Buddha's enlightenment experience. It was through this particular experience that ordinary experience was seen to involve an approach to reality which covered its aspect of quiescence while perpetuating its sorrowfulness. The enlightenment experience is, in principle, accessible to all. It involves a change in the perspective which one has on reality, but is still an experienceable reality. And it is from the new perspective that the arising of the conditioned factors of existence are seen for what they are. While an intellectual understanding of both aspects, the conditioned and unconditioned (or enlightened), is possible, and may have been all that many Buddhist philosophers have had in fact, such an understanding has a serious shortcoming in relation to the actual experience of awakening to the reality of existence. This shortcoming is that it is itself merely another conditioned experience, merely a way of relating ideas. I believe it is for this reason that the practice-oriented school, the Yogacara, have termed such understanding "vijn~apti-matra" or conception only. Referring to an earlier post of Richard's, the one about auto-commentaries, I believe it is because of the stress on the necesxsity of experiencing reality from the enlightened standpoint, at least in some Buddhist schools/sects, and not because of a love of exoticism, that many Buddhist philosophers practice zazen on zafus ("little round cushions"). This experience can help us to transcend the differences in our ways of thinking, linguistic and otherwise, which make the ancient Buddhist teachings so difficult to comprehend. Truly Buddhist wisdom (that is, the wisdom of awakening) must come from experience and not merely textual interpretation or logical analysis. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 24 Feb 1994 17:11:01 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Translating `dhamma' Here are two passages from the Pali canon in which `dhamma' is used in a way that makes it hard to discern its exact sense. I would be inclined to say that in both of these passages `dhamma' is best translated as `characteristic' or `virtue', but none of the published translations have taken it in that sense. Suttanipaata 886 (or 4.12.9) na heva saccaani bahuuni naanaa, a~n~natra sa~n~naaya niccaani loke| takka~n ca di.t.thiisu pakappayitvaa, sacca.m musaa ti dvyadhammam aahu|| Fausboell (1880): There are not many different truths in the world, no eternal ones except consciousness; but having reasoned on the (philosophical) views they proclaim a double Dhamma, truth and falsehood. Saddhatissa (1985): There are not many diverse tuths in the world except those which are surmised by [faulty] perception. Assuming mere sophistry in their views, they claim a duality -- `This is true and that is false'. Norman (1992): There are not indeed many various truths, (which are) eternal in the world, except by reason of (mistaken) perception. Devising a speculation in respect of their views, they say there are two things, truth and falsehood. Note: In what must be one of the earliest passages in Buddhist literature to warn against making false dichotomies, the phrase `dvaya-dhamma' appears literally to mean something like `the nature of a pair' or perhaps `the teaching of a pair'. Norman translates it as `two things' and Saddhatissa as `a duality'. I prefer Saddhatissa's rendering. Suttanipaata 1064 (or 5.3.4) naaha.m sahissaami pamocanaaya katha.mkathi.m dhotaka ka~nci loke| dhamma.m ca se.t.tha.m aajaanamaano, eva.m tuva.m ogham ima.m taresi|| Fausboell: I shall not go to free any one in the world who is doubtful, o Dhotaka; when thou has learned the best Dhamma, then thou shalt cross this stream. Saddhatissa (reading gamissaami for sahissaami): `It is not my practice to free anyone from confusion' said the Buddha. `When you have understood the most valuable teachings, then you yourself will cross this ocean.' Norman: I am not able to release anyone in the world who has doubts, Dhotaka. But knowing the best doctrine, thus you would cross over the flood. Note: One could just as well take `dhamma' here in the sense of virtue or truth, that is, the thing communicated by a teaching rather than the teaching as such. I prefer Norman's translation as it stands, except that I might be tempted to render the last line ` But knowing the highest truth, thus you would cross over the flood Okay, now I promise to stop sending tricky passages in which it is hard to translate the word `dhamma' or `dharma'. I have one simple question for Bob Morrell. How would you translate the phrase "nori no kado"? Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 08:49:03 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Announcement re; `autocommentary' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I disagree with Hayse's desire to avoid all sanskrit terms in English translations of Buddhist texts. My reason is somewhat complex. Most of the Buddhist texts I have translated contain redefinitions of the key terms they employ. This is a characteristic of Buddhist scholastic discourse. And it is found in meditation manuals as well. My feeling is that when a Buddhist text uses a piece of jargon in a in a special way, the crucial thing the translation should do is maintain inter-textuality. The text itself will redefine the term while at the same time refering, in effect, to its usuage in other texts. If you translate the jargon according to its local meaning, you lose the allusion to previous texts and the point of the passage is often lost. For example, when Nagarjuna says that pratityasamutpada is emptiness, he is attacking one aspect of abhidharmic literature using its own terminology as a weapon, bending back the word co-dependant origination on its original users. So we translate this term by some code-signifier which always translates the same sanskrit or TIbetan or Chinese word. We rely on the text to give it its new meaning and we keep interpretiveness out of our translation where jargon is concerned. Where allusion is not important, I would readily abandon jargon to interpretiveness. But that determination is key: is this jargon or is it a non-allusive statement? The answer to that question tends to determine whether I use "dharma" or "law" or "norm" or "religion" for the Tibetan word chos. Robin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 08:55:22 EST From: Robert Kelly Subject: Re: dharma and derma ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- You'll find dharma noted in the Supplement to the OED, with a date of usage in the late 18th Century. So it is older even in our language than karma. I made this point several weeks ago in this discussion, urging us to be happy with what we've got. If 200 years of (at first intermittent, later frequent) usage don't make a word English, what does? RK ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 08:56:29 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: Translating `dhamma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Thu, 24 Feb 1994, Richard P Hayes wrote: ........... > I have one simple question for Bob Morrell. How would you translate > the phrase "nori no kado"? > > Richard P. Hayes > Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec >I have one simple question for Bob Morrell. How would you translate >the phrase "nori no kado"? EXACTLY the way I did seven years ago: "Gate of the Law," i.e., the "[Buddhist] Law which is the Gate [to Enlightenment]." I have seen no persuasive arguments -- indeed, virtually no arguments at all -- why this would be an inappropriate rendering, especially in a Japanese poetic context. Some years ago I was chastised in a review of something I had written with the plaint: "When will people stop translating Dharma as `Law.'" When, indeed? Set me to thinking. So after reading some 75-100 replies on BUDDHA-L, mostly on the Sanskrit/Pali/Tibetan meanings of the term which Stcherbatsky "mistakenly" translates as "element" but which really should be rendered as something-or-other, I returned to my original question -- which had absolutely nothing to do with all this: why may I not translate "nori no kado" as "Gate of the Law," given the fact that the JAPANESE connotations of nori/hoo as often as not DO have the sense of "Law" -- whether or not this does or does not include the Sautrantika or the Madhyamika, or the Abhidharmika connotations of the term? And it didn't matter how many times I repeated this question. It was apparently a non-question. One of the lessons I learned along the way was that when those in the Southern tradition see the word "Chinese, Korean, Japanese," the message immediately times out. This ties in with a question I once posed months ago about how the Southern tradition accommodates theoretical diversity. I mentioned the word "Upaya" -- but apparently in the original Aramaic it means something like "the shepherd boy has three goats" -- or whatever. I have often considered writing an occasional message to the List for the benefit of those who may have inadvertently tuned in, and who might conclude that Buddhism is (by definition) Sanskrit/Pali linguistics. For any such who may be listening -- this is not intended for the Golden Age crowd -- don't be cowed by first impressions. Although we in East Asia appreciate the efforts of the S/P linguists -- there is much, much more to the story. Trust me. Or rather, trust yourselves -- be a light unto yourselves. Bob M ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University [note: NOT papaya, etc.] St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 Compuserve: 71640,1036 (314) 862-5418 (voice) (314) 935-4399 (off. FAX) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 08:58:39 EST From: "Randall R. Scott" Subject: Re: Understanding Experience ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Truly Buddhist wisdom (that is, the wisdom of awakening) must come from > experience and not merely textual interpretation or logical analysis. And would you say this experience, this "enlightenment" or "awakening," has -- as its rudimentary motivation and paradigmatic climax -- emotivity, not knowledge, perception, logic, analysis, wisdom, nonattachment, conceptualization or a lack thereof, epistemology, philosophy, and so forth (as paramount as ALL these are in a vehicular way toward an aesthetical experience, enlightenment, awakening). Cf. mahaasukha ("absolute pleasure"), sku (Tibetan: "Being-as-value"), viraaga ("indifference [to consequence of action]"), mahaaraaga ("[the centrality of] creative, sexual energy"?), yuugen (Jap.: "[the] mystery and depth [of phenomenal existence right on the evanescent surface-of-things]." Randy Scott Washington University in St. Louis ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 08:59:39 EST From: tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Subject: searching for American Buddhist Congress details ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear Colleagues, A following message reached me this morning. Would any of the BUDDHA-L subscribers be able to e-mail a useful reply to Ms.Julia Esparza ? ******* Dr. Ciolek: A professor at Armstrong State College in Savannah, GA USA requested a search on the organization called the American Buddhist Congress. I have general information such as the organization's address. I am also looking for information about its sources of funding and any ways that it exhibits political power. I obtained your name off of the Buddhist Electronic Resources Directory. I used the COOMBSQUEST gopher at your institution but could not find any information that matched what the professor would like to have. If you could point me in the direction of an electronic database that may have the information I am looking for I would appreciate it. I don't want to tell the professor the information doesn't exist when it might be available electronically in a source I haven't seen. If you know anything I would appreciate you help. If not thank you for making your email address available for questions. Thank you, Julia Esparza Reference/Bibliographic Instruction Librarian Armstrong State College Savannah, GA 31419 JESPARZA@EZMAIL.INDIANA.EDU ******** with many thanks, -================================================== Dr T. Matthew CIOLEK tmciolek@coombs.anu.edu.au Coombs Computing Unit, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia =================================================== ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 09:15:08 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Experience versus reality (part 2) Alas, poor Derek. He tries to engage in discussions about Buddhism, and people confront him with Bradley, Plato and Descartes. Ah well, all these distractions are no doubt intended as a clever tactic to help Derek cultivate bodhisattvic patience. It was Dan Lusthaus who brought Descartes into the picture, suggesting that I am pushing platonism and cartesianism rather than Buddhism. To the charge of crypto-cartesianism I must plead innocent. I know very little about Descartes except what I can infer from his names. Since his first name was Rene (reborn), I infer that he was not an arhant, and since his last name was Descartes (Some Menus), I infer that his family was in the restaurant business. Call me a snob, but these unpromising credentials have never inspired me even to read Descartes, let alone be influenced by him. Let us get down to a serious discussion of what our colleague Herr Professor Lustigmacher von Narrenhaus observes: Our good friend Richard has shown that after all this time and after all our skirmishes, his positions remain unaltered. I am moved by Dan's frank admission that he has yet to provide any compelling textual evidence or argumentation strong enough to make me change my positions. Despite this promising beginning, however, Doktor Funhouse's message goes on to make some more dubious claims. While I have no wish to repeat our protracted debates of the past, I do see that Dan has found his way into some interesting new errors that have yet to be corrected. Let me confine myself to discussing his most recent mishaps. It was my claim that, according to Buddhist philosophers, the momentary arising and perishing of things cannot be experienced but can only be inferred. Dan disputes this, claiming that experiencing the momentary birth and disappearance of all things is not only possible but a necessary condition of enlightenment. He then suggests that I reread Masaaki Hattori's masterpiece of scholarship, _Dignaaga, On Perception._ I shall gladly do so, for there is no text in my library that I have read more thoroughly and more repeatedly, and I am always pleased to have an occassion to study it yet again. But since it is a long work, might I ask whether there are any particular passages that Dan has in mind? It was my claim that according to Vasubandhu, one cannot experience a causal relationship. Dan disputes this and points out that in the Aggi-vacchagotta-sutta a character named Vacchagotta admits to seeing fuel causing fire. (Or did he see a fool cause a furor? I forget.) Need I point out that Vacchagotta is not Vasubandhu and that therefore quoting this sutta does not really bear on my claim? That minor quibble aside, I do not think we need to take the verb `see' (pa"s, d.r"s) quite so literally as Dan seems to be taking it. In Sanskrit and in Pali (as in English) these verbs meaning `to see' and their derivatives are very frequently used in the sense of thinking about things. Consider such passages as these from Naagaarjuna: astitva.m ye tu pa"syanti naastitva.m caalpabuddhaya.h| bhaavaanaa.m te na pa"syanti dra.s.tavyopa"sama.m "sivam|| MMK 5.7|| People of little intelligence who see (that is, think in terms of) the existence and non-existence of things do not see the blissful extinction that ought to be seen. nirmamo niraha.mkaaro ya"s ca so.api na vidyate| nirmama.m niraha.mkaara.m ya.h pa"syati na pa"syati|| MMK 18.3|| And he who has no `mine' and no `I' does not exist. Whoever sees (that is, believes in) one without a `mine' and without an `I' does not see (that is, does not understand). Consider also that a view (d.r.s.ti) is not merely an action of vision (although it may mean this) but also an act of understanding, which may or may not be correct. So even if some ordinary fellow in a sutta is portrayed as claiming to see fuel causing fire, there is no need to interpret this as a sensory experience. Do you see what I mean? This message grows long, and I can feel Chuck Pesbish growing restless, so let me take a break here and resume with further comments in a separate missive. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 09:31:16 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Experience versus reality (part 3) I claimed that, according to Vasubandhu, Dharmakiirti and some other Buddhist scholastics, causality cannot be experienced. Dan Lusthaus suggests that the abhidharma scholastics created causal categories that are difficult to perceive and that this might be the reason for Vasubandhu's claims that causality cannot be seen. Vasubandhu is much more straightforward than that. The reason that causal relations cannot be experienced, according to Vasubandhu and later Dharmakiirti, is that experience can only be about what is immediately present (sat). According to these philosophers, understanding causal relations requires that one remember conditions from the past, which are not present (asat). Therefore, recollection of past events cannot be done by the physical senses; it can be done only by the non-physical sense known as the mind (manas). Even the coming into being, the endurance and the eventual cessation of things can be `seen' only by the mind. These things cannot be experienced directly through the external senses. (See the long discussion of this point ad Abhidharmako"sa 4.2 ff) Dan suggests that the radical split between intellect and physical senses is a platonic and cartesian blunder to which the Indians were not heir, and his evidence for this is that the mind (manas) is regarded as a sense-organ. It is true that the mind is classed as a faculty or power (indriya), as are the five physical senses (and also, incidentally, the faculty of breathing and the penis and womb). But while all these aspects of the physical body and the mental body are regarded in general as powers, they are regarded in particular as very different kinds of power. The inner faculty is different in many very important ways from the external faculties. According to Buddhist abhidharma, the powers of the five external or physical senses are limited to discerning what is immediately present, whereas the mind can recall the past and anticipate the future; each of the physical senses can discern only one kind of object (such as colours, odours, sounds, etc), whereas the mind can discern all kinds of objects; the physical senses can discern things only in their particularity, whereas the mind can discern universals and abstractions and patterns. Most important, it is only the mind that can discern the general principles of impermanence, lack of self and universal disappointment that are crucial to gaining the understanding that is necessary for liberation. One does not become liberated by experiencing the particularity of a colour (which is a sensory experience) but by understanding the universal impermanence of dharmas. (See discussion at AdhKBh 6.14) If this is similar to platonism or cartesianism, so be it. Whatever this doctrine may resemble, it is purely Buddhistic. Dan says: Valid inferences can produce correct statements about what is the case, but what is the case is always the unique, perceptual particulars. This is not quite true. As I suggested above, impermanence is the case but it is common rather than unique, conceptual rather than perceptual and universal rather than particular. And so Derek, while I would urge you to continue giving Bradley wide berth, I might also counsel you be cautious about anything that Herr Professor Lustpiel or I tell you about Vasubandhu without checking with Vasubandhu first. I think if you give yourself about eight years to study and reflect on the Abhidharmako"sa that should be enough to build a solid enough foundation upon which to form an eventual understanding. Richard Paksha Hetuvid Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 10:54:48 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Translating `dhamma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Robert E Morrell writes: > So after reading some 75-100 replies on BUDDHA-L, mostly on the > Sanskrit/Pali/Tibetan meanings of the term which Stcherbatsky > "mistakenly" translates as "element" but which really should be rendered > as something-or-other, I returned to my original question -- which had > absolutely nothing to do with all this: why may I not translate "nori no > kado" as "Gate of the Law," given the fact that the JAPANESE connotations > of nori/hoo as often as not DO have the sense of "Law" -- whether or not > this does or does not include the Sautrantika or the Madhyamika, or the > Abhidharmika connotations of the term? And it didn't matter how many > times I repeated this question. It was apparently a non-question. Well, Robert, I thought my recent argument that dhamma is in some sense a 'numinous' term and that the different senses are essentially intended to blur into one another or merge in some way might apply to Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Vietnamese or other cases. I would be interested to know. However, not knowing those languages I can hardly discuss the matter. So it was intended as a response even if I didn't spell the matter out. Of course for the equally important languages of South-East Asia the issue often doesn't arise, since some form of dhamma/dharma has been naturalized. > One of the lessons I learned along the way was that when those in the > Southern tradition see the word "Chinese, Korean, Japanese," the message > immediately times out. This ties in with a question I once posed months > ago about how the Southern tradition accommodates theoretical diversity. > I mentioned the word "Upaya" -- but apparently in the original Aramaic it > means something like "the shepherd boy has three goats" -- or whatever. Well, how would you respond to discussions of Sinhala, Burmese, Mon, Shan, Thai, Lao, Khmer, etc. ! My impression is that there are rather few contributors from the Southern tradition on the InterNet. Or was this aimed directly at my comments or my lack of comments? Please elaborate as I am a bit mystified as to what produced this. I use dhamma rather than dharma because I have spent twenty years chanting in Pali and it has more meaning _for me_ than dharma or chos or ? I don't doubt that if I had spent that time chanting in Tibetan I would feel differently. One point. The Southern tradition has enormous theoretical diversity. It just isn't widely known in English and much has not been translated at all. > I have often considered writing an occasional message to the List for the > benefit of those who may have inadvertently tuned in, and who might > conclude that Buddhism is (by definition) Sanskrit/Pali linguistics. For > any such who may be listening -- this is not intended for the Golden Age > crowd -- don't be cowed by first impressions. Although we in East Asia > appreciate the efforts of the S/P linguists -- there is much, much more > to the story. Trust me. Or rather, trust yourselves -- be a light unto > yourselves. I rather enjoy reading discussions by specialists in Eastern Buddhism. I don't usually contribute because I don't know enough. I enjoy even more discussions of Sanskrit or Pali because I can easily go a month without meeting anyone with whom I could discuss such things. I suspect Japanese is a bit more available? Best Wishes, Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 11:10:33 EST From: mbury@ucdavis.edu Subject: Heian Buddhism for French majors ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I will be teaching, for the first time, a graduate Comparative Literature seminar called "Narratives of Loss." The major readings will be Proust, _Genji_, _Kokoro_. There is no graduate program in Japanese here, and I expect most or possibly all of my students to be French majors with little or no familiarity with Japanese history, literature or anything else. One of the things I want to do in the course is relate the general intellectual/spiritual climate of the time to the arching theme of loss in each of the books studied--or rather, to make it possible for my students to do this. Are there some appropriate, not-too-ambitious readings on the subject of mujoo, or on Heian Buddhism in general, that I can assign? Articles, rather than books, if possible? In English, or of course in French? I'd be grateful for any suggestions. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 13:48:15 EST From: "Nathan Katz, University of South Florida" Subject: searching for American Buddhist Congress details ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Here's the address: American Buddhist Congress 4267 W. Third St. Los Angeles CA 90020 tel. 213/386-8139 Ven. Dr. H. Ratnasara; Rev. Karl Springer; Ven. Dr. Do Ahn Kim ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 24 Feb 1994 to 25 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Mon Feb 28 16:31:08 1994 Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 16:01:20 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 26 Feb 1994 to 28 Feb 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 17 messages totalling 1069 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. On Internets, geese and buddhas (3) 2. Experience versus reality 3. Announcement re; `autocommentary' 4. Descarjuna 5. Heian Buddhism for French majors 6. Translating `dhamma' 7. Mahaparinirvana sutra (2) 8. Experience versus reality (part 3) 9. on dharma and prapa~nca 10. Sanscribbles? 11. Another translation query, if I dare. . . (2) 12. Dependent Origination 13. MtLK? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 07:05:52 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: On Internets, geese and buddhas In his excellent midrash on Suttanipaata 886, Lance Cousins summarizes the implication of the verse for the modern reader: The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating views as true or false. Since I had a bit of philological training, I still have a lingering tendency to seize upon irrelevant details in commentaries, thereby missing most of the important points of anything that is said. The philologist in me has become terribly intrigued by the word `InterNet'. (Is there really such a word? It's not in any of my dictionaries.) Aside from the fact that the word is entirely illegitimate because the prefix is Latin and the core word is Germanic, the word `InterNet' muddies the waters of our language by adding yet another term that resists clear logical analysis. (The computer industry has been pumping altogether too much raw etymological sewage into our language, and I urge all of you to write your congressional or parliamentary representatives to write legislation that would impose stiff fines and perhaps even the death penalty on electronics engineers who do any further damage to the language of Shakespeare and Milton.) As nearly as I can tell, `InterNet' is made up of `inter' (among, between) and `net' (a snare or trap) and therefore means something like among the traps. The traps, I take it, is an oblique reference to academic institutions, which enslave the minds of our unsuspecting youth until they are no longer capable of thinking and therefore are fit to be model citizens in modern society. I gather that some people who live in white houses prefer to refer to the Internet by the term `Information Superhighway'. Given that `supercilious' means `above the eyebrows', I gather that `superhighway' must mean `above the roadways built for cars'. To figure out what this term means, we must ask ourselves: What flies in formation above the highways? No sooner is the question asked than the answer becomes obvious: geese! Now what does the InterNet have to do with geese? Well, in folklore, geese are symbols of silliness. (Hardly a day passes in my life in which someone or other doesn't say to me: `You silly goose!') And, as anyone who has dealt with geese (especially Canada geese) at close quarters will attest, these birds can be most disagreeable. If anyone encroaches on their territory, they have a tendency to hiss and spit and make all manner of threatening noises. >From a purely philological perspective, then, it would appear that the meaning of the word `InterNet' is something like this: a forum on which academics can hiss and spit at one another like a gaggle of silly geese caught in a snare. But now the philologist retires in his scholarly glory and lets the bumbling philosopher have his say. Saith the philosopher: It is clear from a dozen or so verses in the Suttanipaata and the Udaana that the Buddha did not approve much of the almost universal human activity of getting involved in disputes and passing judgement on one another because of differences of opinion. The point of the often quoted parable in the Udaana about the blind men exploring an elephant through the sense of touch is not simply that each blind man formed a different opinion of what the elephant was like, but that the blind men argued with each other so vehemently that they actually came to blows. The Buddha made it very clear in a number of passages that he found disputation undignified, unattractive and unsuitable for wise people. How does one stop unprofitable disputes? One strategy, which has been adopted by a good many people over the years, has been to decry what some people have called binary thinking and others call dualistic thinking. Whatever term is used, what is referred to is the kind of analysis that involves the formation of conceptual dichotomies that partition the universe into two separate and opposed classes, such as `true' and `false' or `good' and `bad'. Some years ago I was in a very lively graduate seminar in which some fairly heated discussions took place. After class one day, a Korean student in the class said to me `We Asians do not think in the same way as you Westerners. Your thinking is dualistic, so you are always arguing about whose opinion is true and whose is false. But we Asians do not make such a fundamental opposition between true and false.' `It seems to me,' I replied to my Korean friend, `that you are suggesting giving up a very useful dichotomy and trading it in for a useless and perhaps even insidious dichotomy. Trying to distinguish between true and false strikes me as a fairly useful dichotomy. The distinction between Asians and Westerners, which you have just drawn, strikes me as a false dichotomy. So not only have you not given up dualistic thinking, as you claim to have done, but you are participating in the most pernicious possible kind of dualistic thinking, namely, that which trades in the sorts of false dichotomies that form the foundation of racism, sexism and other kinds of wrongful discrimination.' To my great surprise, my carefully worded response provoked my Korean friend into making a very heated response. There is nothing more pleasant to me than going after the truth of a matter, but there is nothing more unpleasant to me than a discussion tinged with anger. Therefore, rather than getting involved in a heated discussion, I changed the subject to something more pleasant. Trying to get rid of all binary thinking simply because some dichotomies are false and useless seems to me about as useful as getting rid of your brain in order to avoid getting a headache every now and then. This, it seems to me, is what some people who call themselves deconstructionists recommend. (I am not thinking of Derrida but of some American academics whom I have heard fulminate on the subject.) I should like to think that the Buddha was not being quite as inept as the aforementioned deconstructionists. Surely what the Buddha was recommending in the Suttanipaata was not giving up dualistic thinking altogether. Rather, as Lance Cousins made very clear, what is being recommended is abandoning the tendency to think less of other people when they hold views that cannot be reconciled with our own. So I would be inclined to revise the sentence cited above from Lance Cousin's midrash to read as follows: The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating people as worthwhile or useless on the basis of whether their views are true or false. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 08:41:38 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Experience versus reality ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard P Hayes writes: > Vasubandhu is much more straightforward than that. The reason that > causal relations cannot be experienced, according to Vasubandhu and > later Dharmakiirti, is that experience can only be about what is > immediately present (sat). According to these philosophers, > understanding causal relations requires that one remember conditions > from the past, which are not present (asat). Therefore, recollection > of past events cannot be done by the physical senses; it can be done > only by the non-physical sense known as the mind (manas). Even the > coming into being, the endurance and the eventual cessation of > things can be `seen' only by the mind. These things cannot be > experienced directly through the external senses. (See the long > discussion of this point ad Abhidharmako"sa 4.2 ff) In your understanding, does the same argument apply to one's experience of one's own mental states ? i.e. according to Vasubandhu one cannot experience one's own feelings. These too can only be the object of the sense of manas and one can, I think, only know a past mental state - past at least by one moment. > According to Buddhist abhidharma, the powers of the five external or > physical senses are limited to discerning what is immediately > present, whereas the mind can recall the past and anticipate the > future; each of the physical senses can discern only one kind of > object (such as colours, odours, sounds, etc), whereas the mind can > discern all kinds of objects; the physical senses can discern things > only in their particularity, whereas the mind can discern universals > and abstractions and patterns. Most important, it is only the mind > that can discern the general principles of impermanence, lack of > self and universal disappointment that are crucial to gaining the > understanding that is necessary for liberation. One does not become > liberated by experiencing the particularity of a colour (which is a > sensory experience) but by understanding the universal impermanence > of dharmas. (See discussion at AdhKBh 6.14) If this is similar to > platonism or cartesianism, so be it. Whatever this doctrine may > resemble, it is purely Buddhistic. Agreed that for Vasubandhu (and Buddhaghosa) only the mind can discern the general characteristics and therefore wisdom does not take place as purely sensory experience, at least in its higher stages. Agreed also that seeing can mean understanding, although I suspect there is some different nuance intended in such usages as ~naa.na- dassana. However, does this mean that wisdom (praj`naa) is a purely intellectual process ? In the Sarvaastivaadin system it is a universal component of consciousness, distinct from the Pali system where it is restricted to higher kinds of consciousness. This perhaps supports your case, but two things make me doubtful. 1. The distinction between the different kinds of wisdom. Wisdom derived from practice (bhaavanaamayii) is superior to that derived from inference or from external sources of information. Note that at Kosha VI Vasubandhu asserts the view (against the Vaibhaashikas) that it is born of samaadhi as opposed to that derived from inference which is born of correct reasoning or something similar. 2. The four nirvedhabhaagiya are explicitly stated to be exclusively derived from practice (Kosha VI 20). Since the object of the four is stated to be the four truths, the understanding of the truths, and therefore presumably of dependent origination and therefore equally the conditions, must be at least in its higher levels a product of meditative wisdom. What then did Vasubandhu think was the capability of the mind in meditation ? I suspect he thought it could do rather a lot. Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 08:42:09 EST From: B Bocking Subject: Re: Announcement re; `autocommentary' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The gist of your message I think is rthat you don't like the word 'autocommentary'. I hope I haven't missed the point. Could I make a similar plea agauinst the word 'e-mail'. Thank you Brian Bocking ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 08:42:21 EST From: Derek Heyman Subject: Descarjuna ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Tue, 22 Feb 1994, L S Cousins wrote: > Derek Heyman writes: > > > At MMK XXIV.18, Nagarjuna identifies dependent origination with emptiness, > > and calls this the Middle Way. As I understand it, he is bringing back > > the relational nature of reality, taught by the Buddha, but lost among the > > scholastic constructions of the abhidharmic commentaries. thus, dependent > > Is there any reason to suppose that any abhidharmic commentaries had been > written at the time of Naagarjuna ? Surely only shaastras (like MMK itself) > had been written in his time. > Why apply the term 'scholasticism' to abhidharma and not Madhyamaka ? > If one is, then so is the other. > _________________ To reply: I should be more careful. I didn't mean commentaries, but the Sarvastivadins and Sautrantikas, to whom Nagarjuna was responding. On the question of using the term, 'scholasticism',you are right. I think the reason I tend to think of the abhidharmikas as scholastics and not the Madhyamikas, is because Iwas viewing Nagarjuna as a sort of Descartes of Buddhism. The analogy is that Descartes ended the period of scholasticism and began the period called modern philosophy, and Nagarjuna similarly overcame abhidharma in beginning the Madhyamika, which provided the philosophical basis for Mahayana thought (similarly to the way Cartesianism has provided a basis, for better or for worse, to the modern, scientific world-view). This analogy is pretty inexact, however, and my terminology is entirely unjustified. As Lance writes, "If one is (scholastic), so is the other." I had not actually thought out that analogy before; it was just the activity of my store consciousness, clouding the present concern with a maturing seed planted during an old philosophy course. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 08:52:43 EST From: Rose Bundy Subject: Re: Heian Buddhism for French majors ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- This may not be what you are interested in, but there are the following studies of _Genji_, with which you should be familiar: Norma Field, _The Splendor of Longing in the "Tale of Genji"_ Andrew Pekarik, ed., _Ukifune: Love in "The Tale of Genji"_ Willian J. Puette, _Guide to "The Tale of Genji"_ Richard Bowring, _Murasaki Shikibu "The Tale of Genji"_ (Landmarks of World lit. series) Earl Miner, "Some thematic and structural features of the _Genji monogatari_" Monumenta Nipponica XXIV, 1-2. (sorry I don't have the year, but I think in the 1970's) A book-length study by Haruo? Shirane, the title of which escapes me. I hope this is of some help. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 08:58:51 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: Translating `dhamma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Lance --- In your message of February 25, you respond to my earlier message as follows, here abbreviated somewhat in the interests of space and reader patience: >Robert E Morrell writes: >> ...................................... why may I not translate "nori no >>kado" as "Gate of the Law," given the fact that the JAPANESE connotations >> of nori/hoo as often as not DO have the sense of "Law" -- whether or not >>[they do or do not elsewhere]......................................... >Well, Robert, I thought my recent argument that dhamma is in some >sense a 'numinous' term and that the different senses are essentially >intended to blur into one another or merge in some way might apply to >Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Vietnamese or other >cases. I would be interested to know. However, not knowing those >languages I can hardly discuss the matter. So it was intended as a >response even if I didn't spell the matter out. Of course for the >equally important languages of South-East Asia the issue often doesn't >arise, since some form of dhamma/dharma has been naturalized. >>>>>In your msg of Feb 14 you spoke of "numinosity" as follows: >What follows for translating? I would argue that if you translate >dhamma/dharma separately, you are dividing what Buddhism has >often sought to unite. And perhaps thereby falsifying the meaning? >Moreover, in actual usage, at least for Ancient India and Southern >Buddhism, there is the loss of an important quality which the word >necessarily has if one frequently chants it in a devotional context. >The best word I can find for that quality would be to speak of its >numinosity. This perhaps slightly overstates the case, but in >practice the key terms of Buddhism always have a quality which >inspires an emotional response and often in practice one which is >very moving. The actual value of Buddhist activities for, say the >Buddhists of Ceylon or Thailand, often lies in the touch of awe >which they associate with things Buddhist. I agree that "the key terms of Buddhism always have a quality which inspires an emotional response and often in practice one which is very moving," with some qualifications. This is surely true of any religious system, and is further complicated by the fact that this "important quality which the word necessarily has if one frequently chants it in a devotional context" will vary from society to society within the tradition. I am also somewhat troubled by the statement, "the key terms of Buddhism." Which "key terms"? Always? Everywhere? Their Sankrit/Pali rendering? As someone pointed out earlier, the transliteration for Dharma -- daruma -- never, or only minimally, was ever used by the Chinese or Japanese, except as a transliteration for [Bodhi]dharma, who reputedly brought Ch'an (Zen) to China. And I doubt if the hoo/nori TRANSLATION of Dharma could conceivably have retained even a fraction of the complex associations and connotations of the term in Southern Buddhism. There are, of course, numinous terms in Japanese Buddhism, but I think that Dharma/Hoo would fall rather far down the list. Given the fact that the denotations of equivalents rarely match EXACTLY, and the connotations -- which is where your numinosity resides -- is even more variable, I think there is even the danger of, say, MISTRANSLATING the Japanese hoo/nori back into S/P as dharma/dhamma! Consider this scenario. "Dharma" comes to Japan (via China, of course) as hoo/nori, with only a part of the connotations/numinosity that it has in its S/P context. Now my friend Jien writes a poem using "nori no kado" -- literally "Gate of the Law." If this were translated back into S/P using dharma/dhamma for "nori," the word would reverberate with all of the numinosity that is has in the Indian context. But it was not in JIEN'S phrase. Now suppose we translate the same poem into English and insist on using "Dharma" as the equivalent. Except for specialists in S/P, the term "Dharma" in an ordinary English language context is a bit more -- but not much more -- than an opaque noise with a few basic denotations. So why not "Law"? In any case, thanks for your thoughtful response. And best wishes. Bob M ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University [note: NOT papaya, etc.] St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 Compuserve: 71640,1036 (314) 862-5418 (voice) (314) 935-4399 (off. FAX) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 09:09:12 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Mahaparinirvana sutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Mr. Cohen is interested in the Mahaparinibanna sutta as it relates to the nikaayas. Then, if memory serves me from the days when I studied the Chinese text of that with Eric Zurcher (we spent just two seminars on it), the version which has been translated into English in three volumes from the Chinese Tripitaka will probably not answer Mr. Cohen 's needs. The events at the end of the Buddha's life are common to all versions, but the philosophy in the Mahayana version is quite different from that of the sutta. It is different in one version in the last thirty chapters, which are indeed about tathaagatagarbha theory. There's a little outline of the textual knowledge we have about different editions in Nakamura's INDIAN BUDHISM:A SURVEY WITH BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES. I was very interested in the Chinese commentarial tradition on the Mahaayaanisized versions, because they contained what I call fullness- of-emptiness discourse--- discussions of positive characteristics of the Buddha that in a sense "remain after emptiness"--- which can be positively established despite a Madhyamakan critique a la sunyata. What I saw in Zurcher's seminar was a rich discussion in the Chinese literature that carried forward the kind of talk in the Ratnagotravibhaga on the positive qualities of the Buddha. These seemed to parallel the exciting Buddhist Jonangpa philosophy--- a philosophy which went underground after Taranatha and is coming back into vogue now. Time and fate kept me from going further with that Chinese text, but if anybody is studying the buddhanature sections of the Mahaparinirvana , I'd be interested toknow. Robin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 09:11:19 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Re: Experience versus reality (part 3) ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Fri, 25 Feb 1994, Richard Pak.sa Hetvasiddha wrote: > I claimed that, according to Vasubandhu, Dharmakiirti and some other > Buddhist scholastics, causality cannot be experienced. > Sorry, Dan, but I am afraid that Richard is right about this. Causality is a conceptual fiction which Dharmakiirti retains because it allows us to know and act on particulars correctly. Dharmakiirti's skepticism therefore extends to inference itself, for it also operates through concepts. Nevertheless, inference is a reliable source of knowledge, for the concepts manipulated through inference arise _indirectly_ from particulars. In other words, inference is reliable because concepts are indirectly related to particulars through causality, which, of course, is a fiction. Pretty neat trick, huh? If you really want to torture yourself, you can see Karnakagomin's comments on PV1:34-36 on this issue. I suggest taking two extra strength tylenol before you begin. Richard was right above, but he is not right about this: > > Dan says: > > Valid inferences can produce correct statements about what is the > case, but what is the case is always the unique, perceptual > particulars. > > This is not quite true. As I suggested above, impermanence is the > case but it is common rather than unique, conceptual rather than > perceptual and universal rather than particular. > Not so! Impermanence is conceptually apprehended (at least by p.rthagjana), but it is never apprehended in the absence of a particular. Why? BECAUSE IT _IS_ THE PARTICULAR. This is Dharmakiirti's point when he discusses the inference: "A ewer is impermanent becasue it is created (k.rtakatva, another nasty word to translate)." The relation between predicate and evidence here is one of "identity" (taadaatmya), which basically means that if the evidence (the fact of being created) is an essential quality (svabhaava) of the subject, then the predicate in question (in this case, impermanence) must also be an essential quality of the subject. An objector comes along and snidely says, "Well if the evidence and the predicate are really the same thing, then the inference is just a tatutology, bozo." Dharmakiirti then launches into reams of dense Sanskrit verses and prose (in his autocommentary -- o, I have sinned. What am I supposed to call it, Richard?) in which he presents the theory of apoha. The point of his argument is that the predicate, evidence AND THE SUBJECT (pak.sa) are actually all the same thing: the particular. But because we dummies do not have the necessary conditions to determine or verify (ni'scaya) the impermanence, for example, of a ewer (gha.ta), we have to use inference to know what we already have seen. To do so, we conceptually divide the particular into at least three parts (the subject, the predicate, and the evidence, which is really another predicate). In other words, when direct awareness (pratyak.sa) apprehends the particular, it apprehends _everything_ about it, including its impermanence. But since we are confused by the similarity of successive moments of that thing (which moments are related causally, by the way), we think that the thing is not impermanent. So we need to use inference to prove to ourselves that it is impermanent, even though, in some sense, we already know it. This is made particularly clear by verse 43-45 and their accompanying a***commentary. It seems worth the effort to quote them: ekasyaarthsvabhaavasya pratyak.sasya sata.h svayam | ko 'nyo na d.r.s.to bhaaga.h syaad ya.h pramaanai.h pariik.syate|| If a thing's unitary essential quality is by nature directly perceptible, then what aspect of it would not be seen (by direct awareness) such that it would (need to be) known by other instances of instrumental knowledge? no ced bhraantinimittena sa.myojyeta gu.naantaram | 'suktau vaa rajataakaaro ruupasaadharmyadar'sanaat || (Indeed, no other instrumental awareness would be necessary) if one were not to conjoin (the perceived object with) another quality (that it does not have) due to some cause of error, as in the case of superimposing the cognitive image of silver onto a shell due to seeing a similarity in their respective forms. tasmaad d.r.s.tasya bhaavasya d.r.s.ta evaakhilo gu.na.h | bhraanter nis'ciiyate neti saadhana.m sa.mpravartate Therefore, when a real thing is seen (with direct awareness), all of its qualites are seen; if one does not apprehend those qualities due to some error, then evidence is used (to verify those qualities). All of the parenthetical phrases come either from the svopaj~nav.rtti, 'Saakyabuddhi, or Kar.nakagomin. The point of these verses is to demonstrate how one could have a direct awareness or perception of a partless particular and still not know that it was impermanent, for example. For purposes of the proof, the ewer's impermanence is conceptually distinguished from the ewer; in fact, the ewer and its impermanence are exactly the same thing. Hence, "impermanence" is not other than the particular in question; we conceptually distinguish from the particular in order to prove to ourelves (or others) that the particular in question is impermanent. But there is no real impermanence other than the particular itself. So I must disagree with Richard when he says that "impermanence" is conceptual, common, etc. It is true that "impermanence" is conceptually abstracted from the particular in the process of proof; as such it is conceptual, etc. But in reality, impermanence is nothing but the particular from which we abstract it. In this sense, it is not conceptual. Moreover, Dharmakiirti seems to say that persons such as arhats do not need to use proofs of impermanence and so on because they can experience particulars as impermanent. (Richard undoubtedly would like a specific reference, but I am too lazy to look for it right now.) By the way, the words for "seeing" in the above verses do refer to direct experience. This does not, however, invalidate Richard's observations about the dhaatu "d.r's'; the seeing is often only metaphorical. I hope that I have not bored you too much. anyavyaav.rttatvena John D. Dunne Study of Religion Harvard University ps -- I think it's my turn to say something about "dharma," but I have yet to ponder AK 2.46cd (thanks for the reference, Richard). Perhaps we've all had enough of "dharma," anyway. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 09:22:46 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Re: on dharma and prapa~nca ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In the not too distant past, Dan Lusthaus responded with a thoughtful message to my slapdash refelctions on MMK18.4-5. In speaking of upaadaan, For the last few years I have settled (with a minimum > of discomfort) on "appropriation" from upadaana. It not only "works" > as a general substitute (for all but the "fuel" contexts), but also > neatly dovetails into certain discussions going on in philosophical, > literary critical, and psychological circles around the term > "appropriation", discussions that I do not consider alien to buddhistic > concerns. Sounds intriguing. Could you briefly sketch the uses of "appropriation" in these other circles? Any suggestions for readings on the topic? In my earlier message, I said: > > how, > >by the way should one translate "abhinive'sa=mngon par zhen pa, a crucial > >Buddhist term). > Dan asked: > Why do you find "attachment" inadequate? > In some cases, "abhinive'sa" serves as a gloss of "adhyavasaaya" in Buddhist epistemological literature. I suppose my real problem is with "adhyavasaaya" which seems to mean something like "imaginitve construction." (The term, by the way, is used by the Naiyaayikas with the straightforward meaning of "ni'scaya." Dharmakiirti and his ilk give it a more negative tone.) To the extent that "abhinive'sa" can mean something like "adhyavasaaya," I am not satisfied with the translation "attachment." In many contexts I suppose that translation is adequate. I enjoyed your comments on "prapa~nca," Dan. You said: For Nagarjuna, it seems to function as a synonym for avidyaa, > the root problem. I agree -- some commentators seem to tie it closely to "satkaayad.r.s.ti"; as I recall, this comes up in that same chapter (18) in a number of the commentaries. For Yogacarins it is more or less synonymous with > vikalpa. I do not recall seeing the term very much in Yogaacaara literature, but I have only glanced through what Paul Griffiths calls "the Digests" (this term always makes me think of "Buddhhist Digest's condensed suutras"; maybe it would catch on). Where might I find "prapa~nca" in Yogaacaara work? I liked your other comments on "prapa~nca" as well. Especially: > > The (inadequate and homespun) example I usually offer my students is > the idea that logic "doubles" the world. Of anything, one can say that > it "is" or it "isn't", that x is "true or false" (to follow Frege's > notion of the Bedeutuung). Thus whatever is identified has two logical > possibilities (though only one, or maybe neither, is actually true). > Since everything in the world can be thus identified and thereby have > its possibilities "doubled", logic doubles the world. ... This seems to be Candrakiirti's interpretation, although he never (to my knowledge) actually speaks directly about duality in the context of "prapa~nca." As for your struggles with Hydra, I am not sure that I share your opinions on the difference between yogaacaara and Madhyamaka. But perhaps I will save that for a later posting, when I hope to raise something really fun, such as the "Yogaacaara" philosophers' opinions about "baahyaartha" (external objects). Richard tells me you might have something to say. > Anyway, John, I enjoyed your posting. But beware, Herr Hayes bites > back! Thanks, Dan. But I am not too worried about Richard's teeth. He may bark quite a bit, but he does not go so far as to bite. John Dunne Study of Religion Harvard University ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 09:26:31 EST From: "Phillip W. Hutto" Subject: Sanscribbles? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- My first posting to Buddha-l! Let me begin by saying that I've enjoyed being a lurker on this list for the last several months. It is a curious pleasure to sit in on the barroom brawling of the Buddhist intelligentsia :-) I am no Buddhist scholar myself but rather a Zen practitioner, computer scientist and sometimes faculty member. My question: I've noted the curious punctuations used in Sanskrit transliterations posted to Buddha-l. For example, the characters ("), (~), (.), and (|) in: na"sobhanasa.mj~naamutpaadayati| sa saddharma.m pratik.sipati| tena Would someone be kind and post a BRIEF explanation of these marks for an "outsider" or possibly point me to a descriptive reference? Regards, Phil Hutto ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 09:27:50 EST From: jht@vax.ox.ac.uk Subject: Another translation query, if I dare. . . ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear Buddha-l[overs], Anticipating anything from sclerous silence to smoking modems, I would be grateful to garner your learned opinions, judgements and inspirations, individual and/or collective, on the question of translating DU.HKHA/DUKKHA. I should hasten to add, however, that I shall be equally pleased to be informed about translating analogous/ equivalent terms from any other noteworthy language, e.g., Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Tokharian, Uiger, Manchurian, what have you. The more the merrier. I myself do not have a great deal to say on the matter, as I translate largely narrative texts (avadaanas and such), in which context is often the most important consideration. I use the long- standing 'suffering' often enough. And sometimes 'sorrow' seems to capture the moment rather well. However, alluding to the more technical language which appears to be the meat and potatoes (or should that be bread and butter? or rice and dhaal? or?) of the sages of Buddha-l, it has oft occurred to me that 'unsatisfactoriness' came very close to what is meant in a formula like the trilak.sa.na, but of course had the great disadvantage of sounding dumb as hell. I should only like to add that I noted in a recent posting that Herr Prof. Dr. Hayes may have meant du.hkha when he wrote 'disappointment'. My apologies, sir, if I have inferred incorrectly. In any case, 'disappointment' is provocative, though I shall have to stick into a few texts first before being able to express an opinion. Have the acute and erudite members of Buddha-l aught to comment on this? All opinions welcomed. Regards, Joel Tatelman, Wolfson College, Oxford. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 09:52:56 EST From: Nobuyoshi Yamabe Subject: Dependent Origination ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Professor Hayes says: (begin quote:) Something else that can never be experienced, according to Vasubandhu, is a causal relationship. The only thing we can actually experience is the presence of one thing followed by the presence of another; on seeing this, we infer that the earlier thing caused the latter. In other words, the entire operation of dependent origination is a mere abstraction and as such it is known only to the intellect, and never to empirical experience. This means that (if emptiness is synonymous with dependent origination, as Naagaarjuna says) emptiness can never be experienced. Rather, it is an intellectual construct that corrects the erroneous views that spontaneously arise out of our experience. (:end quote) He further says: (begin quote:) Vasubandhu is much more straightforward than that. The reason that causal relations cannot be experienced, according to Vasubandhu and later Dharmakiirti, is that experience can only be about what is immediately present (sat). According to these philosophers, understanding causal relations requires that one remember conditions from the past, which are not present (asat). Therefore, recollection of past events cannot be done by the physical senses; it can be done only by the non-physical sense known as the mind (manas). Even the coming into being, the endurance and the eventual cessation of things can be `seen' only by the mind. These things cannot be experienced directly through the external senses. (See the long discussion of this point ad Abhidharmako"sa 4.2 ff) (:end quote) I may be misunderstanding something, but I cannot quite follow this argument. It is true that senses cannot recognize the past and the future, so Vasubandhu may say this kind of thing somewhere. But he doesn't seem to say so in the AKBh ad AK 4.2f. The issue here is whether the destruction of conditioned elements (sa.msk.rta) requires destructive cause or not. According to Vasubandhu, an existing result requires its cause, but destruction, which is nonexistence, requires no cause. In his opinion, conditioned elements are destined to perish just by themselves. Thus, the argument concerns only the destruction of conditioned elements; it is not a discussion of "the entire operation of dependent origination." Vasubandhu indeed seems to prefer inference (anumaana) to seeing/observation (d.r"s-) here. However, his point is that we can decide only by inference whether a log is destroyed by fire or a log actually perishes by itself. This is an argument of very limited scope; I don't think Vasubandhu is discussing how to recognize the causality in general here. In the AKBh ad AK 3.25, Vasubandhu quotes a sutra saying: "Because, O monks, a monk has thus seen the dependent origination and the dependently originated elements as they are with correct praj~naa . . ." (yata"s ca bhik.savo bhik.su.naa pratiityasamutpaada"s ca pratiityasamutpannaa"s ca dharmaa eva.m yathaabhuuta.m samyakpraj~nayaa d.r.s.taa bhavanti . . .). Since praj~naa in the AKBh means intellectual judgement, this may support Prof. Hayes's argument. On the other hand, the _Suutraala.mkaarabha.sya_, which may well have been written by Vasubandhu, says as follows (ad MSA 6.4): "When people directly see the dependent origination of phenomena [in the way] that various phenomena arise depending on [their] respective conditions, . . ." (yadaa ca loko bhaavaanaa.m pratiityasamutpaada.m pratyak.sa.m pa"syati ta.m ta.m pratyaya.m pratiitya te te bhaavaa bhavantiiti / . . .). Here the context is that people wrongly stick to the view of aatman even though they are actually experiencing dependent origination. In a way this may be akin to Prof. Hayes's model of intellect correcting erroneous experience. But this passage at least suggests that we can somehow experience dependent origination. Also, the point here is not that the experience is wrong but that people do not understand their experience correctly. Dharmakiirti may clearly say that we cannot experience dependent origination. But as far as Vasbandhu is concerned, I'm not quite sure if he is saying exactly the same thing. Nobuyoshi Yamabe ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 13:45:41 EST From: DanLusthaus Subject: Re: On Internets, geese and buddhas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard's charming drash (a more accurate way of describing how someone produces a midrash; usually when what is being drashed is a line or two, that's drash; when an entire allegory, etc. is produced, that's midrash) on the term internet shows how far a rambunctious philologist, with obviously little to do but post email messages [yes, an answer to Richard's last posting on "experience" is coming - when I have a moment to write it], can go with an a mistaken etymology. Richard writes: >As nearly as I can tell, `InterNet' is made up of `inter' (among, >between) and `net' (a snare or trap) and therefore means something >like among the traps. The traps, I take it, is an oblique reference >to academic institutions, which enslave the minds of our >unsuspecting youth [.... and so on] Net, as "networkers" know, is an abbreviation for "network", not for net (jaala). Why did they drop the "work" from "internet" ? Because that's what doesn't get done while one wastes time internetting. Dan Lusthaus Bates College dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 13:46:50 EST From: flehman@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu Subject: Re: Another translation query, if I dare. . . ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > >Dear Buddha-l[overs], > Anticipating anything from sclerous silence to smoking modems, >I would be grateful to garner your learned opinions, judgements and >inspirations, individual and/or collective, on the question of >translating DU.HKHA/DUKKHA. 'suffering', 'sorrow', 'unsatisfactoriness'and even 'disappointment', seem to be all special cases of obvious philosophical significance for a perfectly general gloss, this being either'difficulty' or even 'problem'. I would not make this remark were it not for the fact that this is precisely the general sense with which the word is borrowed into ordinary colloquial Burmese, which at least suggests that it is the way the Paal.i word is broadly understood in a language and in a community that has been intimately connected not only with (Theravaada) Buddhism but, more especially, with scholarship and textual exigesis for a very long time. In this language the word occurs altogether commonly in the expression we use in agreeable reply to practically any request or suggestion, namely 'doukkha. mahyi.bu:' [lit.: 'there's no dukkha' *doukhka.* in Burmese pronunciation], which is to say 'no problem!' No doubt the most cosmic 'problems' are fundamental suffering and all that, but still the general point of this piece of doctrine, it seems to me, is that, one way or other, the consequence of attachment and the like will be things and situations that are (cause) problems; from which, surely, it follows that it is all quite 'unsatisfactory'. Chit Hlaing > > F. K. Lehman 217-333-8423 Anthropology and Linguistics FAX:217-244-3490 University of Illinois 109 Davenport Hall 607 S. Mathews Avenue Urbana, IL 61801 ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 14:34:46 EST From: Don Hill Subject: MtLK? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Would anyone know of a reference marker such as_MtLK_in the literature? Any assistance always appreciated. Don Hill donhill@wimsey.com ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 14:52:09 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: On Internets, geese and buddhas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Mon, 28 Feb 1994, Richard P Hayes wrote: > In his excellent midrash on Suttanipaata 886, Lance Cousins > summarizes the implication of the verse for the modern reader: > > The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on > the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating views as true > or false. I agree completely with this. > > Since I had a bit of philological training, I still have a lingering > tendency to seize upon irrelevant details in commentaries, thereby > missing most of the important points of anything that is said. The I disagree completely with this. The irrelevant details are the whole point. See below. (If the subject line was not adequate warning, I can't imagine what would be). > philologist in me has become terribly intrigued by the word > `InterNet'. (Is there really such a word? It's not in any of my > dictionaries.) As any goose is aware, what we are dealing with here is known as a 'proper noun', meaning a noun whose sense of propriety prohibits it from appearing in a common dictionary. Chicago is not in any English dictionaries either, but can be found in the commonly appended dictionaries of geography. To find the word InterNet, refer to the virtual reality appendix; or due to the extreme properness of the InterNet, you might have better luck with the Who's Who in Virtual Reality Spaces. By the way, is anyone aware of studies of the new syntactical structures introduced into the language by Wayne and Garth of Saturday Night fame? Are they the popularization of the slang of a subculture, true inventions, minor lexical modifications of existing syntax, or a passing fad? > From a purely philological perspective, then, it would appear that > the meaning of the word `InterNet' is something like this: a forum > on which academics can hiss and spit at one another like a gaggle of > silly geese caught in a snare. I am sure United States regulations will soon prohibit anything this funny from crossing our national border, when humor is classified as military armament along with encryption systems. (We are proud of our Freedom of Speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rigts; we can say whatever we want, but the police have to be able to make recordings. Needless to say, due to the rigorous selection standards for FBI agents, they cannot distinguish funny jokes from subversive criminal activity. Since the CIA is strictly prohibited from domestic investigations, any domestic computer networks will be routed directly through their offices so they can be sure not to accidently tap into them. Furthermore, any illegal tapping will require the cooperation of at least two crooked administrators to make sure the various agencies don't get the drop on each other. Of course we need a half dozen secret police agencies because in a free country there is no other way for the government to engage in criminal activity. Excuse me, there are two men in dark suits and sun-glasses knocking on my office door). > How does one stop unprofitable disputes? I suggest the first task, and by far the most formidable, is to identify them. > The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on > the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating people as > worthwhile or useless on the basis of whether their views are > true or false. One of the greatest, indeed one of the few pleasures remaining to me at all, is the evaluation of people as useless, ignorant and defective. I suggest that this is a harmless pleasure, since no one really cares what I think, as well as a satisfying one; also, unlike most other vices, it has no adverse effects upon the liver and kidneys. I would propose a further amendment (at this point L. S. Cousins should be weeping profusely into his keyboard): The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating people as worthwhile or useless on the basis of whether one thinks their views are true or false, and then insists on bashing them about the virtual ears relentlessly to force them replace their mistaken views with one's own. Seriously, the main virtue I have found in debating view, is when I discover upon defending my position that I don't understand it myself. For example, I recently discovered that I don't know what language is, what it produces, how it functions, or if it has any ultimate value. Fortunately my ability to abuse it continues unabated in spite of my ignorance. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein goldstel@essex.hsc.colorado.edu "It is a sin to believe evil of others, but it is seldom a mistake." ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 15:46:08 EST From: "Richard S. Cohen" Subject: Mahaparinirvana sutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I thank Robin Kornman et. al. who addressed my initial inquiry concerning the Mahaayaana Mahaaparinirvaa.na suutra. At this point it is time to confess that my scholarship on Indian Buddhism moves along strange and idiosyncratic vectors. My interest in this suutra does not stem primarily from its discussion of the icchantika doctrine, or that of the tathaagatagarbha, but rather from the prominent role the Buddha's son Raahula plays therein. Raahula's role is not that of active interlocutor. Instead, he is used throughout as an example. Raahula's relationship to his father is constantly invoked as the ideal model of the relationship between the Buddha and all sentient beings: "The Tathagata pities, protects, and with an undivided mind, sees beings as he does his Raahula." That Rahula would bear such a relationship to the Buddha is not surprising. The fact is, however, that this kind of association is not often drawn in Buddhist Sanskrit literature. I say "sanskrit" consciously, because it is possible that these frequent mentions of Raahula were added by the suutra's Chinese redactor. Does anybody have observations on that matter? Indeed, my reason for inquiring about the nikaayic relationship of this text derives from parallel discoveries from literary and art-historical sources which suggest that the Muulasarvaastivaada nikaaya placed an unusual emphasis upon the Buddha's son. I have reason to believe that the Mahaayaana Mahaaparinirvaa.na was created, at least in part, within a Muulasarvaastivvada milieu. Towards the beginning of the first book, Sakyamuni is made to say that he received his final milk-rice as a bodhisattva from *Nanda and *Nandabala (Yamamoto, vol 1, p. 32). There exist many different versions of this tale, but only those associated with the MS vinaya and the Divyaavadaana name two girls as providing the rice, Nanda and Nandabala. May the merit I gain by posting this message be transformed into a wealth of new references concerning Raahula and the Muulasarvaastivaada nikaaya! Richard S. Cohen, University of Michigan ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 26 Feb 1994 to 28 Feb 1994 *************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Tue Mar 1 16:31:29 1994 Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 16:00:46 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 28 Feb 1994 to 1 Mar 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 15 messages totalling 613 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. On Internets and geese 2. Electronic Sanskrit 3. On Internets, geese and buddhas (2) 4. Descarjuna 5. Another translation query, if I dare. . . 6. Mahaparinirvana sutra 7. Translating `dhamma' 8. Buddhist Resources Online 9. Investigation and awakening (2) 10. The intellect and praj~naa 11. dates 12. Zafu! gesundheit! 13. Heian Buddhism for French majors ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 16:23:26 EST From: Leigh Charles Goldstein Subject: Re: On Internets and geese ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Mr. Hayes submits the following caution: > The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on > the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating people as > worthwhile or useless on the basis of whether their views are > true or false. The distinction between the person and the views they hold might be most helpful in this regard. We may find these views to be in error. They might be confused, incorrect, or even seriously misleading. On the other hand, the person is the fool who holds these mistaken views. ---------------------------------------------------------- Leigh Charles Goldstein "It is a sin to believe evil of others, but it is seldom a mistake." -Menken ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 06:20:20 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Electronic Sanskrit It has been some time since this was circulated, and many new subscriptions to BUDDHA-L will not have seen it. ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF INDIC LANGUAGES IN ROMAN SCRIPT One of the purposes of this list is to provide a forum for discussing the languages in which the Buddhist traditions have been transmitted. For most Asian languages there are established conventions for transliteration into the Latin alphabet. But many of these conventions require the use of diacritical marks. Sending such texts by electronic mail requires its own set of conventions. Sanskrit and Pali both require extensive use of diacritical marks. I suggest that for the purposes of these discussions we adopt the set of conventions being used on the Indological Forum (Indology@liverpool.ac.uk) and by the (now dormant) Sanskrit Syntax group. These conventions are in fact the commands used to print Devanagari in the fonts designed by Frans Velthuis for TeX typesetting software. I find them simple and intuitive. Velthuis's conventions are as follows: 1) LONG VOWELS ARE DOUBLED. (This also happens to be phonetically correct.) The vowels of Sanskrit, then, are a, aa, i, ii, u ,uu etc. 2) CONSONANTAL DIACRITICS PRECEDE THE CONSONANTS MARKED BY THEM. Thus the retroflex class of vowels and consonants is written: .r .t .th .d .dh .n .s Visarga is written: .h The palatals that take diacritics are: ~n and "s The guttural nasal is written: "n 3) DA.N.DA IS WRITTEN | Since quotation mark (") has been appropriated as a diacritic, one can use doubled open and close quote marks to indicate quotation: ``This is within quotation marks.'' Since all of us can distinguish Sanskrit from English and can probably make a good guess at distinguishing between words that are being used and words that are being mentioned, I propose that we minimize the use of quotation marks. That is, instead of writing: The word ``"sabda'' means word. one could just as well write: The word "sabda means word. To give you some idea of what Sanskrit looks like when these conventions are followed, here is the opening paragraph of the "saalistambasuutram (a mahaayaana suutra) eva.m mayaa "srutam| ekasmin samaye bhagavaan raajag.rhe viharati sma g.rdhrakuu.te parvate mahataa bhik.susa"nghena saardhamardhatrayoda"sabhirbhik.susahasrai.h sa.mbahulai"s ca bodhisattvamahaasattvai.h| athaayu.smaan "saariputro yena maitreyasya bodhisattvasya mahaasattvasya ca.mkramas tenopasamakramiit| Richard Hayes ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 08:42:59 EST From: Carol Zaleski Subject: Re: On Internets, geese and buddhas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I've always thought "Internet" must be a corruption of "Indra's Net." Carol Zaleski Smith College cgzaleski@smith.smith.edu ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 08:43:29 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Descarjuna ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- "On the question of using the term, 'scholasticism',you are right. I think the reason I tend to think of the abhidharmikas as scholastics and not the Madhyamikas, is because Iwas viewing Nagarjuna as a sort of Descartes of Buddhism. The analogy is that Descartes ended the period of scholasticism and began the period called modern philosophy, and Nagarjuna similarly overcame abhidharma in beginning the Madhyamika, which provided the philosophical basis for Mahayana thought (similarly to the way Cartesianism has provided a basis, for better or for worse, to the modern, scientific world-view). " The guy who wrote this has already admitted that he was speaking im- precisely, but I just wanted to add my agreement. Let's not use the term "scholasticism" just to refer to the abhidharmikas. I use it all the time to refer to medieval Buddhist commentators of all sorts. The reason is equally vague. If a person is trained in arts of formal reasoning, places a lot of emphasis on commentaries and the commentarial tradition, and engages in detailed scholarly debate on a point-by-point basis, I call him or her a scholastic. My guideline is generic. I take Albertus Magnus and Thomas Acquinas to be examples of scholastics par excellence and call medieval Buddhist scholars scholastics if the form of their work resembles those two. What do other people think? It would be nice if there were some agreement about this term, even if it were not a big fat formal agreement. Robin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 08:46:12 EST From: DanLusthaus Subject: Re: Another translation query, if I dare. . . ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Joel Tatelman asks: >I would be grateful to garner your learned opinions, judgements and >inspirations, individual and/or collective, on the question of >translating DU.HKHA/DUKKHA. I forget who originally came up with it, but "dis-ease" has always struck me as apt. Dan Lusthaus Bates College dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 08:46:55 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Mahaparinirvana sutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard Cohen suspects that the Mulasarvastivaadins (I mispelled it) especially emphasized the Buddha's relationship with his natural son. And he adds that they are the ones who have two women offering him his rice-milk under the bodhi tree. Why? What's the idea? I'm burning with curiosity. Why would those guys get so personal with the Buddha? Why did they care about his family lineage? What's the narrative idea? I mean, what Buddhist sage heroes have important sons? Robin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 08:47:42 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Translating `dhamma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The back-and-forth between Roberto Morrel and Lance about the "numinosity" of the Buddhist use of the term "Dharma" and its translations evoked a curious thought in me. To tell you the truth, I do not find this word in Chinese, Sanskrit, Pali, or Tibetan to be particularly numinous or to produce the said sense of religious awe. I find that its associations in most languages I know are, although quintessentially religious, more involved with a sense of norm, duty, respect, and word. And loyalty and orthodoxy and lecture situations and authority relations. For example, there is the interesting way the Chinese use the term "cheng fa" (true dharma, orthodox dharma). It's usually a translation for sad-dharma. But I notice that the Gold Mt Monestery people translate it as "the Orthodox Dharma." They mean that people might misteach the dharma, but they do it in the proper, correct, traditional way. IT is a very Chinese approach to the concept of authority. Almost legalistic. Now, I believe the Tibetans translate sad-dharma as "dam.pa'i chos" which I usually translate as "holy dharma." (1325 in the Mhvyt.) Again, that's the way a Tibetan, I would say, would assert authority.By saying that this is the "holy" one. Now, compare this translations with the Chinese word "Tao" which we translate sometimes as "the Way." There is a truly numinous term. It always has a sense of the hidden and the mysterious about it. And Chinese Taoist literature, both sacred and so-called secular, has lots of words for numinousness, such as "ling" (Matthews 4071). Think of all the Taoist poetry with its "numinous clouds" and "purple pylons" and "celestial masters" wearing jade and cloudy silken costumes. There the aim of the poetry and the associations sought are of the mysterious, the hidden, the delicate, secret, subtle, ethereal distant light. If we're translating Buddhist poetry from Chinese or Japanese and trying to catch the subtle resonances, I think we should keep in mind how the sound or subtle quality of that poetry in its cultural context would contrast with other poetic genres and sub-spheres of culture. There in the Far East you have intensely numinous verse localized around the Taoist tradition. When Buddhist verse sounds a note closer to that poetic traditions qualities, I would let the English terms express numinosity. When the Buddhist poetry sounds more formal, legalistic, less esthetic, more militaristic and imperial, more concrete, then I would translate it away from the Taoist sense. This exact problem occurs in translations of the Chinese novel, Hsi Yu Chi, Journey to the West. It is a vast comedy about the journey from China to India of a Buddhist monk and a company of Taoist magicians. It was written in the context of a syncretic religious movement called the San Chiao He-yi, The Unification of the Three Schools. There Buddhist terms must contrast with Taoist terms and there must be a different register for the two regions of discourse. For example, the Taoists can fly and are light as air. They can transform shape and see the invisible, numinous world of spirits. The Buddhist monk is more self-controled and utterly ethical and full of discipline. He stands for the Cheng fa, the orthodox, the straight Dharma. They stand for the numinous quintessence and the mysterious Tao. In Tibetan texts of native Buddhist narratives, the same subtlties should be observed, I believe. Because some passages evoke the Central Asian Taoist alchemical elements, some shamanistic religion, and some Indic Buddhism. The strands are woven together, but we translaters need to separate them first in order to then translate them. Robin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 08:55:26 EST From: "Thorton_~Prime_at_lmu-acad1"@lmumail.lmu.edu Subject: Buddhist Resources Online ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I am currently compiling a list of Buddhist resources available online. Please mail me any information you may have on any of the following: o Buddhist Bulletin Boards o Buddhist Discussion Forums o Buddhist Online Archives and Databases o Buddhist Listservs and Mail-lists I will post my findings in a few weeks. Thank you, Thornton Prime thornton@netcom.com ThorPrime@aol.com ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 08:58:57 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Investigation and awakening [My apologies if this is a duplication. It was originally sent out last week but appears to have been sent by mistake to the Whitehouse or some other document shredding centre.] To my earlier remarks on experience, Derek ripostes by saying: > Buddhist-oriented philosophizing originated with an experience, the > Buddha's enlightenment experience. Philosophizing, I think, began not with the Buddha's experience itself but rather with the Buddha's attempt to interpret his experience and explain it to others and convince others that his experience was not merely an hallucination or a wild idea but an accurate reflection of how things really are. Because what he said was sometimes vague, people had to work to make it more precise. Because what he said was questioned (and therefore questionable), it had to be investigated. It is this investigation that makes up the enterprise of philosophy and scholasticism. I think this enterprise is a profitable one. > Referring to an earlier post of Richard's, the one about > auto-commentaries, I believe it is because of the stress on the > necesxsity of experiencing reality from the enlightened standpoint, > at least in some Buddhist schools/sects, and not because of a love > of exoticism, that many Buddhist philosophers practice zazen on > zafus ("little round cushions"). My point about the little round cushions, as I'm sure you realize, was not intended to be a criticism of people who study the dharma, investigate it and try to apply it to their daily lives. These activities are precisely what I endorse. What I was commenting on in this admittedly flippant remark was the tendency that some neophytes have of getting caught up in the external trappings of robes, beads, talismans, zendos, bowing with folding hands and all manner of other exotic affections that have nothing to do with living the dharma. It sounds as if we are in complete agreement about the necessity of getting through the shallow stages of mere imitation and into real practice as quickly as circumstances will permit. > This experience can help us to transcend the differences in our ways > of thinking, linguistic and otherwise, which make the ancient > Buddhist teachings so difficult to comprehend. Be careful not to reify experience. You make it sound as if there is one single type of awakening experience in which all awakened people partake, thereby transcending their differences. But there is no reason to believe that this is true and there are many reasons to believe it is false. The best evidence for its falsity that I can think of is the great diversity of accounts of the awakening experiences of different arhants and awakened masters. Rather than saying this experience helps us transcend our differences, I'd prefer to say these many kinds of awakening experience help us be at home with our many unbridgeable differences. THere is no need to transcend that with which one feels comfortable. > Truly Buddhist wisdom (that is, the wisdom of awakening) must come > from experience and not merely textual interpretation or logical > analysis. On this I think you will find complete agreement from almost everyone. I have never met anyone who has said that textual interpretation and logical analysis is a sufficient condition for awakening. I would not even say they are necessary conditions. Just pretty useful tools in the work of understanding the dharma in order to live by it. To my great surprise, I sometimes encounter people who seem to deny that study, reflection, thinking and philosophizing have any positive role to play in being dharmacentric. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 09:01:01 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: The intellect and praj~naa 1. Lance Cousins asks whether it is my understanding of Vasubandhu that he claims that one cannot directly experience one's own feelings, since this can only be the object of mind (manas), which is capable of comprehending only that which is at least one moment past. Yes, that is my understanding of Vasubandhu's position, but I may be mistaken in my interpretation of him. 2 Lance also points out that there is a distinction between wisdom that comes from inference and thinking (cintaamayii praj~naa) and wisdom that is derived from practice (bhaavanaa-mayii). The latter is said to be born of samaadhi (which I leave untranslated for the nonce). Does this not cast doubt upon my claim that wisdom is purely intellectual in nature and not experiential? Yes, this consideration does cast doubt upon the claim that wisdom is purely intellectual in nature and not experiential. Fortunately, it is not my claim that wisdom is exclusively intellectual in nature. My claim (if I may be pardoned for quoting myself with new emphasis added) was this: Coming to an understanding of the falsity of our intuitions requires *more* than simply having other kinds of experience. It *also* requires some understanding of what is logically possible. In other words, it is only through the study of metaphysics that the errors of experience can be understood. But even when one understands them, one continues to experience things in the same old way: incorrectly. As Dan Lusthaus has rightly pointed out, the last sentence is too broad. It would be more correct to say that there are *some* things that one can never experience correctly, namely, momentariness. On the question of praj~naa, I am inclined to agree with Paul Williams in his observation that we are being a bit too generous when we translate praj~naa as wisdom. Wisdom, as used in European philosophy, implies good judgement. Praj~naa, on the other hand, is nearly always glossed by the word ni"scaya, which just means certainty and conviction. The progression to which Lance refers is that which goes from the conviction that arises from hearing the dharma taught (the dharma sounds pretty good to me), to the conviction that arises from thinking about it (yes, the dharma seems pretty reasonable), to the conviction that arises from putting it into practice (the dharma has transformed my life). It is natural, I think, for anyone to become more deeply convinced of a set of principles as a result of investing effort into living by them (except in those cases where the principles really dramatically let one down in some way, such as when one votes Conservative, which I hasten to add I have never done). But surely one would not wish to claim that a person is wise (showing good judgement) simply because the person has deep and unassailable convictions. (I cite the entirety of human history as a counterexample.) On the question of how one arrives at knowledge some very important principles, such as the contents of the four nobles truths, Vasubandhu, in his discussion of the foundations of mindfulness (sm.rtyupasthaana) at AKBh 6.14cd, says that one cultivates mindfulness by attending to physical or mental properties (dharma) by attending to their particular features (svalak.sa.na, glossed as svabhaava) and to their general features (saamaanya-lak.sa.na). The general features of dharmas are their impermanence, their impurity, their painfulness, their emptiness and their impersonal nature (anaatmataa). Elsewhere (I'll supply the exact passage later), Vasubandhu states that the particular natures of dharmas are apprehended through the external senses, but the general characters are apprehended only by the mind (manas). This suggests to me that the correct practice of mindfulness has an intellectual component that acts to correct the false beliefs that arises from the intuitions that arise from unreflective experience. 3. Nobuyoshi Yamabe correctly points out that AKBh ad AK 4.2 discusses the issue of whether the discussion of conditioned elements requires a separate cause. And he asks what this has to do with the more general claim I made to the effect that Vasubandhu's position is that causality in general cannot be epxerienced. Within that discussion someone makes the claim that one can actually *see* fire destroying firewood, and this therefore proves that the destruction of something is caused by an agent. In rejecting this view, Vasubandhu makes the claim that all we actually *see* is the presence of firewood, then the presence of fire, then the absence of firewood. From seeing this sequence of events, we conclude that fire destroyed firewood. By parity of reasoning, it seems to me that Vasubandhu would also have to claim that when we see the absence of an oak, then the presence of an acorn and then (many years later) the presence of an oak, we arrive at the conclusion that the acorn was one of the causal factors in the production of the oak. But we cannot *see* the acorn causing the oak. Rather, the imputation of causality is an interpretation of what we see. Mr Yamabe's quotation from Suutraala"nkaarabhaa.sya, however, is strong evidence that there was at least one Buddhist (perhaps Vasubandhu himself) who, for at least the length of time required to compose a sentence, believed that one can experience dependent origination directly (pratyak.sam pa"syati). Thank you for this quotation, Mr Yamabe. I will file it away in my shoebox filled to overflowing with strange things said by Buddhist philosophers. 4. John Dunne's point about Dharmakiirti requires a technical response that it will take me several days to find time to write. Since the good folks of BUDDHA-L need a respite from these long messages, I'll post my response directly to John (with copies to anyone else who is REALLY interested in taadaatmya). In hopes that this message bored you to tears and helped you attain a valuable insight into the first noble truth, the pile of impersonal, painful and transient dharmas that wrote this message hereby decomposes, wishing you all a pleasant moment. Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 09:47:01 EST From: "Thomas Lowe Jr." Subject: Re: Investigation and awakening ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dr. Hayes wrote: >..dharmacentric Ouch!! Will we soon be hearing the terms "autodharmic," "multidharmic'" and even"dharmically correct" (DC)? I really do appreciate your dyspeptic humor, though. Tom _________________________________________________________________________ Tom Lowe, Box 2050, Jackson, MS 39225-2050 The tygers of wrath are wiser tlowe@ccaix.jsums.edu than the horses of instruction tomlowe@well.sf.ca.us -Blake ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 10:28:14 EST From: Jan Nattier Subject: Re: On Internets, geese and buddhas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > I've always thought "Internet" must be a corruption of "Indra's Net." Yeah, anything can happen in those Prakrits... ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 13:45:06 EST From: "Nathan Katz, University of South Florida" Subject: dates ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- For a piece of writing I'm doing, I need some dates. Perhaps some Buddha-Lers know the birth/death years (as applicable) of the following: Lama Thubten Yeshe, Bhikkhu Bodhi, TRV Murti, Lama Anagarika Govinda, Jamyang Norbu. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 13:46:16 EST From: James Peavler Subject: Zafu! gesundheit! ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On the subject of experience and philosophy. It has been my experience that in many American Zen centers enlightenment is demonstrated by one's skill in sitting in the dark and pretending to be Japanese. Serious practitioners must somehow get through this and down to business. Sometimes reading, analysing, philosophizing is very helpful to those who suffer from the malady of being intellectual by nature. -- Jim Peavler Albuquerque, NM peavler@plk.af.mil ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 13:46:44 EST From: mbury@ucdavis.edu Subject: Re: Heian Buddhism for French majors ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- My face is turning bright red as I write this, because it's embarrassing to toot one's own horn, but the definitive review article covering the three most recent of those books, written by M. B. Ury, was published in the Summer, 1991, _Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies_. (I reviewed Pekarik's book in the _Journal of Japanese Studies_, when it came out, and Andy is probably still sticking pins in my effigy.) Shirane's book, _The Bridge of Dreams_, is the good one, but even it ignores the Buddhist meta-plot. Now I am beginning to think that what is needed is for someone to write a book explaining Buddhist matters and the Buddhist background to _Genji_. Unfortunately I'm no longer a good enough Buddhist scholar to even contemplate doing this, but somebody ought to do it. (Imagine reading Jane Austen without at least some minimal awareness of Christian beliefs & institutions in her day--which come to think of it might have something to do with her lack of appeal to students.) --Marian Ury P.S. If you are interested in the mythical dimensions of Elvis, you should definitely read the above-mentioned review article. On Mon, 28 Feb 1994, Rose Bundy wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > This may not be what you are interested in, but there are the following > studies of _Genji_, with which you should be familiar: > > Norma Field, _The Splendor of Longing in the "Tale of Genji"_ > > Andrew Pekarik, ed., _Ukifune: Love in "The Tale of Genji"_ > > Willian J. Puette, _Guide to "The Tale of Genji"_ > > Richard Bowring, _Murasaki Shikibu "The Tale of Genji"_ (Landmarks of > World lit. series) > > Earl Miner, "Some thematic and structural features of the _Genji > monogatari_" Monumenta Nipponica XXIV, 1-2. (sorry I don't have the > year, but I think in the 1970's) > > A book-length study by Haruo? Shirane, the title of which escapes me. > > I hope this is of some help. > ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 28 Feb 1994 to 1 Mar 1994 ************************************************** From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Wed Mar 2 16:30:55 1994 Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 16:00:37 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 1 Mar 1994 to 2 Mar 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 18 messages totalling 912 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Myoe Koben (2) 2. Buddhist sacrilege? (7) 3. jaataka literature 4. Map Program 5. On Internets, geese and buddhas 6. What language did Buddha speak? 7. The Mahaparinirvana sutra 8. Administrivia 9. Administrivia 2 10. Vietnamese Buddhism 11. dharma/dhamma/hoo/nori = law? gospel? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 16:33:12 EST From: Mark Ty Unno Subject: Myoe Koben ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I am working on some translations of works by Myoe Koben (1173-1232), and I am wondering if anyone knows of any translations of works other than those listed below: 1. Myoe Shonin ikun (3 translations: Tanabe, Morrell, Rasmus) 2. Yume no ki (2 translations: Tanabe, Girard) 3. Tenjiku riteisho (Morell) 4. Selected passages (Seidensticker 1962 (?), Morell 1987, Kawai 1992) Thank you in advance for any help you may be able to provide. Mark Unno Stanford University ksanti@leland.stanford.edu ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 1 Mar 1994 17:34:12 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Buddhist sacrilege? Some years ago an Indian friend of mine was telling me that his parents had converted to Christianity and brought him up as a Christian. Despite this background, my friend said that what he *really* was was a Shaivite. Not that he ever went to Shaivite temples or performed any rituals or knew any Shaivite doctrines. But when he got really angry or excited and needed to be blasphemous, the expletives that came most readily to his lips were sacred words from Shaivite liturgy. Perhaps because I was at a formative stage of my career, the criterion of blasphemy has always struck me as a very serviceable working definition of a religion. If you can profane it and offend the sweet billy jesus out of somebody by doing so, then it's religious. But if you can't be sacrilegious by misusing it, then it's not religious. Chemistry is not a religion, because people do not swear oaths by the periodic table of elements, nor do they take the names of elements in vain when they hit their thumb with a hammer. Leaping Lutetium! No, it just doesn't quite make it as a swearword. Similarly, biology isn't a religion because taxonomists do not take the name of Linnaeus in vain, even in the excitement of discovering a new subspecies of mugwort (Artemisia vulgaris). Like Robin Kornman, I have to confess that, how ever much I may deeply admire the elegance of Buddhist doctrine and the effectiveness of many Buddhist practices, the word `dharma' just doesn't send shivers of numinosity down me spine. But perhaps that is simply because, like my Indian friend, I have not experienced a complete conversion to Buddhism. (I wonder if I can get a refund on all the prostrations I had to do to join this club.) So I have a question for Lance Cousins, F.K. Lehman and others who have done field work in Buddhist countries. Indeed, I ask our many normally silent Asian subscribers. When Asian Buddhists swear, do they use Buddhist terminology in a way that might make a nun blush, a monk frown and a grandmother reach for her smelling salts? When people step on cobras, for example, or get bitten by tigers, do they say `Sad-dharma!' or `Great suffering stream-entrants!' When a woman gets really angry at her husband, does she say `Go to the preta realm and stay there you unregenerate icchantika!' I seem to recall hearing a very long time ago that some people in Sri Lanka swear by saying `Buddho maa' or something of the sort, but I would like to hear some confirmation. (I hope I haven't just offended a whole bunch of Sinhala subscribers by repeating a ghastly swearword.) Although this may sound facetious, this really is a serious question. It may help me decide whether or not Buddhism is really a religion. Angry arhants! Megalomaniacal bodhisattvas! By the Tathaagata's wisdom tooth! Richard P. Hayes Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:25:05 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: Myoe Koben ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Tue, 1 Mar 1994, Mark Ty Unno wrote: > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > I am working on some translations of works by Myoe Koben (1173-1232), > and I am wondering if anyone knows of any translations of works other > than those listed below: > > 1. Myoe Shonin ikun (3 translations: Tanabe, Morrell, Rasmus) > 2. Yume no ki (2 translations: Tanabe, Girard) > 3. Tenjiku riteisho (Morrell) > 4. Selected passages (Seidensticker 1962 (?), Morrell 1987, Kawai 1992) > > Thank you in advance for any help you may be able to provide. > > Mark Unno > Stanford University > > ksanti@leland.stanford.edu ---------------------------- Mark --- By Seidensticker 1962 you are perhaps referring to his translation of Myoe's moon poems included in Kawabata's Nobel Prize speech, translated as _Japan the Beautiful and Myself_? > Burton Watson has translated 10 waka in Sato and Watson, _From the Country of Eight Islands, pp. 190-191. Karen Brock, at Washington University's Art & Arch Department, has produced a lot of fine work on Myoe's art connections (Gemmyo, etc.), but I am not sure of any translations. You might drop her a letter. (No e-mail address, I think.) Note also that the No play, "Kasuga ryuujin," is certainly ABOUT Myoe, though not BY him. BANDO Shojun has an interesting article about Myoe in _Eastern Buddhist_ some years ago which may have some fragmentary translations. Good luck! Bob M ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University [note: NOT papaya, etc.] St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 Compuserve: 71640,1036 (314) 862-5418 (voice) (314) 935-4399 (off. FAX) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:31:26 EST From: "Jacqueline I. Stone" Subject: jaataka literature ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I would like to relay a request from a colleague. Can anyone recommend any literary studies, in whatever language, of jaataka tales as they appear in either Indic or Chinese texts? Studies focusing on literary issues such as jaataka as a genre, use of language in jaataka tales, etc. would be especially welcome. Thank you very much, Jackie Stone jstone@pucc.princeton.edu ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:32:26 EST From: flehman@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- >Richard Hayes writes: >I have a question for Lance Cousins, F.K. Lehman and others who >have done field work in Buddhist countries. Indeed, I ask our many >normally silent Asian subscribers. When Asian Buddhists swear, >they use Buddhist terminology in a way that might make a nun blush, >a monk frown and a grandmother reach for her smelling salts? When >people step on cobras, for example, or get bitten by tigers, do they >say `Sad-dharma!' or `Great suffering stream-entrants!' When a woman >gets really angry at her husband, does she say `Go to the preta >realm and stay there you unregenerate icchantika!' > >Although this may sound facetious, this really is a serious >question. It may help me decide whether or not Buddhism is really a >religion. It is indeed a serious question, and I, for one, am glad to have been made to consider a possible answer.In, it is not just having done field work but having been brought up speaking Burmese and being a Buddhist more in the ordinary way than in the fashion either of a philosopher of religions or a seeker after oriental mysticims. Now it is in interesting fact that we do not swear (that is, curse) by means of words and expressions of Buddhist significance no, that's not it; just about any word, and the idea behind it can be thought to have significance in Buddhist thought, no doubt, but I mean we don't use Paa.li, or canonical words and the like. Of course, trivially, there's no one to 'damn' anyone, and there's no God to blaspheme against (plenty of deva and devata, gods perhaps, but not Gods). But that is not, I think the whole tale. For one thing, though there are hells and punishments (and, goodness knows, dukkha aplenty!) you cannot wish any of this on anyone; their own actions-cum-intentions are the causes of their own dukkha (even though, of course, there are volitional agents of suffering, ourselves to start with, whom it is our duty to convert, subvert and otherwise turn from doing harm to what other end did the Lord Buddha set in motion the Wheel and provide the examples by his own conversions and subversions of evil men and demons?). So, what might be the equivalent of a Buddhist curse? There are religious curses, certainly, but they serve rather as imprecations typical of AGENCIES ( in the above sense) of dukkha, and therefore are typically taken, in their form and terminology, from Brahmanical Hindu cosmology, ritual, symbolism and so on. It is indeed characteristic of at least Theravaada that the rites and terminology of the manipulation of power, itself an ethically neutral quality that can produce either merit (kusala) or demerit (akusala), are of Brahmanical origin in largest measure. I could say why, but I wrote about this in my old paper on the concept of 'field' in Buddhism, to which the interested reader is referred. All I can add to what I wrote there is that the distinction (Paa.li, not Skt.) between kusala as 'merit' and punna as 'merit' is confirmed by the interesting observation that the former has its privative counterpart in the Paa.li lexicon, but not the latter kusala, that is, remains a binary quality, but punna is a scalar quality, and that accounts to some degree for the close connexion between it and the category of (essentially neutral) power. But back to the main thread. This is not to say we do not have a rich vocabulary of foul language, for Burmese is far better equipped in that respect than, say, English. We also have a pretty fair supply of word taboos, i.e., quite ordinary words that 'nice' people are supposed not to say because they at leat remind one of nastiness. But that's all that's involved; just the distinction between crudeness and niceness. One hardly blushes at bad language; one merely recognises crudity from polish,and that is a status consideration more than anything else. I wish to suggest (it is only a suggestion so far) that this state of affairs is not unconnected with two central facts of rdinary Buddhist understandings of the world. First, that dukkha is inescapable remember that I've already, in an earlier posting, said that the most general gloss for dukkha is 'difficulty.' So, no-one need be shocked or outraged by anything one says in view of the absence of any ideal of a concrete, ontological category of perfection (there are the Perfections, of course, but that's something different; not an ontological state but a quality or stage of a process). In plain language, we have nothing even remotely corresponding to the inspipidity of the Christian Heaven with its angels, total absence of blemish and, in short, of dukkha. Secondly, please recall and keep in mind that common meditation practice includes prominently the deliberate cultivation of the idea of putridity, decay, nastiness and so on. How, I ask, can such a system motivate swearing and cursing in the intended sense, that is, in the sense that compares goodness and badness as ontological states rather than mere qualities? In the Judeo-Christian tradition (whatever that betokens) the 'problem of evil' is a personalised thing; in Buddhism 'evil' is just suffering, and its opposite involves the dissolution of personhood. >From which it more or less follows (maybe less directly than I should like) that, whatever else swearing and cursing may involve with us, it is not somehow the denial or antithesis of a perfect 'state.' At may cause suffering (I mean simply pain, here or in Hell), it may well offend (the ears of the 'nice' and, one hopes, the person cursed, but there's neither a God to offend or an ideal perfect world to bring down or keep from eventuating if we swear and curse) as it is certainly intended to do, but it is not shocking, not blasphemous, a concept totally alien to the Theravaada ethos! Chit Hlaing> F. K. Lehman 217-333-8423 Anthropology and Linguistics FAX:217-244-3490 University of Illinois 109 Davenport Hall 607 S. Mathews Avenue Urbana, IL 61801 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:48:12 EST From: SAMUELS JEFFREY Subject: Re: Map Program ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- While I was browsing around on the internet, I came across a map program (EPI MAP) that might be of interest to some of you. Included in the map program are maps from around the world and EPI MAP is flexible enough that you can edit the borders and names of an existing map, combine two or more maps, enter data for a particular map or maps, and so on. EPI MAP is placed at the ftp site OAK.Oakland.Edu in the directory /pub/msdos/mapping. I might add that unlike a number of programs at this ftp site, EPI MAP is stored there in its entirety and is completely _free_. There is no need to purchase any vital part of the program that was purposefully left out. To facilitate the downloading process, I have appended the list of the mapping directory which provides a brief, one line description of each file. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. Jeff Samuels samuels@ucsu.colorado.edu --------------------------------------------------------- ---- EPIMAP INDEX OF FILES Directory pub/msdos/mapping/ Filename Type Length Date Description ============================================== coordchg.zip B 25290 930527 Convert map coordinates dd,mm,ss <=> dd.#### emap1001.zip B 343638 930517 Epi Map: Install, executables, readme, help emap1002.zip B 301546 930517 Epi Map: Utilities emap1003.zip B 99943 930517 Epi Map: Examples, tutorials emap1004.zip B 323224 930517 Epi Map: Printer/plotter/graphics file drivers emap1005.zip B 56632 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: New England states emap1006.zip B 48127 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: Mid Atlantic States emap1007.zip B 92918 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: E. N. Central States emap1008.zip B 89291 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: W. N. Central States emap1009.zip B 119917 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: South Atlantic States emap1010.zip B 70429 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: E. S. Central States emap1011.zip B 94313 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: W. S. Central States emap1012.zip B 70390 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: Mountain States emap1013.zip B 69855 930517 Epi Map: USA by county: Pacific States emap1014.zip B 47468 930517 Epi Map: World and American continents emap1015.zip B 165189 930517 Epi Map: African emap1016.zip B 112004 930517 Epi Map: South America emap1017.zip B 212464 930517 Epi Map: Europe emap1018.zip B 142231 930517 Epi Map: Asia emap1019.zip B 59184 930517 Epi Map: Mid East emap1020.zip B 43553 930517 Epi Map: North America emap1021.zip B 35380 930517 Epi Map: Australia & Pacific Islands emap1022.zip B 41593 930517 Epi Map: Caribbean emap1023.zip B 158682 930517 Epi Map: Ukraine & CIS emap1024.zip B 28299 930517 Epi Map: Central America emap1025.zip B 330437 930517 Epi Map: Long.-Lat. Files: A - P emap1026.zip B 124403 930517 Epi Map: Long.-Lat. Files: R - Y emap10do.zip B 47507 930517 Epi Map: ASCII manual emap10in.zip B 5009 930517 Epi Map: Inst. notes, file list, general info ozd101a.zip B 348024 930912 OzGIS DOS mapping of census/GIS data 1/7 ozd101b.zip B 70014 930912 OzGIS DOS mapping of census/GIS data 2/7 ozd101c.zip B 397743 930912 OzGIS DOS mapping of census/GIS data 3/7 ozd101d.zip B 212606 930912 OzGIS DOS mapping of census/GIS data 4/7 ozd101e.zip B 224122 930912 OzGIS DOS mapping of census/GIS data 5/7 ozd101f.zip B 601465 930912 OzGIS DOS mapping of census/GIS data 6/7 ozd101g.zip B 262559 930912 OzGIS DOS mapping of census/GIS data 7/7 ozw103a.zip B 353830 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 1/13 ozw103b.zip B 32574 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 2/13 ozw103c.zip B 119566 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 3/13 ozw103d.zip B 149948 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 4/13 ozw103e.zip B 57305 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 5/13 ozw103f.zip B 135112 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 6/13 ozw103g.zip B 173937 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 7/13 ozw103h.zip B 485182 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 8/13 ozw103i.zip B 228959 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 9/13 ozw103j.zip B 144916 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 10/13 ozw103k.zip B 130314 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 11/13 ozw103l.zip B 294214 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 12/13 ozw103m.zip B 114221 940116 WIN3: Mapping of census/retail GIS data, 13/13 topov300.zip B 125323 930310 3-D topographic map plotting program vmap120.zip B 343425 930127 Draws outline maps on many map projections ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:48:56 EST From: "Michael J. Sweet" Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Only one I know of is the Tibetan "Dkon mchog gsum"! (tri ratna), like Catholic French curses on the Eucharist etc. But not as amusing as yours Richard--we need more and better Buddhist curses. Michael Sweet ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:49:32 EST From: BHV2000 Subject: Re: On Internets, geese and buddhas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- On Feb 28, Richard Hayes wrote: " Trying to get rid of all binary thinking simply because some dichotomies are false and useless seems to me about as useful as getting rid of your brain in order to avoid getting a headache" It seems to me that this is exactly the sort of reasoning that the Buddha did, in fact, use. If it is the brain that is the cause of a headache ( which it isn't - the brain actually has no feeling at all. Brain surgery is generally done with the patient awake and alert. It is the muscles in the head that are usually the loci of the ache - mind you, it is the brain that perceives the pain...), then removing it would, in fact, bring the headaches to a stop. This is the same reasoning as behind the statement that, since life is so full of suffering, why even bother being born ? ( And I'm sure that a lot of Bosnians are thinking that at this ver moment) Anyway, as far as I can tell, this is the very same reasoning used by the Buddha, to wit: ...from the ceasation of consciousness is the cessation of naama- ruupa, from the cessation of naama-ruupa is the cessation of the six-sense-spheres, from the cessation of the senses is the cessation of contact....feeling...craving...clinging...becoming...from the cessatiion of becoming is the cessation of birth, from the cessation of birth is the cessation of old-age, death and this entire internet. Daniel Veidlinger ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:50:24 EST From: "" Subject: What language did Buddha speak? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear net, I am currently working on a thesis about the coevolution of language and religion in Tibet, referring to the development of the modern Tibetan language during the period of the growth of Tibetan Buddhism during the last 2600 years or so. Information here at Colgate is very sparse, and it seems like most of the journals are written in Chinese. I only speak Spansih, Japanese, and Attic Greek, though, and am a little pressed for solid information. I started with the language group of the indigenous peoples, and have worked through the Mongol invasions and the adoption of many Sanskrit loan words. The point I'm confused about, though, is whether or not the Tibeto-Burman language is old enough to have been used by the historical Buddha figure. I know this is more historical than philosophical, but if you know of any sources in Spanish, Japanese, or English, please pass them along. I would also welcome a discussion of my topic, if anyone is interested. Sincerely, Anisa Bahiyyih Sherwood Colgate University 1 March 1994 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:55:23 EST From: Marshall Massey - The Environmental Projects Center Subject: Re: The Mahaparinirvana sutra ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- My thanks to Paul Hackett for providing references on the Mahaayaana Mahaaparinirvaa.na Suutra, and to Bob Morrell and Rob Gimello for helping clarify the differences between "original" Chinese source texts. Robin Kornman wasn't the first to point out that there are substantial differences between the Mahaayaana and Pali texts -- the *Shambhala Dictionary* makes the same point! -- but the *details* he provided were largely new to me, and I'm glad to have them. I have no idea what sort of translation I'll finally be able to lay hands on, for I lack the university connections you scholars use to obtain copies of the rare and out of print. But you've indeed given me starting points, and that's more than I had before. In honest gratitude, Marshall Massey Internet: MMASSEY@delphi.com The Environmental Projects Center CompuServe: 71223,770 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 09:55:46 EST From: Paul Swanson Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Re. Buddhist swearing. I don't hear many Japanese taking the name of the Lotus Sutra in vain (damu hoorenge-kyoo?), but a lot of people use the term "chikushoo" without knowing that it comes from the Buddhist term for the realm (gati) of beasts. I've also been struck, however, that there seems to be a lot less "religious" swearing in Japan than the colorful variety they have in the West. I've also wondered if this is really so and what it might mean (maybe I just don't watch enough yakuza and samurai TV dramas). I look forward to other reactions to this topic on the list. Paul Swanson, swansonp@jpncun, Nanzan University, Nagoya ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 10:01:41 EST From: Jim Cocks Subject: Administrivia Problems have been reported from people trying to retrieve the log files of BUDDHA-L. Due to the increased activity on the list, these files have become quite large and have exceeded the limits BITNET allows. As of yesterday, the archiving of BUDDHA-L postings was changed from monthly to weekly. This should allow you to retrieve the logs without running into size restrictions. The monthly format for log files was BUDDHA-L LOGyymm where yy and mm were year and month respectively. The weekly format for the log files is BUDDHA-L LOGyymmN where N is A for week one, B for week 2, etc. Thus the current log is BUDDHA-L LOG9403A . Since this was put into effect after the postings for March 1 were accomplished there is a log file BUDDHA-L LOG9403 for that one day. If you have any questions or have any difficulties retrieving the logs just drop me a note and I'll help you. Cheers, Jim Cocks ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 10:09:12 EST From: Jim Cocks Subject: Administrivia 2 On a second note, yesterday there was a post calling for information sources on Buddhism. The post requested that all info be sent to the requestor Thorton_~Prime_at_lmu-acad1@lmumail.lmu.edu who promised to send a summary to the list. Please send your responses to the above address and not the list. Many bountiful thanks! Jim ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 10:24:33 EST From: Alec Soucy Subject: Vietnamese Buddhism ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- To those in the know, I am currently writing my M.A. thesis on gender and Vietnamese Buddhism. I have had considerable difficulty finding materials related to this subject, and have therefore conluded that there hasn't been a great deal written about it. I am aware of the standard sources (Thich Thien-An, Thich Nhat Hanh, Leopold Cadiere). Are you aware of any other sources (English or French)? I am also in the process of trying to locate someone who specializes in Vietnamese Buddhism whom I might do my Ph.D. work with after I return from Taiwan in a year or two. Is there anyone who fits this description? Alec Soucy, Concordia University (Montreal) ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 13:52:58 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Under the appropriate cicrumstances, Tibetans say, "bkon mchog gsum!" (Three Jewels!) or sometimes just, "Bkon mchog!" (Jewels, which is also the way Tibetans translate the Judeo-Christian, "God.") Some Tibetans say it for almost any circumstances. "Three jewels, I stubbed my toe!" "Three jewels, this is great tea!" "Three jewels, have a seat!" "Three jewels, shut up, will you?" This ubiquitous usage seems particularly popular with tough teenagers and macho monks. For them, it precedes nearly every sentence. But people of all generations use it. I myself picked it up at one point while hanging out alot with Tibetan students. I quickly abandoned this affectation after a roomful of monks nearly dismembered me for saying it in the wrong context. Bkon mchog gsum, what a bummer. John Dunne Study of Religion Harvard University ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 13:54:34 EST From: Gunapala Dharmasiri Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- There are not many swear words in Buddhism. The commonest is "Budu Amme" (My mother, the Buddha). It may refer to the mother, qualified by the the term Buddha, or to the Buddha, qualified by the term mother. Here, in this context, a subtle form of invocation for help is also implied. But there are plenty of swear words in Sinhala, but they are not related to Buddhism as such. Oh, God or Oh Gods! is anothr one, here referring to Hindu polytheistic gods like Kataragama. Some swear words refer to the Mother, but they are not different from the western similar ones. G.Dharmasiri, Bowdoin College. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 14:57:24 EST From: William Bodiford Subject: dharma/dhamma/hoo/nori = law? gospel? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Like Bob Morrell I have read the postings on Dharma/Dhamma with much interest, and also like him, I have eagerly awaited someone to address the question of "nori =? law" in the context of Japanese. Since no one else has taken up this challenge (Jackie Stone, Jan Nattier where are you when we need you?), I'll jump into the fray. To be frank, I have never liked the use of "Law" to translate "Dharma/dhamma/fa/hoo/nori" etc., but I have never given it much thought either. Certainly I would not criticize someone else's use of the term. It's just that for me "law" conjures up associations with "Nation of Laws," "Natural Theology," and "Lawman" (as in Westerns), none of which seem appropriate in Buddhist contexts (but perhaps my understanding of law or Buddhisms is too narrow). In the past I just rationalized the use of "law" by saying that "law" is used in the sense that Buddhas discover the true characteristics of nature just like the same way that scientists discover "laws of nature." But I was never totally satisfied with this analogy. Now Bob Morrell has suggested that "hoo" (Chinese "fa," the word most often used to translate Indic "dharma/dhamma") is understood as "nori" in Japanese and that "nori" was used in a sense equivalent to "law" (meaning, I guess, prohibitions and prescriptions dictated by rulers or by social custom and enforced by police powers). Thus, "Law" is not just a possible translation, but one that more accurately reflects the local connotations of Japanese Buddhist language. This suggestion deserves careful consideration. Can it be true? To state my conclusion first, while I will not begrudge Bob's use of "Law," I think there are many valid objections to this translation. Not having considered this issue in depth before, please allow me to engage in a little thinking aloud (or on Internet). Those of you who expect a concise or well-reasoned message probably should DELETE this posting NOW. It is often impossible to decipher meanings assigned to words by living authors, much less dead ones far removed in time, place, and cultural backgrounds. I believe everyone on this list must be well aware of the difficulties of translation, the various strategies available and the advantages and disadvantages of each. There is no need to review those issues here. I must emphasize, however, that Japanese (as Japanese) is particularly difficult, especially if one is trying to sort out native Japanese connotations of nouns vs. Chinese connotations (e.g., if one is trying to separate the meanings of "hoo" from "nori"). In brief, the reasons for this are as follows: 1) Historically there has been so much intermingling of words of continental origin in Japanese before writing became widespread in Japan that even etymologists can never be sure which Japanese words might be of Chinese or Korean origin; 2) Japanese systems for writing the sounds of their own language have never been phonetically accurate; 3) Thus, it is impossible to know historical pronunciations with accuracy; 4) Words now pronounced alike might once have been distinct linguistic units, while words separate in modern usage might derive from common roots; 5) The same Chinese graphs can be used to write different Japanese words, while the same Japanese words can be written with different Chinese graphs; 6) There is little historical evidence to work from since before the 13th century literate Japanese were educated mainly in Chinese and documented most aspects of their lives in literary Chinese (or an approximation thereof)--the main exception being certain forms of aristocratic song and poetry, in which there seems to have been a conscious attempt to restrict the number of vocabulary terms allowed and especially to avoid Chinese-sounding language; 7) Japanese lexicographers love folk etymologies that often have no linguistic basis; 8) Worst yet, many traditional meanings listed in unabridged Japanese dictionaries are unattested or of doubtful accuracy. In short, one cannot separate Chinese usage from Japanese usage so easily. This is especially true in the case regarding the vocabulary of Japanese Buddhism. Japanese learned about Buddhism from Chinese translations of scriptures, which Japanese Buddhist monks read aloud in Chinese word-order and in an approximation of (various) Chinese pronunciations. In other words, in most contexts Japanese Buddhists read about and talked about "hoo," not "nori." Moreover, this "hoo" was understood in the context of Buddhist worldviews, not non-Buddhist ones (neither Chinese nor Japanese). The idea that the Chinese graph for "hoo" and the Japanese pronunciations of it as "nori" must have different connotations reflects, I suspect, lingering influences of the post-Meiji (1868) false theory that Buddhism is a foreign (i.e., non-Japanese) religion. In fact, it is likely that average Japanese before, say, 1600 associated the word "nori" most often with religious contexts derived from the Chinese translations of Buddhist scripture that were widely copied, chanted, preached, and studied in Japan--not with contexts found in non-Buddhist literature. In other words, the best context for examining the range of meanings associated with "nori no kado" is the usage of "hoomon" (Chinese "fa-men") in Buddhist scripture and commentaries, a topic which other people on this list have already discussed. It is possible, I guess, to imagine the existence of some Japanese who never came in contact with the copying, chanting, and preaching of Chinese translations of Buddhist scripture, who never listened to explanations of Buddhism, or who never asked Buddhist priests to explain the meaning of "hoo," i.e., people who only thought in terms of "nori." Even in this case, however, the evidence suggests that most idiomatic usages of "nori" have clear Buddhist connotations, which differ from the idea of "law." Here (in spite of what I wrote above) I will turn to Japanese dictionaries for evidence. I can think of four dictionaries, 2 Buddhist and 2 secular, that should be useful: (1) Nakamura Hajime (ed.) *Bukkyoogo daijiten* (Unabridged dictionary of Buddhist Terms; 1981) (2) Iwamoto Yutaka (ed.) *Nihon Bukkyoogo jiten* (Dictionary of Japanese Buddhist terms; 1988) (3) Ootsuki Fumihiko, *Dai genkai* (Great Ocean of Words; 1884; rev. ed. 4 vols., 1932-1937) (4) Shoogakukan (comp.) *Nihon kokugo dai jiten* (Unabridged Dictionary of the Japanese Language; 20 vols. 1972-1976) Of these, Nakamura probably is least useful, since it focuses on how Chinese translated Indic terms, with only a few comments on particular Chinese or Japanese usages. Iwamoto, naturally, is the best source, since he is concerned primarily with the usage of Buddhist terms in non-scriptural Japanese literature. Just so we concider the full range of possible meanings, however, let's also look at non-Buddhist dictionaries. Ootsuki's *Dai genkai* is widely regarded as the best product of traditional Japanese philology, while the Shoogakukan 20 vol. dictionary has set the standard for modern linguistic scholarship. These 4 dictionaries provide the following glosses (I translate only the gist) for "nori": **Nakamura**, p. 1089 1. Nori (Chinese "fa"): (a) = hoo (Chinese "fa"); see under "hoo"; (b) Japanese translation of Christian word "gospel" -- nori no kidoku (miracle): Miraculous sign resulting from the power of the Buddhas -- nori no niwa (place): site of Buddhist ceremonies (butsuji) -- nori no fune (boat): stock saying in which Buddhism (buppoo) is likened to a boat -- nori no michi (path): Japanese way of expressing Butsudoo (Buddhist path), i.e., Buddhism (buppoo) 2. Nori (Chinese "ch'eng," i.e., unit of measurement): = hoo (Chinese "fa"); see under "hoo" **Iwamoto** p. 577 Nori (Chinese "fa"): the teaching preached by the Buddha; hoo; one of the three jewels; : "nori" originally meant a matter proclaimed (norite) and settled by an authority and thus refers to standards and ceremonial forms, as well as to legal codes and regulations. However, the main use of this term is in court poetry, like when "Hoo-u" (dharma rain) is read as "nori no ame," in order to avoid the unpoetical sound of "hoo." See under "hoo" (Chinese "fa"). -- nori no kado (gate): Buddhism (butsumon) -- nori no koe (voice): the sound of Buddhist suutras being chanted or the sound of Buddhist preaching -- nori no tsukai (messenger): Someone who acts as Buddhist missionary **Dai genkai** (1982 small-print ed.), p. 1596-97 1. Nori (Chinese "fa," "tse," "tu," "kuei," or "fan") : (a) Something established from above on which all people in the realm must base their actions; a standard that must be observed . . . . rules, regulations, standards; (b) The teaching of the Buddhas; Buddhism (buppoo) 2. Nori (Chinese "ch'eng"): a ride 3. Nori (Chinese "hu"): rice paste; glue 4. Nori (Chinese "hsueh"): sticky, undried blood 5. Nori (Chinese "hai-t'ai"): seaweed **Shoogakukan** (1980 small-print edition), vol. 8, pp. 777-80 1. Nori (Chinese "shih"): a device used in divination 2. Nori (Chinese "hsueh"): blood that has not yet dried 3. Nori (Chinese "shen," or "fan"): a curve 4. Nori (Chinese "fa," "tse," "ru," "t'ien," "hsien," "fan," chih," "ch'eng," or "tu"): <1> something that must be followed-- (a) teachings from a superior; guidance; especially, the teaching of the Buddhas; Buddhism (buppoo); vinaya (kairitsu); (b) an order from a higher-ranked person; a law; a regulation; (c) standards that lower-ranked people must follow; (d) principles that apply to all people in general; (e) procedure; method; format; <2> the basis of measurement-- (a) unit of length; (b) angle -- nori no ajiwai (flavor): the marvelous taste of Buddhism -- nori no ato (footprint): remains from the spread of Buddhism -- nori no ame (rain): expression likening the way that Buddhism teaches all sentient beings everywhere and provides them with blessings to a rain shower -- nori no ikada (raft): expression likening the way that Buddhism saves all sentient beings by taking them to the other shore of ultimate happiness to the way that a raft takes one across a waterway . . . . -- nori no kado (gate): The teachings of the Buddhas; Buddhism (buppoo); So said because it is something that leads to an authentic awakening; A.k.a., "hoomon" (NOTE: one of the texts cited as examples of this usage is a poem by Jien) . . . . (more than 65 more compound expressions beginning "nori no" are listed. In all of these "nori" refers expressly to Buddhism or the teachings of the Buddhas) 5. Nori (Chinese "ch'eng"): a vehicle 6. Nori (Chinese "hsuen," or "kao"): a proclamation 7. Nori (Chinese ""hu"): rice paste; glue -- etc. -- (4 more entries for "nori" follow, but you get the idea) --> Conclusion: In reading through these dictionary entries I was struck by two things. First, the use of "nori" as a translation of the Christian word "gospel." I doubt if anyone would see a connection between "gospel" and "laws." Second, in all the idiomatic expressions beginning with the phrase "nori no" it is clear that "nori" means the teachings of the Buddhas. Its primary connotations and contexts all involve Buddhist teachings, both doctrinal and behavioral. Moreover, the Shoogakukan dictionary is especially clear in indicating the that primary meaning of "nori" is the teachings of the Buddhas. Note how it indicates that the usage of "nori" in the sense of "law" is secondary to its original meaning of "teaching proclaimed by a superior person." It stands in sharp contrast to the pre-war interpretation of the *Dai genkai*. In any case, no dictionary provides any support for the idea that "nori no kado" ever could have meant anything like "gateway to laws, rules, and regulations." Therefore, I would prefer to translate "nori" in its Japanese context as: Buddhist teachings; Buddhist sermons; Buddhist practices; Buddhist ceremonies; Buddhist rituals; Buddhist doctrines; I.e., dharma/dhamma; In short, Buddhism Likewise, "nori no kado" could be translated as: Buddhist teachings; Buddhist practices; Gateway to Buddhism; In short, Buddhism. Of course, if one wanted to avoid the word "Buddhism," Nakamura provides the alternative of "Gate of the Gospel" :-) (Fortunately, I rarely have to attempt to translate poetry.) Bob, best wishes in your work regardless of how you translate "nori no kado." -- William Bodiford (ibfbwmb@mvs.oac.ucla.edu) ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Mar 1994 15:46:31 EST From: Jamie Lemone Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- My understanding of the Dharma is that there cannot be sacriledge in Buddhism in the same way as other religions. Because one is responsible for one's own spiritual development, and that the consequences of one's actions are determined by the natural law of karma vipaka rather than judgement by a higher authority, there really can be no sacriledge or blasphemy. There is no one or nothing to blaspheme against. One could use a Dharmic term in anger but it would be the anger and not the word choice that would be unskillful. This is in sharp contrast to other religions that postulate much more severe punishment for using god's name in vain than that of an ordinary human being. When several monks asked the Buddha how they should respond when they hear other people speaking badly of him, the Buddha replied that they should do nothing. Being Enlightened, he hardly needed to be defended against attacks from less aware and compassionate people. For a more in depth treament of this subject, I recommend an essay by Sangharakshita titled "Buddhism and Blasphemy". It should be available from Windhorse America. Jamie Lemone University of New Hampshire ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 1 Mar 1994 to 2 Mar 1994 ************************************************* From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Thu Mar 3 16:08:26 1994 Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 16:00:47 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 2 Mar 1994 to 3 Mar 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 12 messages totalling 433 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Descarjuna 2. dates 3. Buddhist sacrilege? (3) 4. What language did Buddha speak? 5. Myoe and Nichiren (2) 6. Buddhist sacrilege 7. Buddhist Sacrilege 8. dharma/dhamma/hoo/nori = law? gospel? 9. On Internets, geese and buddhas ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 07:52:08 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Descarjuna ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Robin Brooks Kornman writes: > The guy who wrote this has already admitted that he was speaking im- > precisely, but I just wanted to add my agreement. Let's not use the > term "scholasticism" just to refer to the abhidharmikas. I use it > all the time to refer to medieval Buddhist commentators of all sorts. > The reason is equally vague. If a person is trained in arts of formal > reasoning, places a lot of emphasis on commentaries and the commentarial > tradition, and engages in detailed scholarly debate on a point-by-point > basis, I call him or her a scholastic. My guideline is generic. > I take Albertus Magnus and Thomas Acquinas to be examples of scholastics > par excellence and call medieval Buddhist scholars scholastics if the > form of their work resembles those two. This seems like an excellent description of philosophy in European and North American universities today. The only difference is the rather fine point that the commentaries although doing exactly the same thing are not formally commentaries, but then neither were most of the treatises of Naagaarjuna. In other words, why not call them thinkers rather than evoking Protestant attempts to take the intellectual high ground and remove the need to look at Catholic thinkers. Lance Cousins. -- Hon. Fellow, University of Manchester Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 07:56:02 EST From: Gregory Alexander Hillis Subject: Re: dates ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The book jacket of _Wisdom Energy_ (Wisdom: London, 1982) states that Lama Thubten Yeshe was born in 1935. I believe he died in late 1983 or early 1984. Greg Hillis ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 07:56:17 EST From: Gregory Alexander Hillis Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I have heard that a common Tibetan exclamation is "dkon mchog gsum!" ("Three Jewels!") which I take to be something like saying "Jesus Christ!" in a Christian country. greg Hillis ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 07:56:31 EST From: "Michael J. Sweet" Subject: Re: What language did Buddha speak? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- This is an interesting, though extremely speculative question. All of the canonical sources agree that Buddha preached in "Magadhi", or the ordinary language (or Prakrit) of that area of India now in Northern Bihar and Southern Nepal (the Terai), 2500 or so years ago. His utterances in the original are now lost, although Pali purports to be closest. As to what language he may have spoken "at home", that's anybody's guess, although he did come from one of the (probably) non Aryan hill tribes of the Terai, who might have spoken one of the Tibeto- Burman languages, as some do today. Buddhism didn't come to Tibet before the seventh cent. C.E. at the earliest, and "Tibet" didn't exist as such in the time of the Buddha--R.A. Stein's "Tibetan Civilisation" is a good intro. to early Tibetan history. Hope this is helpful. Michael Sweet ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 07:58:47 EST From: Robin Brooks Kornman Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Tibetan swear expression: "Eat your father's flesh." (Yes, I know, it's not religious. But then, neither is the Russian's favorite swear expression: yob tvayu mats. Robin Kornman ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 07:59:03 EST From: Mark Ty Unno Subject: Myoe and Nichiren ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Thanks very much to Robert Morell for the helpful information about translated texts related to Myoe Koben. I have another question concerning Myoe. I vaguely recall that Nichiren praised Myoe for the latter's criticism of Honen. Does anyone know where this can be found? Thanks again for any help you may offer. Mark Unno Stanford University ksanti@leland.stanford.edu ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 09:10:12 EST From: Dave Tilley Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Only one I know of is the Tibetan "Dkon mchog gsum"! (tri ratna), > like Catholic French curses on the Eucharist etc. But not as amusing > as yours Richard--we need more and better Buddhist curses. > > Michael Sweet > It seems to be that the whole rebirth thing is choc full of them. May you be reborn as .... an elephant proctologist the supervisor of a disgriuntled postal employee Sen. Packwoods "favorite" employee Dave ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 13:15:50 EST From: "Dr. I. Astley" Subject: Buddhist sacrilege ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Reading Paul Swanson's message about _chikushoo_ reminded me that the Japanese have a rather nice saying (not really swearing in that sense, but indecent enough to prevent even me opening a conference on the sermon in Buddhism with it): seppoo hyakunichi---he hitotsu. Roughly translated, it means, ``A hundred days of expounding the Law [I just want to make Bob M. happy], one fart.'' I quite like it, and most Japanese Buddhist priests I know laugh their socks off at it (or solemnly indicate their agreement), so it's probably not sacrilegious. Over to you, Richard. Ian Astley e-mail: astley@mailer.Uni-Marburg.DE Philipps-Universitaet, FB 11 Tel.: [+49] 6421 28-3662, FG Religionswissenschaft -3661, Liebigstr. 37 or -7035 D--35037 Marburg Fax: [+49] 6421 28-3944 Germany ---PLEASE NOTE the new postal code!--- ---AND the new e-mail node address!--- ******************************************************************** ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 13:16:12 EST From: John Dunne Subject: Buddhist Sacrilege ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Another Tibetan expression that some people use in the sense of "Oh, my God!" is "bla ma mkhyen!" (literally: "(My) Lama knows"). This expression does not seem to be particularly blasphemous, but nor "Oh, my God!" need not be so. The Tibetan expression "snying rje" ("compassion") is used in the sense of "what a shame" or "what a sorry fellow." To convey the same idea, Ladakhis say, "sdig pa rig," which means something like "I know that so-and-so committed sins in the past just by looking at him or her now." The people in the countryside near Leh tend to draw out the last syllable to create a kind of wail. Exhausted Westerners trudging by on expensive treks often elicit this response. As for blasphemy, Michael Aris has written an article on the "Lotze" (spelling?) of Bhutan. These ribald tales told by itinerant bards recount the scatalogical and lascivious adventures of various Buddhist figures; the tales often imitate the scansion and structure of liturgical works. In Tibet, the bawdy deeds of Akhu Tonpa, said by some to be an emanation of Avalokite"svara, lead us to monasteries, nunneries and the Potala itself in search of smut. Some of these have been translated, but most are unifit for quotation on Buddha-l. John Dunne Study of Religion Harvard University ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 13:36:13 EST From: Robert E Morrell Subject: Re: dharma/dhamma/hoo/nori = law? gospel? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Holy Toledo, Batman! Bodiford has out-Hayesed Hayes! Where does one begin to reply to a 13,886-byte message? Well, maybe at the conclusion and then work backwards. For those who have understandably had quite enough of the Dharma/hoo/kado business, now is the time to hit (D)elete, (N)ext, or maybe even (A)bort. Anyhow, Bill's detailed discussion certainly deserves a reply, so I will try to touch on a few points before I completely run out of steam. Bill --- 1. First you tell me: >To state my conclusion first, while I will not begrudge Bob's use >of "Law," I think there are many valid objections to this translation. Fair enough. I assume that by this you mean that while my usage may just be at least minimally possible in some circumstances, there might be valid reasons why one might prefer not to use this term in others/most, depending on the context. Who could ask for anthing more? I am not proposing a single translation for hoo/nori, but merely that "Law" is perfect adequate in certain circumstances. . . But what you give with one hand, you later take away with the other: >In any case, no dictionary provides any support for the idea >that "nori no kado" ever could have meant anything like "gateway >to laws, rules, and regulations." Let me hasten to add that I have never proposed the meaning to be "gateway TO laws, rules, and regulations." With all the flak this discussion has generated, it is quite understandable that you may have overlooked my remarks to Ian Astley way back on Feb 9: >I am having such a time with little old hoo/nado that I >hesitate to start a brouhaha over particles -- but anyhow... >Yes, _no_ `has a far wider connotation than the English "of."' >You propose "towards." But might not an equally acceptable >reading be (according to my koten dictionary) "dookaku no i wo >arawasu, ...to iu, ...de aru no i." As in "Chichi no Dainagon wa >nakunarite." (Genji: Kiritsubo) That is, "(Her) father, the >Middle Counselor..." Apposition. Nakamura's Bukkyoogo daijiten >(1237) under _hoomon_ entry: "Shinri no oshie, kyoosetsu. >Hotoke no oshie. Shinri e itaru kado/mon. Kaigo shita taidoo >(satori) ni itaru mon/kado." To me this seems to support an >appositional use: The Buddha's Teaching IS the Gate which brings >us to the Truth.. . .So I still prefer "Gate of the Law," i.e., >"the Gate which is the Buddha's Law [through which we arrive at >the Truth (shinri)."' This, of course, is the same Nakamura Hajime dictionary to which you referred under (1). Under your item "1" you note that Nakamura does list "hoo" (Chinese "fa") as the first definition, q.v. Then a list of examples, e.g., "nori no kidoku (miracle): Miraculous sign resulting from the power of the Buddhas." . . . Are you not moving a bit quickly here? Note that the definition says" BUPPOO (i.e., BUTSU HOO) no kootoku. . ." Strickly speaking, ". . . resulting from the power of BUPPOO" -- Buddha Dharma, Buddhist Law, Buddhist Teachings, etc., but not just "Buddhas." While we are still deciding whether or not "Law" is an acceptable translation for HOO, should we not treat it rather gingerly? 2. Appropos of your contention that `no dictionary provides any support for the idea that "nori no kado" ever could have meant anything like "gateway to laws, rules, and regulations' (although you do not begrudge me the use of the term -- but why not, if it is wrong?), let me point out in spite of the fairly widespread contemporary preference not to use "Law," there are indeed many precedents in dictionaries and in translations. I did not invent the usage. I assume that we do not disagree that the primary meaning of kado/mon is "gate" in this context -- quite apart from Paul Swanson's "sticky, or seaweed, corner." The issue, then is hoo/nori. The ancient Soothill/Hodous _Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms_ (1937) begins (p.267) with this definition under the character for fa/hoo: "Dharma, Law, truth, religion, thing, anything Buddhist, etc." More DICTIONARIES: The Inagaki/P.G. O'Neill _A Dictionary of Japanese Buddhist Terms_ (1988), p. 100: Hoo . I. Law, truth. II. The Buddha's Teaching. III. An object of thought. IV. A thing, element. . . Daito Shuppansha's _Japanese-English Buddhist Dictionary_(1965), p. 107 "Hoo...I. Law, truth, righteousness...," p. 114, "Hoomon. dharma-paryaaya. The teachings of the Buddha. The meaning is that the dharma is something like a gate, because through it sentient beings attain the enlightenment." (Cf. my apposition discussion, above.) Note that these are SINO-JAPANESE/English dictionaries, and the Sanskrit/Pali/Tibetan "original" connotations for "dharma" are not our concern at this point. You cite Iwamoto Yutaka's _Nihon Bukkyoogo jiten_ (1988) your "best source", p. 577: Butsumon. OK. But you omit the citation to the preface to the _Sambooe_, translated in Edward Kamens, _The Three Jewels_ (Michigan, 1988). See p. 100, n. 27: `Literature,...literally, the Way of Literature," is contrasted with "the study of religion" (nori no kado, literally "the gate to the Law:...", Although we might quibble over whether the "no" implies "to" or "which is," here is another instance of contemporary usage from Japanese sources. 3. An important distinction and another dictionary. It is important to distinguish between (1) definition as explanation or loose paraphrase, and (2) definition as close reading of the original term's images. For example, you cite Shoogakkan, _Nihon kokugo daijiten_. (I think you have a page number typo. Try 8:62.) You will agree, I think, that "Hotoke no oshie" is an EXPLANATION of "nori no kado," since "hotoke" is "Buddha" literally not "nori" (dharma, or whatever); and "oshie" is "teaching," literally not "gate." As a metaphor/loose paraphrase -- no problem. But then we have a closer look at the metaphor: BUPPOO no koto de, sore ni yotte shinjitsu no satori ni tsuzuru tokoro kara iu. (Again cf. the Nakamura/apposition discussion, above.). . . Yes, that is precisely the Jien poem I am referring to. 4. My impression is that some -- but not all -- people object to "Law" because of its English connotations. You say `for me "law" conjures up associations with "Nation of Laws," "Natural Theology," and "Lawman" (as in Westerns), none of which seem appropriate in Buddhist contexts.' For others it conjures up Mosaic Law, Islamic Law, Newton's Laws of Motion, and, last but not least, Murphy's Law. This seemed somewhat persuasive to me for a time, but then I began to consider. Few of our English uses of "Law" have all that much in common. We are not bothered when people speak of, say, Islamic Law, and then five minutes later mention Newton's Laws of Motion. So why cannot we speak of the "Buddhist Law" with its own unique set of denotations and connotations -- especially if the Sino-Japanese etymology often leads in this direction? The alternative is either paraphrase (cf. "Buddha's Teaching" for "nori no kado") or importing an opaque foreign term -- dharma/dhamma -- which, note, the Japanese did NOT do in this instance. In any case, Bill, thanks for the careful analysis. And you, too, keep up the good work -- a successor to your excellent _Sootoo Zen in Medieval Japan_? Bob ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert E. Morrell Dept ANELL, Box 1111 Washington University [note: NOT papaya, etc.] St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 Compuserve: 71640,1036 (314) 862-5418 (voice) (314) 935-4399 (off. FAX) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 14:42:53 EST From: Hunyeow Lye Subject: Re: Myoe and Nichiren ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- According to Mark Ty Unno: > > ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Thanks very much to Robert Morell for the helpful information about > translated texts related to Myoe Koben. I have another question > concerning Myoe. I vaguely recall that Nichiren praised Myoe for the > latter's criticism of Honen. Does anyone know where this can be found? > > Thanks again for any help you may offer. > > Hmm... can't remember off-hand but my best bet is to look into Senji-sho - Nichiren's discussion on the relationship between the wide practice of the Lotus Sutra and "timeliness." He devoted quite a bit of it on Jodo, Shingon and Zen. -- Hun-yeow Lye hl2m@poe.acc.virginia.edu 304 14th Street NW Charlottesville VA 22903 ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 3 Mar 1994 15:44:01 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: On Internets, geese and buddhas ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard P Hayes writes: > In his excellent midrash on Suttanipaata 886, Lance Cousins > summarizes the implication of the verse for the modern reader: > >> The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on >> the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating views as true >> or false. [section deleted] > I should like to think that the Buddha was not being quite as inept > as the aforementioned deconstructionists. Surely what the Buddha was > recommending in the Suttanipaata was not giving up dualistic > thinking altogether. Rather, as Lance Cousins made very clear, what > is being recommended is abandoning the tendency to think less of > other people when they hold views that cannot be reconciled with our > own. So I would be inclined to revise the sentence cited above from > Lance Cousin's midrash to read as follows: > >> The point then is that as a result of engaging in debates on >> the InterNet one becomes caught up in evaluating people as > > worthwhile or useless on the basis of whether their views are > > true or false. But surely the problem is the fact that one is caught up and therefore unable to see clearly. It is not really evaluating that is the problem. Lance Cousins. -- Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 2 Mar 1994 to 3 Mar 1994 ************************************************* From owner-BUDDHA-L@ULKYVM.LOUISVILLE.EDU Fri Mar 4 16:31:19 1994 Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 16:00:41 -0500 From: Automatic digest processor Subject: BUDDHA-L Digest - 3 Mar 1994 to 4 Mar 1994 To: Recipients of BUDDHA-L digests There are 18 messages totalling 529 lines in this issue. Topics of the day: 1. Euthanasia (5) 2. Myoe and Nichiren (2) 3. Ethnic Buddhism in America 4. Buddhist sacrilege? (2) 5. - 6. Computional brown bag 7. Buddha's Tongue (2) 8. Administrivia 9. Buddhism/Islam 10. Translating `dhamma' 11. Review of Harvey's intro to Buddhism? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 07:11:40 EST From: Richard P Hayes Subject: Euthanasia One of my colleagues is teaching a course in medical ethics, and he is trying to incorporate material from different religious traditions by inviting guest lecturers. This year his principal topic is the ethical dimensions of medically assisted suicide. To my great shame and embarrassment, I actually agreed to his polite request to lecture on classical Indian Buddhist perspectives on euthanasia. Why can't I learn to say NO? Anyway, I have absolutely no idea even where to begin looking for material on this topic, and if I don't get some ideas soon I shall have to consider performing a bit of suicide rather than talking about it. (The main failing of academics is that we are long in theory and short in practice.) The only material on suicide in general that I can think of is Martin Wiltshire's article from the mid-1980s, and if nothing else I will base something on that. But if anyone can help me think of a reading that can be assigned to my friend's class, I would be grateful. Please do bear in mind that I am looking specifically for Indian Buddhist materials (although Southeast Asian would do in a pinch); Victor Hori will be lecturing on Japanese Buddhist perspectives on this issue, and Katherine Young on Hindu perspectives, so I cannot duplicate their efforts. Sorry this message is so short. Please add 150 lines of mindless rambling drivel of your own choice to fill it out to my usual length. Richard P. Hayes cxev@musica.mcgill.ca Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 08:57:14 EST From: "Jacqueline I. Stone" Subject: Re: Myoe and Nichiren ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In reply to Mark Unno: I belive the reference you want is in the "Shugo kokka ron," *Shoowa teihon Nichiren Shoonin ibun*, vol. 1, p. 90. Here Nichiren lists Myooe's Zaijarin along with other critiques of the Senchakushuu- -critiques that, in Nichiren's opinion, were written "by men of eminent virtue" but nonetheless "have not yet made clear the root of the Senchakushuu's slander of the Dharma." George Tanabe quotes a portion of this passage on p. 110 of his *Myooe the Dreamkeeper.* By the way, I don't know if anyone has mentioned the recent French study of Myooe's dream diary. I've been trying to dig out the precise reference in response to your earlier posting but can't seem to lay hands on it. Probably you know it already. Best wishes, Jackie Stone ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:00:18 EST From: Jan Nattier Subject: Ethnic Buddhism in America ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In looking over my materials from the last AAR meeting (in preparation for the next), I noticed that there was a meeting of an "Ad Hoc Interest Group in Buddhist Studies" on the topic of "Ethnic Buddhism in America." Was anybody from BUDDHA-L there? If so, can you give us a brief report on what happened, and what if any ongoing projects/ meetings etc. are expected to come out of this initial session? Many thanks, Jan Nattier ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:01:33 EST From: Ray Ball Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- All this talk of exclamations from the East makes me wonder about the origin of "holy cow!" -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ray Ball Internet Mail: rayball@fpp.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:03:17 EST From: Scott Walton Stetson Subject: - ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- I am interested in researching cross-fertilization between Buddhism and Islam - are there any good sources? -Scott Stetson, Duke U. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:03:44 EST From: Mahinda Deegalle Subject: Re: Buddhist sacrilege? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- >When Asian Buddhists swear, do they use Buddhist terminology in a way that >might make a nun blush....people step on cobras....do they say >`Sad-dharma!....I seem to recall hearing a very long time ago that some people >in Sri Lanka swear by saying `Buddho maa' or something of the sort, but I >would like to hear some confirmation> The Sinhala term for a curse is 'saapa' from the root sap. This has some relationship to two Pali verbs--sapati and abhisapati- -that are used for cursing as well as for swearing. Two Jatakas- -Matanga (No. 497) and Pandara (No. 518)--record two events of cursing (in the latter case, the curse is in the form of an act of truth- -saccakiriya--'Because you are wicked and deceiving, may your head explode into seven pieces!'). Sinhala prose texts also mention cases of cursing (Amavatura, ed.Kodagoda Nanaloka, Colombo: Gunasena, 1967, p.85). Buddhists in Sri Lanka do not use the name of the Buddha or of the Dhamma in cursing. However, in colloquial Sinhala, one finds expressions used in swearing such as "Budun pallaa me attayi kiyanne" (In the name of Buddha, I say the truth). When somebody is really in trouble, he or she may say in Sinhala: 'Budu amme, mama ivarayi' ([my] mother, the Buddha, I am finished!). Even though words related with sacred objects are not used in cursing, some important figures in Buddhist literature are used in insulting. For example, one would say: 'Ohu Devadattayek' (He is a Devadatta--Buddha's cousin as well as eternal enemy); "muu maha Muusalayek" (This person is so ungrateful--like Musila). Here Musila is an alusion to the Guttila Jataka where Guttila was the Bodhisattva in his previous life, while Musila was his student who entered into a musical contest with the teacher. (Guttila Jataka in The Jatakapota, ed., Naulle Dhammananda, Colombo: Jinalankara, 1969, pp.471-475). Mahinda Deegalle History of Religions University of Chicago deeg@midway.uchicago.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:08:14 EST From: "Charles S. Prebish" Subject: Re: Euthanasia ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard: You might refer to "Buddhist Ethics in the Practice of Medicine" by Venerable Mettanando Bhikkhu in _Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society_, edited by Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp.195-213. Chuck ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:09:44 EST From: Don J Wilson Subject: Computional brown bag COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCES "BROWN BAG" SEMINAR ANNOUNCEMENT "Higher Order Methods For Certain Separable Elliptic Boundary Value Problems" Graeme Fairweather, UK Department of Mathematics Tuesday, March 8, 1994 at 12:15 pm , 327 McVey Hall ABSTRACT: Fast Direct Methods are presented for the solution of linear systems arising in high-order orthogonal spline collocation applied to separable,second order,linear,elliptic partial differential equations on rectangles. The methods which are based on a matrix decomposition approach, involve the solution of a generalized eigenvalue problem corresponding to the orthogonal spline collocation discretization of a two-point boundary value problem. The solution of the original linear system is reduced to solving a collection of independent almost block diagonal linear systems which arise in orthogonal spline collocation applied to one-dimensional boundary value problems. The results of numerical experiments are presented which compare an implementation of the orthogonal spline collocation approach with a recently developed matrix decompsition code for solving finite element Galerkin equations. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:23:19 EST From: "Michael J. Sweet" Subject: Buddha's Tongue ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Kent Palmer sent a query about my speculation that Gautama was of a non-Indo-Aryan tribe. Perhaps I should have been a bit more equivocal ("probably" too strong), but this has been bandied about for many years, mostly on the basis that the Shakyas had a republican form of social organization, quite alien to the Brahmanical Indo-Aryans. Even today the Terai is the boondocks of the Indian cultural area, full of Tibeto-Burman-tribal indigenes--imagine how "hilly" it would have been back then, when even Magadha had fairly recently been thoroughly Indianized. Then too, in an entirely unscientific vein, the standard iconography of Buddha images has always seemed to me to have something "non-Causcasian" about it, though this may merely reflect my personal schemata (samanya-lak.sana?) of a Buddhist teacher, derived from my experience with Tibetans and other "Mongolian" types. Any art historians out there with more informed comments on such speculations? Excepting the Gandhara style of course. Michael Sweet ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:41:44 EST From: Jim Cocks Subject: Administrivia Sorry for that mispost to the list. It was meant for another list. My fingers are a good example of the Pavlov effect. --Jim ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:43:16 EST From: "Michael J. Sweet" Subject: Buddhism/Islam ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- In Message Fri, 4 Mar 1994 09:03:17 EST, Scott Walton Stetson writes: > >I am interested in researching cross-fertilization between Buddhism >and Islam - are there any good sources? >-Scott Stetson, Duke U. Can't imagine that anything as positive as "cross-fertilization" has occured between two religious systems as antithetical as Buddhism and Islam, though wiser heads may disagree. There is the material in the "Kaalatantra" on the barbarous Kla klo or Muslims, even gives a fairly coherent account of some Muslim practices and beliefs--I think Helmut Hoffman has written on this, although I don't have the reference to hand--do have a copy of a paper from the 1989 AAR conference, by John Newman, on "Islam in the Buddhist Kalacakra Tantra"--I think he subsequently published this in a journal. Michael Sweet ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 15:05:26 EST From: Damien Keown Subject: Re: Euthanasia ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Regarding the request by Richard Hayes for material on this topic, I'm afraid you'll find there's very little available, and what there is isn't up to much. I researched the published material not long ago for my forthcoming book 'Buddhism & Bioethics.' About one third of this is taken up with a discussion of medical dilemmas which arise at the end of life such as defining death, euthanasia, PVS, etc. The primary source-material used for generating a Buddhist response to these questions is the Pali canon. The bad news is that this won't solve your immediate problem since the book won't be out until 1995 (Macmillan). If it will help I could send you some draft material with a bibliography of secondary sources. In the meantime, since Katherine Young's name was mentioned, you could take a look at her article called (something like) 'Euthanasia in Hinduism,' which despite the title also refers to Buddhism and Jainism. I'm going by an increasingly unreliable memory now, but this appeared around 1988 along along with two other articles, one by Harold Coward and the other by Julius Lipner in a publication in the series 'McGill Studies in the History of Religion' (or something similar). IMHO, approaching the question through suicide (as she does) is not fruitful: there are different moral issues involved. ************************************************* Damien Keown HSA01DK@uk.ac.gold Department of Historical & Cultural Studies University of London, Goldsmiths' College London UK, SE14 6NW Voice (+44) 071 692 7171 Fax: (+44) 071 694 8911 ************************************************* ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 15:09:10 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Translating `dhamma' ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Robin Brooks Kornman writes: >The back-and-forth between Roberto Morrel and Lance about the > "numinosity" of the Buddhist use of the term "Dharma" and its > translations evoked a curious thought in me. > > To tell you the truth, I do not find this word in Chinese, Sanskrit, > Pali, or Tibetan to be particularly numinous or to produce the said > sense of religious awe. I can't say anything about Tibetan, other than to note the use of the three refuges in the Tibetan tradition. Even less about Chinese. As to Sanskrit, there are clearly plenty of contexts and usages in Sanskrit which do not have the kind of associations I am arguing for. Actually I suspect that this is something that lessened, perhaps as theism and bhakti grew. One can't quite imagine later Indian kings talking in the way Ashoka does about dhamma. It had lost some of its 'pull' by then. For Pali (and other dialects of Middle Indian such as 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit') I do want to argue the case. It is very clear that there is considerable difference between the emotional content of Buddhist terms in the Southern Buddhist countries and how European scholarship has traditionally seen the intellectual content. (This is less true for _some_ of those in the educated classes who are influenced by 'western' scholarship.) Richard Gombrich, writing about Ceylon has referred to this as cognitive dissonance, if my memory serves me correctly. For myself, I suspect that the problem is rather that we misinterpret some of the basic concepts. Overall there is a very strong quality of emotion and something more 'mystical' than that in the living Buddhism of the Southern Buddhist countries. The question is whether that is a much later development. I suspect that is the assumption of many. I do not believe it and for one simple reason. If I picture the Buddhism of India just prior to the rise of the Mahaayaana as similar in many respects to traditional Buddhism in South-East Asia, then the rise of the Mahaayaana is easily understandable and indeed quite a natural development. Otherwise it seems to make no sense at all. > I find that its associations in most languages > I know are, although quintessentially religious, more involved with a > sense of norm, duty, respect, and word. And loyalty and orthodoxy and > lecture situations and authority relations. For example, there is the > interesting way the Chinese use the term "cheng fa" (true dharma, > orthodox dharma). It's usually a translation for sad-dharma. But I > notice that the Gold Mt Monestery people translate it as "the Orthodox > Dharma." They mean that people might misteach the dharma, but they do > it in the proper, correct, traditional way. IT is a very Chinese > approach to the concept of authority. Almost legalistic. > In brahmanism the sense of duty is of course prominent. The Buddhism of Ancient India seems to me to avoid this sense very systematically and consciously. > Now, I believe the Tibetans translate sad-dharma as "dam.pa'i chos" > which I usually translate as "holy dharma." (1325 in the Mhvyt.) Again, > that's the way a Tibetan, I would say, would assert authority.By saying > that this is the "holy" one. Would they refer to President Clinton as 'holy' ? > Now, compare this translations with the Chinese word "Tao" which > we translate sometimes as "the Way." There is a truly numinous term. > It always has a sense of the hidden and the mysterious about it. > And Chinese Taoist literature, both sacred and so-called secular, > has lots of words for numinousness, such as "ling" (Matthews 4071). > Think of all the Taoist poetry with its "numinous clouds" and > "purple pylons" and "celestial masters" wearing jade and cloudy > silken costumes. There the aim of the poetry and the associations > sought are of the mysterious, the hidden, the delicate, secret, > subtle, ethereal distant light. One could hardly disagree. Of course in my postings I was careful to state that using the word numinous overstates the case. Obviously I do not intend to go as far as this. Still there are plenty of Protestant Christian traditions with a strong sense of the numinous (we owe the word to them, do we not ?), which do not much resemble the kind of picture you have just drawn of Taoism ! And wouldn't want to, I should imagine! Let me offer some positive evidence. Some quotes: Buddhadaasa Bhikkhu: "Dhamma is a very peculiar word in that no one can give its definition correctly in its full sense." "... when we talk about Dhamma we mean something occult, mysterious, that has no form like human beings, but possessing more power than men." Well, this post would get rather long if I give too many quotes. I will try and post again later with more passages and say something about why I think this already held good in Ancient India. DHAMMO HAVE RAKKHATI DHAMMACAARI.M. IT IS DHAMMA WHICH PROTECTS ONE WHO FARES IN DHAMMA. (Theragaathaa 303) Lance Cousins -- 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 15:09:50 EST From: DanLusthaus Subject: Re: Buddha's Tongue ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > Then too, in an entirely unscientific vein, the standard >iconography of Buddha images has always seemed to me to have something >"non-Causcasian" about it, though this may merely reflect my personal >schemata (samanya-lak.sana?) of a Buddhist teacher, derived from my >experience with Tibetans and other "Mongolian" types. Any art >historians out there with more informed comments on such speculations? >Excepting the Gandhara style of course. > > Michael Sweet SInce the Buddha was not represented in artworks until many centuries laters (a halo, or lingam-like thing, or some other substitute would occupy his spot in a composition while the other people would be depicted as humans), I'm afraid we can't turn to artwork to find out what the Buddha looked like. We can only hope that some of the 32 marks and 80 minor marks are accurate enough to give us a vague idea (did you know that according to the Lalita Vistara, one of the 80 minor marks includes the fact that Buddha had 40 teeth [we have 32, without the wisdom teeth]!). Dan Lusthaus Bates College dlusthau@abacus.bates.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 15:11:35 EST From: L S Cousins Subject: Re: Euthanasia ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- A couple of references on suicide: Lamotte, Etienne, "Religious Suicide in Early Buddhism", _Buddhist Studies Review_, 4, 2, 1987, 105-118. Sharma, Arvind, "Emile Durkheim on Suicide in Early Buddhism", BSR , 4, 2, 1987, 119-126. You might find something in something cited in the bibliography to: Keown, Damien, _The Nature of Buddhist Ethics_, Macmillan, London, 1992. The obvious issue is the application of the kammas of immediate effect. Lance Cousins Home Address: 35 Burlington Rd, Withington, MANCHESTER, UK, M20 4QA Telephone (UK): 061 434 3646 (International) +44 61 434 3646 Fax (UK): 061 275 3613 (International) +44 61 275 3613 ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 15:13:24 EST From: Mark Ty Unno Subject: Re: Myoe and Nichiren ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- To Jackie Stone, Thank you very much for the reference on Nichiren. I believe the French study you referred to is, Frederic Girard, un Moine de la Secte Kegon a l'Epoque de Kamakura, Myoe. Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1990. Mark Unno ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 15:14:52 EST From: Raynald Prevereau Subject: Review of Harvey's intro to Buddhism? ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Has anybody on the net seen a review of Peter Harvey's _An introduction to Buddhism: teachings, history and practices_ (Cambridge University Press, 1990)? A friend whom I have been feeding with Buddhist doctrine for a few years has recently asked me what I thought of this book, but I haven't read it yet and won't be able to do so for a while. I figured sending her a copy of a book review (or summary of a book review) may make her happy for now. Thanks in advance for ALL your responses. Raynald Prevereau McGill University ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Mar 1994 15:16:33 EST From: Sara McClintock Subject: Re: Euthanasia ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Richard -- While reading your posting concerning euthanasia some seed in my continuum awakened. Long ago I wrote down a reference for an article by Louis de la Vallee Poussin, entitled "Quelques Observations sur la Suicide dans la Bouddhisme ancien." You can find it in the Bull. de l'Academie belgique, 1919, pp. 685ff. Since I haven't read it myself, I can't tell you any more than this. But please, if it turns out to be useless, do not take it badly! This is one area in which I'd be happy to see you mired in theory without any practice! Sara McClintock ------------------------------ End of BUDDHA-L Digest - 3 Mar 1994 to 4 Mar 1994 *************************************************